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:'i'lealth and Pm1er: Political and Economic Chanqe in the UoAoEo 
---
This work tests haw the sudden rise in the UoAoEo's oil revenues 
after 1973 changed the Federation's political machinery set up in 
1971 and, at the sa.11e tir:le, asks how the fact of the country's 
federal structure, ivith its interdynastic dynarrtic, affected the 
outcome of those ~~ngeso 
Chapter One begins with the historical background to the 
•rrucial States' position on the eve of Britain's withdraVTaL The 
story of the ~~gence of a sev~~-me~r Federation is told briefly 
to illuminate sane features of the 1971 Provisional Constitutiono 
Chapter ~·~ is devoted to the economic upheaval of the 
1970so The s-v,ritch fra11 a subsistence economy is d<A....'"'U!Tlented in detail 
and social attitudes to mooern elnploym~~t are examined, but the 
Chapter's main thrust is the role played by mass imnigration, 
especially fra11 the Indian sub-continent, in ~~e politicization of 
public opiniono 
Chapter Three is a short account of ti1e inter-dynastic 
dispute v1hich paralysed the Federation in 1978 and Chapter Four 
describes the yonng, educated, non-royals Hho stepped into the 
breacho Their d~~nds are brought together in a survey of the 
Arabic-language literature produced by these ne\·1 "Young Turks" o 
The fate of the same young men when shaikhly control was 
reasserted is the theme of Chapter Fiveo Finally, Chapter Six 
examines how the oil glut of the 1980s and the consequent cuts in 
government spending were received by the nav mud1 more highly 
politicized and d~uanding publico 
The thesis concludes that the shaikhs have not addressed the 
challenge of power-sharing and that their ability to respond to any 
challenge is still hampered by dynastic rivalries which neither the 
b:::>om nor the slump have overcomeo 
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Introduction 
The act of federation between the shaikhs of the Lower Gulf was 
conceived as a response to the sudden withdrawal of the· protecting 
British presenceo Almost irrrrnediately after its birth 6 however 6 the 
Federation underwent 6 coincidentally u a unique experience a Because 
of the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and 1974 6 the middle 
seventies witnessed a sudden and complete transforrnationo The 
consequences of the rapid economic changes introduced into 
circulation political concepts that were new to the previously-
insulated shaikhdomso This thesis hopes to test how the vast changes 
of the 1970s affected the nature of the Federation and howu 
conversely u the existence and developnent of the Federation affected 
the outcome of those changeso 
Britain°s individual Treaties with the shaikhs of the coast had 
ensured for 150 years t.hat the shaikhs had minimal contact with other 
Powerso Such exclusivity was the express intent of the 1892 Treatyo 
Internally u most of the shaikhdoms were still epitomized in the 
1960s by extreme economic underdevelopment u due to the absence of 
natural resourcesu sizeable populations or large-scale British 
development effortsu and to their history of unstable alliances and 
feuds with each othero By the latter half of the decade Abu Dhabi 
had begun to disburse same oil revenues and a prosperous trading 
entrepot had long been established at Dubaio 
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The obvious dialectic of the Federation°s gestation period following 
the announcement of Britain's intent to withdraw was that of 
reconciling the security and economic advantages of joining a larger 
unit with each shaikh 1 s determination to assert his sovereign rights 
over his own territoryo This inherent tension has continued to 
generate the dynamic of Federal politics to the present dayo 
Accordingly, this thesis uses a brief outline of the negotiations 
between the Rulers between 1968-1971 and the resulting Provisional 
Constitution of 1971 to illustrate which areas of control the Rulers 
felt able to cede to the central v Federal authorities and those 
areas over which they insisted on keeping their own rightso 
The thesis then narrates the substantial growth of the Federation 1 s 
organs during the original Constitution°s five-year life to 1976 0 by 
which year the member Emirates had been able to agree on important, 
though not uniform, new transfers of power to the centreo 
However during these years of expansion of the Federal apparatus, 
both the economic and demographic bases of the shaikhdarns were 
suddenly overturnedo Because of the multiplication of oil revenues 
after 1973, the UoAoEo suddenly acquired one of the highest notional 
per-capita incomes in the worldo Its population multiplied 
eightfold, equally suddenly, but as a result of a mass influx of 
foreigners that brought the proportion of UoAoEo nationals in it down 
to 20 per cent by 1 980o In describing the huge changes that befell 
the UoAoEo in its early years, this thesis lays particular emphasis 
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on the contribution this phenomenon of immigration made to the 
politicization of public opiniono 
In 1977 u the great boom began to subsidev and differences of 
economic experience and expectations between the Erniratesu 
differences which .had been submerged from view during the years of 
easy prosperityv began to surfaceo Thenv in 1978, a specific 
dynastic dispute paralysed the central machinery of the Federationu 
and newly politicized elements of the younger generation reacted with 
hostility to the freezing of decision-rnakingo In their demonology8 
these 11Young Turks" classified tighter Federal integration as pro-
gressi ve and individualism on the part of the shaikhs as reactionary o 
Their demonology also rated immigrationu the foreign role in canmerce 
and every aspect of American foreign policy as evils o 
The leadership vacuum of 1978-9 gave the Young Turks a brief spell in 
the limelight, though their heyday did not survive the settlement of 
the mutual grievances between the President and the Vice-President 
which resulted in the Vice-President 0s assuming the premiership in 
1979o By that unhappy year v internal dissent had become in any case 
a luxury in which the shaikhs could no longer afford to indulge 
without restrainto 
Regionally u Britain ° s withdrawal catapulted the shaikhdoms out of 
their almost total isolation into an unenviably polarized 
environmento Territorial disputes abounded and soured the new 
state 1 s relations with its immediate large neighbours Sacudi Arabia 
and Irano Both monarchical regimes were nevertheless in the final 
analysis on the same side of the great ideological divide as the 
:3 
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UoAoEo It was Bae.athist Iraq and revolutionary Aden 0 independent 
since 1967 0 that were seen by conventional wisdom as the likely 
sources of radical contagiono Both acquired Treaties of Friendship 
with the Soviet Union in the 1970so 
In the wider Arab context 0 the humiliation of the 1967 defeat had 
proved fatal for a number of regimes and had strained relations 
between otherso After the next Arab-Israeli \'lar of 1973 and the oil· 
embargo against the \vest 0 the Arab oil producers were propelled into 
the focus of world attention 0 attention which then intensified with 
the Gulf war of the 1980s and the concomitant threat to navigation in 
the Straits of Hormuz o Thus, apart from a brief Golden Age in the 
middle seventies when Iran and Iraq were at peace 0 the UoAoEo has 
been surrounded by rifts and revolutions, camp David and the 
isolation of Egypt; the mutual hostility of Syria and Iraq; the 
overthrow of the monarchy in Iran followed by the Iran-Iraq war; the 
overthrow of the monarchy and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; 
the war in the Horn of Africao The effect that this environment has 
had on Federal cohesion has been mostly but not always positiveo 
There are few regimes for which the adage "united we stand 11 divided 
we fall" can have more aptnesso 
Ironically 0 though, the intensification of outside interest in the 
area has, as well as encouraging a closing of ranks, albeit 
incanplete, between the regimes 0 fostered at the same time the 
latent anti-Americanism that has long been a feature of Gulf public 
opiniono This is one of the main components of the thinking of the 
younger educated eliteo Its twin is a desire for political modern-
izationo Their thinking is the warp that entertwines with the woof of 
inter-Emirate relations to weave the stuff of politics in the UoAoEo 
______ -----.-·4;L___ __ ·-----
-~ .Chapter One 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the form of the Federation 
erected in 1971 and the intentions of the founder members to it and 
to its future evolutiono Accordinglyu the Constitution of 1971 
will be studied textually and contextually in detailo Its historical 
genealogy will be traced in the inter~Gulf discussions that followed 
the annoWlcement of Britain ° s intention to withdraw from the area and 
comparisons will be made with the constitutions of the other Gulf 
states a The Rulers 1 sometimes-conflicting and sometimes-converging 
objectives will then be followed through the course of events during 
the Provisional Constitution's five-year lifeo First, however, an 
outline of the shaikhdoms' body politic is necessary 0 
The Body Politic 
The bcrly politic of the shaikhdams on to which a written fonn of 
government was grafted in 1971 consisted of four groups~ the ruling 
families; the tribes, including those from which the ruling 
families spring, the merchant class and the first formally-educated 
younger generationo A UoAoEo national may belong to all four - they 
are not mutually distincto Governing them to their satisfaction was 
then and is still a personal and not an institutionalized processo 
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'rhe Ruling Families and The Tribes 
Both the al-Nahayan ruling family of Abu Dhabi and the al-i,1aktum 
rulers of Dubai spring from what is usually called the Bani Yas 
confederation of tribes. Aut:J'1orities differ on the number of Bani 
Yas subdivisi0ns they recognize but the common names Suwaidiu 
Huhairi, Hamili, Rumaithi and Qubaisi for ~ple, familiar to 
businessmen, all indicate Bani Yas lineage. The 1\lahayan of Abu 
Dhabi, who have been in power since the second half of the 18th 
century 0 are part of the small Bu Falah subsection whilst the Maktum 
of Dubai belong to the Bu Falasah who migrated east out of Abu Dhabi 
and founded Dubai in the 1830s 1 • 
Historically concentrated around the inland oases and later the 
coastal areas, the Bani Yas maintained date gardens in the Liwa oases 
in the interior and joined the pearling boats in the summer 
2 
season • other Liwa plantations were owned by the l-1anasir 
(singular:: Mansuri), who were the largest of the non-Bani-Yas tribes 
in Abu Dhabi Emirate and were noted as camel-herders and as seasonal 
pearlers. Like the Bani Yasu the Manasir are Sunnis of the t-1aliki 
madhhab. Huch of the land around the oases of al- ~nu which the 
Nahayan now portray as their family seat, was owned originally by 
the third of the Abu Dhabi tribes the Dhawahir3 (singular: 
Dhahiri). Since the Nationality Law4 of 1967 membership of the 
cg, 
Bani Yas, the l-1anasir, the Dhawahir or the fourth tribe the Awamir 
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(singular~ 
nationalityo 
e.A'Tiiri) has been the legal definition of Abu Dhabi 
They form the core of the Emirate 0s political life 0 
they inter-marry, have ready access to Shaikh Zayid and are \'rell 
represented an the Abu Dhabi National Consultative Council. 
On the fringe of this elite are a number of smaller tribes and 
familieso The social gap between the tribal elite and the non-elite 
is argued to have been narrowed in the oil age by the rnassi ve influx 
of non-nationals into · the shaikhdoms o In the face of the invasion 
the local population has developed a common sense of identity 
stronger 0 the argument runs, than the inter-tribal sensitivities of 
the pasto Quantifying the importance of tribal balancing in politics 
today is however too perilous a task for an outsider to attempto 
Special mention must be made here. of five Nahayan brothers whose 
contribution to Abu Dhabi politics and thus to Federal politics is 
particularly importanto Shaikh Hamdan ibn Muhammad took over as 
Deputy Federal Prime Minister from the son of his Cousin Shaikh Zayid 
and Shaikh Hamdan 1 s brother Hubarak has been Federal Hinister of the 
Interior since the Federation was createdo Shaikh Saif ibn I.fuhamrnad 
was at one time Federal Minister of Healtho Two other brothers, 
Shaikhs Tahnun and Surur ibn Muhammad, occupy the key posts in the 
Nahayan hierarchy of Ruler's Representative in the East Region, Leo 
Go f 1 € • vern or o a - Ain, and Chainnan of the Presidential Diwan 
respectively. Shaikh Tahnun is also Chainnan of the powerful Abu 
Dhabi Na~ional Oil Company. 
:7 
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Their great influence in Nahayan family affairs stems from the 
prestige of their father Shaikh t-'luhalmnad ibn Khalifa (died 1979) 
Hhose own father Shaikh Khalifa ibn Zayid had been one of the sons of 
Zayid the First 8 who ruled Abu Dhabi through the peaceful years 
1855-1909 and .,.,horn the Hinistry of Infonnation likes to label "Zayid 
the Great" o On the death of Zayid the First, his son Shaikh Khalifa 
ibn Zayid declined to became Rulero He declined again on the deaths 
of his brothers who succeeded o Several of those brothers of Shaikh 
Khalifa had a hand in a series of fratricides5 fl leaving Shaikh 
Khalifa himself something of a symbol of the old days of peace and 
prosperityo 
In the next generation Shaikh Khalifa 0 s son t-1uhammad ibn Khalifau 
father of the five brothersfl, declined the position of Ruler in his 
turn6 but was long regarded as the "kingmaker" o The title of 
Ruler passed to the sons of his father 0 s brother Shaikh Sultan; 
Shaikh Zayid is the second of Shaikh SUltan's sons to rule 0 having 
deposed his own brother the late Shaikh Shakhbut in August 1966o 
These family relationships have been charted in detail because 
primogeniture is by no means the sole detenninant of succession in 
tribal systemso Today the foreign appellation "Crown Prince" may 
appear to have frozen the process in favour of the sons of the 
current rulers but if so the appearance is deceptiveo To freeze the 
succession into the primogenitive channel would be to do violence to 
Arab tribal moreso 
:8 
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Traditional rivals of the Bani Yas 0 though sometimes in shifting 
alliance with the.l\ 0 v1ere the Qawasim (singularg Qasimi) rulers of 
the Northern Emirates 0 whose possessions were divided in the early 
1900s into the two Elnirates of Ras al-Khaima..h and Sharjah 7 o The 
viahhabi Qawasim and the Hanbali Na l!: im rulers of <:Ajrnan were on the 
Ghafiri side of the old Ghafiri/Hina\vi divide whilst the four tribes 
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai as well as the Sharqi rulers of Fuj airah were 
all Hinawi8 o This rift 0 vlhich is rooted in the Ornani civil war of 
the 18th century 0 has probably been rendered academic by the passage 
of time and the spread of educationo 
Nonetheless the Qawasim and the Sharqis fought a serious skinnish on 
the East Coast as recently as 19729 and resorted to further 
violence in a property dispute in the Hajjar mountains in 19801 0 o 
In the towns tribalism is· less evidento 
Throughout mcrlern history the way of life of the interior tribes has 
been dominated economically by an extreme paucity of resources and 
socially by Islamo In the coastal towns 0 the grip of these two 
fundamental facts of life has been looser 0 
continues to make itself felto 
a difference that 
Economically, the only resources available before oil to support life 
in the interior of what is nO\., the UoAoEo were the date palm0 the 
camel and the pearl banks off shoreo Life styles remained simple in 
the extreme and even precarious, particularly after the collapse of 
the pearl market in the 1920so That event was the main landmark in 
the shaikhdoms' history before oiL 
~9 
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Long distances and insuperably hostile terrain would have made the 
development of sophisticat~ ad~nistrative madlinery difficult even 
if it had been nece::;sary u which in the absence of social or economic 
com;.:>lexi ties it \·ms not o Self-sufficient means of settling both 
econanic disputes and social issues were provided by Isla~ and tribal 
custom11 o 
The religious hCA-nogeneity of the interior tribes \'laS and is totalo 
All of them are Sunni Huslims of either the I·ia.liki or Hanbali schools 
and vlith the exception of proselytizing by the \'lahhabis little had 
happened to change their affiliations since the original Islamic 
conquest in the seventh century o Their values were the bedu values 
of traditionalisrnu patriarchy u feudu 
eldersu simplicity and openness12 0 
courageu 
Againu 
respect for 
ho\vever the 
carrnnunities on the coast were in different circumstanceso Thereu 
the effects of the Omani civil war u the strong mercantile tradition 
and the immigration of foreigners had combi~ed to produce a society 
still dominated by mainstream Sunni Muslims but also tolerant of 
other Islamic sects and non-t-1uslim groups as well and shawing some 
division into social classes13 o Shaikh Zayid is famous in the Arab 
14 
world for espousing the bedu values u 
r-.. \..- ; . ~~h,..,l • ban 1 5 
.I..JI..U,)CI.... ~s seen as ~::~t~y~ng more ur mores o 
\'lhilst Shaikh Rashid of 
The legacy of the UoAoEo 1 s social and economic history is a strong 
motivation among the less well-off to share in the benefits of the 
current sole resourceu oilu and a perception on the part of both 
rulers and ruled that the raison d 1 etre of a shaikh is to ensure that 
those benefits are indeed shared outo It is not an exaggeration to 
10 
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say that sharing out the oil wealth lies at the heart of the 
conceptual legi tir.lacy of the Gulf shaikhs o But as nomads or 
inhabitants of the most inaccessible parts of the country, the 
interior tribes have been the last a'T\Ong the IXJpulation in general to 
benefit from government spending on canmunicationsu utilities, 
medical services and, in particular, schoolso rrhey are thus in the 
greatest danger of becoming divorced from the new prosperityo As a 
resultu part of the tribes 0 input into the political process tcx:1ay 
is the problem of their place in the econany, which can be said to 
dictate certain commercial tenets in the rnost tribal Emirates that 
are not held with equal faith in the non-tribal oneso 
Thus those of the tribesmen who were attracted to Abu Dhabi in the 
late 1960s and the 1970s for example found themselves unqualified for 
all except the menial jobs that their value-system precluded them 
from accepting o The tribesmen differentiate clearly between work 
that an Arab may accept honourably and work that is unArab 16 0 
Their. poverty was politically intolerable in a small state in which 
so many thousands of foreigners were making fortunes and v1as one of 
the reasons why Abu Dhabi pushed for corranercial laws restricting the 
ownership of businesses to local nationalso Less tribal Emirates, 
led by Dubai, vievled this philosophy unenthusiastically o 
11 
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.Table 1-1 ~ Tribal Pooulation .Qy_ State and Tribe, 1968 
Tribe Abu Dubai Sharjah C}>.jman UoAoQo HoAoKo Fujaira Total 
Dhabi 
Ahbab 319 1 25 7 347 
Al-CAli 60 155 508 85 2u862 1v445 3 5v 118 
~wamir 1 v 721 69 37 7 19 34 5 1,892 
Bicfuwat 42 450 1 6 499 
Dahanima.h 9 59 13 7 551 94 733 
Dahababiha 3 2 6 8 19 
Dhawahir 2u844 42 109 41 9 57 3v102 
Ghafalah 96 6 34 5 127 25 293 
Habus-Shihuh 
- Dhahuriyin 147 74 74 13 5v845 244 6v 177 
Bani Jabir 49 8 4 5 15 81 
Bani Ka~ 
(inc Shavmhiyin) 217 16 197 39 189 59 717 
Nuhariza 17 12 312 10 351 
!I:Janasir 31'224 275 49 21 38 3,607 
l·1asafarah 6 39 7 19 1 72 
Nazarei 1,287 271 293 17 38 1u062 76 3,044 
Nac::.im (inc 
Khawatir) 325 171 219 616 25 968 10 2,334 
Najadat 662 29 5 1 11 85 793 
Naqbiyin 16 1,345 541 3 1y905 
Qawasim 101 108 3v592 8 3 1,055 14 4v881 
Bani Qitab 617 156 1u458 21 6 112 2,370 
Quwaid 3 1 162 4 19 6 195 
Sha.hairah 3 1 11 69 84 
Bu Sham±s 370 769 689 190 12 408 2,438 
Sharqiyin 80 65 116 69 25 82 8,372 8,809 
'funaij 13 2 372 7 21 22 437 
Bani Yas 4,597 3,913 1,424 213 1 290 27 10,465 
zacab 22 27 710 7 4 2;455 3,225 
other 903 1v194 1,280 226 69 2v366 256 6,294 
Total Tribal 17v750 7u864 12v769 1 1611 3,209 17,941 9,138 70v282 
Total 
population 46u500 59v000 31,000 4,200 3,700 24,000 9,700 179v000 
Tribal pop-
ulation as 
% of total 38% 13% 41% 38% 86% 7-q. :;,, 94% 39% 
Source: 1968 Trucial States Census (unpublished) a 
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'l'he same need to involve citizens vlithout forrna.l education in the oil 
wealth lies behind the distribution of lando Hhen developed and 
let, buildings secure an easy inco.-ne for the o·wner o All land on Abu 
Dhabi island belongs to the Government but is given a\·lay in 
perpetuity either for personal use or ca,nnercial developmento 
Beneficiaries of this minha (gift) land can bequeath it to their 
heirs on death but can sell it only with permission and cannot then 
cla~n co~pensation or a fresh allocationo Soft loans and assistance 
with letting and maintenance further help the local owner to maximize 
his inca:ne from properly and are taken U.? on massive scale by the 
populationo \'lhen a foreign develo;;>er leases land fran an Abu Dhabi 
citizen, furthennore, the maximum life of the lease is fixed by law 
whereafter both the land and the buildings on it 
revert to the ownership of the Abu Dhabi nationalo 
This law was the first in a series of consistent measures implemented 
by Shaikh Zayid when he carne to [X)W'er in 1966 on the crest of the 
great demand for the new oil money to be spento Again, the same 
need to include the beduin in the boan explains the Abu Dhabi 
regulation 18 requiring transport comp:mies in Abu Dhabi to hire at 
least 50 per cent of their fleet from citizens and obliging the oil 
companies to hire local transport - vehicles and drivers - for 
journeys between the town and the distant oil fields o Along with 
land and transport, th 1 . . ht t . 19 e exc us1 ve r1g o sponsor canparu.es v1as 
the third link between the unskilled citizen and the bonanza o Abu 
Dhabi gave trade licences only to co~panies wholly-owned by locals, 
in contrast to the other Emirates, so that an individual's 
13 
.The Characteristics of The 1971 State ----~=.;;.. 
citizenship itself becameu intentionally u a route to richeso 
Finallyu . an array of subsidies protected the citizen from the change 
in the cost of livingu an array so wide that amending the subsidies 
upwards formed the overwhelming bulk of all Abu Dhabi local 
governrnent business in the 1970s o 
Legislating ~1ese r~s of weulth-distribution is within the gift of 
the Ruler o Patronage, it has been arguedv has shifted the relative 
position of the shaikh and the rest of the people20 o At one time 
merely a primus inter pares chosen for administrative tasks, the 
shaikh in the oil era has become the source of ease and plenty o 
Tribal virtues of equality and simple democracy are undennined, this 
argument continueso Commenting on its validity is outside the 
competence of this study o 
The essential and enduring legacy of tribal custom is hov1ever ~1e 
rnaj lis system of ruleo Itself portrayed as an ernbodiment of · ~1e 
Islamic precept of shura (consultation), the rnajlis has survived the 
upheavals of the oil era and remains at the heart of the political 
process todayo Most Rulers still hold a majlis every dayo A citizen 
with a grievance to air or a dispute to settle goes to the majlis, 
sits with the Ruler and makes his pointo Far from being cere1nonial, 
these sessions form the substance of day-to-day governmento Local 
and Federal government departments are beginning to assume same of 
the functions of the majlis but this evolution towards 
institutionalized government is limited (not least by the Rulers 0 
intentions) and the Ruler • s maj lis is still the final court of appeal 
on all important matterso 
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The M2rchant Class 
The largest group to be found in a Huler 0 s maj lis today is th-3 
merchant groupo Almost every indigenous family in t.'1e coastal tO\vns 
of the UoAoEo has ca11mercial interests.v whether as i.11port agents, 
contractors or landawnerso The size and standing of this group are 
self-evident and well-known to the outside worldo Tribal and 
mercantile interests have merged into one in recent years as the 
tribesmen have beca.11e landovmers and property developerso The 
demands which the merchant class qua merchants makes on the political 
system are material and satisfied by material meanso Hence tJ1e 
repercussions of the recessions of 1977 and the middle 1980so In 
their capacity as the educated8 cosmopolitan elite 0 on the other 
handu the merchant class has in the pa.st been the main source of 
reformist pressure on the shaikhs21 0 
The Nev1 Generation 
----
During the later 1970s 8 the fourth and newest interest group, 'Which 
might loosely be termed the younger generation, emerged ori to the 
sceneo This group embraces both the first graduates to be sent 
abroad to study at the Federation's expense and the first graduates 
of 
e 
own university at al- Ainu which opened in 1977 o 
Education is synonymous v1ith the Federation for this generation8 
having been conspicuous for its absence before the Federal budget 
made school-building possibleo 
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As a generali.zationv this group can be said to attach rather less 
importance to considerations of their E.nirate of birth and rather 
more to those of the FE:.xlerationo Its concerns differ from those of 
the other interest groups in baing only partly material and in having 
as well a less easily satisfiable ideological content that tends to 
favour more accountable fonns of ruleo In time both trends - thz 
weakening of local chauvinism and the strengthe.'1ing of interest in 
lllodern systerns of government - will inevitably shift the arena of 
politics from inter-shaikhly manoeuvrings to the new territory of 
shaikhly versus elected ruleo In the early 1970s this thinl~ing \'las 
very new and exiguous and not widespreado It found its first public 
eA"Pression only in 1979 in the Joint Hemorandum (see Chapter Four) 
of the cabinet and the National Assemblyo In the early days of the 
Federation, those with which this chapter is concerned, it was not 
in open circulationo 
These pioneers were superseded in the 1980s, when mass education had 
become the norm, by the Islamic fundamentalist move:uent, Hhose 
demands were still less amenable to satisfaction by materialist 
mea.'15, but that developnent pertains to a later chapter o 
Individual Players 
Completing the early Federal tableau were two extremely influential 
individuals who enjoyed the confidence of the President and the 
Vice-President respectively and who played a formative role in 
designing the 1971 Federationo In the case of the President his 
closest adviser was Ahmad Suwaidi, Federal Foreign l.Unster until 
1980 and first educated scion of Abu Dha!::>io In the case of the 
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Vice-President the dominant influence was l'lahdi Taj ir, 
Ambassador to London and nntil 1980 Chairman of the all-poHerful 
Department of Ruler's Affairs and Petrolewn in Duba.L SUi·raidi ·was a 
crusading Federalist22 and Tajir a billionaire business 
entrepreneur o 
De.llograohic Peculiarities 
Four parties are absent from this tour d 'horizon of the body politic; 
the anned forces, the religious establishment, the media and the 
majority immigrant populationo The armed forces' contribution to 
politics to date has been purely passive in that ;nerging their 
· ccmnands \·ms a serious issue both before and after their supposed 
merger under ti1e constitutional a'llendments of 1976o 'fheir highest-
ranking officers are the sons of shaikhs, but at other levels the 
armed forces have been heavily dependent like all other sectors on 
expatriate personnelo As a body the armed forces have not put 
forvrard a political viewpoint of their own, as far as is knowno 
There is reason to suppose however that this may change with the 
evolution of an educated, indigenous officer corps( national 
recruits to the armed forces seem not to come from the materially-
minded merchant middle classes o 
The institutionalized forces of religion, ~~e ~ulama and the Shari~a 
gadhis, were not parties to politics in the 1970so They too were 
for the most part expatriateo Some of the devout in the public at 
large did feel concerned that Islam should be upheld against the 
sudden influx of foreign ways, but there was no identifiable 
11:. 
movement led or supported by the ulamao 
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Local newspapers for most of these years numbered only twoo One 0 
·al-Ittihad (The Federation) belonged to the Hinistry of Information 
a.'1d the other v though privately owned 0 restricte::l itself lir..e the 
former to criticism of tl1e public services and not of tl1e syste~ of 
governmento Later in the 1970s the radical daily al-Khaleej and the 
very much more radical vteeldy al-Azmena al-Arabia appeared in 
Sharjaho Both were owned by the younger generations of merchant 
f~~lies and both openly advocated electionsv the faster re-
distribution of wealth and the total merger of the Thri.rates; or 
rather the abolition of separate Thri.rates in a unitary stateo Both 
vrere virulently anti-American in the broadest sense and al-Khaleej 
still is: al-Azrnena was not allo.·Ted to survive for longo 
Expatriates for their part did exert same influence on decision 
makingu though again passivelyo Their huge numbers - they made up 
80 per cent of the population by 1980 ~ generated a backlash that 
sometimes verged on xenophobia and coloured the views held by sbme 
nationals on the economy and internal security o The presence of so 
large a foreign and partly non-Islamic majority was also to make the 
UoAoE vulnerable to the Islamic fundamentalist revivaL As organized 
groups on the other hand, the inunigrants with a few exceptions did 
not themselves have the ear of the Rulers and were not in a position 
to provide political inputo The few exceptions included a handful of 
foreignu mostly European and Arnericanu consultants whose 
friendships with the Rulers coloured the Rulers' spending decisions 
and thus the direction of econanic developmento 
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It is surprising in fact how little expatriate politics intruded into 
the life of the UoAoEo In the cases of four of the country 0 s largest 
suppliers of labourv Indiav Pa.ld.stan 0 Iran and the two Ye:nensu 
the 1970s saw the trial and imprison118!"1t of Hrs Ghandi and the State 
of Emergency v the deposition and hanging of Hr Bhuttou the 
overthrm1 of the Shah and the murder in quick succession of three 
Presidents of the Ye11enso But there Has no violence on the streets 
of the UoAoEo and no demands were made of the host governmento 7he 
irrunigrants 0 total failure to exercise their numerical muscle is 
always attributed to their purpose in working in the UoAoEo in the 
first placeu the wholly material purpose of making money o 
Deportation was the usual sentence for foreign lawbreakerso 
One exception must be made hov1ever o Host school teachers u 
broadcasters and journalists in the UoAoEo in these first years of 
mass education and mass media were Palestinian6 Syrianu Egyptian or 
Jordaniano They gave the UoAoEo student a window on inter-Arab 
politics and their role came to alarm the Ministry of Educationo 
Indiscipline and even isolated incidents of violence broke out in the 
secondary schools after the signing of the divisive Egypt-Israel ca~ 
David accordso The UoAoEo has suffered fevler than half a dozen 
terrorist acts to date but all of them were manifestations of other 
Arab states 1 disputes unconnected vlith the UoAoE~ itself o 
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9fhe Genealogy of The Constitution 
'l'he Federation of 1971 was predicated on improving relations between 
the Emirates, not on dissolving t.L'1em; its gestation bet\'leen 1968 
and 1971 casts light on why this was soo For 150 years the Pax 
Britannica had pursued two prophylactic, not prescriptive, goals in 
the Gulf, that of preventing the shaikhdoms from warring with each 
other and that of protecting them fran external interferenceo After 
the decision to \'li thdraw from the Gulf vTas made in 1968, Britain's 
continuing objective was to guide the shaikhdans into some form of 
grouping that might preserve the same desiderata, namely "that 
there should continue to be a reasonable degree of stability within 
the area and that generally speaking the countries of the region 
should remain orientated towards the \Vest23" o The desirability of 
federating Siltall states before their independence seems to have been 
part of late-colonial received wisdom and had lead to the aA-periments 
of the \Vest Indies, Central Africa, l>1a.laysia and Adena 
The Nature of The Treaty Relationship with Britain24 
The original treaty of 1820 between the Trucial Shaikhs and the East 
India Ccmpany followed on from the latter's successful raid of 1819 
on the Qasimi pirate fleet based in Ras al-Khairnah.. Both the raid 
and the subsequent treaty were designed to make the sea routes to 
India safer for British shipping and the Treaty contained an 
additional clause against the slave tradeo Gradually, over the 
ensuing decades v lacunae in the 1820 pact were closed until in 1853 
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the shaikhs agreed to turn a series of temporary truces between 
thenselVGS into a perpetual oneo Their territories thus bacarne the 
'rrucial Stateso 
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century u rivalry between 
the L\rropean col~,ial powers brought about a change of e~phasiso 
From then onu the primary goal of the treaty was to deny firstly the 
territories and later the natural resources of the shaikhdoms to 
rival Powers u specifically Gennanyv Russiav Turkey or Franceo In 
aim and content they were thus very similar to the 19th- and early 
20th-century treaties governing Britain's relationship with the 
native states of the Aden Protectorate25 o By the 1920u the scope 
of the treaties had been widened to restrict a Ruler's right to award 
concessionsv be th f 1 . f '1 t' 26 ey or pear ~ng or or o~ -prospec ~ng u to 
any party other than Bri taino 
The independence of India in 1948 finally nullified the shaikhdams 0 
importance on the route there u but Britain retained a strong 
interest in the oil concessions and in the safety of surface 
cornmunications to the Far Easto The beginning of the Cold \•lar also 
brought with it a notion of a Russian threat27 but a recent study 
has concluded that by the 1 960s Britain ° s main reason for re11aining 
in the Persian Gulf was 11 force of habit1128 o 
In official parlance the Trucial states were never formal 
protectorateso They \vere 11 independent states in S;?ecial treaty 
relationship vlith Britain"29 and their internal administration was 
not in theory in Britain's handsv though 11constant advice and 
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encourage;u::mt 11 \<rere offered to the Hulers30 0 
.,, 
Recent worJ~ .... 
have detailed many cxarnples of pressure an local shaiY"J1s over 
danestic matters, however a notable recent one being the 
confiscation of Shaikh ShaJmbut of Abu Dhabi's travel documents until 
he agreed to grant the oil concession to a 3ritish ca11pany32 - and 
an expert legal assessment of the situation in Aden Protectorate, 
where the 11advice'0 system was the pattern for the Trucial States, 
was that Britain as control did ~~tend to all areas of 
~ore succinctly 6 the concept that accepting British advice was 
voluntary has been dismissed v not only by Arab COTiffientators, as 
"purely acadenric"34 , an "imperialist fiction" 35 or just 
"humbug"36 o In any event, internal administration had not evolved 
in most shaikhdoms beyond the simplest and most informal level, 
social and economic catalysts being absent37 0 
What the Trucial States lacked therefore in 1968 when Britain decided 
to leave was not only a modern infrastructure and administration but 
also an international persona and the "Ylherewi thal to defend that 
persona, and this at a time of very considerable instability in Arab 
politics resulting from the defeat of 1967 o 
Though with hindsight it is possible to see the writing on the wall 
for Britain's presence in the Gulf as far back as the election of the 
Hilson Government in 1 964, when a wide-ranging review of defence 
policy 'Y/a.S set in motion "to relax the strain imposed on the 
British economy by the defence programme which it had 
inherited"38 the Defence Review vlhich resulted from that study 
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actually provided for an increase in uritish personnel in the Gulfu 
stating that "weo o o intend to with:kavl our forces frcxn the Aden 
baseo o o o o o [but] vle shall be able to fulfil our remaining obligations 
in the l•:iddle East by making a small increase in our forces stationed 
in the Persian Gulf"39 0 A year later however carne the first Aruma! 
Staten1ent on Defence Estimates since the l·ialaya/Indonesia 
confrontation had ended in August 1966o Clearly e;ntx:x1ying the new 
realities, this Statement \'las e.11phatic that Britain "should not 
again have to undertake operations on this scale outside Europeo The 
purpose of our diplomacy is to foster developments which \·Till enable 
the local people to live at peace wie1out the presence of external 
forces"o 
Still, however, "political arrangements have been made and 
practical preparations are under way for e1e small increase in our 
forces stationed in the Persian Gulf which we shall need to fulfil 
our remaining obligations in the area after we leave Aden"40 0 
Shortly after, though, a supplementary statement pointed out that 
fixed bases were decreasing in importance as the flying range of 
. ft . ect41 a1rcra 1mprov o 
Officials toured the area to assure the shaikhs that Britain did 
indeed intend to stay in the Gulf42 o 'rhen, in November 1967, 
sterling was devalued and in January 1968 Harold Hilson made his 
famous statement to the House of Conunons on "making devaluation 
v10rk" o "Abroado o o this means reassessing our role in the vlorld and 
realistically limiting our commitments and our outgoings to our true 
capabilities"43 0 The next month's 1968 Statement on Defence 
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:estimates announced thatg as a direct result of the need to reduce 
expenditure u the major decision had been taken to bring- fbnrard the 
withdraHal from Nalaysia and Singapore to t..~e end of 1971 and to 
leave the Persian Gulf by the same date44 o 
Clearlyq 
financial45 o 
thenu the reason for Britain's withdrawal was 
A Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy in July 
1968 went on to say that Britain had entered into consultations v1ith 
the governments in the area about means of developing a new basis for 
peace and stability after the Britain's departure and that "we wish 
to see a steady evolution in the local arrangements for defence and 
co-operationo o o o o [The Trucial States] appreciate the importance of 
using the intervening period to work out means \vhereby they can 
emerge successfully into unqualified independence in close 
co-operation with one another and with the support of t.lleir larger 
neighbours"46 o It was hoped that the Trucial Oman Scouts would be 
incorporated into a Federal army47 o 
Rulers of the shaikhdoms received the news of the about-face with the 
word "khiyana" u betrayal48 o Shai.YJls Zayid and Rashid offered to 
pay for the upkeep of the Sharj ah base 49 o Their fears of their 
larger neighbours were historically well-founded; saCUdi Arabia 
disputed control of the Buraimi/al- c:.Ain oases so beloved of the 
Nahayans and Iran claimed all of Bahrain and the three islands of Abu 
Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb off the Trucial Stateso That saidq 
both Sa udi Arabia and Iran had a strong interest in preserving the 
monarchial status-quoo 
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History does not record their ovming up to a threat from internal 
sources on the other hando The upheaval in Ade1i after Britain as 
departure tl1e year before and tl1e huTiiliation of the .~ab defeat of 
June 19G7 must have been felt to some extent but ;?u!Jlished material 
on the state of public opinion at the time is inconclusiveo It is a 
moot point whether the phrase "public opinion10 can have had any 
meaning in conn tries \vhose dominant characteristics, as far as most 
but not all the population was concerned, were isolation and 
illiteracy o British diplo~ts were fairly confident tl1at the shaikhs 
were safe internallyo Bahrain and Kuwait had both seen nationalist 
agitation in the 1950s and ilie British Hesident in Bahrain Sir Rupert 
Hay had observed much susceptibility in those "advanced" shaikhdo.11S 
to t.'-le "ceaseless" nationalist propaganda fran cairo and Baghdad on 
the radio and from immigrant teachers 0 a particularly disturbing 
group, but he considered the Trucial states less vulnerable50 0 
Sir William Luce strongly opposed the pull-out but still felt tl1at 
"it never had even the makings of the cataclysm some people 
feared"51 o others shared his view52 o 
British journalists, by contrast, were unanimous that the shaikhs 
were about to 11 inherit the full blast of revolutionary propaganda 
once the Aden base is closed53 , though one or two thought the 
regimes might enjoy a temporary reprieve as result of the decline in 
Nasser 0 s prestige after the defeat of 196754 0 
Arabic-language historiography of the late 1960s suffers fran no such 
contradictions~ 
nationalist, 
it portrays the shaikhdans as seething vlith 
anti-imperialist 55 fervour o The nationalist-
orientated Arab League, whose charter includes a commitment to 
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helping the non-independent Arab states to .v1in their freedo-n, had 
been taking a grading intero2st in the 'I'rucial' States since the early 
1960s and was ;?rompted to send a fact-finding mission in 1964 after 
Iran vla.S reported to have used Abu Musa during naval exercises the 
previous yearo 1'he mission v s report is valuable for the picture it 
gives of political conditions in the shaikhdo.11s in the nationalist 
view a It voices grave concern over three areas~ the threat to the 
shaikhdai1S v Arab identity from large-scale irrnnigration, particularly 
from Iranu which it canp3.res in dangerousness to Jewish irrmigration 
into Palestine in the 1930s and which it goes so far as to accuse 
Dubai of encouraging; the threat to stability fran the chronic 
border disputes, which was particularly urgent in 1964, v1hen Dubai 
and Sharj ah were in bitter hostilities after the sinking of an 
exploratory oil well in disputed territory; and Britain's failure to 
tackle the shaiY.Jldans' extreme backwardness in developnent56 " 
Iran, the League noted \vith concern, had already opened a showpiece 
hospital and a school in Dubai o 'Ib pre-empt further Iranian pene-
tration, it was proposed that an Arab League office be set up in 
Sharjah as a channel for Arab aid .. A League technical team 
recormnended that an Arab-financed development prograrrme should begin 
with the construction of a metalled road fran Dubai to Sharjah57 o 
Arab accounts maintain that Britain's decision to set up the 
Developnent Office in 1965 was merely an attempt to thvmrt the IP..ague 
and the nationalism it representedo Britain's Minister of State 
George Thanas \'las reported to have warned the shaikhs sternly against 
allowing the League to open its office58 , and these sources and 
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others attribute the deposition of Shaikh Sagr of Sharjah in 1965 to 
his rejection of the wamin359 o 
Interesting thoush this .itrab nationalist picture of the shaiYJ1dans on 
the eve of the moves tov.rards federating may be 0 it is not safe to 
assume that it reflects the view from the local street or that local 
eyes saw things fran exactly the same angle as Cairene or Damascene 
eyes60 • Any account of the politics of the street in the shaiJ.-J1-
doms of the 1 960s rnust be tempered by the fW1:lamental fact of the 
scantiness of their populationso Noneth~less, there is a record of 
pamphlets and petitions in circulation as the Rulers met for the 
first time, demanding representative rule and total unification61 o 
~Bterial on public opinion in the early years of the Federation is 
even rarer~ the writer has heard occasionally of a wave of arrests 
of yoWlg people in 1973 for alleged membership of PFLOAG or similar 
groups, and has seen one reference to these arrests in print62o 
Perhaps it is endemic in research into public opinion that con-
clusions cannot be definiteo The present author, having knovm scme 
of the personalities who v1ere politically aware in the 1960s, 
inclines to the view that nationalist phraseology did excite as 
phraseology and that same institutionalized say in government would 
have been popular, but that organizing to press their views, let 
alone violent insurrection, were far beyond their thinkingo 
\"Vhatever the true state of affairs was, ~1e Gulf presence had 
beca.'1le a luxury Britain could no longer afford and Has ended for 
purely British reasonso Before the Wilson statement of January 1968 
there had been no. preparation for independence; as far as the 
shaiJ.·J1s .were concerned it v1as being th-rust U:;>:Jn the.11 Ul1\'lelco:rted. 
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The Dubai Agree:nent and The Neootiations 1968-1971 63 
In February 1968u a month after the issue of British statement of 
intent, Shaikh Zayid of Abu D!1abi and Shaikh Rashid of Duffii met and 
signed t\·10 agree1nents which set in motion the train of events leading 
to the 1971 Federation and gave the negotiations b1eir tone over the 
next three yearso First, they settled their border dispute; frcm 
the outset, their association was seen as a way of resolving border 
issuesu not of abolishing borderso Second, they declared a federal 
union between their two Emirates encompassing foreign affairs, 
defence, internal security u nationality and immigration and sane 
public utilitieso 
Bahrain, Qatar and the five smaller Trucial States vrere then invited 
by Shaikh Zayid and Shaikh Rashid to join the new Federationo 
I•Ieeting in Dubai a week later from 25th to 27th February, the nine 
agreed to establish a ":F'ederation of Arab EIDirates11 "to pranote 
co-operation between them in all fields, o o o o o o o to support respect 
for each other's independence and sovereignty u to unify their 
foreign policy u to regulate the collective defence of their countries 
in order to protect their people and preserve their security and to 
consid~ generally their mutual affairs and interests" o 
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The salient features of the Dub::ii Agreernent64 \vhich they signed to 
these ends were firstly that all the shaikhdams were to continue to 
exist separately0 not as a merged unit, arri secondly that the 
Federation's terms of reference were not to apply ca~prehensively to 
all areas of lifeo Each D.nirate was to continue to manage 
individually all ~~ose of its internal affairs not expressly 
consigned to the Federationo 
The Dubai Agreement created a Supre.rne Council beb1een the nine Rulers 
"to fonnulate its high policy in intemational 0 political 0 defence 0 
econanic, cultural and other matters related to the purposes of the 
Federationooooo 11 Decisions in this Council were to be taken 
unanimously, each member having one equal vote and thus a vetoo The 
Supreme Council was also charged with drafting a pennanent 
constitution and issuing a budget 0 each member 0 s contribution to 
which \-laS to be determined at a later stageo An executive body 
subordinate to the Supreme Council and a Supreme Court were also to 
be set up 0 their composition and precise functions again to be 
specified by agreement later o In the sphere of defence, the 
contracting shaikhdoms were to "co-operate vri th each other and to 
support and strengthen their military capabilities" o 
The nine convened again in Abu Dhabi in l,'iay and July 1968 but 
differences on important matters were a feature of the discussions 
29 
fran the start 65 and such was the air of pessimism in some 
quarters 
off66 o 
that prospects for the Federation were being vrritten 
Nonethelessv the nine were able to agree at these. sessions 
on ag_::>ointing the Arab legal expert who had written !(uuai t' s 
constitution to draft e1e Federation's and to the formation of a 
ternporary executive council under the premiership of Shaikh Khalifa 
ibn Ha'T!ad .P~-Thaniu then Deputy Ruler (now I<uler) of Qataro This 
executive was to take its decisions on the basis of a two-ti1irds 
majority voteo Agreement on a federal capital was proving difficult 
and pending a final decision it was decided ~t the presidency 
should continue rotate between rnembers67 o 
In October 1968 they met again in Qatar and this session brought 
forth ti1e important decision to set up a common defence force with 
airv sea and land armS to operate alongside - not to replace - the 
existing separate anniesv as well as a number of joint canmittees on 
social and economic affairso 
appointed to advise68 o 
TWo Arab military experts were 
Bahrain tried to persuade the Rulers to hold their next meeting in 
its capital .Hanamav perhaps as an expression of solidarity at the 
time when e1e Shah was proving ol:rlurate over his claim69 o Not all 
the Rulers saw such an act of defiance as wise" hrn'leverv and 
eventually after some wrangling the neAt meeting assembled in Doha 
again insteado 
A great deal of coming and going between the shaikhdoms themselves 
and between the shaiY.Jldoms and their larger neighbours before this 
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Doha meeting tried to resolve both the problem of venue and the 
substantive issues of where the· Federation ° s capital \vas to be, the 
design of its flagu the size of the Federal army in relation to the 
members 0 individual forces, the extent of the Federation's 
legislative povrers in relation to the merubers 0 own and the 
intractable preble~ of voting shares in the new state 0 s various 
organs a 
But as the negotiations became more detailed, the differences 
between the parties began to loom larger o Bahrain had over 40 per 
cent of the nine states' total population but less than one per cent 
of the total land area; Abu Dhabi, by contrast u had less than 12 
per cent of the total population but over 75 per cent of the land 
areao Bahrain°s population density was 800 persons per square mile 
and the highest in the Niddle East whilst Abu Dhabi 0 s 111as two persons 
per square mile and the lowest in the Hiddle East if not the worldo 
Bahrain's population was urbanized, educated and on the way to 
becoming industrializedo In 1970 Bahrain's oil exports were 80 u 000 
bpd and declining; Abu Dhabi 1 s were 695u000 bpd and risingo Bahrain 
had Oo4 barrels of oil per day per head of population against Abu 
Dhabi's 11o6 and Bahrain's per capita incorne of $390 per annum was 
less than a tenth of Abu Dhabi' s $4, 000 per annum 70 o In 1968 and 
1969q one of Bahrain's main requirements from the others was 
solidarity in face of the Shaho 
C!atar was ahead of the Trucial States in education and oil 
production; Abu Dhabi had almost no adrninistrati ve apparatus and a 
subsistence economy on to which oil revenues had suddenly begun to 
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cascade tvro years earlier o Dubai had a so;>histicated port and an 
influential class of co5rnopolitan merchants P many of \·lhom were of 
Iraniun descento Sharjahv for historical reasonsv had better 
educational provision and a more developed administrationo 
P.as al-Khairnah had a detennination to ensure that the historical 
weight of the Qasimis in the Gulf was reflected in the distribution 
of power \oJithin the new 1-:-e::1eration, and its Ruler Shaikh Saqr v 
dissatisfied on this scorev held out against joining until February 
1972o He later revealed that he had approached Ornan v1i th a view to 
forming an alternative federation in preference to joining the other 
Trucial States 71 o Al-Azmena al-Arabia claims that his eventual 
joining was forced upon him by nationalist deuonstrations in the 
streets but Dr Tariam alludes more soberly to an audience with a 
"popular co.11ffiittee1172 o 
and administrationo 
The smallest Emirates lacked both resources 
Bahrain's contention that her larger and better-educated population 
merited a proportionately larger share of the votes in the 
Federation's decision-making and representative forums acted as a 
serious stu~ling-blocko Hithout proportional representation, 
Bahrain's rulers would have had a harder task convincing public 
opinion of the advantages of federating vdth the far less developed 
Emirateso The Federation could have drawn and in sane cases did dra'\·1 
the accusation that it v1as a pact betvreen Rulers 73 and not betvJeen 
peoples, .,.Tho were not consul ted - the same accusation was to be heard 
again a decade later a propos of the Gulf Co-operation Councilo But 
the smaller shaikhdo.'llS on the other hand were jealously unable to 
forego the one-shaikhdom one-vote principle vlhich guaranteed them a 
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veto irrespective of clout and exempted the11 from being round by 
majority decisionso 
Furthermore boundart disputes between the shaikhdoms v1ere numerous o 
Ras al-Khaimah disputes its border Hith Fujairah1 Ulnm al-Qaiwain has 
a claim on Sharjah' s offshore oil field \·.rhich necessitated the 
intervention of the Hoyal Navy in 19G9 7 4 1 Sharj ah has claims on 
~jrnan and Dul::ai and Fujairal1u with wham it fought a border skinnish 
in 1972 75 as well as Umm al-Qaiwain; Dul::ai has claims on Abu 
Dhabi and Sharjah; Abu Dhabi on Qatar; and Qatar and Bahrain have 
two recurring disputes over tl1e tip of the Qatar peninsula and the 
Hawar Islands in the Gulf76 0 
The Doha meeting resolved to push ahead vrith drafting a constitution 
before the next session but failed to agree on who vias to be 
President; on the allocation of rninisterial posts or the extent of 
ministers 0 p:>wers; the capital; methods (election or appoint11Emt) 
of constituting the consultative body or the basis (equality or 
population-vreighting) for awarding seats on it 77 u leaving all 
these issues to be settled latera 
Little progress had been made78 when the nine met in Abu Dhabi in 
October 1969 for what was to be the last time, but great strides 
were suddenly made nonethelesso Bahrainu perhaps jolted by an 
apparent improvement in Sa c. udi-Iranian · relations after the Shah's 
visit to King Faisal, gave way on proportional representation79 , 
as the seats on the proposed consultative l:x:x:1y were now to be four 
each regardless of sizeo Shaikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi \vas named Federal 
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President artc:i Shaikh Rashid of Dubai Vice-President for a tenn of t\-,10 
yearso Qatari Crown Prince Shaikh Khalifa ibn Hamad was appointed 
Federal Prime t·linister o ,~\bu Dhabi was designated tem~JOrart 
capital80 pending the construction of a permanent seat on the 
newly-settled .i\bu Dhabi-Dul:ai border o 
t.'Jany other contentious issues such as the budget and the apj?Ort-
iorunent of ministerial s2ats were still left unsettled however u 
Shail-"Jl Khalifa told -The Times81 and as the meeting drew to a 
-- y 
close the British Political Agent Mr James Treadwell appeared and 
made a speech urging progresso The Rulers of Qatar and Ras al-Khaimah 
declared his intervention an attempt at improper pressure and made it 
their pretextu whatever their real motives may have been, for not 
signing the final communique82 o The meeting was regarded as a 
f '1 83 aJ. ure o Iran stepped in \>lith a statement strongly criticizing 
the canmuniqueo A dismayed Shaikh Zayid repeatedly invited the nine 
to reconvene the next month 1 but they \>lere never able to do soo 
The Deputy Rulers met twice in the course of the following year, 
1970, but their negotiations stu~led84 , not least on the old 
issue of proportional representationo \·lhen Iran accepted the 
findings of the UoNo commission in favour of Bahrain°s independence 
and dropped her claims85 , Bahrain felt free to revert to her 
previous stance seeking size-\'leighted voteso Bahrain then appointed 
her own separate Cabinet in early 1970 and Qatar adopted a separate 
constitution in April of the same year and a Cabinet in June86 o 
In June 1970 the surprise Conservative victory in the British general 
election gave rise to speculation that Britain might after all 
34 
.The Characteristics of the 1971 State 
reverse her decision to wi thdrav1 from the Gulf u as I<'.r Heath had 
hinted vlhile in opposition87 u and the federation taD~ lost SO.":le of 
their momentum accordingly88 o Sir i!illiam Luce made a tour of the 
area and recorn:nended hov1ever that the withdrawal proceedo Finally a 
high-level joint Sa c:sudi Arabian and Kuv1aiti delegation visited the 
nine shail:.bdo:ns in January and April 1971 and narro>·led dovm and 
clarified the points of disagreement bet>.,rcen t.'lemu but the various 
formulae the delegation mooted were to no avaiL 3a.hrain declared its 
own independence in August 1971 and Q:ltar followed in Septe.llber89 o 
Sir \'.Jilliam made a further tour in November and spent six days in 
Tehran and one in Sharjah dealing with the problem of the disputed 
islands, v1hich he now described as "the least important of the 
disputes betv1een Iran and her Arab neighbours"90 and \'lhich The 
Tirries quoted hirri as saying had now been resolved as far as Britain 
and Iran were concerned91 o Sharjah and Iran arrived at an 
agreement under which Iran was granted a rni.li tary post on the island 
of Abu !-1usa but control of civil affairs was to remain Sharjah's; 
the island's natural resources were to be divided equally and Sharjah 
was to receive a cash subsidy on3 a Sm a year until her own revenue 
reached a sirriilar leve192 o Ras al-I<hai.mah on the other hand would 
not accommodate Iran and on 30th November Iran invaded the two Tunb 
islandso The invasion caused loss of lifeo Britain was \'lidely seen 
as having connived at the Iranian strike and feelings ran higho Iraq 
broke off diplonEtic relations, Col Qadh~lafi expropriated British 
Petroleum and sane observers attribute Km·.ra.it 0 s decision to introduce 
military conscription to t.'le occupation93 o 
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ot.~ers, ho~1ever, viev1ed the timing of the invasion as a deliberate 
formula to save the shaikhs' fa ceo Since the reality of the 
situation \vas that the Shah was going to bke the islands 
regardless, less danger to the shaikhs would result if he took the.rn 
before the shai&\s D~caQe technically responsible for tha~94 o 
The l.uab League protested to the ill~ and the issue was said to be one 
of the causes of the abortive coup in Sha.rjah in 1972o Shaikh 
the Sharjah Ruler who had signed the agree:nent with Iran, 
was killed in an atte~pt to regain power by his predecessor Shai~~ 
Saqr, vlho had himself been deposed in 1965 allegedly for his 
interest in League and nationalist affairs95 o Ra.s al-Khairnah was 
believed to have supported Shaikh Saqr 8 s atte~pt and there was 
speculation that Ras al-Khaima.h and Sharjah were to have fonned a 
rnini-Fe::leration of their own had it succeeded96 0 It failed, but 
the issue of the islands was still alive in December 1972 when the 
inhabitants of one of the islands petitioned Shaikh Zayid to continue 
to uphold their Arabness97 o In Hovember 1973 a magazine was closed 
down allegedly for carrying an article on the islands which 
displeased the shah98 o 
Generated by reaction to external events and not their own 
initiative, the nine Rulers' federal motivation had been sufficient 
to make possible a degree of co-operation in the fields of defence 
and foreign affairs of which they had no previous experience, but 
clearly insufficie11t at the same time to wrest from them substantive 
concessions of power over the managa~t of their own dornainso They 
feared external aggression but differed in their responses to the 
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threat or even on its source o They were able to ap;Jrove joint 
defence forces but only if able to retain their o·..m local annieso 
Though unequal in size 6 resources and develo;ment 6 they held out 
against majority decision-makingo The egu<:tlity of separate units \vas 
hallO\<leOo 
rrhe Constitution that bound the rella.ining seven bedfellO\·lS together 
was thus to sane extent born "by caesarean section1199 o Britain's 
interest 6 too 0 lay only in passing on a defensible international 
persona to shaihl1doms co-operating peacefully with each other and did 
not extend to merging them com?letelyo The 1 971 Provisional 
Constitution of the United Arab Emirates thus enshrines the 
continuing existence of separate Emirates who were to join together 
for the defence and foreign affairs previously monopolized by Britain 
and for same internal purposeso But its joint defence provisions did 
not go as far as unifying existing armed forces and its joint 
developnent philosophy did not go as far as federalizing the control 
of natural resourceso Federalism as an ideology could not prevail any 
further v given the Rulers' motivation and perceptions at the timeo 
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Jhe Distribution of Powers in the 1 971 Constitution 
The UoAoEo was the third Gulf state to acquire a constitution after 
Kuwait and Qatar, whose constitutions are dated Novellber 1962 an:3. 
April 1970 respectivelyo Unlike Kuwait and Bahrain u \·Those 
constitution took effect in 1974, the UoAoEo 0 S constitution did not 
pass through any stage of popular consultation in its evolution and 
on that ground, and on the grounds of the absence of provision for 
election and on others, the Federation was criticized in progressive 
circles as a victory for reaction 1 00 , having b:en written off all 
along by leftist organizations as an imperialist plot against 
nationalism and progress101 0 
All four constitutions show fundamental similarities but also bring 
to light important differences of attitude tawards the questions of 
legitimacy and accountability, among otherso 
Km-m.it, Bahrain and Qatar make haste to affinn the inviolability of 
hereditary shaikhly rule102o Succession is expressly confined in 
all three cases to the families in power at the timeo The UoAoEo 
constitution does not concem itself \·lith the intemal rule of its 
member Emirates but the hereditary shaikhly system is perpetuated in 
any case as an effect of the provision that members of the Supreue 
Council must be Rulers (see below) o 
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Islam is the second camnon denaninator v in that all four con-
stitutions stipulate that Islam shall be a nein source of law103 o 
~bre generallyv all contain commitments to improving the quality of 
life and to providing emplo~nent104 and safeguarding private 
ownership of property a 
The main differences are to be found between Kuwait and B3.hrain on 
the one hand and Qatar and the UaAoEo on the othero Kuwait elevates 
"the people" to the source of all power and sovereignty 1 05 , 
limits the ruling family's share of the oil revenues 106 , gives 
ultimate power over legislation107 to a representative body elected 
by "universal'' suffrage 1 08 and penni ts trade unions 1 09 and the 
right of association110o Bahrain also cites the people as the 
source of all power111 and regulates future allocations to the 
privy purse (though not for the present Ruler) 112 o Legislation 
to have been ratified by a National Assembly113 again elected was 
by "universal10 114 suffrage but Bahrain 1 s National Assembly 
experiment ~,oas so short-lived as to render these two provisions 
academico ••uni versal1' in Gulf terms excludes local women and 
immigrants of either sex o Bahrain's constitution allowed trade 
unions to be formed "for lawful purposes"115 and the right of 
association was guaranteed 116 , as in Kuwaito In Bahrain and 
Qatarv however, the executive is ultimately responsible to the 
Ruler 117 ; in Kuwait it is, or was v responsible to the 
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National Assembly118 0 I<uwai t and Bahrain both devote much detail 
to the circumstances in \vhich the elected Assenlbly can be dissolved; 
in both countries the relevant provisions state that the Asse:nbly may 
not be dissolved twice for the same reason 119 and that elections 
for a new Asse~ly must follow the dissolution within two 
months120o In practice both countries abandoned these safeguards 
vmen their Assemblies were dissolvedo 
Qatar 1 s constitution does not specify the source of power or 
sovereignty but refers to the Ruler's right to rule "by virtue of 
consensus"121 in accordance v1ith the Islamic Shari "ao No limits 
are set on the ruling family 0 s share of the oil revenueso By way of 
a 11representative" body Qatar is equipped with only an Advisory 
Council empowered only to "express opinions"122 and The Ruler is 
bound only to listen to this opinion before legislating123 0 Unlike 
the National Assemblies of Kuwait and Ba.hrainv Qatar 1 s Advisory 
Council has no right to discuss the state budget - it may discuss the 
budgets of major projects only124 and may not discuss any subject 
at all that has not been approved in advance 125 o l>lembers are 
nominated by notables of ten districts v who put forward four names 
per district to the Amir 6 who in turn selects two from each group of 
four126 o Like T(uwa1' t and Bahra1' n. Qatar . . th . f ~- . enJo1ns e oonven1ng o 
a new Council within two months of the dissolution of a ?revious 
127 
one There is no mention of trade unions or the right of 
association a 
The Provisional. Constitution of the UoAoEo has same features of those 
of Kuwait and Bahrain but is more similar to that of Qataro The 
accountability of the executive is to the Rulersv not the 
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representative arm; that representative arm is apf)Ointed rather than 
elected and does not have the final say on legislationo 
The UoAoEo Constitution 1 s main task is to differentiate between the 
powers to be assumed by the Federation and the powers to be retained 
by the separate me~r Emiratesu it is not concerned with the 
internal affairs of its memberso Essentially, the act of federation 
has the effect of liquidating the ~nirates internationally - or, 
more preciselyu of preventing their acquiring separately those 
foreign-policy attributes of sovereignty that they did not enjoy 
during the British period - whilst enshrining their separateness at 
home 128 o All matters not specifically arrogated by the central, 
Federal government re-nain in local hands in addition to matters 
expressly designated as localo The powers of the Federation were 
thus viewed as finite and determinate and the residual powers of the 
member Emirates, contrastingly, as wider and more encompassing129 0 
This limitation of central authority is the first of two 
constitutional mechanisms that guarantee not only the continuing 
existence but also the continuing internal self-rule of the 
Emi.rateso The second is the voting system inside the supre~ 
decision-making body, discussed below o 
Federal Powers 
The powers delegated to the Federation consist chiefly of the right 
to conduct foreign representation and defence, to print the 
currency, grant nationality and administer some but not all public 
utilities such as inter-Emirate high\vays and the mail130 o As an 
exception to the Federal monopoly of foreign contacts, members were 
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empowered to "conclude limited agreements of a local and 
administrative nature" with other countries but only v;ith the 
approval of the Federal Supreme Council131 o This rightv which is 
similar to that enjoyed under the British8 legitimized Sharjah 1 s 
deal with Iran over the latter 1 s presence on Abu t·lusa 132 o 
Local Powers 
The powers left to the individual Emirates on the other hand include 
the right to fly a local flag 8 the right previously enjoyed by 
Britain to decide the exploitation of natural resources found in 
their territories, and the right to levy troops v which add up to a 
textbook definition of sovereignty133 0 The right to have armies 
was repealed by the constitutional amendments of 1976 and a number of 
the Emirates surrendered their flags as a voluntary initiative at the 
same time but the l''ederal state as conceived in 1971 clearly acquires 
no prescriptive economic or political rights over mernbers 1 local 
governments and does not presume to address itself to members 1 
internal affairs even to .the extent of enjoining upon them the 
hereditary shaikhly system, as the constitutions of Kuwait 8 Bahrain 
and Qatar are careful· to dov 
sovereignty a 
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The Structure of Governrnent 
The Govern-nent as created by the 1971 Constitution consists of an 
unusual three-part executiveu a non-legislative consultative 
assembly ru1d the judiciaryo The tripartite executive ccimprises the 
top policy-making and legislative body the Supreme Council, its 
chairman the President, whose office combines a wide range of 
powers, and the Hinisterial Council134 o This executive is 
answerable to the Suprerne Council, not the consultative arm, and 
the syste11 is thus not parliamentary o 
The President 
The President of the Federation, Shaikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi, 
represents the UoAoEo both ceremonially and politicallyo The process 
by which he became and has been reconfinned as President is described 
officially as "election" by the other members of the Supreme 
Council but in practice there has never been any contender for the 
post other than Shaikh Zayid, who was not only a prime mover of the 
federal idea but also rules the Emirate that occupies over 85 per 
cent of the Federation's land area and supplies 90 per cent of its 
budge to 
Ex officiou 
meetings, 
the President convenes and chairs all Supreme Council 
takes responsibility for the Ministerial Council's 
performance and heads the Supre.11e Defence CounciL 
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His other poHers are exercised through the Supre-ne Council or the 
cabinet or l:lotho \'lith the agreement of the Supreme Council on the 
one hand he ratifies and promulgates all laws and treaties and 
declares war 8 appoints the Chief Justice and the judges of the 
Federal Supreme Court and the Prime l•1inister o He appoints senior 
diplomats and civilian and military officers in conjunction with the 
Council of t<1inisters, on the other hand.v theoretically on the 
no~nation of the minister concerned135 but in practice also after 
an inter-Emirate political processo 
Since the Constitution requires the President and the Vice-President 
to be "elected" from among the members of the Supreme Council.v who 
must be Rulers or Rulers' deputies, it would seem that the powers 
wielded by the President can never pass constitutionally into the 
hands of a non-roya1136 o 
The fact that the holder of this position has always been Shaikh 
Zayid, in other words that the person with the theoretical 
constitutional status has also been the person with the real 
power-political clout, has had a strong positive influence on 
Fed 1 h . 137 era co es1on o It gave the later movement towards 
integration a momentum it could not have had otherwiseo It follows 
necessarily, however, that any change in Shaikh Zayid's attitude 
towards federalism or in Abu Dhabi's relative financial position 
could cause that influence to change v that is to weakeno 
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'l'he Suoreme Council 
SUpreme po.'ler belongs in name and in fact to the Supre'11e Council of 
the Fed.erationf which consists of the seven Rulers of the seven 
Dnirateso Since the Supreme Council is the highest policy-mill~ing 
tody, ti1e provision that each flnirate enjoys one equal vote in its 
deliberations means that rule remains collective, not centralized, 
and is the second guarantee of the members' continuing internal 
sovereignty138o Ten years later the same voting system was adopted 
by the Arab Gulf Co-operation Council for its own policy-making 
body1390 
It is the fact of being a Ruler that qualifies tl1e member for 
membership of the Supreme Council and the loss of power in his own 
Einirate disqualifies an ex-Ruler; thus it is the local function that 
defines the composition of the Federal supreme body and not the 
Federal function that defines the local Ruler's position140 0 
The UaAoEo Supreme Council was meant to meet at least once every two 
rronths during an annual session of eight months but has never done 
141 
so Resolutions on matters of substance have to be carried by a 
majority of five votes including those of both Abu Dhabi and Dubai, 
142 
each of whom therefore has an absolute veto o This system 
reflects the reality that when Abu Dhabi and Dubai agree on a measure 
it will proceed and when they do not, it will noto Vice-President 
Shaikh Rashid of Dub3.i used his veto in 1977 and 1978 to block 
important federal legislation on the vital subjects of 
land-ownership u the control of canmerce and the Central Banko As a 
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result of his deep res~-vations over G,ese and other issues, the 
. . 
Supreme Council was unable to meet between November 1977 and June 
1979 \vhen Shaikh Rashid agreed to become Federal Prime Hinister 
himselfo The absence of the Supreme Council effectively paralysed 
federal decision-makinga 
The Council of t-linisters 
Supreme Cot:mcil policy is implemented by a Council of r.linisters whose 
function is clearly defined as executive only and 'Vlithout political 
initiative143 a l~nisters are collectively responsible to the 
Supreme Council and not to the representative ann; in Kuwait and 
Bahrain Hinisters were responsible to the National Assembly and in 
Q:ltar to the Arnir o 
Originally, Federal Ministers were to be appointed in the fields of 
foreign affairsu the interior u defence, finance economy and 
industry, justice, education, healthv public works and 
agriculture, planning, canmunications, infonnation and labour and 
social affairs, a total of 14 portfolios including the Prime 
Minister and his Deputy144a Oil was a notable exceptiona 
The writ of certain ~'linistries ran less than comprehensively" 
hm·revera The r-1inistry of Communications for example had no 
connection with Ras al-Khaimah's earth-satellite station, 
belonged to that Emirate individuallya The t·1inistry of Electricity 
and lvater operated only in the three poorest Emirates as the f0ur 
larger ones each had their own separate authoritieso Dubai's 
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sho..,rpiece Rashid Hospital was independent of the Federal ~iinistry of 
Healtho Devoid of binding powers the t,.linistry of Planning was in 
practice a statistical service and the ~tinistry of Petroleum and 
Hineral Resourcesv when eventually set UPv was once described by its 
Hinister Dr al- ~Utaiba as no more than a token l'linistry 145 and a 
conference-orgarlizing service and suffered the embarrassment at those 
conferences of not being able to speak for the Federation ° s second 
main oil producer v Dubai 146 o ~1ore importantly v control of t.l-te 
J;X>lice and anned forces was not ceded to the Federal Ministries 
concerned until the end of the Provisional periodv and then only 
incompletelyo 
The composing of Cabinets observes two desiderata, the balance of 
prestige between the Emirates and the need to present an acceptably 
high ratio of commoners to shaikhso After Ras al-I<haimah became the 
seventh member of the Federation in 1972, the number of Cabinet posts 
had to be increased to accommodate · nationals of that Emirate in 
proportion to its relative standing and size, and the cabinet grew 
that year to comprise the Prime Minister, his Deputy v 16 Ministers 
and five Ministers of Stateo Both the Prime l>linister and the Deputy 
Prime l·tinister were shaikhs of the Dubai ruling family as were the 
.t-linisters of Finance v Economy and Industry (in the same person as 
the Deputy Prime Hinister in this instance) and of Defenceo The 
Interior Hinistry was awarded to Abu Dhabi's Shaikh Hubarak ibn 
l'~d and that of Foreign Affairs to Ahmad Suwaidi, an Abu Dhabi 
commoner so closely associated with the ruling family as to obviate 
the distinctiono t>linister of Information Ahmad ibn Hamid was also an 
Abu Dhabi Shaikh 1 4 7 o 
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Qasimi shaikhs of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah now had the second-
ranking and technical portfolios of Educationv Justice, a~j 
Electricity, ~·later and Public l'.'orlcs; Agriculture Has detached fra.-n 
ti1is last and given to the son of the Ruler of FUjairah as a separate 
f.linistryo i·lembers of the csl-1jman and Urnm al-Qaiwain ruling families 
took Cammrn1ications and Health respectivelyo Ga'TI!Tioners therefore had 
Housing v Labour and Social Affairs, Planning, Youth and Sports and 
four of the five t.linistries of Stateo Education in addition was 
given to a commoner on the accession of the original shaikhly 
Ninister as Ruler of Shatjaho 
The preponderance of shaikhs - eleven shaikhly full l'·tinsters to five 
non-shaikhs - receded in the next cabinet in 1973, when Abu Dhabi 1 s 
separate Ministries were dissolved into the Federal structure and the 
number of cabinet seats grew again to 20 Ninistries, the Prime 
Hinister and his Deputy and six I>tinistries of Stateo Petroleum and 
Hineral Affairs and Islamic Affairs had been createdv Economy 
detached from Finance and Industry and Labour detacherl from Social 
Affairs a Of this total, the Prime Hinister and Deputy Prime 
r~1inister v 12 Hinisters and two Hinisters of State were shaikhs whilst 
eight Hinisters and four Hinisters of State \-rere commoners, if Ahmad 
Suwaidi be counted as such 148 0 
Graduate or indeed educated candidates to fill high-level posts were 
very few in number at this juncture in the UoAoEo 1 s developnento 
Before oil few cash resources had been available for spending on 
education and the two systems that did exist, the Abu Dhabi f.1inistry 
of Education and the Km-miti-financed schools in the Northern 
Emirates, were of necessity conc~1trated at ~~e primary levelo 
48 
The Characteristics of The 1971 State 
Secondary education vms introduced in Dubai in the early 1960s and in 
Abu Dhabi in the late 1960so 
Despite the favour civil service jobs enjoyed in the local 
population's social scale of valuesv by the end of the 1970s only 
just over half of all Federal civil servants were UaAoEo 
nationals 149 o Abu Dhabi, the largest of the local government 
employers~ had fewer than 4,000 locals in its staff of 24,0oo150 0 
The best of the few graduates available were creamed off by the 
t1inistry of Foreign Affairso 
Nonetheless the ratio of shaikhs to commoners among full f.linisters 
had been reversed by the time of the next Cabinet reshuffle in 1 977 
to five shaikhs plus the Prime Hinister and Deputy Prime Hinister 
against 11 canmonerso One of the five Ministers of State was also a 
shaikho The progression attests the willingness of the shaikhly 
families to cede places on the albeit non-policy-forming Council of 
Hinisters at least as far as the less important l..Unistries are 
concerned151 a 
Posts to which the shaikhly families attached importance, by 
contrast, were apportioned between them by bargaining and were open 
neither to free geographical redistribution nor to cammonerso These 
are the posts controlling the forces of coercion and law and order 
and the purse strings o Abu Dhabi's share of the Ministries rose to 
nine in December 1973 and included the Deputy Premiership for the 
first time with two additional Hinistries of State to compensate for 
the aboli ti0n Of the Emirate IS Own local MinistrieS a Dubai retained 
the Premiership and four other seats152 
But regardless of the 
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numerical balance u the Dubai Ruler 0 s sons lllakturnu Ham::lan and 
' . 
Huhammad re:nained Prime Hinister v !·1inister of Finance and r.tinister 
of Defence respectively in all ad~nistrations up to Shaikh Rashid 0 s 
own of 1979 and relations of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi held on to the 
posts of Deputy Prime Hinister and Hinister of the Interior. In 
keeping these key positions in royal handsv the U.A.E. is conforming 
to the norm in the Gulf 0s political systems153• 
The Federal National Council QE National Assembly 
In theory, laws drafted by the Council of l'linisters in pursuance of 
Supreme Council policy have to be sh0WI1 in normal circumstances to 
the consultative Federal National CounciL In the event of a 
disagreement between the cabinet and the F .N.Co over a billv the 
SUpreme Council can act as mediator under the tenns of the 
constitution and can require the executive to re-submit drafts to the 
consultative body for reconsideration. If compromise still proves 
impossible the Supreme Council may finally enact law without the 
154 FoN.C. 0s approval • The reverse was the case in Kuwait and 
Bahrain, wl;lere the two National Assemblies had ultimate power to 
pass legislation not approved by the Arnir155• 
The executive may in addition enact decrees when the F .N.C. is not in 
session and is then bound only to notify it vlhen next it sits. In 
urgent cases the Supreme Council can legislate without reference to 
the F.N.C. even when it is in session and such urgent laws have 
permanent 156 force _o Nor is the F.N.C. the party to which the 
executive is accountable; it is the Supreme Council and the 
50 
The Characteristics of The 1971 State 
President vlho have that status 157 • 'rhere is no provisionv either v 
. . 
for the f'oN.C. to table votes of no confidence in the Govern;:lent or 
individual Hinistersv a power granted to the deputies of l~m-mit .and 
Bahrain158 • v:ith these limitations on its po•vers 8 the F.N.C. or 
National Assembly ~,ot have been intended as a legislative arm of 
govemment159 • It is a striking feature of the Assembly's history 
up to the end of the 11Golden Age" of the mid-1970s that its voice 
was nonetheless generally heeded. 
\'lays of selecting Assembly members are left by the constitution to 
each Emirate 1 s preference 1 60 • Elections are not precluded. Indeedv 
the Preamble credits the Rulers with the ambition of "progressing by 
steps towards a canprehensi ve v representative 8 democratic 
regime"161 • In practice in all cases the representatives have been 
appointed by the Rulers from the prominent, often commercially 
prO.'Tiinent, families. 
Like Kuwait 1 s and Bahrain 1 s, the U.A.E. National Assembly was meant 
to be reconvened within 60 days of any dissolution 162 but when the 
U.A.E. 1 s experiment with its National Assenlbly was put on ice, the 
U.A.E. Government neither dissolved it nor formally reconvened it. 
No explanation was ever offered for its absence. 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai each send eight members to the F .N.C., Sharjah 
and Ras al-Khaimah six each and the remaining Emirates four63 • 
Nembers tend to be young; the Speaker estimated their average age as 
about 32 in 1977164• Although appointed by Rulers of separate 
Emirates, they tended to see their mission as a federalizing one. 
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Fundamental political issues such as the nature and purpose of the 
Federation did not cane to dominate the Ass~~ly's concerns until ~~e 
first Speaker, 1'hani ibn Alrlullahv Has replaced at the end of 1976 
by 'I'ariarn 1'ariamv retU-l'"lling Ambassador in cairo. Insteadv much of 
its time in these earlier years was spent debating public services 
and exposing their shortcaningso S0111etimes Hinisters were subjected 
to quite strong criticism of their performanceso A de facto division 
of the political arena into t\vo seemed to be in force; on the 
acceptable side fell criticism of housing provision, standards in 
the schools and hospitals and other services vlhilst foreign policy, 
the conduct or canpetence of the shaikhly families and certainly the 
fact of ~~ikhly rule remained taboo. 
Lateru the FoNoCo eagerly took up the cause of speeding the transfer 
of vital aspects of sovereignty from the individual Emirates to the 
central Governmento From early 1977 the Assembly ventured into the 
political and contentious fields of a Ruler 0s control over natural 
resources and contributions to the Federal budget, for exampleu and 
became obsessed with immigration and the role of foreigners in the 
economy, to which it was hostileo 
But it was not only the content of its debates that changed radically 
at this timeo The Assembly 0s 1nodus operandi also switched from a 
reactive, as envisaged under the 1 971 constitution u to an 
initiating one, a mode which overstepped those constitutional 
parameterso In the absence of the Supreme Council in 1978, the 
Assembly began to send delegations to chivvy ti1e Rulers and to 
arrange joint sessions with the Cabinet in pursuit of its policy 
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objectives, in short seizing an initiative ti1at the Rulers had not 
. . 
intended it to have. Fran a mechanism for letting off steam evolved 
first a pressure group and later an oppositionv an opposition 
agitating against those Rulers who dragged their feet on federal 
integration. 
That evolution seems all the more remarkable when placed in its Gulf 
context. In ~~e recent past d1e Gulf's other quasi-parliamentary 
experiments had been terminatedu Bahrain's in August 1 975 and 
Kuwait's a year later in August 1976, when parts of the constitution 
\·tere also suspended. 
At the height of its campaigning zeal however the Assembly's goals 
coincided with those of the integrationist Rulers on the Supreme 
Council; it did not follow iliat the Assembly 0 s muscle could continue 
to grow if that coincidence proved impennanent. These developnents 
postdated the five years of the Provisional Constitution however and 
few intimations of them were in evidence to occupy the Rulers' minds 
when they reviewed the constitution's clauses on representation in 
1976. 
The Federal Supreme Court 
A Federal Supreme Court, the fourth ann of the 1971 state, was set 
up to adjudicate in disputes between the other anns, beb'leen the 
Emirates' local govern11ents and the central government and betweo..n 
the Emirates themselve~ .• \'lith "final and binding powers11165 , the 
Supreme Court was empowered to pronounce on the constitutionality or 
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ot.~er.vise of both local and federal la\1/S if so requested and to try 
ainisters and other senior Federal officials and cases affecting 
national securityo The status of legislation in the me~r ~~irates 
vms ti1us open to challenge by the Federation on constitutional 
grounds 1 66 ; further f an enabling clause paved the way for the 
12nirates to transfer all or part of ti1eir Oi·m local jurisdiction to 
the Federation as and vmen they so Hished 167 o 
As a test of the Emirates 0 intentions towards centralized rule 
however the most telling incident in the Supreme Court 1 s history was 
n~tiveo Sharj ah and Dubai resisted all pressure to refer to it 
their chronic border disputeo Shaildl Zayid dismissed the land at 
issue as insignificant and found the antagonists 0 disregard of the 
Supreme Court so provocative that he threatened to stand down168o 
Previous battles over the territory had proved intractable despite 
legal and diplomatic efforts; now the squabble was rekindled \vhen 
Sharjah publicized plans by France's Renault company to build a very 
large complex of shops, officesu residential and leisure facilities 
at the site, which was opposite the Khan r.oundabout on the 
Dubai-Sharjah Roado As soon as the site was fencedu Dubai sent 
armed police to prevent work from continuingo Finally the quarrel 
was referred to a private :aritish legal company and 'tms never raised 
in the Federal Supreme Court 169 0 
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, '.Five Years of Constitutional Develo:roents 
During the life of the Provisional Constitution 0 initiatives \-.'ere 
put forward fr0111 the top and others sprang up from below v1hich tested 
the rne1lbers' willingness to take the Federation further than that 
original charter had providedo The testing process produced 
different results from Ruler to Rulero As the five years came to an 
end, these initiatives culminated in a draft of a permanent 
constitution which greatly expanded Federal at the eA-pense of local 
powers and transformed the appointed, consultative National Assembly 
into an indirectly-elected legislatureo The draft was rejected by 
the Supreme Council and was never publishedo The Provisional version 
of the constitution \'laS extended for a further five years with 
amendments insteado It can be judged from the amendments how far 
attitudes to federalism had or had not developed and how far 
attitudes to institutionalized participation had or had not 
progressedo 
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New Initiatives 
Federal institution-building began v-lith the setting up in late 1972 
of the Supreme Defence Council170 consisting of the President and 
Vice-President and the Hinisters of Defence, Foreign Affairs, 
Finance and the Interior with the Commander in cnief of the Anned 
Forces and the Chief of Staff o This was the body that supervised 
pre~ations for the unification of the separate armies at the end of 
the five-year perio::L The UoAoEo Currency Board was set up in 
1973171 and set about introducing a uniform·currency to replace the 
Qatar/Dubai riyal and the Bahrain/Abu Dhabi dinar then in circulation 
in the Northern Emirates and Abu Dhabi respectivelyo A National 
Planning Council172 was created and briefed to draw up a 
comprehensive social and economic development plano 
At this stage the Supreme Council see.115 to have been able to agree on 
the desirability of at least looY~ng at tighter forms of federation, 
for in July 1973 it delegated a committee of the Ruler of Sharjah, 
the Deputy Ruler of Ras al-I<haimahu the Hinister of Finance and the 
Hinister of State for the Interior to recormnend measures to dispose 
of obstacles and strengthen the Federal apparatus 173 o In December 
Abu Dhabi anticipated one of the cormnittee' s findings by taking the 
most important federalizing initiative of the UoAoEo 1 S two-year life 
when it abolished its own Hinistries and merged them with their 
174 Federal counterparts o 
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The Ruler of Sharjah 0 s full report came before the Supreme Council in 
January 1974o 'l'he details were not published but a recent work 
suggests it recontmended the unification of· the an-:1ies and the 
j.udiciaries175 o Ho ne'\'7 measures were announcedu Hhich implies 
disagree1nent o In December 1974 the Council of Hinisters, vlhich is 
not charged with policy innovationu intervened by setting up its own 
commission to follow up the implementation of the constitutionu 
suggest ways of strengthening the Federation and negotiate faster 
unification with the local authorities176 0 
This latter report was discussed by the Rulers in April and Nay 1975 
and p~)ted them to decide in principle to unify the armed forces, 
cede control of immigration and internal security to the . Federal 
1'-tinistry of the Interior, enforce the Federal Foreign .Hinistry's 
monopoly of external contacts, co-ordinate oil policies and study 
the reapportioning of Federal and local powers over services such as 
health177 a J.lost significantly, however, this historic Supre~e 
Council meeting of Hay 1975 resulted in the appointment of a 
constituent cammittee to draw up the permanent constitutiono 
Sharjah, in a burst of federalist fervour, v1ent beyond the 
in-principle measures and announced in November 1975 that the Sharjah 
National Guard was to be merged with the Union Defence Forceo 
Sharjah' s law courts v1ere to be handed over to the Federal Hinistry 
of Justice and her broadcasting station to the Federal Ministry of 
Information a Symbolically, the Sharjah flag was to be 
. 1' ~ ed178 aoo ~s.1 o Fujairah and later ~jman followed suit, as did Abu 
Dhabi in abolishing its flago 
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Next, during discussion of the following year's budget, Abu Dhabi 
carr:~itted 50 per cent of her individual oil reve.··me to the Fe:1eral 
coffers for the first time179e Abu Dhabi had always contributed 
over 90 pzr cent of 01e Fe~eration's budget since the first one, but 
that 90 per cent had been only a fraction of Abu Dhabi's ovm 
revenue. Abu Dhabi's local budgets in the previous years had been 
larger than the Federation's. 
All three moves clearly transcended the member Emirates' obligations 
to the Federation as envisaged by the 1971 Constitution. They 
represented the first confrontation bet\reen those Rulers who insisted 
on retaining their sovereign rights as perpetuated by that document 
and the integrationist Rulers who for ideological or political 
motives sought to extend Federal powers over the local Emirates. 
The Fate of the Draft Permanent Constitution 
---------
t·1eanwhile, the 28 authors of the pennanent constitution canposed 
their draft. Among them were the two "Grand Viziers" Ahmad Suwaidi 
and Hahdi Tajir; ShaiJ.-Jl Surur ibn Huharmlad of Abu Dhabi; a few 
r-Iinisters, several rising stars of the younger civil servant 
generation and in addition a considerable number of the young 
intelligPntsia and National Assembly members including one of the 
future drafters of the radical Joint Hentorandtun of 1979180• 
The most radical of their innovations were the abolition of the Abu 
Dhabi/Dubc.li veto in the Supreme Council and a statutory carnni.tment by 
each Emirate of 75 per cent of its incane to the Federation. 
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Two-stage elections to the National 1\Ssembly were also proposed. 
Under this radical proposal, each Ruler would nominate a number of 
electors equalling five times the seats already l1eld by that Emirate 
on the Assentbly. Thus Abu Dhabi and Dulni for e.."<CUTTple, \·lith eight 
seats, Hould appoint 40 electors each. This group of electors v10uld 
t."len elect one fifth of their nt.lrnber by balloto Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai, to use the same e..v..am;>le, would thus still have eight 
representatives but each of them would have been elected by forty 
voters181 o 
The Supre.rne Council rejected all the proposalso An initiative from 
below had hit a ceiling of resistance in the first of what was to be 
a number of comparable incidentso Shaikh Zayid made little secret of 
his disappoinbnent with some other Rulers' grudging concessions to 
federalism, even e>.."Pressing his views openly in the Gulf press in 
the latter half of 1976 o He complained that the Emirates v1ere even 
dragging their feet over concessions already agreed, such as the 
police and army mergers. When the Dubai-Sharjah border dispute re-
surfaced, Shaikh Zayid vms provoked into threatening not to stand 
again as President when his term expired in December 1976o 
Shaikh Zayid left the country to attend the Colo.110bo Non-Aligned 
Summit in August 1976 and during his absence a Bahraini paper quoted 
his intention to stand down182 0 On his return in September the 
UoA.E. witnessed its first demonstration, a small and peaceful 
ff ' . t f hi '~ 183 A d ta ed ' 1 a aJ.r 1n suppor o s presJ.aency o secon vlaS s g 1n a -
ryU,n the following month and the. National Assembly ventured to send a 
t . t' t th Pr 'd t I · · · t · 184 pe 1 1on o e esJ. en as~1ng n1m o remaJ.n o 
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The tvlice-postponed Supreme Council session at which these issues 
were to be resolved was finally ccx1ve.."1ed on 6th Nove:nber 1976o As 
always its deliberations were secret but the ca~unique broadcast at 
the end infonned the public that in order to decide the question of 
the budget, a ccmnittee of the Rulers of Sharjah, "1i.jman and 
rujairah had been asked to draw up a binding fonnula to be 
implemented vlith effect from the 1977 financial year o These \vere the 
three Emirates that had merged part of their local administrations 
voluntarily into the Federal structure the year before and had gained 
the most integrationist reputations; in the cases of ~Ajman and 
Fujairah they were also the poorest and in the case of Sharjah the 
most indebted, and therefore the most dependent on the Federal 
finances that \•!ere provided to the tune of 90 per cent by Abu Dhabio 
The communique also stated that discussion of the Dubai-Sharjah 
border dispute had been postponed for further studies, so that the 
two issues on the resolution of which Shaiv~ Zayid had made his 
remaining in office conditional had thus been deferred rather than 
settledo On the anned forces, on the other hand, the Rulers 1 
right to raise separate air, sea or land forces was abrogated 
formally by the repeal of Article 142o A new security machine was to 
be set up reporting directly to the president and a civil guard 
established with Sa udi Arabian advice to protect vital institutions 
d t . t' f . . 185 an proper y ~n ~s o cr~s~s o 
Shai}~ Zayid appeared satisfied and no more was heard of his 
resignationo On 27th November he was re-elected President by the 
Supreme Council and the Provisional Constitution \'las extended for 
five years with amend.mo....nts eml::x:rlying the merger of the annies186 
0 
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Conclusion: Federalizing Pro:rress to 1976 
Dy the time the Provisional Constitution expired in 1976g the 
Rulers' willingness to allow the Federation to grow had made 
possible a number of institutional additions to the Federal edifice 
and one radical concession of sovereigntyg that of separate defenceo 
Sovereignty over natural resources was left uninfringed on the other 
hand but the idea of looking for a fonnula to govern obligations to 
the central treasury had ?roved acceptable o The surrender of the veto 
in the SUpre.'1le Council had been rejected and a pennanent constitution 
had been found to be still prernaturea On popular participationg the 
National Assembly was to remain wholly nominated by the Rulers and no 
experiments with elections had been countenancedo Non-shaikhly 
participation in the Council of Hinisters had been encouragedu on 
the other hand u and commoners had been included in the constituent 
assemblyu though their conclusions had been rejecteda 
Hidden in the compromises of 1976 were positions separated by a \·Tide 
gulf a Same Rulers had handed over various of their local 
deparbnentsu others had nato Sane of the poorer had pushed for 
higher Federal spending whilst others resistedo 'rhe 1976 outcome of 
this first constitutionalist-integrationist clash was subsequently 
shown to have been more apparent than real; the merger of the anned 
forces was still incomplete five years later and the issue of the 
budget was never a..1licableo Far from laying the ground for a 
permanent settlement, the constitutional amendments of 1976 so.-led 
the seeds of the dispute that brought the Federation to its severest 
test in 1978o 
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After the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and 1974, Gulf 
governments e~ked on a frenzied spending spree on a scale which 
won worldwide celebrityo Contractors, banks, suppliers and 
individual entrepreneurs swanned ino Not surprisingly, the 
· two-year-old and severely underdeveloped UoAoEo addressed the problem 
of its underdevelopnent by throv1ing the new bonanza money at ito 
Federal Budget allocations multiplied from DhsOoSbn in 1973 to 
Dhs13bn in 1977 and gross domestic product from Dhs11bn to Dhs52bn in 
the same periodo Imports soared from Dhs3bn to Dhs20bn as the 
population grew from a little over 200,000 to 862,000 and deserted 
the villages for the ta.-mso As a result the indigenous population 
had been reduced by 1977 to a tiny minority in its own country and to 
a state of questionable relevance to the new ordero 
Three events then combined to end the boano The first signs of 
saturation in the market place began to appear just as a draconian 
shake-out at the CUrrency Board curbed the banks' expansiveness and 
the price of oil began to softeno Merchants now had too much stock 
on their hands, and heavy indebtedness to their banks in the face of 
dwindling contracts; profits slumpedo Among the uprooted and 
bemused population in general a backlash began to gain ground against 
the boom experience, against the foreign majority and in some 
quarters against Westetn-style development itselfo The surrounding 
73 
. rhe Imoact of Ranid Economic Change 
Islamic world was in the throes of its puritan revival at this timeo 
Historically-rooted differences of ethos surfaced between the b'/0 
largest members of the Fe:leration over the best approach to the 
economic challenge. 
Part of the aim of this chapter is to tell the story of these unique 
events but additionally it aims to pick out the contribution they 
made to the Federal dynamic and to the politicization of public 
opiniono 
The Econa:nv Before The Oil Era 1 
-- ------
Before the 1970s the livelihood of much of the small indigenous 
population carne from subsistence agriculture and from fishing by 
traditional methodso Pear ling, the main cash occupation, \'las 
established on the coast and general trade Has carried on in Dub3.i. 
Same small-scale industries existed to serve the fishing community, 
such as boat building and the manufacture of nets and traps o A 
British Embassy in Beirut survey of the Northern Eni.ra tes on the eve 
of Britain's \'lithdrawal reckoned that in 1968 c;Ajrnan and Uimn al-
Qaiwain had public revenues of just BDOo08m; Fujairah 0 s was BD0.24rn, 
Ras · al-Khairnah 1 s BD0.30rn, Sharjah 1 s BD1 .02rn and even Duba.i 1 s was only 
2 BD3.73m" 
Fishing was the main livelihood of the smaller Emirates of both East 
and \'lest coasts - gAjrnan, Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujairah. Agriculture 
74 
Chapter Two 
vas limited by the availability of water to four areas1 Ras al-
Khaimah, the Batinah coost, the chain of oases on the Jiri gravel 
plain at the foot of the Hajjar t-1ountains and the Liwa in the 
southern Abu Dhabi deserto Date palms and tobacco dominated fanning 
and C<311lels and goats were the predominant livestocko The camel, 
goat and date palm between them fed, clothed and housed this 
population for ge...1erations, the camel and goat by their milk, meat 
and hide and the palm by its dates, fronds - woven into barasti 
walls, roofing, floor matting and utensils - and ~~ which was 
used for corner poles o 
The population had gr~~ very little since Lorimer's fieldwork at the 
turn of the century# Fenelon estimates that 18,000 adult males of 
working age had been lost to emigration during the leanest years of 
the 1940s and 50s3o Its life-style knew of very few imported or 
non-essential artefacts; experience of the outside world among the 
tribal population of the interior was minimaL Illiteracy in 1968 
4 
was about 80 per cent o 
Commonly, families divided their labour seasonally between tending 
the date-gardens and a cash job, originally at the pearling banks 
and later at the oil industry siteso As the number of such modern 
job opportunities grew, fewer families remained dependent on farming 
or fishing, and the date gardens and fishing fleets gradually 
dwindledo Government ministries grew at such a pace to cope with the 
unprecedented administrative demands of the new oil era - and proved 
so attractive to local nationals - that they employed 15 per cent of 
the workforce by 1 97 3 o Allied in this case to the carnnon propensity 
of state organs to proliferate in less developed countries are a 
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number of social and political factors peculiar to the UoAoEou 
discussed belowo 
Britain's prime concern during ti1e •rrucial period had been with the 
maintenance of security and not with the economy5 o A Five-Year 
Development Plan giving priority to education and administration and 
costing l 450,000 had been implernented between 1955 and 1961 and a 
second Plan allocated It 550,000 for 1961 - 66o 'lb these small sums 
was added aid fran Kuwait, Qatar, 
The Arab League delegation sent to the area in the mid-1960s to 
investigate conditions produced a report severely critical of 
Britain's failure to initiate development projects, recommending, 
as was noted in d1apter Oneu 
organization for the area7o 
that the League set up its own aid 
Britain then saw fit to step up its 
own efforts, some say to pre-empt further atter1tion from the League 
in the light of the effects that Nasserism in its heyday was having 
in South Arabia at the time8 o The Trucial States Development Fund 
was set up in 1965 with an initial contribution from Britain of 
"!1m9 and the Arab League 1 s proposed office was quashed by means of 
a personal warning by George Thomas to the Rulers to have no truck 
'th 't10 w~ ~ o 
\'lhen Shaikh Zayid ibn Sultan came to power in Abu Dhabi the following 
year the pace altered sharply o Abu Dhabi contributed 50 per cent of 
the Fund in 1967 and 90 per cent in 1968 and undertook numerous extra 
road-building, 
tw.' t 11 =u~r.l es o 
utility and education projects in the Northern 
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Within this overall pre-oil scenario of extre~e simplicity 0 
howeveru wide diss~~ilarities marked the individual Emirates fran 
each othero li'hen \•hfrid 1'hesiger visited the Trucial Coast just 
after t.J1e Second vJorld \<Tar v Abu Dhabi had declined from the arid 
principality of 11,000 souls owning 410 pearling boats described by 
Lorimer 12 to "a small u dilapidated towno o o o o there were a few 
palms, and near the."Tl a well"13 o It then had two thousand 
inh.abitantso 
vlilderness"14 o 
In the early 1950sv Sir Rupert Hay found "a ha.Nling 
Dubai, by contrast, was in Lorimer 0 s time a larger 
tmvn of nearly 2,000 houses and 400 shops with already-considerable 
and expanding trade and a large community of foreign merchants15 
and in Thesiger' s "the largest [town] on the Trucial Coast with 
almost 25,000 inhabitants"16 o Sir Rupert Hay put its population at 
35,000 in the early 1950s17 o 
By then about a quarter of Dubai 1 s large population was foreign, 
furthermore, and the largest foreign group was the merchant 
corrununity that had migrated across the Gulf from the southern coastal 
area of Persia18 o These inhabitants of southern Persia claimed 
Arab origin and were largely Sunni by religious practice and Arab by 
mother-tongue o 
For most of the 19th century a Qasimi Arab governor bad administered 
Bandar Lingehv the most important port on the Persian littoral of 
the Gulf, on behalf of his kinsmen on the Arab shoreo Qasimi 
hegemony had been challenged intermittently, however, by the 
centralizing ambitions of the Qajar dynasty and during tl1e last two 
decades of the century Lingeh 1 s Sunni merchant class began to cross 
to the Arab side, where they were especially attracted to Dubaio 
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This wave reached its peak when Lingeh fell finally to the Qajars in 
1899o Sa.11e of Dubai 0 s senior merchants of today are the grandsons of 
those tum-of-the-century rnigrantso 
One of the pillars of Lingeh's prosperity had been the regular call 
by the .ao.-nbay steamship, which unloaded there goods destined for the 
Arab shore and its hinterlando \·lhen the new centralized Persian 
administration imposed high custorns tariffs on i.r.lports through its 
southern ports, Dubai maximized the opportunity by abolishing its 
own customs duties·o Encouraged by the Dubai ruler, the mutahaW\'lil 
("transferring") merchants then persuaded the steamship company to 
abandon Lingeh and call at JJ\.ltai instead, which it did on a regular 
basis from 1902o 
After the accession of Reza Shah in 1921, his tight monopoly of 
foreign trade sparked a second major wave of migration from southern 
Iran to the Trucial Coast again consisting for the most part of 
well-to-do merchantso Reza Shah's high taxes on sugar and tea 
tempted ti1em into illicit trading in such items and smuggling 
flourished a It grew still more important when the world market for 
pearls collapsed with the Great Depression and deprived the Trucial 
States of their main cash incomeo 
Others of the mutahawwil (or Hula) were driven out of Persia by 
distaste for Reza Shahls policy of secularization, especially the 
forced unveiling of women; still more made the move after Shaikh 
Khaz ~ al, leader of their etimically Arab southern province of 
Arabistan, was finally defeated in 192419 0 
78 
.Chaoter Two 
t-iany of this second wave originated fra-n the Bastak region and the 
land they were given in Dubai became known as the Bastakia. The 
Dub:li BastaJ.:ia \vas v and still is, tl1e symbol of Hula culture. The 
characteristic \vind-towers stand facing the Ruler's Officev a neat 
embodiment of the place of the merchants fran Persia in the life of 
the town. 
Dr z.luhammad l'lorsy Ab::lullah ascribes their successful penetration of 
Gulf trade to the sociological factor of the value-system held by the 
indigenous Arabs. These tribal Arabs might concern themselves 
honourably v1ith warfare, pearling and dhows but eschewed lx>th trade 
in other merchandise and shopkeeping20 • 
The two communi ties, tribal Arabs and Hula, did not inter-marry or 
encroach on each other's spheres of influence; rather they lived 
symbiotically. In time a backlash against the Persians 0 eminence 
gained ground among the "true" Arabs who disparaged or denied 
altogether the Hulas' Arab ethnici ty. The tensions were in evidence 
by the 1 960s and had hardened by the depressed 1 980s, when the 
Bastakia was partly demolished to make way, symbolically, for a new 
enlarged Ruler's office. Nonetheless, Dubai during the heyday of 
Shaikh Rashid in the 1960s and 1970s - which included the gestati ve 
and formative years of the Federation - \vas an alliance, a "quasi-
contractual" one21 between the then-daninant faction of the Arab 
~Bktums and the Hula merchant class. 
After ShaiY.JJ. Rashid formally succeeded his father in 1958 Dubai, 
having already started improving its Creek, embarked on two decades 
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of rapid modernization 1 acquiring a land registry u a Municipality, 
a National Banku a police forceu public utilities and a Chamber of 
Canmerce by 1965 u follo\ved by a port and international airport22 o 
L11ports into Dubai multiplied ten-fold in the ten years 1964-7 3 
before, that is, the great oil price rises and the mega-projects of 
the mid-seventies23 0 Shaikh Rashid continued to give land to 
foreigners occasionallyu including refugees fro~ Zanzibar after 
Karumeh's coup and the Bengali boat-people after the break-up of 
Pakistan, despite the fact that by then giving land to non-nationals 
had cane to be regarded in nationalist circles as incompatible in 
spirit with nationalismo 
Despite the far larger oil revenues spent by Abu Dhabiu Duba.i thus 
remained the largest town in the Federation until the late 1970s 
and, even after Abu Dhabi overtook it numerically, remained the 
capital of private-sector commerceo At the time of the 1975 census, 
Abu Dhabi Emirate had overtaken Dubai Emirate in terms of population 
but the town of Abu Dhabi was still smaller than the town of 
Duba .24 l. 0 
The Boom Years _____ ..;;...;;;.;;;;;= 
In Abu Dhabi crude oil exports began in 1 962 but revenues arising 
from them did not begin to be spent lavishly until Shaikh Zayid 
replaced his brother Shaikh Shakhbut in 1966o In 1968 and 1969 they 
were spo-nt so determinedly that Abu Dhabi succeeded in running into 
deficit1 revenue in those two hectic years stood at BD55o4m and 
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BD68o 1m 
BD82m25 o 
respectively whilst e..xpendi ture reached BD59o4m and 
Again 
of Dhs1o5bn26 v 
in 1 97 4 Abu Dhabi overspent its development budget 
indicating the vast sums poured into its economy by 
the Emirate's new Government in those years and its relative success 
in achieving spending targetsu which was better than the Federal 
Government 1 s record even though the Federal Government had smaller 
sums to spend until 1977 o 
As a result Abu Dhabi now began to overtake Dubai as the largest 
population centre27 0 Its faster quantitative and different 
qualitative growth produced discrepancies which were plainly apparent 
by the middle 1970s. Although the construction industry absorbed the 
largest percentage of labour in all the Emirates in 1968 u - 26 per 
cent of total labour on average - in Abu Dhabi fully 40 per cent of 
the labour force \vas concentrated in that sector (see Table 1 ) o Abu 
Dhabi's relative share of the Federation 1 s labour force grew to 42 
per cent canpared \vi th Dubai' s 34 per cent28 0 
Having been brought to power expressly to spend the oil revenues of 
which his brother and predecessor Shaikh Shakhbut had been so 
apprehensive, Shaikh Zayid evolved for Abu Dhabi amid the 
unimaginable physical changes a conscious philosophy of saving the 
local nationalv especially the unskilled local national, from being 
left behindo 
The three cardinal examples of that philosophy, the land use system, 
the trade agencies system and the transportation laws, have already 
been mentioned a Land can only belong to nationals; foreigners have 
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to rent ito In 1968 the maximull life of a lease was fixed by decree 
at eight years, after which not only the original land but also any 
buildings Hhich the foreign lessee had develoj?ed on it reverted to 
the ownership of the local citizen29 o 
lrn[X>rt agencies, one of the prime routes to riches, were granted only 
to companies which were wholly owned by local nationals, in contrast 
to the practice of other Emirates30 0 Transport vehicles could be 
registered under the Traffic Law of 1973 by Abu Dhabi citizens only 
or by CQllpanies wholly owned by Abu Dhabianso Contracting companies, 
if less than wholly local-owned, and the onshore oil callpany had to 
hire their transport from the local ownerso In 1976 the system was 
amended so that contractors had to hire 50 per cent of their fleets 
from local ovmers at rates stipulated by a special department of the 
1 . 31 po ~ce o MX-lA and later the various other offshore oil ventures 
\vere exempted but the law remained an effective channel of wealth 
distribution - and an irritant to company managernentso 
Combined with an extensive network of social welfare benefits and 
subsidies, these characteristic Abu Dhabi groundrules added up to a 
distinct, protective philosophy which was not shared in toto by 
Dubaio 
But by 1975 all seven Elnirates were in the throes of urgent 
transfonnation and it was symbolic that Fujairah, the most re110te 
one, lying entirely on the East Coast beyond the Hajjar .1\'lountains, 
was linked by metalled road to the other flnirates and thus to the 
rest of the world for the first time that yearo 
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Federal budget expenditure 
Dhs2.278bn32 and im?orts 
trebled fro11 Dhs865m in 1974 to 
rose from Dhs7.1bn to Dhs10.9bn33• 
Lebanese businessnEn, 
Lebanese civil war, 
flocking to the Gulf at the outset of the 
epitomized the nevl atmosphere with their 
sophisticated advertising agencies and ~nart boutiques. 
In Abu Dhabi the local developnent budget jumped in 1975 fran 
Dhs1.5bn to Dhs3.5bn34 • llork began at Das Island on the Gulf's 
first natural gas liquefaction plant complex, costing over a billion 
dollars, and elsewhere on a range of smaller industries mostly 
serving construction, such as the cement plant. The congested Port 
Zayid was expanded and plans were drawn up for a multi-billion dollar 
petrochemicals city at Ruwais · where heavy oil- and gas-based 
industries would be concentrated, along with a population of between 
40,000 and 80,000 employees. 
The most conspicuous activity was on the building sites; the 
Corniche was soon lined with high-rise blocks and housing sprang up 
in a sprawl all over the untidy u rubble-strewn town. \'1ater supplies 
and electricity were stretched beyond their limits by the soaring 
population and frequently failed. Acco~~tion in flats and villas 
for residents and in hotels for visiting businessmen was unable to 
keep pace with demand and rents shot up to Dhs100,000 per annum 
(then $25,000) for a house, often of poor finish. Landowners and 
merchants made fortunes and the euphoria masked the necessarily 
cyclical nature of the property boom. 
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In Dt.lb:l.i, rents followed the same trajectory. Dubai's 39-storey 
International 'frade Centre P started in 1975 Q was to be the tallest 
building in the i·iiddle East. The~220m dry-dock was designed to take 
tankers twice as large as any so far built. The Hiddle East's first 
(it was a decade of superlative adjectives) underwater road tunnel 
was opened under the Creek to relieve traffic congestion on the 
bridge linking the city's two halves. An earth-satellite station was 
inaugurated to provide the most modern telecQ~unications - Dubai at 
this juncture was reported to have the highest nu'llber of telex 
machines per head of population in the world. An income in the 
region of an estimated Dhs4bn a year in the mid-seventies, collected 
from the two small offshore oil fields that began producing in 1969 
and 1972 respectively and reached an output level of around 330,000 
bpd, was supple"Tiented by borrowings on the international market to 
finance a 22-berth extension to the 15-berth Port Rashid, the dry 
dock, the Gulf's second aluminium smelter and a natural gas liquids 
plant. Again, construction was the most visible activity. 
It \'las in the third-largest flnirate Sharjah however that some of the 
most eye-catching schemes were hatched. Oil exports had begun only a 
year earlier in 1974 from a small field off the island of Abu Husa 
that had been occupied by Iran on Britain's \vithdrawal in 1971. 
Revenue from production, estimated at 50 P 000 bpd at the time but 
destined to drop sharply in the coming years, was shared in theory on 
a 50-50 basis between Iran on the one hand and Sharjah plus Umm al-
(aiwain on the other. Sharjah and Urmn al-Qaiwain made this sharing 
35 the subject of a continuing dispute throughout the 1970s • 
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On the strength of this part share in a s:nall oil field, Sharjah had 
under construction by 1975 a port a.'1d an international airport, a 
dozen luxury hotels, a man-made lagoon dredged on a man-made island 
in the middle of a natural lagoon, a "square mile" of 12 ta,.1er 
blocks to house banks and other financial institutions, a deep-water 
port in the East Coast dependency of Khor Fak.kan, and the inevitable 
cement planto 
The young Ruler's energetic American advisor cw~paigned to attract 
private-sector light industries, marketing Sharj ah on the strength 
of its liberal attitude to investorso Even tourism was promoted, 
despite the UoAoEa 's ungenerous visa policy, and in subse--.JUent years 
Prince Alfonse de Hohenloe opened one of his jet-set Narbella clubs 
in the Emirateo Land ownership was not restricted to UoAoEo 
nationals, v1hich made Sharjah a magnet for Lebanese emigreso 
By the end of 1975, the UoAoE .. had suddenly acquired a ~pulation of 
around 600,000, three times its 1968 size, served by most of what 
urban life in the \vest has to offer, from hospitals and colour 
television to hamburgers, drive-in cinemas and the epitome of that 
lifestyle, the take-away Chinese restauranto It was also served by 
45 canpeting banks with 298 branches.. Bank lending grew by 70 per 
cent during the year36 and 50 per cent of that lending financed the 
import trade o 
By the end of the same year, the U .. AoE .. 's citizenry had abandoned 
its fishing creeks and farming villages en masse for life and jobs in 
the to\mso If the trend seems to have established itself remarkably 
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fast, the e>..1Jlanation is easily found in the extreme contrast 
between b,e hardship of the farming livelihood in the r~~ote interior 
on the one hand and the security and ease on the other of the modern 
town jobs provided by a Government which seemed to have limitless 
largesse Hi th which to provide thern 6 and which viewed itself and was 
viewed by its people as having an absolute obligation to do soo 
Between 1968 and 1975, as Tables 3 and 4 show dramatically, ,.rhile 
the population trebled and the workforce quadrupled, that proportion 
of the inhabitants of the four ~1all Emirates that supported itself 
by agriculture and fishing had dropped by a low of 40 per cent in the 
case of cAjman to a 
Qaiwaino OVer the 
government services 
of percentage pointso 
high of nearly 100 per cent in that of Urrnn al-
same period the proportion employed in the new 
had risen by hundreds and in two cases thousands 
The rush out of fanning and into the civil service was to continue 
through the second half of the decade especially in the case of 
Fujairah, which because of its remoteness beyond the Hajjar 
mountains suffered a time-lag before the changes reached ito There, 
the proportion of the economically-active population engaged in 
agriculture and fishing slumped from 77 per cent in 1968 to 25 per 
cent in 1975 and to nine per cent in 1980 while the average change 
for all sectors together was a rise of 103 per cento In Ras 
al-YJlaimah the proportion fell from 49 per cent to 15 per cent to 
eight per cent against an average rise for all sectors of 115 per 
cento For Umm al-Qaiwain the drop was from 49 per cent of the 
population engaged in agriculture or fishing in 1968 to 10 per cent 
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in 1975 and 8.5 per cent in 1980 in the context of an aggregate rise 
in the econa1lically-active population of 144 per cent. In. ~Ajrnan, 
farmers and fishermen declined fran 36 per cent of the econa11ically-
active po;;mlation in 1968 to to 4.5 per cent in 1975 and just three 
per cent by 1980 in the midst of a rise of 463 per cent in all 
sectors taken together. 
Taking ~1e four small Emirates together, the grcrwth in ~1eir 
economically-active population bet\oJeen 1968 and 1975 was an aggregate 
146 per cent~ e1e growth in that proportion of their economically-
active population a~ployed in the government was however exactly ten 
times as great, at 1, 460 per cent37 o 
Not being broken down by nationality v these aggregate figures do not 
necessarily tell us that it was the UoA.Eo national as opposed to the 
inunigrant who left the land (though most farmo...rs were in fact locals 
before oil) or that it was he wham the civil service beguiled away. 
The aggregates reflect also the huge rise in employment in general 
caused by immigration and in some cases they demonstrate no more than 
the extreme p.:tuci ty of government services available to the small 
Emirates before oil. Figures for the employment choices of U.A.E. 
nationals do hcr,.,rever confirm both tenets (see Table 8b) o 
The 
was 
number of nationals in the workforce according to the 1975 census 
43,88838 but the "establishments census" of the private sector 
in the sa11e year puts only 8,829 U.A.Eo nationals in the private 
sector, where they constituted only 5o495 per cent of that total 
private-sector workforce of 160,67239• By the time of the next 
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population census in 1980 P the number of nationals in the work force 
the establishments census of the sa'Tle year 
puts ti1ose of the~ who were in ~1e private-sector at 9,292, having 
declined as a percentage of the total (366, 726) to 2o53 per cent41 o 
By contrast, the number of nationals in the Federal Civil Service 
alone, which does not include the larger local governments or the 
Federal or local police or military forcesp v.;as by then 11 P 78642 , 
i .. e .. more than the entire locally-born private sector .. 
In the industrial sector P according to a survey by Dlltai Chamber of 
Commerce in 1984, UoAoEo nationals made up just one per cent of the 
workforce .. Broken down in more detail by job-title, the survey 
showed that nationals occupied six per cent of the administrative 
posts in industry but only 0 .. 3 per cent of the technical and 
engineering jobs - just seven persons in all - and 0 .. 02 per cent of 
the blue-collar jobs or 13 U .. A .. E .. nationals in a1143 0 
Although Abu Dhabi's National Consultative Council protested 
regularly in its fortnightly debates and annually in its reply to the 
opening address44 against the failure of the majority state-owned 
oil canpanies to nationalize their staffs - which were still only 12 
per cent national by 1985, they said45 - it \'laS not the shop-floor 
jobs they covetedo In-house training schemes had difficulty in 
attracting and keeping local personnel; proposals to open a 
technical training institute had a markedly hostile reception in the 
Federal National Council on the grounds that such an institute was 
incompatible with the U .. A .. Eo 's cultural climate and had to be 
dropped46 o This sharply-perceived distinction between culturally-
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acceptable and culturally-unacceptable jobs is common to all the Gulf 
societieso Indeed in Sacudi Arabia it has been dernonstrated that the 
incentive of high wages carries little or no \·Ieight in attracting 
citizens to certain jobs 
''honourable1147 o 
if the jobs in question are not 
In the private sector as a whole UoAoEo nationals were outnumbered 
50:1 by 1980, according to a Hinistry of Planning reporto Nationals 
made up one per cent of the workforce in construction, two per cent 
in petrochemicals, three per cent in manufacturing, five per cent in 
trade, hotels, restaurants, transport and communications and eight 
per cent in banking and finance 48 0 
In sharp contrast, by 1983 sane 31 per cent of all civil servants 
were UoAoEo nationals 49 o Graduates and secondary school leavers 
took it for granted that the Government should and would find them a 
desk job, an assumption so confident that 95 per cent of all 
graduates applied to the civil service in 1985, according to the head 
of the civil service cornmission50 0 
This is a well-documented preference throughout the Arab world51 
but one which the U oAoEo has been enabled to indulge to the full by 
the abundance of cheap imported lal::our o In Abu Dhabi all national 
graduates were guaranteed a state-sector job by decree in 198252 o 
As well as the obvious relative ease and security of desk jobs, the 
public sector benefits fro~ both a political assumption and a 
cultural inhibitiono It is accepted implicitly in the UAE as in 
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other Gulf states that the government 0 s raison d'etre is to ~~e 
amends for' the times when life was hardo This obligationv ex;Jressej 
in Arabic as the philosophy of "ta c. a·,.;idh" com:Jensation 
- v • p is so 
pervasive as to form in. sane ways the Gulf's equivalent of the 
contrat sociaL So:ne writers contend that it may have its roots in 
or be reinforced by the tribal custom of sharing booty and of buying 
loyalty with subsidies and gifts53 o 
The most obvious and inrnediate way of "canpensating" is to give out 
salaries a 'I'hus is was often the fact of being a UoAoEo national that 
entitled an applicant to a civil service positionv rather than his 
qualifications and regardless of any actual need for staff54 0 The 
political need to create jobs proved so strong as to prevail over the 
need to cut current expenditure \vhen the oil glut decimated the 
UoAoEo's revenues in the 1980so In the worst year, 1986, 600 new 
Civil Service jobs of high rank were created for new graduates but 
that nu1lber was inadequate and had to be increased to 700, whereupon 
the civil service commission immediately began to agitate for a 
further increase to 1,000 new jobs annually to cope with demand fran 
nationalso In shortv the UoAoEo lD(e the other Gulf oil-exporters 
pursued a policy of "creating jobs for applicants, not applicants 
for jobs"55 o 
As a result many civil service jobs entailed either very light 
demands on the employee or none at all, which further sharpened the 
contrast between civil service jobs and the private sector and 
further sharpened the attractiveness of the fonner at the expense of 
56 the latter o 
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CUlturally 6 job choices are restricted by an inhibition ~,orhich see:11S 
to militate strongly against beComin3 another individual's ~nployeeo 
•rhis attitude encouraged those who did not work for the state to 
borrow money from banks 6 which were competing to lend it .to them in 
the mid-1970sr and open their own s:nall businesses rather than work 
In 1975 only 8 6 829 UAE nationals worked in the 
private sector, as we have seen 6 but only 5r222 of those 8r829 v1ere 
actually employees~' the other 3r607 being classified as "v."'rking 
proprietors"57 o UAE nationals had declined as a 
proportion of the private-sector v10rkforce to only 2o53 per cent or 
9,292 out of a total of 366r726 6 but by that time the number of 
"working proprietors" had actually overtaken the number of UoAoEo 
nationals who were employees: 5 r 430 UAE nationals owned the 
businesses they v10rked in but only 3, 862 nationals worked in the 
capacity of ernployeeo Thus fewer nationals \'lere wage-earners in the 
private sector at the end of the boo.11 than \men it began58 o The 
number of UoAoEo nationals in the federal civil service alone was now 
11 , 786 (see above), by way of canparisono 
In 1975 the smallest and poorest Emirates of Fujairah, Umm al-Qaiwain 
and ~Ajman were already in the curious position of having more 
nationals who \~re employers than nationals who were employees59 v 
perhaps because "working proprietor" includes fcmners o By 1 980, 
however, all of the Emirates were in that J:X>Sitiono •ro take two 
extreme examples 1 Abu Dhabi Emirate's western-most village of 
Ghiyathi in the desert boasted 36 canmercial establishments in 1980 
but not a single UAE national v1orked in any of themo At the other 
end of the country, the fishing village of Badya at the foot of the 
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Hajjar mountains on the north-east coast supported 87 establishments 
in 1980 but again not one of them had a single employee who vlas a 
UoAoEo nationa160 o 
'l'here are tv1o implicationso One is that not even t.'le severe hardship 
of the far-flung villages could induce the school-leaver to ~~e on 
the status of saneone else's employee when there \'/ere immigrants 
available insteado The other is that aversion to private-sector jobs 
is not the product of the luxury of choice available in the new urban 
centres; it pre-dates urbanizationo 
The impersonally-~...ned and impersonally-managed public shareholding 
companyp vmich might have escaped this inhibitionv was very slow to 
gain acceptance and did not contribute to the formation of employment 
patternso Only 373 companies or 2o2 per cent of the total 16v997 were 
shareholding companies at the time of the 1975 establishments census 
whereas or 90 per cent were O\'lned by individuals or 
partnerships of individuals61 o Five years later the number of 
shareholding companies vtas still only 507 v down to 1 o 4 per cent of 
the total of 36,84762 o By then ninety-five per cent were owned by 
individuals or partnerships of individualso 
Both of these idiosyncrasies - the preference for civil service work 
and for ovming companies - might have had to yield in some degree to 
a process· of adaptation had it not been for the proximity of the 
ever-overflov1ing lal::xJur pools of the Indian subcontinento In the 
event they were both rigidified and, as both depended directly or 
indirectly on Government spending, they set up an employment 
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structure for the UoAoEo Hhich t.;as threatened in its entirety by any 
future change in Govem'lP_nt reve.nuev that is in the price of oiL It 
is in this absence of an Luperative to ada~t L~t any comparison 
breaks down betHee.n the UoAoE 1 s ffi.1_Y->._rience and b'hlt of other 
countries which have undergone a sudden eco.ncmic transformationo 
By the end of 1975, the U oAoE had a \'iorkforce vlhich wa_s 40 per cent 
Indian, 25 per cent Pakistani, eight per cent other Asians, nine 
per cent European and 18 per cent Arab63 0 
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~bre of the same high-speed growth and physical change d1aracterized 
1976o Luxury go:xls filled the new shops and boutiques a Abu Dhabi 1 s 
oil receipts rose from Dhs14o4bn to Dhs19bn and development 
allocations fran Dhs3o5bn to Dhs5bn64 o Dubai announced plans for 
one of the world's largest ports, to be built at Jabal~Ali at a cost 
of $1 ,6bn together \-lith an industrial tO\m housing an aluminium 
smelter and an eventual population of 400,000 - more than the entire 
population of the UoAoEo in 1973o Ras al-YJlaima.h, still not 
accessible from the other Emirates by dual ca:triagevmy v opened its 
international airport" the UoAoEo 0 S fourth, and began building an 
earth-satellite station independent of the Federal communications 
ministryo It vras noticeable that plentiful cash encouraged rivalry 
and not co-ordination between the Emirates as far as prestige 
projects were concerned65o 
The Federation°s budget grew from Dhs2o278bn to Dhs4,152bn66 and 
imports from Dhs1 0 o 9bn to Dhs13 o 6bn 67 o Transport equipment and 
machinery, imports for the construction industry" accounted for 42 
per cent of all imports and for 52 per cent of Abu Dhabi's 68 0 Bank 
lending expanded by 85 per cent during the year, three-quarters of 
it for construction and tradeo When the m.nnber of banks operating 
reached 55, 
licences 6 9 o 
the CUrrency Board imposed a moratorium on new 
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In the cases of Sharjah and Ras al-IChaimahu sc:rne of the a-nbitious 
projects v1ere being funded by foreign loans o Repayments due to 
foreign billru~s and to contractors began to add up to ~eep 
indebtedness70 o As an input into the future of Federal politicsv 
the debts were a significant product of the econo.llic upheavalv for 
they coloured the Rulers 1 expectations from the Federation a 
By 1977 GDP had mushroaned fran Dhs6o4bn in 1972 to Dhs51 oSbn 71 o 
The volume of imports sucked. in by develop11ent on such a scale was 
extremely large in per capita tenns and the rewards for the mo...rchant 
class were richo Imports rose from Dhs3bn in 197372 to Dhs20o5bn 
in 1977 73 1 at a rate of 112 per cent during 1973 1 54 per cent 
during 1974 u then 25 per cent and 49 per cent during 1975 and 
197674 0 The hypothetical sl~e of the individual in total imports 
leapt from Dhs6u973 in 1972 to the very high level of Dh20 1 362 in 
19771 a level high enough to cause concern for the future of the 
balance of pa.ymentso 
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The larger part of these imports were routed through Dubaio 
nnirate 
Abu Dhabi 
Dubai 
Sharjah 
'lbtal 
1975 1977 
value % value 
2~Table 9 
% 
1979 
value· 
1980 
% value % 
3,795 34o8 5,430 26o9 7,752 29o1 10,471 32.0 
7,117 65.2 12,660 62.6 16,737 62.7 19,551 59.0 
2,567 8.0 
15 413 1 .o 
10,912 100.0 20,218 100.0 26,657 100.0 33,002 100.0 
(Sources~ 1975 and 1977, Dr Khaz e..al al-Jasim, Da"Yrr al-Tijara, 
op.cit; 1979 and 1980, al-Ittihad 18 October 1982) 
Given the smallness of the U.A.E. 's indigenous population, it is 
obvious that so high a level of imports can be sustained only by a 
continuing high level of irrmigration. Hostility else"Ylhere in the 
population to irrmigrants is not shared by the established merchant 
class who \vield great, and in the case of Duba.i decisive, influence. 
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Peculiarities of the UoAoEo private sector 
In shortu these three peal;. years of the b::x::m 1 975-77 saH the 
fonnation of a private sector in the UaAoEo that vlaS highly 
idiosyncratic in sizeu structurev sectoral canposition and above 
all in national make-upo Its size doubled fran 16,997 companies with 
160,672 staff in 1975 to 22,350 with 324v596 in 1977, a remarY~le 
enough development in itself75 0 f.1ost of these concerns were very 
smalL Smallness was especially characteristic of the trading 
companies, meaning to all intents and purposes importing companies, 
that accounted for 60 per cent of all comp:mies in both years and 
where over 90 per cent in both years had fe\'ler than 1 0 staff 76 o 
The largest single segment of the workforce - 35 per cent in 1975 and 
46 per cent in 1 977 - was employed by just one sector v 
construction77 o 
Only 32 per cent of all compariies in 1975 and 39 per cent in 1977 
were owned outright by UoAoEo nationals or by UoAoEo nationals in 
partnership with others78 ; the majority of the remainder were 
owned by Asians, particularly Indians79 0 These dQ~nating 
features of the UoAoEo 1 s business life were to exacerbate economic 
problems when the boom ended and inevitably beca~ a political hot 
but despite their drawbacks and dangers the private sector 
was to prove peculiarly impervious to reformo 
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1977: The Great Reversal 
All the record-breaking increases and. statistical superlatives sprang 
fra.11 Government spending o But su~ allocated for spending and su~ 
actually spent differed by a wide gapo It \·las revealed by the 
Higher Budget Co.TIITiittee set up at the end of 1976 under the 
chairr.a'1.ship of the Ruler of Sharjah that targets had been met at a 
rate of only 40 per cent on average in the three years fran 1974o 
The 1976 rate was 41 per cent00 0 
Up to and including 1 975 capital outlay v according to a later 
Hinistry of Planning analysis, had not e.v.ceeded the country's 
absorptive capacity o By the end of 1976, on the other hand, the 
absorptive bounds had been over-run81 o For the first time since 
Federation, therefore, allocations for new projects \tlere cut back in 
the 1977 budget and fell by 225 po_r cent from Dhs478m in 1976 to 
Dhs147mo OVerall, the total 1977 budget of Dhs10o9bn, later 
increased to Dhs13a1bn, appears to dwarf 1976°s Dhs4a15bno Abu 
Dhabi, however, having pledged 50 per cent of her private revenue 
to the Federal budget during the manoeuvring at 1976 re-elction time 
( see Chapter One) , had now for the first time charged her own 
big-spending departments of education, health and infonnation to the 
central budgeto 
82 Dhs13o 1bn o 
These accounted for Dhs5o6bn of the total 
Any cutback in Govern.11ent eA-pendi ture was especially bad news for the 
construction sector; sane 52 per cent of all capital investment in 
the UoAoEo between 1972 and 1977 (Dhs23o5bn out of Dhs45o5bn) 
stemmed directly fran the Governmento But after two years of hectic 
building the supply of housing and offices, so inadequate in the 
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earlier yGU.rs q \'laS soon to catch up Hi th and then overtake 
dernanct83 o Sharjahq \'There so much pro1)8rty had been built in those 
yearsi faced a particularly severe squeeze when rent rises began to 
decelerateo The CUrrency Board, already alanned by the uncontrolled 
grO\·lth in bank lending and money supply q n0\'1 feared for sane of the 
tanks that had made extensive !endings to developerso 
Because of the quick returns to be made hitherto fran property or 
importsq few private-sector capitalists had made the move into 
alternative sectorso Industry consisted of a few factories making 
ice-cream, canning soft drinks or producing cement blocks o Hhen the 
construction boom ended and rents and imports ceased rising, the 
average businessman had little alternative income to cushion the 
blowo 
\'lith lending to property still increasing but returns no longer so 
attractive 6 the CUrrency Board took drastic action in Hay 1 977 o 
Banks \~re required by Circular 376 to reduce ti1eir lendings to a 
multiple of 15 times their capital plus reserveso The ratio of their 
dirham deposits iliat the banks had to lodge with the Board was 
increased from five to 7oS per cent, taking the statutory multiple 
of that increase out of the econanyo 
No licences for new banks or ne\·1 branches of existing banks \..rere to 
be grantedo 1-Urther, a 25 per cent deposit in cash was exacted on 
all letters of credit opened to finance importso Following an outcry 
to the Head of State, hO\'/ever q this last measure was dropped witilin 
the weekq illustrating neatly the tenuous extent of a Federal body's 
authority in canparison with the real pD\'ler of the CQ11Illercial lobby o 
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As a result of these steps, which the Currency Board came to call 
"the corrective measures 11 , the expansion of money supi.JlY sllunped 
fro.11 its peak of 82 per cent during 1976 to nine per cer1t during 
Bank credit foll~~ed suit with its awn expansion slowing 
from its peak of 87 per cent in the course of 1976 to just three per 
cent in the final quarter of 197785 • But of this total lending, 
ti1e construction sector continued to absorb an ever-increasing 
share, sane 45 per cent in Abu Dhabi and 23 per cent in the Northern 
:Emirates. Trade took a further 35 per cent of all lending by banks 
in Abu Dhabi and dominated lending in the other Emirates, where it 
v.ras 49 per cent of the tota186 • 
But the import trade too grew by less than one per cent in 1978 
compared with 49 per cent in 197787 • Clearly, if the property 
market was reaching saturation and imports were no longer to rise by 
the huge leaps and bounds of the earlier 1970s, many of the banY..s 
v.rere now in an exposed position. Two closed their doors, the Janata 
Bank, ovmed by the Government of Bangladesh, and thecAjrnan Arab 
Bank, which numbered among its founders the ruling family ofCp.jman. 
None of the success in bringing banking under control was achieved 
without bitterness, especially against the CUrrency Board's t-lanaging 
Director Hr Ronald Scott. But the measure that provoked the sharp8st 
protest from the merchants did not come from the Currency Board and 
did not stem fro11 the clampdown in bank lending. On 25th October 
1977 a Palestinian assassin, in an attempt on the life of visiting 
Syrian Foreign minister calxl al-Halirn 1\ha.ddarn, Jr..illed instead the 
U.AoEo l1inister of State for Foreign Affairs Saif Ghobash. This was 
the U.A.Eo's first political assassination outside of shai}dhly family 
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squabbleso Outragedu the local populaceu already ill-dis?Qsed to 
the foreign presence after a year of \vorsening recession 1 nov1 
castigated t.'le inu11igrants as a security threat as welL 'l'he Su;>re:11e 
Council met at the beginning of I-Jovernber in v1hat was to be its last 
session until , .. Jarch 1 979 and decided on security <;,-rounds to aoolish 
the transit visao 
Three-day transit visas had previously been available at airports to 
any visitor in possession of onward travel tickets o Dumi had becn11e 
the stopping-off point for hundreds of thousands of Indian sub-
continent migrants to the other Gulf shaikhdo.llS u vlho vrould each 
spend a thousand or two thousand dirhams in the suq on their journey 
honleo This important source of profit dried up overnight and caused 
further alarm in Duba.i over the way in which decisions affeeting 
Dubai's interests were being madeo 
The National Assembly and The Politicization of CoiTI!nerce 
also in Novernber 1977 u the Federal National Assembly in its 
character as a vociferous mouthpiece for anti-immigrant sentiment and 
a pressure group for nationalistic legislation approved a draft lav1 
requiring that at least 51 per cent of every business be a.vned by 
local interestso The law divided the Rulers bitterly, hov1ever 1 and 
was destined to be blocked for years to COlle o It imposed the 51 per 
cent local-ownership rule on all companies with an annual turnover of 
more than Dhs30,000 and stipulated that import agencies could Pe held 
only by companies which were 1 00 per cent locally-ownedo 
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Abu Dhabi already had laHs requiring 1 00 J:)"'...r cent local ownHership 
for both agencies and ca11panies88 0 Once the Federal Asse:nbly had 
approved the Federal bill v the Hinistry of Econcmy and 'I'rade fanned 
a number of joint conmittees vlith the l·lunicipalities and Chambers of 
Co:nrnerce of the various Elnirates to allow each to put fonrard its 
It soon b2ca.11e clear that merchant circles felt that the 
economy could not support new restrictions at a time of recessiono 
\·Tnen the canmi ttee 1 s report was published in t-larch 1978, all the 
Emirates were shrnin to be unanimous that the law should be enacted 
later rather than sooner and that the local authorities should be 
able to grant a wide range of exemptions, with many professions from 
barbers to accountants exempted altogether o 
Differences came to light over the power to exemptu with Abu Dhabi 
arguing that the pa.ver to grant exemptions to a Federal law lay with 
the Federal authority only whilst the other Emirates insisted that 
the pa.·1er belonged to the local Ruler concerneda Sharjah, in line 
with its policy of attracting light industry, ·moved that no local 
holding be mandatory for industrial ventures with a capital of more 
than Dhs15m and that a local stake of only 15 per cent be required 
for similar ventures capitalized at between Dhs2m and Dhs5m, with 
the local Ruler entpO\vered to reduce the canpulsory local stake in 
even purely commercial matters to 25 per cent at his discretiono 
Views on the time-scale for implementing the law ranged fran the 18 
months proposed by Fujairah to the five-year moratorium sought by Ras 
al-I~haimaho 
To the Government Is considerable displeasure the F oN a Co we..'1t on in 
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January 1978 to alter fundamentally a la\"1 regulating t.~e mmership of 
lan:l by foreignerso In its original draft prepare:l by the l1iinistry 
of Justice, tl1is bill provided tl1at foreigners in possession of land 
or buildings in the Uo.'\oEo before the la\v tool~ effect be permitted to 
retain ther.1 but that such property, \·men sold, could be sold only 
to UaAoEo citizenso Little land was in fact ovmed by non-Arabs and 
such as there \·las had often by gifted by Rulers in reward for long 
service or because of special interests or sometimes hardshipso 
other Arabs did sanetirnes buy and speculate in land; however, 
especially in Sharj aho 
\'Jhile passing through the hands of t.l-te Asse.-nbly 1 s legislative 
corranittee hOYlever, prior to discussion in plenary 1 the bill 
acquired a new paragraph changing it into an expropriation billo The 
new clause would have obliged all foreigners to divest themselves of 
their land and property in the UoAoEo within three years and to local 
citizens onlyo Nationals of SaCudi Arabia and other Gulf states \'Tere 
to be exe~ptedo Given the severely depressed state of the property 
market at that juncture, it was obvious that a foreign landovmer 
could have little hope of a fair dealo 
Although tl1e Assembly debate which ensued was one of the most heated 
in the body 1 s history 1 the need for further deliberation was finally 
accepted and the bill was handed back to the legislation committeeo 
In February the F oNoCo agreed to send the cabinet a canpra.'Tii.se 
fonnula giving foreigners six years rather than three to dispose of 
their property to local nationals but e~powering the Government to 
dispose of any such land itself in the interim if it saw fit to do so 
in the national interesto Dubai held up this second divisive bill 
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in the Supre:ne Conncil, claiming its ?revisions Here a blot on the 
..... • ' • . -'l na~1on s L~ge aoroa~o 
One of t.~e princip3.l outcanes of the FoNoCo's venture into carrnerce 
and the role of foreigners in the economy was thus to s;_:x:>tlight the 
divergence of attitudes betv1een lillu Dhabi and Dubai 1 maJ~ing their 
differences harder to reconcile until they paralysed political life 
in early 1979o 
Duba.i 1 s merchants were well aHare that their li velihoojs depended as 
much on imported consumers as on imported consumer goods o Dubai 
persisted in blocking all seven contentious pieces of restrictive 
legislation apj?roved and ardently desired by the FoNoCo 1 thus 
fuelling the frustration in that body that finally found expression 
in the Joint He11orandum of 1979 (see Chapter Four) o 
Immigration~ Tne UoAoE. 1 s Formative E:~ience 
But the Asse~ly went 
the immigrant rnaj ori ty. 
devoted to the dangers 
Council of r:i.nisters , 
on to vent ever more spleen over the size of 
At a rare secret session in April 1978 
of v1hat it called "free" immigration, the 
the executive, was formally invited b~' the 
Assembly to join it in a joint conmission to fonnulate proposals on 
the immigration issue for presentation to the Rulers in the Supreme 
Conncil. 'l'hus the F oNoCo Is first attempt to exceed its 
constitutional pov1ers v1as inspired directly by the presence of the 
foreign majority. 
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nass irnmigration has been ~~e distinguishing e..'qP--rience of all the 
Gulf states in their ncx:lern history and of all the Gulf states the 
U.A.:C. Is has been the extreme caseo hs 'fable 11 shoi·lS, the gross 
population of the then Trucial States at the time of the 1968 census 
had h..=....n 180, 000, out of which nationals v;ere 63 per cent and 
foreigners 37 per cent. But by the 1975 census the position had baen 
reversed: out of a total of over 600,000, only 36 per cent were 
local nationals (Table 10). By 1980 the proportion of nationals in 
the population had fallen to 28 per cent according to the census39 
but vlas reported in a i1lemorandum by the t·1inistry of Planning to have 
fallen below 20 per cent90 and to be faced with dwindling to only 
seven percent by 1 990 and only 2. 5 - 4 per cent by the year 2, 000 if 
the influx continuect91 o 
Non-Arab irrrnigrants made up 45 per cent of the p:>pulation in 1975 and 
51 per cent in 1980 in the census figures92 but again the 
£.1inistry' s l•lernorandum figures were more pessimistic, calculating 
that immigrants from the four supplying countries India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Iran alone constituted 54 per cent of the U.AoEo 
population. Comparable figures for the mid-seventies put the 
indigenous population of Qatar, by comparison, at 38 per cent of 
the whole, of Kuwait at 48 per cent, of saC.ucli Arabia at 73 per 
93 
cent and of :aa.hrain at 76 per cent • 
v;i thin the vlorld:orce, the immigrant majority 1-ms 57 per cent, 85 
t and 90 t . th thr . . 1 94 per cen per cen J.n e ee census years respect:J. ve y • 
Pach year, the number of work permits issued to non-Arabs far 
exceeded the number issued to Arabs. Of the 239,555 issued in 1976, 
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for exampleu sane 17 0, 51 0 or 71 per cent \·I ere to Indians, 
Pakistanis and other Asians o 
During the peak inflO\v years 1975-8 the already-s:nall proportion of 
Arabs entering the I.Joi~oEo workforce declinej from 18o4 per ce.'lt of 
work-pennit holders to 15o 7 Z:Jer cento Indians and Pakistanis 
maintained their share and the fastest-grm1ing carrrnunity vTas that 
fran the Far East, \vhich fro.11 only 6o 4 per cent in 1975 had cane to 
represe.'1t 15o 4 per cent by 197tl ('fable 13) o By that year the 
workforce -vms thus 1 5o 7 per cent Arab a11d 84 o 3 per ce...'1t non-Arabo 
The rise in the proportion of Far !:!astern nationals reflects the 
S\'litch in demand tovmrds relatively more highly sldlled personnel at 
the end of the construction boom95 0 
Hi thin these aggregates, Abu Dhabi's and Dubai 0 s experiences were 
divergento In tenns of general population, Abu Dhabi had attracted 
66 per cent of all the Arab migrants in the UoAoEo at the time of the 
1975 census and they made up 32 per cent of Abu Dhabi's total 
inhabitantso Abu Dhabi's Arab immigrant community ~'1en grew in 
absolute tenns by 1 07 per cent between the 1975 census and the next 
in 1980, when 64 per co....nt of all the Arab irrn11igrants in the UoAoEo 
lived in Abu Dhabi and accounted for 31 per cent of its populationo 
Only 17 per cent of the country's Arab community ma.de its heme in 
Dubai on the other hand, according to the 1975 figures, and they 
constituted only 9oS po._r cent of Dubai 0 s total populationo In ~'1e 
next five years to the 1980 census DW:ai 's Arab migrant canmuni ty 
grew by only 51 per cent - less than half the rate in Abu Dhabi - so 
that in 1980 Dubai hosted only a 12 per cent sr.are of all the Arabs 
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in t.""le . U .A.E. cmd they represented only 9. 7 per cent of Dubai 1 s 
inhabitants96 • 
In terms of \vorkforce, Abu Dhabi's largest percentage of worJ~ 
pennits Has a\·lardcd. to Arab nationals whilst Dubai 's preference Has 
again for Indians. Dubai granted fevler worl~-permits to Arabs than to 
:Europeans, in fact97 • This contrasting tendency reflects .Z\bu 
Dl1abi 1 s tx>Sition as the de facto capital and thus hane of the 
Govern·nent i1·linistries, which tended to recruit .itrabs, against Dubai 's 
J:X.>Si tion as the ccxrrnercial capital. Dubai housed 42 per cent of all 
private-sector workers in 1975 against Abu Dhabi's 39 per cent and by 
the time the boom peaked in 1 977 the distinction had beco11e more 
marked: Dubai still had 42 per cent of the private sector Horkforce 
but Abu Dhabi's share had dropped to 32 per cent. In figures Dubai 
tovm's private sector workforce in 1977 was 135,103 against Abu Dhabi 
town's 63,74998 • 
The ~bate 
The reasons for the U.A.E. private sector's preference for Asian 
migrants is a topic of hot and hostile debate among Gulf 
intellectuals and has inspired a large literature. Chief among the 
reasons usually cited is the explanation that Asians are perceived as 
relatively more \'lilling than Arabs to tolerate minimum 1:1ages and 
d 't' 99 con ~ ~ons • 
Then comes the assumed relative political apathy of Asians compared 
\'lith Arabs, and the Gulf governments' concomitant failure to ratify 
any of the Arab League instruments on the inter-Arab transfer of 
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labour 100; their suptx:>se:i te.:'1dency to stay for shorter periods -
which is however rebutted by sane statistical studies101 ; their 
superior sl~ills - again re::mttec:i by reference to the sectors in ·v;hich 
the strength of pre-existing historical links 
. t tl U " E .. I d. l OJ - . th ' t' t th be ".veen 1e oii.o · o ana n ~a Corni_)are:! H~ \vea.Ker ~eS 0 0 er 
Arab countries, liru~s ·dnich are elevated by sorne ccm:nentators into 
conspiracy theories by Hhich the oil oanpanies sought to insulate 
their industry fran Arab nationalism 1 04 ; the popularity of 
11turn-key11 contracting, uhich left recruitment in the hands of the 
foreign contractor105, 
during the boom years106o 
and the sheer quantity of labour needed 
The well-organized character of labour exporting bureaux in 'L"le 
subcontinent and Far East is also put forward as a reason107, as 
is the structure of the private sector, which favoured very numerous 
small cornpanies wasteful of labour, and the legal frarne\'lork of 'L"le 
private sector, vlhich allo'l·led foreigners to own companies and import 
their fellow-countrymen108 0 
This legal framework was untrammelled by Federal legislation, since 
the licensing of ca~panies, and thus the po1·1er to control their 
number, rested vli th the local municipal authorities, as a result of 
Hhich two-thirds of all ventures in the UoAoEo were ovmed by 
f 0 109 ore~gners o Underlying that framework is the weakness of 
central planning in the face of the free market ideolo;nr, as the 
anti-immigration lobby sees it, a central \•leaYJ1ess exacerbated by 
the evident rivalry beb1een the Einirates vlho vied \·lith each other to 
appear bigger and more II~---'~ II 11 Q JIIUl.J,ern o The sponsorship system also 
takes much of the blame, v1hereby citizens were able to make money by 
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~aporting nunbers of Asians in the guise of personal servants and 
then releasing them to find work in return for an ai1..'1ual fee for th2 
renewal of the visa o 'l'his very large seg;:~ent of the wori~orce 
im;nigrants brought in as personal servants - \·las not even subject to 
the powers of control that the i'linistry of Latour did have, or to 
the LaOOur Lawo The importation of t.'1ese "servants" 1 v;ho are the11 
released illegally to fend for the~elves, is also arranged by 
service bureaux whose activities are again lice11sed by ti1e local 
municipalities and not the Federal Governrnent 111 o Finally the 
sheer force of habit of using the familiar, supposedly cheaper 
labour-intensive operating methoos, in preference to newer capital 
intensive ones requiring higher outlays112 1 is given as a general 
reason, a habit again reinforced by the fact that t'dO-thirds of all 
companies in the U oAoEo \<lere ovmed by nationals of the subcontinento 
Legislation impinged very little on the private sector's freedom to 
indulge its preferences since no visa quotas were operated for 
particular nationalitieso The UoAoBo did have labour-importing 
arrangements vli th Horocco 1 Tunisia and Sudan but these were 
government-to-government agreements which had little relevance in 
practice, despite the fact that the governments of Horocco and 
'l'unisia offered discounts of up to 40 per cent on airline tickets for 
employees hired under the sche.11e o 
It was the non-Arab i.rnmigrants v;ho tended to stay longest, as a 
demographic study 
UoAoEo \\7ere found 
stay of 6 yearso 
in 1975 concludedo The longest stayers in the 
to be t.'1e Iranian immigrants, \·Jho had an average 
Non-Arab irnmigrants on average stayed 3o5 years 
whilst the Arabs' average length of stay was 2 o 9 years o This is the 
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reverse of the ex)Jerience of i~m1ait and Sac:udi Arabia 113 • Of all 
b1e Gulf states, me U.A.:S. i1ad t.'"le HorJ:force uim b1e highest 
proportio.:1 of .'>.Sians, the collective ter.n use:'i roth in the official 
statistical aggregates and the :Bny can:nentaries for foreisrners fro:n 
~b1 thG In:lian sub-continent un:1 the Far .cast: !~sians ::ude u:;> 90.2 
per cent of the U.A.t:'s ':.'orkforce in 1~GO, 85 po2r cent of ~ta:::-'s, 
78 per cent of l'~U\..rait's, 58 per cent of I::ahrain's and 16.5 per cent 
of Saudi Arabia's, according to the same study. 
The ll.sian Has statistically more likely to be illiterate and less 
likely to oe accompanied by his farilily 11 4 0 'l'he visual i.:1pact on 
U.A.:S. society needs no emphasis. rrhe :;::>opulation developed marked 
social abnorrnalities115 o A disproportionate tranche of L'1e 
population was of Harking age and a hugely disproportionate nl.JI11l.y:>_r 
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were males o Only 31 per cent of me p::>pulation Has female in 
1975 and mere had been no improvement by 1980. Abu Dhabi sho,.,ed me 
imbalance, Hith a 73 per cent masculine population in ooti1 greatest 
117 years Illiterates constituted 41 per cent of the \~OrY~orce and 
68 per cent had no education whatever 118 o Arabic \~S the language 
neither of the street nor of business: nearly SO per cent of all 
sales staff in the country and 60 per cent of all clerical workers 
Arb 119 were non- ra s o 
Public opinion in the UoAoEo fell easily into the habit of bl~~ng 
the country's grov1ing crime rate on its peculiar demography o Quasi-
academic studies laid an extraordinary variety of charges .at 
~~gration's door, from low prcriucti vi ty in me workplace to me 
spread of disease, spying, economic and moral sabotage conspiracies 
~~d subversion120 
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hs immigration beca11e one of the central facts of life in the UoAoEo 
and do~inated daily lifev so public o~inion lost sight of the fact 
that few of the desired material iraprove:ner1ts \;rould have bee..'1 
possible Hit.'lout imported labour, given the mismatch of .sl~ills 
available unO. s!dlls required and the innate disinclination of mucj 
of the local ;>O;>ulation to\~'ards many cate~ories of employment:-
11
'l'ne Uo.hoEo citizen has lost his close social ties, and at a 
time \vhen he had imagined they would l::B deel?"'....ned by prospo._ri ty o 
'rhat Has his ideal, and his most important oneo It \vas crushed 
iP....nea th the bou tloa.ds of invading irrmigrants v who bro~~e dOi-m 
all social lxmds and set aoout annihilating the country 1 s Arab 
identity by their huge nu'Tibers and their dissimilar cultureso 
The colli'1Uy 1 s characteristic features have changedv yes, but 
in \'lhich direction? 'l'he buildings and roa.ds and electric 
lighting have rnultipliedv that is also true, but for whan? lvho 
lives in the buildings and uses the roa.ds and the lighting? Hmv 
much of the citiz~1s' money has it all cost? If the citizens 
plus t.'1e Arab with whom he works need one third of what has !:Ben 
built, by \vhat right were the other tHo thirds spent? This 
question also applies to streets, services, public buildings, 
hospitals, communications, spending on security, electricity 
consumption and similar services financed ?~'If of the country 1 s 
resources for the benefit of the non-citizen" o 
The most serious of the economic charges made out against large-scale 
iiThmgration has been the distortion of public spending o Nedical and 
educational capacity, roads, communications facilities, etco, have 
had to be supplied fro~ scratch on a scale quite unrelated to the 
needs of t.'1e indigenous population, the argument runs, and are 
therefore an unacceptable drain on the financial returns fro~ 
non-renewable oil reserves o To the an11ounced price of any contract 
has to be added the cost of all such extra utili ties entailed by the 
irnp:>rtation of the labour, plus in addition b'1e savings re:nitted 
ha-ne by the immigrant workforce o The true cost of any development 
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effort is thus in ~~e end a multiple of the cost of the 
contract122• 
In the case of 1~uwait it has i::x~en estiuuted that 553 e;.:tra j,X)Sts in 
education, health, security, etc., are neejed for each 10,000 
. . . 123 1.1n.111.gram:.s ; it is said that in Qatar an ·2:n::>loy•2e costing his 
employer aroillld QlZ2, 000 a montJ1 also costs the state a further 
QR4,000 a month in utilities, services and fuel and focrl subsidies 
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A more invidious effect of ii'llmigration, as we have seen, has been 
to foster the U.A.E. national's already strong prefere...-1ce for civil 
service or managerial jobs and his disinclination for menial '1-lork or 
indeed any v1ork in the capacity of an employee. Concern has been 
prompted not only by the direct results such as L~e proliferation of 
an absurd number of small caa:;:::anies operating in the same field and 
the loss of any incentive to discard labour-inta~ive met11ods but 
also by less palpable consequences. 
Hany Arab sociologists and econo11ists have argued that a population 
structure a'1d a politico-econani.c syste:u that allo\v all citizens to 
indulge their disdain for labour to G~e full may c~~nt their 
socially-based view of labour to the e;-:tent ~~t it may fail ~o 
respond to subsequent econanic ' 125 cnanges Further, a system that 
allO\·ls the local national to make a living out of the mere accident 
of nationality by selling his s;,:xJnsorship to co11panies and 
inC:i vicuals greatly i·7eake.•'1s link between effort and 
126 
reward • Expectations of high revmrd fro11 minimal participation 
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add up to v1hat the literature calls the "i:larginalization" of the 
citize:-1127 • 
Politically, the argu::1ei1t runs, the neH order has not o:1ly 
ilabi tuated the local national to a life of ease but has led l"tim to 
asswae uncjuestionil1gly that providing that life of ease is the 
Goverrunent's over-riding duty123 • Radicals go on to claim that 
capitalis.-n has b8cane enshrined and the influenc:e of the merchant 
classes a~1anced129 • 
Finally, the centrality of the public debate on inunigration has been 
argued to have had the effect of displacing Hhat lllight othen·1ise have 
been expected to be the central debate in a society rapiG.ly acquiring 
moo ern education: the demte on the un-mcdernized systern of 
govern-nent. Since tl1e goverrunent is easily able to satisfy the 
people's exi.Jecta tion of superior status over the im:-nigrant 
majority's, 
130 
concern 
it . is content to see such de-nands du11inating public 
A loose parallel could perhaps be dra\m v-li th Elie Halevy' s famous 
thesis that the energies Hhich the early industrial proletariat in 
Britain might othen1ise have channelled into revolution were diverted 
by the Uietho:1ist reviva1131 • The imnigr&tion issue has even l:::een 
dubbed the Gulf's ovm "opium of the masses" 132• 
Though such a parallel cannot be more than speculative, one of the 
most signi':icant features of the irmnigration debate is that it v1as 
alloHed to rage without constraint in the Government-guided and 
self-censoring press. Evidently sa-ne of ti1eir Rulers did see the 
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Young Turks' obsession v:i th the issue as having potential advantages 
outweighing the cost of allm;ing free e..x-_:Jression to the indirect 
criticism of their e.1tire oil-era strategy that hostility to 
im:nigration impliedo Intra-Federal as Hell c:lS abstract considerc:1tions 
may have been at ·..vorl:, too; Abu Dhabi 1 s al-IttihaC. an~ tb.e Young 
Turks 0 a.l-lilialeej were keenest on t:1c debate, Duooi 1 s al-ll::wan less 
SOo 
So full in fact \·las the discussion that in this particular instance 
the question of 110\v far the controlled press can be ta]~en as a 
genuine indicator of public O;?inion loses sa-ne of its \veight o Here 
i,ras an e:2r:lple of t.'1e not Ut"1ique phenanenon v1hereby the presentation 
of an issue -v;as itself fonnative of the issue; whether accurate and 
unbiased or overstated and partial, the ;x:>rtrayal of the immigration 
issue by al-Ittihad and al-l~1aleej was so pervasive b~t it moulded 
the popular perception of the state of the nation, rather like the 
pJrtrayal of industrial change and dislocation by Dickens and 
133 l'layhe\v o 
Also at v1ork is a co11mon readiness to look for scapegoats in 
preference to applying self-analysis and self-criticism to 
problem-solvingo Bl~~ing foreigners did not of course prevent sa~ 
nationals from continuing to ~~e a living out of selling visas to 
themo Though rarely ackno\·Jledged in b~e iirmigration literature, 
th . t d . . . 11 thr. . f ' 1 34 ~s ra e ~s s~~ a ~v~ng source o ~nca~e o 
A serious iS opposed to polemical attempt to grap;?le v1ith the massive 
social, political and econo:nic distortions forced on the UoAoEo by 
its dependence on imported labour was made by the farsighted former 
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Minister of Planning Sa~ id Ghobash in l'~ovembcr 197uo His r·iinistry 
subnitted a long f'.lemorandum to the cabinet analyzing the demographic 
problem and proffering a choice of polic-y optionso One of its 
fundamental suggestions v1as that the J:1oribw1d National Planning 
Cou11cil of 1973 be re-constituted v1ith a more active briefo 
This move was approved by the Supre."'le CoW1cil in I·E.rch 1 979135 when 
the Rulers also approved the idea of dra\ving up a "comprehensive 
medium-term social and economic development plan" to run fran 1981 
to 1985o 'fhe Plan \•las completed vlith immense effort but then 
shelvedo !11andatory central planning po1vers have proved to be too 
radical a surrender of local sovereignty and too W1popular with the 
merchant lobby o Sane Gulf vlri ters regard the vlhole concept of 
planning as too foreign in any case to impose on a society \-lhose 
whole economic experience has been of great hardship interspersed 
with chance bonanzas outside their control and vlhich is culturally 
inhibited by a resulting belief in the primacy of chance 136 o In 
the UoAoEo neither the Plan nor the new Planning CoW1cil ever saw the 
light of day o 
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Continuing Staonation 
By February of 1978 the Currency Board, estimatin;J that inflation 
had fallei1 to around 20 per cent 137 8 felt able to rela::-> t.~e 
"corrective measures" and business life began slowly to reviveo 
Under the terms of CUrrency Board Circular 418, the percentage of 
their dirham de;>osi ts the banks Here required to looge \·lith the Board 
Has reduced fran 7oS per cent to seven per cent; t.~t half per cent 
represented at the time some DhsSOrn ..,.,hich, when multiplied by the 
statutory deposits~lending ratio specified for each individual hallie, 
made sanething like Dhs250m - Dhs300m extra available for borrowers o 
Both local and foreign banks received long-awaited clarification of 
hm; their deposits and thus their total permissible lending Here to 
be calculatedo Foreign banks were authorized to include under 
"deposits" sums set aside for the purpose by their head offices 
abroad whilst local banks were allO\'led to include their borrowings on 
the inter-bank markets of more than six months 0 maturity o Though 
crucial if lending were to be resumed, the decision was a difficult 
one for the Currency Boardo Hhile foreign banks with small local 
deposit bases had been unable to make lendings on any scale before 
the clarification, local barnes complained of unequal competition if 
foreign banks' overseas offices were allmted to contribute in this 
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wayo A.'1ti-inflationa.ry brakes \vere added to the Circular 418 
package 1 38 but as far as the CUrrency Ba3.rd \oJaS concerned the era 
of tight ;noney \vas over o 
'fhe injections of Goverrunent money that the merchants and the FoNoCo 
alike looked for in the 1978 budget Here not forthcomingv on the 
other hando The upvra.rds curve in oil prices had started to level 
outo Fra.ll 1977 1 s Dhs13bn (which had again been greatly underspent) 
1978 ° s budget shrank to Dhs1 OoSbn 139 o For the first timev the 
FoNoCo approved the budget only with reservationso In a strongly-
worded f.'lerno to the Supreme Council the Asse..11bly protested at the 
continuing state of stagnation and demanded quicke reflation and more 
spending on education and health 140 o Other, unconsciously 
contradictory voices in the forum .called for access to the UoAoEo 's 
schools and clinics to be restricted to citizens and, inevitably, 
for tighter controls on limnigrationo 
The merchants too were still unhappy at the end of that year of 
change 1978, despite the CUrrency Board 1 s liberalization a For the 
first time, imports into Dubai failed to rise materially in value, 
reaching Dhs12o71bn oallpared with Dhs12o66bn the year before, and 
they actually fell in terms of volume141 o 
Though it \vas not vlidely realized at the time, the end of the boan 
was irreversible: over the corning five years 1978-83 Dubai's Lmports 
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\·!ere to grow by an annual average of only 3o4 p2r cent co11pared \·lith 
the annual average of 41 per cent during 1974-1978o Irn!JQrts of 
capital goods for construction proj~cts, vlhich had been increasing 
by 47 per cent a year in the earlier period, greH by only OoS par 
cent in the latter142o 
Nor did the Government's success in spending its allocations ~11proveo 
The overall achievement rate went down in 1978 to 32 per cent fran 54 
per cent the previous year, with some projects involving inter-
Emirate co-operation dO\m to one and t\'lo per ce..'1t of target 143 0 
To·wards the end of the year, the merchants organized themselves 
under Saif al-Ghurairu Chainnan of the Federation of UoAoEo Chambers 
of Commerce, to lobby the President o Among their chief burdens was 
that of interest repayments due to their banks on loans taken out to 
build buildings \'lhich were now standing empty - a burden which was to 
becane all too familiar in the years to caneo The Currency Board, 
ahmys concerned at the banks' exposure in the property market, 
shared their anxietieso The solution hit upon was the real Estate 
Bank, a state body which was to take over the commercial banks' 
loans to property developers in other words a state rescueo 
Borrowers would repay the state bank at reduced rates of interesto It 
was received like manna fran Heaveno 
Throughout the worst of the recession suffered by the other Emirates 
however, Abu Dhabi by contrast busily av.rarded the largest contracts 
in its historyo An onshore gas liquefaction scheme costing an 
estimated $1o6bn got underway and a consortium put together for the 
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develop11ent of offshore oil fields i·Tcls reported to be the largest in 
the world in terms of capital144 0 
Lonq-ter.n :Cffects of The Econcnic Uo~caval 
---
But if the manifestations of change have differed fran &"nirate to 
Emirate, the overall result of the econanic e.~ience of the 
mid-1970s has been ti1e creation of eA"}JeCtations increasingly, not 
decreasingly, dependent on oil and therefore on the Governmento If 
sectoral contributions to GDP appear to show a decline in the share 
of oil in sane years (see tables overleaf), the crude figures are 
misleading145o Closer exa'Tlination vlill shO\v that the percentage 
contribution of non-oil sectors to the GPD grevr by exactly that 
percentage by 1·1hich oil declined and at exactly the same time, the 
years of soft crude priceso It \•las not the non-oil sectors that greiv 
in importance but the price of oil that declined: when crude prices 
rose again in 1979, the percentage contribution of non-oil sectors 
fell bac~ to the level before the oil price erosion of 1977-So In 
other v1ords, there are no significant indices of the UoAoEo economy 
except the price of oilo 
Government spending is grov1ing at a faster rate, furthennore, than 
the value of non-oil productiono '!'his means that the Government 1 s 
and therefore the entire econo:ny 1 s dependence on oil has inter1sified 
over the period of the boo.uo Not only capital investment but also 
current spending outstripped non-oil inco11e, an op?Qrtunistic use of 
'1 t h' t' 146 o~ revenue o cus ~on consumo ~on o 
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GoverTh~nt Soending (Consu'71Dtion plus Fixej caoital Foraution) ard 
Non-oil i::brnestic Product 1972-77 (in Dhs million) 147 
Year Govern.11ent SDending: ~~on-oil G?D 
1971/2 1,500 2,351 
1972/3 2,100 3,538 
1973/4 4,500 6,079 
1974/5 7,600 9,516 
1975/6 11v500 14,268 
1976/7 15,400 19,289 
Average gra.·lth: 59 o 3 per cent 52o3 per cent 
Increasingly, rewards co:ne fran the state, directly or indirectly' 
in smn a ne\·1 manner of social organization, and one which channels 
eA"'J?8Ctations over the whole spectrum of econa.11ic, social and 
political issues increasingly tcrwards the Govern11ento 
Official figures148 , though slightly different, tell the same 
story: 
Public Finances, 1975 and 1930 (in million dirhams at current 
prices) 
Category 1975 1 980 Gror..Jth ~ 
Crude oil revenue 18,025 52,050 23o6 
Other revenues 1,626 3,972 19o6 
Public revenue 19,651 56,022 23o3 
Public expenditure 13,364 39,811 24o3 
Surplus 6,287 16 f 211 20o9 
Ratio of 1 to 3 (%) 91 0 7 92o9 
Ratio of 2 to 3 (%) Bo3 7 01 
P..atio of 4 to 3 (!s) 68o0 71 01 
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Conclusion~ The Political LeGacy of the Loo.-:1. Exnerience 
Dy the end of the )x)an years therefore the econany of the UoAol:::o had 
been revolutio:1izedo Frn11 an economy of extreme underdevelopn·2I1t v:ith 
a tiny p::>pulation su;??Qrted by subsistence agriculturev fishing and 
scxne trader it had metamorphosed into an economy of high per capita 
irni?Qrtsp the highest per capita incane in the \·JOrld and a large 
population swa11ped by foreign immigrants, increasingly urbanized, 
confirmed in its distaste for menial ·.vork and above all dependent for 
its lifestyle on Government decisionso This ne\'1 econa.'!ly had in few 
respects developed out of the old; except for importing P t..'1e nevr 
skills were not adaptations of the old; the ne\'1 lifestyle had not 
not grown out of roots in the oldo 
to find a niche in the ne\·1 order v 
to growo 
For those those who were unable 
a feeling of deracinement began 
\'lithin this scenario differences in ethos and living standards still 
separated the Emirates a Abu Dhabi's · oil J::x:x:rn continuedo Dubai 
insisted on the mercantile values in keeping vlith its entrepot 
tradition and in keeping with its merchants 0 vie\1 of the importance 
of the immigrant p:>pulation as a market for their goodso By blocY..ing 
interventionist lavlS Dubai vra.s brought into confrontation with the 
intelligentsia of the National Assembly P whose mm views had cane to 
be dominated by imrnigrationo Deadlocl~ on these lines vra.s to be a 
main cause of the Federal doldrums of 1978-9o 
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'l'able 2 ~ 1 6 
:EJ:ri.rates u Income as <;; of liliu D~bi 's 
-----
1972 1975 1930 
Dubai 34.4 32.8 32a9 
Sharjah 15.8 19.9 13.3 
l~jman 12a9 10.4 13a 1 
Has al-Khaimah 12a 1 10a9 14a8 
Fujairah 9a 1 9.2 1la8 
Urnm al-Qaiwain 15a7 12.8 14aO 
Increase in oer caoi ta incane 1975-1980 
--=== 
1972 1975 1980 
Abu Dhabi 225.9% 41.8% 
Dumi 234.7% 42.6% 
Sharjah 341 .. 3% -5.2% 
Ajman 180 .. 6% 79.2% 
Ras al-I\hai.'Tiah 216.1% 93.0% 
Fujairah 253.3% 81.9% 
Umm al-Qai\omin 185.6% 61.9% 
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OUtside the main to'.·ms, sa11e levelling effect had obviously been 
proouccd by the spending on electrification, ruads, schools and 
housing of the DDQ11 yearso After a time-lag in the early years 
during \·lhich Abu Dhabi, Dub3.i and Sharj ah enjoyed the biggest 
increases in per capita inco.11e, the poorer I:inirates in the second 
half of the 1970s sa\·l faster rises than the oil-exportinq- ones (see 
'fable 1 6 ) o If ~r capita income in the other tinirates is ex'_;>ressed 
as a par centage of Abu Dhabi's, ho\vev0r, it beco:nes clear that the 
poorer Eilli.rates enjoyed only a relatively Inodest ~~prove~ent: by 
1980, per capita inca~e in Fujairah \vas still only 11 .8 per cent of 
per capita inca.~e in Abu Dhabi 149 o 
But \·lhile enjoying only sa.-ne of the benefits of v.ret Shaikh Sultan of 
Sharjah later disparaged as the merely "concrete" revolution, the 
villagers of the poor Emirates began to suffer at the same time fran 
a new perception of the unacceptability of their still relatively 
deprived conditionso The fact that the immigrant workers v1ere 
present in such huge numbers while many local nationals lived on 
social security defined and underlined the marginality of the 
latters' role in the new ordero 
In their Joint He~randurn to the Rulers during the troubles to cane 
in 1979, the Assembly and tl1e cabinet CQ-nplained openly of the 
"economic inequalities" and protested that:-
"the state's responsibility is to all its regions, \oJhich means 
that equality and equilibrium must be esta;Jlished beh;een each 
regiono If o!1e region has a surplus of wealth 1t1hilst another 
suffers because of the lack of it, this does not tally with the 
principle of equalityo The effects of this situation are 
reflected in the disparate capacity for develo~nent in each 
region and the disparate economic and social opportunities open 
to their citizens"o · 
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been there; only t.'1e consciousness and 
discontent over them Here nevJ o '1'he 
t-ie.11orandtnn emlxxUes the first fruits of mass education - the Young 
Turks vlith their hostility to the uealth gapu to the foreign stake 
in the neH econOJ:-~y, to immigration and to personal u unmooemized 
forms of ruleu in sum a generation vlhose ideological input into the 
political systern represents potentially the most innovative product 
of e1e econo11ic upheaval of the 1970so 
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Table 2:1(a)Eoonornically-active Population~ Sector and flnirate, 1968 
Sector Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah cAjman UoAoQo RoAoKo Fujairah Total 
Agriculture 
& Fishing 2,284 1 ,601 2,503 437 582 3,736 2,398 13,541 
Processing 
Industry 880 1,546 392 25 22 153 11 3,029 
I-' Construction 11,731 4,029 2,530 183 142 939 320 19,874 N 
U1 
Oil 2,428 410 162 16 4 40 2 3,062 
Trade 1,787 40 434 1,006 150 114 469 68 8,028 
Banking 153 483 76 2 15 1 730 
Transport & 
Garnnunications 2,073 4,153 1 0 359 98 82 704 65 8,534 
Government 
Services 4,536 3,607 1,818 218 141 1 p 111 143 12,678* 
Other 
Services 3,412 3,700 796 93 93 418 78 8,595 
Total 29,284 24,014 10,642 1,222 1,180 7,585 3,086 78,071 
* Including the Trucial Scouts force of 1,0580 
Source: UoAoEo i:·'linistry of Planning, Central Statistical Deparbnent, reprint of 1968 censuso 
Table 2:1(b) Economically-active Population _2y Sectoral Irnnortunce and flnirate 8 1968 
Sector Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah cAjman UoAoQ. RoAoKo Fujairah 
Agriculture 
& Fishing 7o8 6o6 23o5 35o8 49o3 49o3 77o 7 
Processing 
Industry 3o0 6o4 3o7 Oo2 1o9 2o0 Oo4 
I-' Construction 40o0 12o8 23~8 15o0 12o0 12o4 10o4 
N 
"" Oil 8o3 1o7 1o5 1o3 Oo3 Oo5 Oo 1 
Trade 7 01 18o5 9.5 12.3 9o7 6o2 2o2 
Banking Oo5 2o 1 Oo7 0.2 Oo2 
Transport & 
Communications 7 01 17o3 12o8 8.0 6o9 9o3 2o 1 
Government 
Services 15o5 15o2 17 01 17.8 11o9 14o6 4o6 
Other 
Services 11o6 15.3 7.5 7.6 7.6 5.5 2o5 
Total 100o0 100o0 100.0 100.0 100o0 100o0 100.0 
Source: UoA.E. Hinistry of Planningv Central Statistical Departrnentv reprint of 1968 cerlSUSo 
Table 2~2 UoAoEo~ Population ~Emirate" 1968r 1975 and 1980o 
Emirate 1968 % 1975 % 1980 
Abu Dhabi 46,500 25o8 211,812 38o0 451,848 43o3 
Dul:Bi 59,000 32o9 183,187 32o8 276,301 26o5 
Sharjah 31,000 17 0 7 78,790 14o 1 159,317 15o3 
Ras al-Khairnah 24,000 13o7 43,845 7o9 73,918 7 01 
Fujairah 9,700 5.4 16,655 3.0 32,189 3.1 
cAjman 4,200 2.4 16,690 3.0 36,100 3.5 
Umm al-Quaiwain 3,700 2 01 6,908 1a2 12,426 1o2 
Total 179,100 100.0 
Sources: 1968: 1968 census reprints frar.11 Hinistry of Planning files; 
1975 and 1980: U.A.E. Hinistcy of Planning Central Statistics 
Department, Population Census 1975, Table 1 pp 29-39 and Population 
Census 1980, Table 1 pp33-48. 
127 
Table 2:3(a) Econanically-active Population f?y Sector and E'Jnirate 0 1975 
Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah cAjman UoAoQo RoAoKo Fujairah 'Total 
Agriculture and 
Fisheries 5 0 957 10 384 10 609 320 295 2 0 461 1, 543 13 0 569 
Processing 
Industry 8q043 91'538 20 861 764 192 10 776 345 23 0 529 
...... 
Construction 39 0 436 31 0 905 131'021 10 657 964 40 934 1,953 93 0 U70 
N 
CX> Oil 31'959 1q975 413 95 381 45 6,868 
'frade 12,657 19 0 538 30 448 499 190 1 u 111 272 37 0 716 
Bankinc; 2,249 21'843 506 106 42 15 1 5 0 997 
Transport and 
Communications 8,822 4 g 153 1 0 359 98 82 704 65 23 0 601 
Government Services 42" 175 22 0 888 11 0 669 3 0 038 1 0 121 40 663 1 ,812 85 0 376 
Other Services 30 412 3 0 700 796 93 93 418 78 8 0 595 
Total 123 0 299 101 0 335 35;653 6 0 875 20 875 16 0 277 60 212 292 0 526 
Source: l1inistry of Planning 0 Central Statistics Deparbnentu from 1975 censuso 
Table 2:3(b) Economically-Active Population gy Relative Importance of Sector 
and Emirate, 1975 
Sector Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah cAjman UaAoQo RoAoKo Fujairah 
Agriculture and 
Fisheries 4o8% 1a4% 4o 1% 4o7% 10a3% 15o 1% 24aB% 
Processing Industry 6oS% 9o4% BoO% 1L 1% 6o7% 1 Oo 9% So6% 
I-' Construction 31o9% 31o5% 36o5% 24o 1% 33o5% 30o3% 31o4% N 
\0 
Oil 3o2% 1 .. 9% 1o2% L4% - 2o3% Oo7% 
Trade 1 Oo3% 19o3% 9a7% 7o3% 6o6% 6o8% 4a4% 
Banking 1o8% 2o8% 1o4% 1o5% LS% L3% Oo6% 
Transport and 
Corrnnunications 7o2% 11o 1% So9% 1o4% 2o5% 4o5% 3o3% 
Goverment Services 34o2% 22o6% 32o7% 44o3% 38o9% 28o7% 29o2% 
Other Services 2o8% 3o7% 2o2% 1o4% 3o2% 2o6% 1o3% 
Total 100o0% 100o% 100o0% 100o0% 100o0% 100o0% 100o0% 
Note: totals may not add up because of roundingo 
Source: 1968 and 1975 censuses 
Table 2:4 Percentage Gra(rth in Economically-Active Population, !?Y Sector 
and Emirate 1968- 1975 
-----
Sector Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah cAjrnan Uol\oQo Hol\oKo Fujairah Total 
Agriculture and 
Fisheries +161% +140% -56% -37% -97% -52% -55% + Oa2% 
Processing Industry +814% +518% +630% +2,956% +773% +1,061% +3a306% +677% 
I-' Construction +236% +692% +415% +806% +679% +426% +510% +372% 
w 
0 Oil + 63% +382% +155% +494% - +853% +2,150% +124% 
•rrade +608% +341% +243% +233% + 67% +137% +300% +370% 
Banking +1,380% +498% +566% +5,200% - + 1 ,313% +3,800% +722% 
Transport and 
Communications + 326% + 171% + 56% + 294% - 16% + 5% + 212% +177% 
Goverrunent 
Services + 830% + 526% + 542% +1,298% + 695% + 320% +1, 167% +917% 
Other Services noao noao noao noaa noaa noao noaa 
Total + 321% + 322% + 235% + 463% + 144% + 115% +103% + 275% 
Source: from 1968 and 1975 censuseso 
~rable 2:5(a) Econanically-Active Population !2Y_ Sector and Emirate, 1980 
Sector Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah cAjman UoAoQo R.A.K. Fujairah Total 
Agriculture and 
Fisheries 15,556 2,160 3,200 478 476 2,553 1,190 26,513 
r1ining and Petro-
leurn 9,688 1 , 141 366 65 41 544 7 11,352 
Manufacturing 9,446 12 v 128 6,901 2,188 348 3,040 824 34,875 
Electricity, Gas 
and \va ter* (a) 5,302 2,515 1,939 264 139 539 254 10,952 
1-' Construction 90,100 30,472 16,51 0 2,795 1 ,447 7,322 6,332 154,978 w 
1-' 
\'lholelsale and Re-
tail Trade* (b) 24,023 34,532 10,472 1,634 420 2,435 816 74,332 
Transport and 
Cornmunica tions 16 v 136 17.004 5,901 923 207 1,473 394 42,038 
Finance, etc. 6,066 6,026 1,863 271 74 457 189 14,946 
carnnuni ty Services 96,402 40,591 26,115 5,969 2,399 12,382 3,838 187,696 
1'otal* (c) 261,766 147,334 73,661 14,702 5,591 30,940 13,931 559,960 
Note (a) Not previously listed separately 
(b) Includes hotels and restaurants 
(c) AllovlS for undefined activities and those seeking work for first time. 
From: U.A.E. i1inistry of Planning Central Statistics Department, Almual Statistical 
Abstract, Ninth Edition 1984, table 27 pp 51 and 52. 
Table 2:5(b)Econornically-Active Population ~Relative Importance of Sector and Emirate, 198 
Sector Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah cAjman U.A.Q. R.A.K. Fujairah Total 
Agriculture and 
Fisheries 5.7% 1o5% 4.3% 3.3% 8.5% 8.3% 8.5% 4.7% 
£-'lining and Petro-
leum 3.5% 0.8% 0.5% 0.4% 0.7% L8% o. 1% 2.1% 
~lanufacturing 3.5% 8.2% 9.4% 14.9% 6.2% 9.8% 5.9% 6.2% 
Electricity9 Gas 
1-' and Water* (a) 1o9% 1. 7% 2.6% 
w 
1.8% 2.5% 1. 7% 1.8% 1.9% 
N 
Construction 32.% 20.7% 22.$% 19.0% 25.9% 23.7% 45.5% 27 0 7% 
vlholelsale and Re-
tail Trade* (b) 8.8% 23.4% 14.2% 11.1% 7.5% 7.9% 5.9% 13.2% 
Transport and 
Corrmunications 5.9% 11.5% 8.0% 6.3% 3.7% 5.6% 5.9% 7.5% 
Finance, etc. 2.2% 4.1% 2.5% 1.8% 1.3% 1.5% 2.8% 2.7% 
Community Services 35.2% 27.6% 35.5% 40.6% 42.9% 40.0% 27.6% 33.5% 
Total* (c) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0 100.0% 100.0% 
Note (a) Not previously listed separately 
(b) Includes hotels and restaurants 
(c) Allows for undefined activities and those seeking work for first time 
From: U.A.E. ~tinistry of Planning Central Statistics Department 9 Annual Statistical 
Abstract 9 Ninth Edition 1984 8 table 27 pp 51 and 52. 
Table 2: 6Growth in Economically-Active Population ~ Sector and Enrirate, 1975 - 1980 
-----
Sector Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah «=Ajman U.A.Q. R.A.K. Fujairah Total 
Agriculture and 
Fisheries 161% 56% 99% 49% 61% 4% -23% 95% 
~lining and Petro-
leum 145% -42% -11% -32% 43% -543% 73% 
. i'1anufacturing 17% 27% 141% 186% 81% 71% 139% 48% 
Electricity, Gas 
I-' 
ar .. ~ Water* (a) w n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
w 
Construction 129% -5% -27% 69% 50% 48% 224% 65% 
Wholelsale and Re-
tail 'l'rade* (b) 90% 77% 204% 227% 121% 119% 200% 97% 
Transport and 
Corrununica tions 83% 51% 178% 842% 192% 99% 94% 78% 
Finance, etc. 170% 112% 156% 76% 116% 385% 149% 
Conununity Services 129% 77% 124% 96% 114% 166% 112% 120% 
Total 122% 45% 107% 114% 95% 90% 124% 91% 
Note (a) Not previously listed separately 
(b) Includes hotels and restaurants 
From: U.A.E. Hinistry of Planning Central Statistics Deparbnent, Annual Statistical 
Abstract, Ninth Edition 1984, table 27 pp 51 and 52. 
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Table 2:7(a)Economically-Active Population ~ Industry 
Industry 
Agriculture, forestry, 
hunting and fishing 
Mining, quarrying and 
petroleum extraction 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water 
Building and construction 
1968 
13 v 541 
3u062 
3,029 
19,874 
Wholesale and retail trade, 8,028 
restaurants and hotels 
'rransport storage corrnnunication 8, 534 
Finance insurance & real estate 730 
Goverrunent services 12,678 
Personal and social services 
Not defined or stated/ 
seeking work for first time 
Total 78,071 
1975 
13,229 
6,791 
17,205 
6,237 
93,411 
37,524 
23,383 
5,960 
63,272 
8,595 
290,330 
1977 
14,580 
10u200 
36,200 
11,500 
157u150 
74,690 
52,350 
13,300 
72u130 
23,318 
476,600 
1980 
26,513 
11u852 
34,875 
10,952 
154,978 
74,332 
42,038 
14,946 
0 187,696 
35,500 
2u678 
559,960 
Source: l'1inistry of Planning Central Statistical Department, Annual Statistical 
Abstracts 1979 p 54 and 1982 pp 46 and 47o 
~able 2:7(b) Number of Employees .!?Y. Sector 1975 .:. 1900 
Sector 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1930 grovrth p.a. 
Agriculture, husbandry, fishing 23,156 24,711 25,269 28,738 29,741 31,300 6.2 
Extractive industries 
a) crude oil 3,352 3,479 3,565 3,864 4 Q 115 4,630 7.0 
I) other 833 951 1 u 115 1,307 1,532 1,795 16.6 
Processing industry 17,205 24,100 33,140 34,000 35,170 39,200 17.9 
Electricity and Hater 6,200 7,000 9,600 11,200 13,000 16 g 190 21o2 
I-' Building and Construction 73,870 120u240 156,900 145u240 157, 190 142,700 14 0 1 
w 
Ul 
Wholesale and retail trade, 50,700 61,800 74,000 80,400 34,700 90,300 12.2 
hotels and restaurants 
Transport storage communications 31,021 43u925 59,850 65,950 66,300 73,900 19.0 
Finance, Insurance and Property~ 
a) finance and insurance 6u899 8,266 9 u 112 9,830 1 0 u 188 10,500 u.s 
b) property 185 266 423 686 884 900 37o2 
Goverrunent services 43,575 51,665 60,000 64ul300 66,500 72,0HI 10o7 
Danestic services 8,000 10,000 12,500 15,000 17,000 20,694 21.0 
'l'otal 288,414 383,983 477,301 494,480 523,240 541,0JJ 13o4 
from: al-TatavJTtrurat al-Iqtisadiyya \v 1 al-Ijtimac..,!m fi Dawlat al-Imarat al-l.:arabiyya al-~luttahida 1 
li 0 sanmvat 1975-1980, OPo cito p9<L 
Table 2:7{c) Structure of Labour EY, Helative Importance of Sector 
Sector 1975 % 1976 % 1977 % 1978 % 1979 % 1980 % 
Agriculture, husbandry0 fishing BoO L4 5a3 5a8 5a7 SaiJ 
Extractive industry: 
a) crude oil 1a2 Oa9 Oa7 Oa8 Oa8 0.9 
b) other Oa3 Oo2 0.2 Oo3 0.3 0.3 
Processing industry 6a0 6.3 6.9 6a9 6.7 7.2 
Electricity and water 2a 1 2a 1 2.1 2a3 2a5 3.0 
1-' Building and construction 25.6 31.3 32a9 29a4 30.1 26.4 
w 
0\ 
Hholesale and retail trade, 17.5 16.1 15o5 16.2 16a2 16.7 
hotels and restaurants 
'l'ransport storage COimrrunications 10.8 11.4 12a5 13o3 13.0 13.7 
·Finance, insurance and property: 
a) finance and insurance 2o4 2o2 L9 2.0 1.9 1.9 
b) property o. 1 Oo 1 Oo 1 o. 1 0.2 0.2 
Other services 8.1 6o9 6.7 6.8 6a7 6a8 
Government services 15a 1 13.5 12o6 13a 1 12.7 13a3 
Do~estic services 2.8 2o6 2o6 3o0 3a2 3.8 
•rotal 100.0 1 OOoO 100.0 100o0 100.0 1 OOaO 
From: previous source table 5-2 p 99o 
Table 8(a) 
Percentage of U.A.E. Nationals in VJorkforce 1 930 
Sector U.A.E. % Immigrants % Total % 
Agriculture 6,910 20.0 27,390 79.9 34,300 6.1 
Petroleum and 1,280 20.0 5,120 80.0 6,400 1.1 
!-lining 
Petroleum-related 174 3.3 5,026 86.7 5,700 0.9 
Industries 
Manufacturing 1,063 2.9 35,938 97 01 37,000 6.6 
Electricity and \'Jater 1,910 9.9 17,290 90.0 19,300 3.4 
Construction 2,876 1.9 142,874 98.1 145,700 26.1 
Trade, Hotels and 4,430 4.9 85,870 95.1 90,300 16.2 
Restaurants 
Transport, Storage 3,900 5.1 73,000 94.9 76,900 13.8 
and Communications 
Finance, Insurance 910 8.1 10,490 92.0 11,400 3.0 
and Property 
Personal Services 560 0.9 60,040 99.1 60,600 10.8 
Government and Public 41,738 58.0 30,362 42.0 72,000 13.0 
Administration 
'Ibtal 65,700 11.8 423,300 88.2 559,000 1 oo.o 
Source: t~~npower Planning Study by Hinistry of Planning quoted in 
al-Ittihad 17 July 1984 p 15. 
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Table 2:8(b) U.A.E. Nationals in the Horkforce !2Y Sector, 1968u 1975 and 1980 
------
1968 % 1975 % 1980 % 
Sector 
Agriculture, l''ores try & 
Fishing 12,461 37 01 6,244 14.2 4,676 lLG 
Petroleum & Mining 1,500 4.5 890 2.0 959 1.8 
Hanufacturing & 
Electricity 576 1.8 2,322 5.3 2,258 4.2 
1-' 
w 
CXl Construction 3,577 10.7 2,216 5.1 1,497 2.8 
Trade 3,452 10.3 3,685 8.4 3,876 7 01 
'rransport, Storage & 
Corm nunica tions 4,011 11.9 4,115 9.4 3,144 5.8 
Finance and Insurance 314 0.9 762 1.7 996 1.8 
Services 7,680 22.9 23,654 53.9 36,842 67.9 
·rotal 33,571 100.0 43,888 100.0 54,240 100.0 
Source: Faris, oe.cit., table 7-1 p193 quoting unpublished sections of the 1968, 
1975 and 1980 censuses. 
Table 2:8(c) i Expatriates in Workforce EY Sectoral Distribution, 1975 
Sector Gulf Arabs Other Arabs non-Arab Asians Europe/US Total 
Agriculture & Fishing 2.9 0.7 3.4 0.2 2.9 
Hining & Petroleum 2o6 2.4 L8 20.4 2o4 
....... 
i'1anufacturing 4o4 6.5 9.6 3.5 8.6 
w 
1.0 Construction 12.0 33.8 40.4 37.5 37 01 
·rrade 6.4 10.2 15.4 6.8 13.7 
Transport & Comnunications 9.5 4.5 8.1 1.5 7.':J 
Finance & Insurance 0 .. 9 3.8 1.8 4.9 2.1 
Services 61..3 38o 1 19.5 1L2 25.3 
Total 100.0 1 oo.o 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Faris, op.cit, table 6-2 p 169 
l'able 2:8(c)ii Expatriates in Horkforce .£y Sectoral Distribution, 1980 
Sector Gulf Arabs Other Arabs non-Arab Asians Europe/US Total 
Agriculture & Fishing 2.6 8.9 88.3 0.2 100.0 
~tining & Petroleum 7.4 31.7 47 01 13.8 100.0 
...... 
f.'lanufacturing 1.3 12.8 83.9 2.0 100.0 
"'" 0 Construction 0.5 8.5 87.5 3.5 100.0 
•rrade 1.6 9.9 86.0 2.5 100.0 
Transport & Cbmmunications 3.5 8.0 84.2 4.3 100.0 
Finance & Insurance 1.8 23.0 65.4 9.8 100.0 
Services 15.1 24.4 58.5 2.0 100.0 
Total 5.6 14.7 76.6 3.1 100.0 
Source: Faris, op.cit., p171 
I'able 2:10 Pooulation £y Nationality 1975 and 1980 
Nationality 
Indians 
Pakistanis 
Iranians 
Europeans/ Americans 
Other non-Arabs 
Total non-Arabs 
Total non-UoAoEo 
Total population 
1975 
number % 
202,000 36o1 
103,000 18o5 
83,000 14o8 
109,000 19o 5 
38,000 6oS 
12,000 2o 1 
12,000 2o 1 
253,000 45o3 
356,000 63o9 
558,000 100o0 
1980 
nu:nber % 
291,000 27o9 
220,000 21o1 
247,000 23o7 
187,000 18o0 
26,000 2o5 
30,000 2o9 
42,000 4o0 
532,000 51o0 
752,000 72o1 
1,042,000 100o0 
Source: al-C.l.lil1ll1Clla al-Ajnabivva fi Agtar al-Khalij al-Carabi, 
(Foreign Labour in the Arabian Gulf States), opocito, tables 5-1 p533 
and 11-1 p536 quoting UoAoEo population censuses 1975 and 1980o 
141 
Table 2:11 (a) Population E.Y Einirate and Nationality (L'Jational/non-i'lational), 1968, 1975 and 198 
1968 1975 1980 
UAE non-UAE Total UAE non-UAE 'l,otal UAE non-UI\E Total 
Abu Dhabi 23,287 23,288 46,575 54,886 156.,926 211,812 90,792 361,056 541,840. 
Dub:li 29,685 29,586 59 .. 271 50,81.6 132.,371 183,187 62,516 213,785 276 8 301 
Sharjah 23,336 8,632 31,968 41,227 37,563 78,790 60,495 98,822 159,318 
I-' 
,j::. 
'Ajman N 4,203 43 4,246 7,442 9.,248 16,690 13,376 22,724 36,100 
Uol\oQo 3,706 38 3,744 4,458 2,450 6,908 5,845 6 Q 581 12,426 
RoAoKo 20,276 4,411 24u687 29,613 14u232 43,845 39,148 34,770 73,918 
Fujairah 9,540 195 9u735 13,1 02 3u553 16,655 18u372 .13,817 32,1U9 
'I'otal 114,033 66,193 180u226 201,544 356u343 557,887 290,544 751,555 1,042,099 
Sources: based on Farisu opocitou tables 3-1u 3-2, and 3-3u pp52-4o 
Table 2:11 (b) Population .!?Y. Emirate and Nationality J.! National/non-National), 1968, 1975 and 1980 
1968 1975 1930 
UAE non-Ulill •rota! UAE non-UAE Total UAE non-Ul\E Total 
Abu Dhabi 50.0 50.0 100.0 25o9 73.1 100.0 20o 1 79o9 100.0 
Dubai 50.0 50.0 1 OOoO 27.7 72.3 100.0 22.6 77.4 100.0 
Sharjah 73.0 27.0 100.0 52.3 47.7 100.0 38.0 62.0 100.0 
...... 
~ 
<=Ajrnan w 99.0 1.0 1 oo.o 44.6 55.4 100.0 37.0 63.0 1 oo.o 
U.A.Q. 99.0 1.0 100.0 64.5 35.5 100.0 47.0 53.0 100.0 
RoAoKo 82.0 18.0 100.0 67.5 32.5 100.0 53.0 47o0 100.0 
Fujairah 98.0 2.0 100.0 78.7 21.3 100.0 57 01 42.9 100.0 
rl'otal 63.3 36.7 1 OOoO 36.1 63.9 1 OOoO 27.9 72.1 100.0 
Sources: based on Faris, op.cit., tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3, pp52-4. 
1-' 
~ 
~ 
Table 2:12(a)Population ~Emirate and Nationality Group (Arab/non-Arab) 1975 
Dnirate National % Arab % non-Arab % ·rotal 7s 
immigrant inmigrant 
Abu Dhabi 54,886 25.9 67,742 32.0 89,1134 42.1 211 0 012 100.0 
Dubai 50,816 27.7 17 0 357 9.5 115,014 62.8 183,187 1 oo.o 
Sharjah 41,227 52.3 9,069 12.1 27,994 35.5 73,790 100.0 
cAjrnan 7 0 442 44.6 3,153 18.7 6,095 36.5 16,690 1 oo.o 
U.A.Q. 4,458 64.5 741 10.7 1,709 24.7 6,903 100.0 
H.A.K. 29,613 67.5 4 g 106 9.4 101126 23.1 43,845 100.0 
Fujairah 13 0 102 78.7 682 4.1 2,871 17.3 16,655 100.0 
Total 201,544 36.1 103,350 18.5 252,993 45.4 557,887 100.0 
Sources: from cabd al-Razzaq Faris al-Faris, Ta.YJ1tit al-Qmva al....Carnila fi Dav1lat al-I~narat 
al-Carabiyya al-Huttahida, op .. cit., tables 3-5 p58 and U.A.E. Hinistry ofPlanning Central 
Statistics Department Population Census 1975, Part 3 table 1 pp29-39. 
Table 2:12(b)Population ~Emirate and NatioQalJty Group (Arab/non-Arab) 1980 
Emirate National % Arab % non-Arab % 'rotal % 
immigrant immigrant 
Abu Dhabi 90,792 2Qo 1 139,975 3LO 221 ,081 48o9 451,848 100o0 
Dubai 62,516 22o6 26,277 9o7 187,508 G7o9 276,301 100o0 
Sharjah 60,495 38o0 30,481 19o 1 68,341 42o9 159,317o 100o0 
I-' 
cAjman ~ 13,376 37o0 8,038 22o3 14,686 40o7 3G,100 1 OOo 0 
U1 
UoAoQo 5,845 47o0 1,662 13o8 4,919 39o6 12,426 100o0 
RoAoKo 39,148 53o0 1 o, 481 14o2 24,289 32o9 73,918 100o0 
Fujairah 18,372 57 01 2,837 BoB 10,980 34o 1 32,189 100o0 
Total 290,544 27o9 219,751 21o1 531,1:304 SLO 1,042,099 1 OOoO 
Sources: Faris, OEoCiL q table 3-6 p 59 and UoAoEo Hinistry of PLanning Central Statistical 
Department Population Census 1980, table 1 pp33-48o 
~rable 2~13(a)llork Pennits Issued, ~ i~ationality 1975..:.. 1979 
Nationality 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Arab Countries 23,532 48,508 40,440 25,767 14,700 
India 47,749 99,642 96,581 60,384 54,969 
Pa~istan 37,403 57,880 53,131 36,455 25,093 
Other Asians 8,165 12,988 18,248 25,338 14,538 
Africa (non-Arab) 248 511 458 511 399 
European 9,108 16,660 14,662 13,617 8,737 
American 1,607 2,996 2, 661 2,039 1 ,407 
Oceania 121 370 323 290 216 
Total 127,938 239,555 226,509 1 64,401 120,1 09 
Sources: UoAoEo 1>1inistry of Planning 1 Central Statistical Depto, 
Armual Statistical Abstracts, Fourth Edition 1979, Sixth Edition 
1981 and Seventh Edition 1982o 
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Table 2:13(b)Percentaoe of Total \'lork Permits Issued to Various 
Nationalities 1 1975-79 
i~ationality 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
?.rab Countries 18~ 4% 20.3% 17.9% 15.7% 12.2% 
India 37.3% 41.6% 42.6% 36.7% 45.8% 
Pakistan 29.9% 24.2% 23.5% 22.2% 20.9% 
Other Asians 6.4% 5.4% 7.2% 15.4% 12.2% 
Africa 0.19% 0.21% 0.21% 0.31% 0.3% 
Euroi.)ean 7 01% 6.9% 6.5% 8.3% 7.3% 
American 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 
Oceania 0.09% 0.16% 0.15% 0.18% 0.18% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: U.A.E. Hinistry of Planning, Central Statistical Dept., 
Annual Statistical Abstract, Fourth and Sixth Editions, 1979 and 
1981 0 
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Table 2:14(a) Hork Pennits .!2Y_ Emirate and Nationality, 1973o 
Emirate Arab India 
--
Pakistan Other Asian African hUrope America Oceania Total 
Countries Countries Countries 
Abu Dhabi 13,933 13,017 12,883 11,428 84 4,802 503 46 56,696 
Dubai 5,987 32,397 14,743 9,947 287 6,357 1,359 181.3 71v256 
I-' Sharjah 3,379 71 502 3,262 2,166 94 2,028 159 41.3 1i3v638 
·~ 
(X) C.Ajrnan 999 2,647 1,626 11 005 27 147 6 2 7v282 
Umn al-Quaiwain 218 392 191 60 - - - - 861 
Ras al-YJ1aimah 11 158 31 855 3,173 580 17 278 12 6 91 079 
Fujairah 102 574 577 152 2 5 1 - 1,413 
'rotal 25,767 60 1 384 36,455 25,338 511 13,617 2,03~ 290 164u401 
Source: UoAoEo Hinistry of Planning, Central Statistical Depto u Annual Statistical 1\bstract, 
Fourth Edition 1979, Table 34 page 68 
Table 2: 14(b) Percentage of 'rota! \•7ork Permits Awarded to Various Nationalities, 1978. 
Einirate Arab Countries India Pakistan Otl1er Asian African £Urope hnerica Oceania Total 
Countries Countries 
Abu Dhabi 24.6% 23.0% 22.7% 20.2% 0.15% 8.5% 0.9% 0.08% 100% 
Dubai 8.4% 45.4% 20.7% 20.7% 0.40% 8.9% 1. 91% 0.26% 100% 
1-' Sharjah 24.8% 40.3% 17.5% 11.6% 0.50% 10.9% 0.9% 0.30 % 100% 
~ 
\D 
c.Ajrnan 13.7% 36.4% 22.3% 13.8% 0.37% 2.02% 0.82% 0.03% 100% 
Umm al-Quaiwain 25.3% 45.5% 22.2% 7.0% 100% 
Ras al-Khairnah 12.8% 43.6% 35.0% 6.4% 0.19% 3.1% o. 13% 0.07% 100% 
Fuj.:lirah 7.2% 40.6% 40.8% 10.8% 0.14% 0.4% - 100!6 
Total 15.6% 36.7% 22.2% 15.4% 0.30% 8.3% 1.24% 0.18% 100% 
Source: U.A.E. ~tinistry of Planningr Central Statistical Dept, Annual Statistical Abstract, 
Fourth Edition 1979, table 34 page 68. 
Table 2:15(a)Percentage of Total ~lork Permits Issued to Various Nationalities, £i flniratee 1981 
Emirate Arab India Pakistan Other African Europe ~nerica Oceania Total 
Asians 
Abu Dhabi 19.0% 36.3% 22.5% 13.3% o. 14% 6.9% 0.97% 0.13% 100% 
Dubai 8.0% 50.7% 22.5% 12.6% 0.26% 4. 7%. 1 015% 0.12% 100% 
I-' Sharjah 13.5% 48.6% 23.2% 8.5% 0.54% 5.1% 0.51% o. 15% 100% 
Ul 
0 cAjrnan 14.3% 43.2% 25.3% 14.5% 0.23% 1.137% O.GG% O.OG9; 100% 
Urnrn al-Qaiwain 9.04% 61 01% 17.4% 7.3% 0.62% 3.2% 1 0 35% - - 100% 
Ras al-Khairnah 6.25% 52.6% 32.9% 7 018% 0.07% 1.02% 0.03% - 100% 
Fujairah 5.9% 43.9% 25.6% 20.7% 0.13% 3.8% 0.03% - 100% 
Total 14.2% 43.8% 23.3% 12.1% 0.23% 5.4% 0.88% o. 12% 1001; 
Source: U.A.E. Hinistry of Planning, Central Statistical Dept., Annual Statisical Abstract, Seventh 
Edition 1982q table 43 p65. 
Table 15 (b) \'lork Pemi ts Issued, Ex. I:lnira te and Nationality, 1981 
Emirate Arab India Pakistan Other African .E:urope America CJceania 'l'otal 
Asians 
Abu Dhabi 13,094 23,992 14,895 8,759 89 4,529 643 83 GG,084 
Dubai 3,449 21,837 9,677 5,407 114 2,025 496 53 43,058 
Sharjah 2,796 10,084 4,818 1,763 113 1 ,051 106 30 20,761 
I-' 
U1 
I-' CAjman 498 1,507 881 505 8 64 23 2 3,488 
Ur;m al-Qaiv1ain 87 588 167 70 6 31 13 - 962 
Ras al-Khaimah 552 4,648 2,902 634 6 90 3 - 8, 335 . 
Fuj.:lirah 139 1,039 606 491 3 89 2 - 2,369 
Total 20,615 63,695 33,946 17,629 339 7,879 1,286 168 145,557 
Source: UoAoEo Hinistry of Planning, Central Statistical DepL, l\rmual Statisical i\bstract, 
Seventh Edition 1982, table 43 p65o 
1--' 
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Table 2:17(a): G'DP .9Y Sectoral Importance 1975.::.19130 
(at current prices) 
Sector 
Agriculture, husbandry 8 fishing 
Extractive industry: 
a) crude oil 
b) other 
Processing industry 
Electricity and water 
Building and construction 
1975 
Oo8 
66o5 
Oo2 
Oo9 
Oo5 
10o9 
l·lholesale and retail trade, 8 o 2 
hotels and restaurants 
Transport storage communications 3.3 
Finance v insurance and property: 
a) finance and insurance 1.6 
b) property 4.0 
Other services 1o0 
Less: banking services (1o4) 
'I'otal industrial sectors 96o5 
Government services 3. 4 
Domestic services Oo1 
Total 100o0 
Total sectors without oil 33.5 
1976 
0.8 
62o7 
Oo3 
L2 
Oo6 
11.6 
7o9 
3o8 
2o5 
5.3 
Oo9 
( 2 01 ) 
95o5 
4.4 
0 01 
100o0 
37o3 
1977 
1.0 
55o7 
0.3 
2o9 
Oo7 
13.3 
9o8 
4.1 
2.7 
5.8 
1 oO 
(2.2) 
94o9 
5.0 
Oo 1 
100.0 
44o3 
1978 
0.8 
53.2 
0.3 
3.6 
1.1 
13.5 
9.2 
4.7 
2.4 
4.9 
1o0 
( 1 o G) 
93.3 
6.5 
0.2 
100.0 
46.8 
1979 
0.7 
59.3 
0.3 
3 01 
1.2 
11.6 
8.5 
4.2 
2.2 
3.3 
0.9 
( 1 0 4) 
94.0 
5.(3 
0.2 
100.0 
40.3 
1980 
63.3 
Oo2 
3.8 
1.2 
8.8 
8o2 
3.3 
1.9 
3.6 
0.7 
( 1 0 3) 
94.4 
5.4 
Oo2 
100.0 
36.7 
Table 2:17(b): Gross Domestic Product Qy Econanic Sector 1975 ~ 1980 
(in Dhsm at current prices) 
Sector 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 19UO gro1 .. 1th pa 
Agriculture, husbandry, fishing 329 432 492 604 680 027 20.2 
Extractive industry: 
a) crude oil 26,364 32,275 35,575 32,618 47,884 70,532 21 .8. 
b) other 98 133 187 207 220 235 19 0 1 
Processing industry 369 593 1,853 2,197 2,533 4,191 62.6 
Electricity and water 209 313 467 689 985 1,297 44.1 
1-' 
lJ1 Building and construction 4,308 w 5,963 8,474 8,271 9,338 9,834 17.9 
\'lholesale and retail trade 3,248 4,075 6,243 5,509 6,850 9,094 22.9 
hotels and restaurants 
Transport storage oornmunications 1,255 1 u 981 2,662 2,866 3,420 3, 731 24.4 
Finance, insurance and property: 
a) finance and insurance 626 1,265 1,727 1,450 1,737 2,123 27.6 
b) property 1,592 2,739 3,731 2,979 2,676 4,006 20.3 
Other services 382 483 610 675 740 814 16.3 
Less: .f!anking services (550) ( 1 , 096) (1 ,401) (970) ( 1 , 124) ( 1 , 403) 20.6 
·rotal industrial sectors 38,231 49,156 60,618 57 u 175 75,949 105,271 22.5 
Govennent services 1,364 2,295 3,195 3,981 4,700 5,989 34.4 
Danestic services 40 57 82 114 148 200 38.0 
Total 39,635 51,508 63,895 61,270 80,797 111,470 23.0 
Total sectors without oil 13,271 19,233 28,320 28,652 32,913 40,930 25.3 
Table 2 ~7 (c) : GUP .!2Y Econanic Sector 1 97 5 ..=. 1 980 
(in Dhsm at 1980 prices) 
Sector 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 19[30 gra;~th pa 
Agriculture, animal 367 4130 563 649 732 f327 17.6 
husbandry and fishing 
Extractive industry: 
a) crude o1l 35,820 39,456 41,653 37,266 52,504 70,532 14.5 
b) other 118 155 204 202 220 235 14.9 
Processing industry 472 702 1,923 2,274 2,542 4,191 54.0 
Electricity and water 287 392 547 792 1,122 1,297 35.2 
1-' 
Ul Building and construction 4,770 4,746 7,381 9,749 9,753 9,834 15.6 ~ 
\~holesale and retail trade 4,940 6,631 9,054 8,046 8,316 9,094 13.0 
hotels and restaurants 
Transport, storage and 1 ,608 2,295 2,915 3,188 3,552 3,731 18.3 
cam!Umica tions 
Finance, insurance and property: 
a) finance and insurance 825 1,459 1 g 948 1 ,591 1,868 2,123 20.8 
b) property 1, 326 1,667 2,044 2,4!32 2,956 4,006 24.8 
Other services 516 587 666 703 736 814 9.5 
Less: Banking services (600) (963) (1,227) (1,407) (1,514) (1,403) 18.5 
Total industrial sectors 50,449 57,607 67,676 65,891 82,787 105,681 15.9 
Government services 2,551 3,761 4,189 4,496 5,125 5,989 13.6 
Domestic services 54 69 91 119 147 200 29.9 
Total 53,054 61,437 71,956 70,506 88,059 111,470 16.0 
Total without oil 17,234 21,981 30,293 32,884 35,555 40,93(3 ln. 9 
Table 2: 17 (d) : GOP EY. Sectoral Importance 1975 .::. 1980 
(in Dhsm at 1980 prices) 
Sector 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Agriculture, husbandry, fishing 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 
Extractive industry: 
a) crude oil 67.5 64.2 57.9 53.4 59.6 63.3 
b) other 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Processing industry 0.9 1.1 2.7 3.2 2.9 3.8 
Electricity and water 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.2 
1-' 
Ul Building and construction 9.0 7.7 10.3 13.8 11 0 1 8.8 Ul 
Wholesale and retail trade 9.3 10.8 12.5 11.4 9.4 8.2 
hotels and restaurants 
Transport storage comrmmications 3.0 3.7 4.1 4.5 4.0 3.2 
Finance, insurance and property: 
a) finance and insurance 1.6 2.4 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.9 
b) property 2.5 2.7 1.8 3.5 3.4 3.6 
Other services LO LO Oo9 1.0 0.8 0.7 
Less: Banking services ( 1 0 1 ) ( 1 0 6) ( 1 0 7) (2.0) (1. 7) ( 1 0 3) 
'rotal industrial sectors 95.1 93o8 94.1 93o4 94o0 94o4 
Goverrunent services 4.8 6o 1 5o8 6.4 5.8 5o4 
Domestic servics o. 1 Oo 1 Oo 1 Oo2 Oo2 Oo2 
Total 100.0 100o0 100.0 100.0 100o0 100o0 
Total without oil 32o5 35.8 42.1 46o6 40o4 36.7 
1-' 
l1l 
0\ 
:Table 2:18(a) Trade Balance 1975 .=. 1980 
(in Dhsm at current prices) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 19UO 
Total commodity exports 29o112 36o012 41o049 39o444 56o25Q 84o512 
Total corrnnodi ty imports 10o912 13o601 20o218 21o473 26o642 34o116 
Trade Balance +18o200 +22o411 +20o831 +19o971 +29o608 +50o396 
From: (this table and following table) al-rratawvll.lrat al-Igtisadiyya w' al-Ij tima'=~ fi 
Dawlat al-Irnarat al-carabiyya al-Huttahida 1975 .=. 80u opo cito pp 143/4 
I-' 
Vl 
-..J 
Total commodity exports 
Total commodity imports 
Trade Balance 
Source: as previous table o 
~able 2:18(b) Trade Balance 1975 - 1980 
(in Dhsm at 1980 fixed prices) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
41o632 47o081J 52o452 48o714 G5o671 84o512 
18o539 24o223 32o978 30o399 34o270 34o116 
+23o09J +22a865 +19o474 +18a315 +31a401 +50o396 
1-' 
Ul 
CXl 
Table 2:19(a) Public revenue 1985 - 1980 
Category 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
CUrrent revenue 19,033 24,766 27,347 25,489 34,653 53,550 
crude oil revenue 18,025 23,484 25,794 24 0 937 32,950 52,050 
other revenues 1 0 008 10 282 1 ,553 10 552 1,703 2,500 
Capital revenue 618 1,158 1 ,671 1 ,848 1 p 395 1 ,472 
Repayment of other loans 29 13 191 83 108 232 
Loans 589 1,145 1,480 1, 765 1,287 1 ,240 
'l'otal revenues 19 Q 651 25,924 29,018 27,337 3G,04U 56,022 
Source: al-'rata~t.rwurat al-Igtisadivya w1 al-Ij tinlOfi~ fi D:lwlat al-Imarat al-r.arabiwa 
al-Muttahida 1975 .=. 1980, op.cit. p157 
Table 2:19(b)Public Expenditure 1975 ~ 1980 
category 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Wages 1,867 2,298 3,312 4,145 5,044 6,590 
f-J Conmi bnents 1,789 2,753 3,501 3,691 4,477 7,349 U'1 
\0 
CUrrent transfers 388 652 900 1,059 1,172 2,024 
Total current expenditure 4,044 5,703 7,713 8,895 10,693 16;763 
Total gross capital 4,075 6,761 10,332 11 v 391 10 u 154 9,592 
formation 
capital transfers 5,245 6,098 6,431 5,964 8, 770 13,456 
Total capital expenditure 9,320 12,859 16;763 17,355 113,924 23,0413 
Total public expenditure 13,364 1(3,562 24;476 26,250 29,617 39,811 
Source: as aboveo 
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On 1st February 1978, renner headlines in the ne\vspapers trurnpeted 
t.~at Shaikh Zayid' s second son Sultan ibn Zayid had been a;J:?Ointed 
carmander-in-Chief of the armed forces and that the regional r:tilitary 
co1n:nands had l:A....~n abolished in ccmpletion of t.~e 1 976 merger. Abu 
Dhabi's motives for the timin9 of the move remain unexplained; it 
may be that there was no explanation and that Abu Dhabi was simply 
showing \'lhat a \\'estern diplanat described at the ti.:ne as a "criminal 
negligence" of Duh:l.i. 1 s feelings. Both Shaikh Rashid and his son the 
Hinister of Defence, \vho were visiting Tehran at the time, were 
taken co~pletely by surprise. Co~ng at a time when e1e year-long 
econo~ic gloo~ was already aggravating differences of philosophy and 
when integrationist 
changes of 1976, 
pressure, follo\ving on from the constitutional 
\vas already beginning to provoke resentment in 
Sultan 1 s appointment brought relations bet\veen Abu Dubai, Shaikh 
Dhabi and Dubai abruptly to their nadir. 
~vhatever its 
made to the 
rights or \orrongs, the main contribution the controversy 
future of the Federation was to crystallize and force 
into the open the fundamental differences between the President and 
the Vice-President over the meaning of federalism, that is over the 
merits of the federalism that their Constitution embodied versus the 
total integration with which Abu Dhabi and an element of the 
population were seeking to replace it. Indeed, the novel feature 
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of the events of 1978 was the use Shaikh Rashid chose to make of the 
press. \'lhile the dispute sirrunered the Supre.~~e Council of the U.i'\.E. 
was i.rru.lo!::lilized and the newly-active Young 'l'urk.s step?ed eagerly into 
the breach. Thus the inter-dynastic crisis of 1978 led directly to 
the heyday of the Young Turks in 1979 and to the intro:Juction of a 
new political vocabulary into U.A.E. affairs. External events too 
were creating a fertile environment for ideologues. 
The decree promoting Col. Shaikh Sultan ibn Zayid to the rank of 
Brigadier and appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the U.A.E. Armed 
Forces 11with the approval of the Council of i>linisters 11 based itself 
in its prea~le on Article 138 of ~1e Provisional Oonstitution1• 
Article 138 specifies that the appointment of the CQ~der-in-Chief 
shall be made by means of a Federal decree2 1 a Federal decree, in 
turn, must be approved by the Council of ~·tinisters plus either the 
Head of State alone or the Hhole Supreme Council, according to their 
various jurisdictions3• It is the whole Supreme Council on the one 
hand that must join Hith the cabinet in approving Federal decrees 
appointing the Prime iltinister and mernbers of the Supreme Court; only 
the Head of State alone, on the other hand, need add his approval 
to the Cabinet's in the case of the Commander-in-Chie£4 • Legal 
opinion has it however that since the nomination for comparable 
civilian appointments reaches the Cabinet fro.11 the l'linister con-
cerned, \vho originates it, the Cormlander-in-Chief should have been 
nominated by the l•linister of Defence. As the latter was not con-
sulted, it would appear on the strength of this argument5 that 
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Shaild-1 Sultan us appointment was indeed unconstitutional, as Dubai 
ah;ays maintainej. 
Fidelity to the co:1stitution was thus the core of Shaikh Rashid 1s 
demands in an intervie\·1 of unprecedented fral1YJ1ess he gave to the 
c.iaily sa·dt al-U;n.rna, the interview that first brought ha11e to the 
U.A.E. t..l-te gravity of the dispute6• First, Shaikh Rashid dernanded 
an enquiry into all the amendments that had ever been incor;>orated 
into the constitution to detennine vrhether or not the manner in which 
they had been passed (not their substance) were constitutionaL 
Secondly, he sought a review of Supreme Defence Council Resolution 
1/76 on the merger of the military bcxlies, to the same end. His 
third p:::>int contested the validity of Shaikh Sultan's appoint:Jna.....nt 
since it \•Ta.s not supp:::>rted by a cabinet resolution despite the claim 
in the preamble. Next, Shaikh Rashid called for all Federal lavlS to 
be examined for possible transgressions of the constitution. 
Finally, the Vice-President demanded an irrrnediate start on the 
building of . the Federation's pennanent capital. In the 1971 
Constitution Abu Dhabi is designated as only a temporary capital, to 
be replaced by a nevi city called al-l~amah to be built for the 
purp:::>se by the end of 1973 7 in the no-man's land separating the two 
Enirates. No work had started at the site, which had been 
largely-forgotten by the tL~e Shaikh l~shid voiced his de~nd in the 
summer of 1978 and it was o::Wiously impossible for al-I~arnah to be 
built in the remaining few months. I<aramah vms being used as a 
S}~l for the re-institution of collective rule in place of the 
trend tovmrds dorr~nation by Abu Dhabi in Federal decision-mill~ing. 
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The next round in the dispute v:as an interview in t..~e Lebanese vleekly 
al-Hawadess in which Shaikh Rashid again'beganby declaring Shaikh 
Sultan 1 s apjX)intrnent unconstitutional but then Hent on to berate a 
list of other hostile actions by ,'\bu D!1abi beginning Hith an 
"econor:~ic blockade" against Dubai8 o He CQll;?lained that Abu 
Dhabi 1 s Executive Council, whose clBinnan \vas Shaikh Zayid 1 s eldest 
son Khalifa, had imposed a boycott on oil-industry canpanies 
operating from headquarters in Duba.L J.\ photostat Has reproduced in 
the magazine of a circular dated 11th April 1978 by the Abu Dhabi 
Dep:1rtrnent of Petroleum ordering all such companies to move their 
headquarters to Abu Dhabi within six months in canpliance \·lith an 
Executive Council decree of 9th April9 o The signature on the 
Department 1 s circular vms that of its chainnan Dr l·an'-a al-cutaiba 
who, in his other capacity as Federal ; .. linister of Petroleum, had 
frequently urged greater co-ordination bebo~een the Emirates in oil 
affairs. Dr al-cutaiba intimated in the al-Ha1.vadess article that the 
circular had been issued to him by the Executive Council o 
The hasty abolition of the transit visa 10 had dealt another serious 
blow to Duba.i 1 s mercantile econany, Shaikh Hashid went on; so had 
regulations issued in supposedly-federalist Abu Dhabi to the effect 
that citizens of the other E}nirates needed an Abu Dhabi sponsor 
before doing business there. Restrictions such as these \llere 
anathema to Dubai. But Sl1aikh Rashid insisted throughout that their 
inspiration was not Shaikh Zayid himself but his "mercenary" 
integrationist adviserso 
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Continuing his list of grievances, the Vice-Presid2.!"1t went on to 
accuse the Federal r Abu uhabi-based ~'linistry of InfoiTtl3.tion of 
waging proi)aganda carni)aigns against Duooi. The same J.!inistry had 
delayed granting a licence for a nei·l Dt.1l::B.i pa;>2r authorized by Shail:.h 
Rashid personally. On sensitive issues of nationality and 
citizei'1Ship, his mm bona-fides were b2ing disregarded. Although 
decisions on U.A.E. nationality were the bailiHick of the Federal 
authorities, Shaikh i<ashid insistej that unjer the constitution each 
Huler had the right to decide who was a citizen of his ovm .i..:1nirate 
and therefore eligible to apply for Fejeral nationality. In practice, 
he claimed, Dubai citizens \1ere being refused nationality despite 
the Vice-President•s personal attestations. 
Furthermore, 
cent of its 
nnirate was 
stood accused 
ignored the 
appoinbnents 
Dubai vlas being attacked for not contributing 50 per 
income fro~ oil to the Federal budget when in fact no 
required to do so by the constitution. Although Dubai 
of lacking federal fervour, it \vas Abu Dhabi that had 
Federal Minister of D2fence, had made top-level 
without his r.nowledge and had breached a joint 
undertaking not to import new annaments except for the Federal army o 
Only strict adherence by all, 
these quarrels o 
including Abu Dhabi, could prevent 
The same point was made in the second part of the al-Hawadess 
investigation by Shaikh Rashid 1 s 
ambassador to London Nahdi 'l'aj ir, 
closest adviser, 
who diagnosed that Abu Dhabi had 
tipped the balance of power too far in its ovm favour by av.rarding the 
Commander-in-Chief 1s title to Sultan ibn Zayid when his older brother 
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l~hailfa already held the rank of Deputy Supre:ne Con:nanjer, renounced 
willinsly by the Vice-President Shaikh Hashid, to \'lha11 it pro;:>erly 
1 -11 be onge:1 • 
Pinpointing the crux of the dispute, 'I'ajir explained that Shaikh 
l{ashid had ah1ays been a loyal federalist but had never agreed to 
integration. -~s caaplete integration was to beco.11e the slogan of the 
Young Tur):s as the drama dragged on, b1eir interests coincided 
fortuitously at this juncture \•lith Abu Dhabi's, and the seeds were 
smm of an enduring hostility between the intelligentsia and Shaikh 
I{ashid. 
'rhe next tv.relve months saw little improvement in the atmosphere. It 
was read as a hopeful sign that Shaikh Rashid 1 s role as Vice-
President , .. ,as bolstered somev1hat in the autu'lll1 of 1 978 vlhen he v1ent 
to Egypt on his first overseas visit in his vice-presidential 
't 12 capac1 y • On returning he chaired the cabinet for the first time 
at its emergency meeting to repudiate the camp David accords13• In 
December however the Vice-President left for a private visit to 
Pakistan and made his strongest statement so far in the dispute by 
failing to return for the sacrosanct National Day celebrations. 
The nevl National Assembly session vTclS to devote much of its ti:ne to 
the subject of Federal legislation desired and passed in its cha~ber 
but held up by the Supre~e Council's failure to meet. It went on to 
voice open criticism of those v1ho impeded integration, by vlhich it 
plainly meant Shaikh rta.shid. 
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In April 1978 the F'ol>JoCo had already taken what Has to be b~e first 
of a nu~r of initiatives oy inviting the ca~inet to form a joint 
co.:1.nission on irnmigration and to present its fin:iings to b~e Su;:m~me 
1l: Council - initiatives v1i1ich excee::led the role laid dovm for thG 
Fo;'ioCo by the Provisional Constitutiono 
In the sumner a sGcond joint commission, chairej jointly by b~e 
Assernbly Speaker 'l'ariam Tariam and the Deputy PrimG :Jinister Shaikh 
i-lam:lan ibn t·iuharrunad, v1ho uas a leading shaikh of Abu Dhabi, was 
created specifically to 11overcn~e difficulties impeding b'""le progress 
of the Federation1115 • A subco:raittee took its reco:nrnendations to 
the Rulers individually toHards the end of 197816 ; it ap;>--=ars to 
have produceci no results but the demarche marks the beginning of the 
heyday of the Young 'furkso 
\iaiting around the corner of the ne\v year 1979 was the fall of the 
Shah of Iran. s~·prised in their divided state by the revolution, 
the leaders of the U.A.Eo might have beeil expected to close ranl~s 
against the ?Qtential menace of radicalization from Iran and 
polarization a..11ong the Arab states over the Camp David accords. Even 
so, the u!timely dispute dragged on and it was only Kuv1aiti 
intervention that finally convinced b,e President and Vice-President 
of the wisdan of resuscitating the Federation. This they achieved by 
the means of placing the energetic Vice-President in day-to-day 
control of the executive as Prime J.vlinister. But between the furore 
of February 1978 and Shaikh Rashid's inauguration in July 1979 the 
non-shaikhly radical thinkers had leapt into the vacuurn and led the 
U.A.E. to an entirely new, ideological phase of its development. 
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After the constitutional arnendments of December 1976, a cabinet 
reshuffle in January 1977 brought into office for the first time an 
echelon of young men Hho were all graduates of foreign universitiesf 
"''ere not relate..i to the ruling families and were familiar with an 
abstract political vocabulary. Credit for pro.11oting them generally 
goes to the President and his right-hand man Ahmad Suwaidi. Their 
moment in history begins with that year's 1'lational Assembly session, 
when the elderly Dubai businessman Thani ibncAbdullah was replaced as 
Speaker by the former U.A.E. .Z\mbassador to cairo Tariam Tariam. 
Under Tariam' s leadershipf the Assembly was to undergo a fundamental 
change in its view of its own function: fro.~ limiting itself to 
expressing opinionsf its constitutional role, the Assembly went on 
to pressure the Hulers and de.~nd change. Thenf during 1978f because 
Abu Dhabi and Dub3.i remained deadlocked in their dispute, the Young 
Turks stepped willingly and extraconstitutionally into the vacuum. 
Active public participation in politics in the U.A.E. \¥as thus 
triggered initially by default. 
The demands the radicals pressed fell into two categories, for more 
federalization on the one hand and for more de.~ratization on the 
other. Their attachment to a stronger Federation reinforced the 
Young Turks' natural inclination towards the Abu Dhabi camp, from 
which many of them had drawn their original encouragement. During 
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their heyday in 1 979, the Young Turks loudly questioned the right of 
the shaikhly fmnilies to obstruct reforms and to dispose of the 
country's wealth at wilL The fali of the Shah in January of that 
year galvanized debate on syst~ns of 1-ule throughout the Gulfo It 
also aggravated US fears for ilestern interests in the region; 
attitudes to the <·Jest were to drive one of the biggest wedges b2tween 
the regimes and their radical intelligentsiaso 
Gulf Representative Bodies in Their Historical Context 
In theory, ~1e idea of popular participation in goverrunent is 
sanctioned in Islamic tenns by the Quranic precept of shura, 
consultationo Its embodiment in informal councils such as Kuwait's 
diwaniyyas is a long-established feature of Gulf politics but 
formal, modern representative institutions have only a short and 
chequered history and elected parliaments with binding, as distinct 
fran advisory, powers have been unsuccessful to dateo 
Dubai was administered for six months in 1938 and 1939 by a partly-
democratic body of 15 notables selected by their peers. Rooted in 
the rivalry which was normal between individual members of the ruling 
fmnilies, the self-styled Dubai Reform Movement drew nourishment 
from opposition to Britain's policy on the manumission of slaves, to 
the air agreement and later to the terms of the oil concessions1• 
Economic deprivation during the world depression of the 1930s lent 
cogency to differences over the proper allocation of state revenue. 
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In 1938, when the :·E.jlis finally forced itself on the Ruler, Shaikh 
. . 
sacid, after two failed attempts in 1929 and 1934, it was this issue 
of revenue-sharing that brought about its rapid aO:::>lition. Public. 
amenities such as schools, security patrols and pensions v1ere 
financed by the i•1aj lis out of income from the port ceded to it by the 
ruling family, but finding funds fran this source inadequate for 
more ambitious projects, the f1ajlis decreed the income from the air 
agreement and the oil concession as well to be the public property of 
Dubai. The ruling f&~ily was to be paid only a fixed allowance from 
ito Shaikh Sa c. id, who had avoided the f.1ajlis after its first two 
sessions, found the proposal hu~iliating and rejected it. Deira was 
taken over by Majlis partisans but reconquered by Shaikh saeid's son 
Rashid ibn Sac id, 
festivities2• 
the next Huler, under cover of his ovm wedding 
Both Kuwait and Bahrain have experimented since independence with 
parliamentary democracy, that is with elected parliaments. Kuwait 
prides itself on its history of free constitutional debate extending 
back to the beginning of this century and its majlis al-umma enjoyed 
real powers, including the power to select the heir apparent and 
thus the next Amir fran among the Sabah family's nominees3 o All 
legislation had to be approved by the Hajlis and the Government was 
obliged to submit to it drafts of its policies in all spheres 
including foreign policy o The first lv',aj lis lasted 16 years and grew 
more outspoken with every general election. In 1965 the Speaker and 
a group of members resigned over a dispute with the executive and in 
1967 the opposition accused the Government of ballot-rigging4• By 
1 976 the chamber's comments on othel;' Arab regimes, especially on the 
Egypt-Israel disengage~ent and the parties to the civil war in 
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Lebanon, had beco:ne a source of serious e.'Tibarrassment and p:::>tential 
danger to the regime and the ; Jaj lis was suspenjed for four years. 
During those four years t..'te constitution \·las "revised''. 
Insights into where the i·lajlis transgressed, in the Goverruaent' s 
eyes, i-lere volw1te2red by the Crovm Prince in February 1 980 \-lhen he 
addressed the inaugural session of the com~ttee formed to revise the 
constitution on 19th February 1980o 'rhe import of the speech is that 
the return to dernocracy 
"must not be turned under any slogan \-lhatsoever into a cause for 
disunity and division, a starting point for controversy and 
strife •••••• shaking confidence, frustrating decision-making and 
encouraging disregard for the duty to act in the service of the 
country" ~. 
The heresy of "disunity", like the danger of external threats, is 
a camnon stick with which to beat dissent in the Arab world as 
elsewhere but this particular litany of sins was presumably chosen to 
some degree for its pertinence to the previous parliament. 
The need for the new emphasis on responsibility and stability is 
justified as follows: 
"OUr need for this new conception is made more urgent by the 
character of the age in which we live, the age of international 
tensions, wars hot and cold, fought by divers weapons through 
artful techniques. Huch of what is going on around us again 
confinns that the Arab and Islamic worlds are the butt of 
ambitions, the target of dangerous, concealed, cunning 
conspiracieso lve hope these facts will be in the forefront of 
your minds as you tackle your mighty task". 
'The elections for the revived !'1ajlis in 1981 produced a membership 
more sympathetic to the Sabahs' concerns. 
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Bahrain's National Assembly survived for a much shorter time. After 
independence in 1 971 P preparations began for elections to a 
Constituent Jl.sse:-nbly v1hich would draft a constitution. Of this 
lxxly' s 44 me.-;illers, 1 0 were to be me;nbers of the Government and a 
further 12, i.e. together half the total, were to be appointed by 
the Governrnent P \'lith the remaining half elected by male suffrage. 
Opposition groups both Nationalist and religious6 boycotted the 
ballot when it was held on 1st December 1972. A constitution viaS 
drafted and published nonetheless the follo\ving June and elections 
for the 30 non-Government seats provided in the National Assembly 
were organized for December 1973. These were not boycotted and the 
results of the 85 per cent turnout carne as a shock to the 
Al-Khalifa. Instead of returning representatives of the influential 
merchant families who had fielded so many of the candidates, the 
voters elected 18 members of a recognizably anti-Establishment 
complexion including Comrnunists7• 
The authorized version of its history is that soon after convening, 
the Assembly was inundated with draft bills from left and right as 
well as with a number aimed at settling personal scores and 
furthering personal interests. Legislation desired by ~~e Government 
was not passed and, on declining by an atypically-united majority to 
pass an internal security law pennitting detention \'lithout trial, 
the Assembly was dissolved sine die in August 19758• 
In conversation, but rarely in print, few CQ~nentators would fail 
to add as a main or even the main reason for the dissolution of the 
Assembly its unpopularity with the rulers of Sacudi Arabia9• 
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Abu Dha~i's National Consultative Council 
Since 1971, A!:lu Dhabi has had a Consultative CounciL Its statutory 
brief is to 11assist the Huler and the Council of dinisters in 
carrying out their duties11 and its me.11bership is to consist of 
"leading figures, notables and persons of sow~d judge~nt and 
status". It goes \·lithout saying that they must also be men. The 50 
me.llbers are no;ninated by Shaikh Zayid in his capacity of H.uler of .lillu 
Dhabi10 but as members tend to be already-acknovlledged tribal 
leaders, to sane extent Shaikh Zayid endorses rather than chooses. 
NCC me:llbers represent t.'le four main Abu Dhabi tribes and their 
subdivisions and seats on ~1e Cow1cil are often bequeathed in t.'le 
custanary tribal way. \vhen a tribal representative dies, ti'1e 
Chairman of the NCC Shaikh Sultan ibn Surur al-Dhahiri, head of the 
Dhahiri tribe and formerly Ruler's representative in the \·/estern 
Region until removed fran that post to make way for a member of the 
Bani Yas, passes on to Shaikh Zayid the Council's vievl as to which 
of the deceased's. heirs is emerging as the most fit for membership. 
Shair~ Zayid normally appoints that heir. The NOC's constituency is 
thus very different from that of ~1e Federal National Asse.llbly, 
covering the non-urban as well as the urbanized segments of society. 
NCC members' concerns have tended to be largely material and of a 
day-to-day administrative nature, with land ovmership as one of the 
main issues. Land-ownership, and the prosP8ct of generous 
compensation for land under ~1e Emirate's policy of bP-nevolent 
expropriation, is the key to riches; an NCC carunittee formed in 
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1980 to canvas ca11plaints found that 75 per cent of all 
carununications it received concernej land11 • 
Non-material issues such as girls' education (which the f\0: often 
seeks to restrict in scope), marriage to foreigners (which it 
deplores), municipal services (which are never gocx:l enough), 
la!::x:>ur laws (which the iJCC considers too generous to im-aigrants) and 
what me~s see as the excessive leniency of sentencing in local 
lawcourts are also debated howevero The NCC can nonnally expect its 
resolutions to be heeded by the Abu Dhabi Govern11ent and can beco11e 
s_"llite agitated \•lhen they are not. 
Because it reflects the pre-existing power structure in Abu Dhabi, 
NCC members can argue that their forum exerts greater influence than 
the Federal Hational Assembly, where members are apj_X)inted by Rulers 
whose freeda11 to appoint and dismiss is not so circumscribed. 
Similarly, because of the tribal system c:in which it is based, the 
NCC likes to claim closer contact vlith the grass roots. 
To canpare the power of the NCC over the Abu Dhabi Govermnent with 
that of its Federal counterpart over the Federal Government, the 
case of the Federal labour sponsorship law is instructive. In 1980 
the Federal Minister of Labour set a deadline by which all immigrants 
wishing and entitled to change their employer had to do so; 
thereafter all immigrants found not working for their original legal 
sponsor were to be deported. Fearing the effects of a totally 
liTh110bile workforce on the econa11y, the NOC demanded a long extension 
of the deadline, even though it had no legal right to address itself 
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to a Fe::ieral ;-linister o The Federal ilinister in c,:"'llestion rejected 
categorieally any extension; the .~cc a;_::Jp<=>_aled to Shail:.h Zayid and 
the following day the president over-ruled the hinister and decreed 
an e;~tension of four months o 
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.The dational .;.sserablv anj The ;:use of The Youna Turks 
Like ~1e Abu Dhabi Uational Consultative Council, the i.<,ederal 
!\ia tional Council, or l\ational ll.sseii::Jly, Has aesigned as a purely 
consultative rather t:1an legislative l.xx:lyo Its terms of reference, 
which are modelled on those of the PCC, are ''to discuss any general 
subject pertaining to the affairs of the Federation", but that brief 
is immediately qualified by the next clause "unless the Council of 
l·iinisters infonns the Federal ~\lational Council that such discussion 
is contrary to the highest interests of the Federation" 12 That 
qualification means that the Y.:.JC may only discuss 1vhat the executive 
allov1s it to discuss o The Fi'-IC may also question Cabinet Hinisters and 
must in nonnal circuostances be given d1e opportunity to express its 
views on draft la\·ls before t.'1eir enactment. However, as we have 
already seen, its views need not prevail if they differ from those 
of executive (see Chapter One). 
Two further constraints circumscribe the FNC' s po1vers: the Supreme 
Council may enact la\vS when the Assembly is not in session if it 
considers that the need is 13 urgent , and the Supreoe Council is 
not required to consult the Assembly before signing international 
14 
agreements e The Assembly has the right only to ''be apprised 
of" such 2..grec>Jnents and la1·1s. \'lith these restricted functior~s, the 
Assembly does not amount to a legislature and members are well avBre 
f th - t15 o e rae o 
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In January 1 977 a ne\·1 Cabinet \vas formed which intrcxluced six nev1 
ca'TI!noners, lilialfan Hu11i, I-1uharrrnad cab:l al-1<ah:nan al-Bakr, (;,.u.!xiullah 
~lazru c i, I•Iuha:n;na.d 1~halifa al-Kindi, Sacid Ghobash and 'I'hani ii:nc:Isa 
al-IIarib, as l·linisters of Health, Justice, Lai:x:mr an::l .Social 
!..f. fairs, Public i larks, Planning, and Electricity and iiater 
t o 1 16 respec J.Ve y a .Sane of the changes were the result of mergers 
beb1een previously separate l'-linistries or demergers fra11 previously 
integrated t-tinistries but in each case except Planning a shaild1 
ap;:ointed for family considerations had been replaced by a cam1oner 
appointed at least in part for his qualifications. The four 
disappearing shaikhs were minor ones and no rne.'nber of the Abu Dhabi 
or Duh:ii ruling families vias unseated with the one e.."{ception of 
Shaikh Hamdan ibn r·luharnrnad al-Nahayan \vho v1as replaced as llinister of 
Public Harks, but only because of his elevation to Deputy Pr~11e 
l':linister. Nor \vere the major political portfolios of Defence, the 
Interior or Finance delegated to co11moners; L~ey re~ined within L~e 
two families. At ~1e end of the day, the concession of relatively 
junior posts to non-royals was not a radical tilt in the pov1er 
structure. 
Because of their youth and social and educational bacl~ground, 
however, these ne'.v i.•linisters inclined naturally to syrn;;>athize ".'lith 
their contemporaries on the new Hational Asse-nbly \vho, because both 
~1e Hinisters and the l'~ational Asse-nbly delegates usually came fro'TI 
already-praninent families, were often relations as well. Together 
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'llith the existing f:linister of Education c.AlXlullah Tariam, the ne':l 
Speaker' s brother, they became the nucleus of the new movement o The 
Ta.riarns O'lm the 11radical 11 Sha.rjah daily al-Khaleej o 
'J.'hree of the new i,linisters were to gain particularly progressive 
re9utationso cAtdullah (1azruc.i, whose family is one of the largest 
numerically in the UoAoEo, was a refonning ;:.tinister of Labour and 
grappled ·,.;it.~ the immigration issueo Sac:id Ghobash, v1ho numbered an 
illustrious judge and historian among his Ras al-I<haLrna.h forebears as 
'"'ell as t.~e Hussian-educated dinister of State for Foreign Affairs 
Sa if Ghoba.sh17 , Has a far-sighted and articulate Planning 
~·linister. The Ghobashes owned the very radical 1:1eekly al-Azmena 
The new Health l'1inister Khalfan Rurni, from a leading 
Sharjah family, \'laS a member of the President' s conunission drafting 
tn. e 0 e,..,...,,,"' nent Const;tut;on18 - t t · th -• ........... ... .... ana · . .;en on o .oecome a co-au or or 
the Joint :-:e:110randumo 
0y a fateful coincidence 197d, t.~e year the Supreme Council was 
i.11.rnooilized by its dispute, \vas also the year in \·lhich the economic 
recession reac!1ed its de9th. Urgent decisions Here needed out not 
ma·:ie and the ::·Jational .J,sse.:-:illly under 'l'ariam' s neH leadersili9 gre'·" 
restive. ::.a'.-lS t!1e .:\.ssernbly desired strongly included for e:<arnpl8 the 
Co.lT.Ierce La.;., restricting L"Tiport agencies to can9<1nies wholly m·med oy 
nationals, which had been approved by the Asse:nbly in ~·lovem~r 1977 
but had since disappeared fra:1 sight. ;~ll other cmmercial ventures· 
would have had to transfer 51 per cent control to nationals \·lithin 12 
mnths of 81e bill's becaning la'.Y (see Chapter 'l".vo) o 
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In January 1978 the ,\ssembly drastically altered a draft land-
a~mership bilL Fra--:1 a craft that Hould merely have restricteJ 
future o.-mership of land and property in the UoAoEo to nationals, 
the ~\sse:nbly fashioned a laH can;;:mlsorily transferrin:J land .::mJ 
pro;:erty already owned by foreigners to UoAoEo citizenso Jl.s 
originally drafted by the i'-iinistry of Justice, the bill allo-.-1eJ 
non-nationals to retain existing holdings but required them \·!hen 
selling to sell only to nationalso I~ter three acrimonious 
sessions, ~1e Assembly inserted a~endments forcing foreigners to 
divest themselves of all land and buildings to locals within six 
yearso In short, the Asse~ly had on its own initiative drafted an 
expropriation bill19 o 
I:.ven more radical in its linplications was the Industries Bill Hhich 
the Assellbly approved in ~larch 1978o By investing the pcrv1er to grant 
or \-li~old licences for industrial projects in a Federal Higher 
Industries COrunittee, this law clearly infringed the local Rulers' 
absolute rights, enshrined by the Provisional Constitution, over 
the eA?loitation of natural resources within their own territorieso 
The new law also gave existing industries two years to appoint a 
local manager and laid dovm the mininmm percentage of the workforce 
that had to be locaL Licences were to be granted only to ventures 
with '51 per cent local capitaL Like the others ~1is bill20 , 
ardently desired by the FNC, mat intenninable delayso 
The Assellbly's shedding of its inhibitions passed a milestone when in 
rarch it approved the Federal Budget only with reservationso At 
Dhs10o5bn, the new Budget was slightly smaller then the previous 
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year 1 s and b'1e Assembly was driven to sending a telegram to ti1e 
Supra~e Council de~nding faster reflation through higher Gove~~ent 
spending21 o 
In April 1978v the Assa~ly held a session in ~~ra to debate 
L11Illigration and aften1ards pressed the cabinet into taking part in a 
joint Assembly-Goverrunent en~uiry into this favourite subjectv b'1e 
first joint demarche of the kind22 o 
During b~e SlliTh~er the Su~r~ne Council still failed to meet and the 
Federal legislation urged by the .i\ssembly still dre1-1 no nearer to 
enactrnento A second milestone Has passed when the 1\Sse.~ly grasped 
the nettle and invited the cabinet to a joint, closed session that 
resulted in a joint canmission "to remove the obstacles to Federal 
progress 11 in other '.vords to persuade t.'"le c,;uarrelling Rulers to 
reach a settle.menL This initiative clearly exceeds t1e ;\ss~nbly 1 s 
constitutional terms of reference. 'rhe Spea~~er, Taria~n Tari2lln, and 
the Deputy D . • n.me ,·'linister Shai~~h I-lamdan ibn !-luhar:unad chaired the 
ccxrmission and a suD-committee took itself off to visit tl1e ~{ulers 
individually over the 23 remainC.er of the year Its efforts c~ne to 
noughto 
.L\ashid faileJ to return to the cow1try to attend the 
~·'eder.:1tion 1 s annual ~·lational :Jay c-elebrations in Oece:nb2r; in J,:muary 
1979 t:1e Sl"ill.h fell and a ·.vaV·2 of tur.-:1oil si.re::Jt e:e Gulf. On 0t..:1. 
J.:muary the ,\sse!ui.Jly forced the {·linister of State for SU!.Jre:ne Council 
Affairs, Shai~~~ c::.alxl al-c..,..\ziz ibn HuTtaid al-;)asimi v to name the 
.i<uler op?Osing the centralizing legislation and to state his reasons. 
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Of the bills being blocked by Dul.XJ.i, the l'::.inister e.,.'"'Plained, four 
had been rejected by ShaH: .. l) Rashid on legal grounds - ·two quarantine 
bills and a fraud ·and decei]tion bill because they exceeded Federal 
jurisdiction and a Civil Defence bill because it needed further 
study; the fifth and si:·:b'1, the industries law and the land 
ownership la>v most crucial to further centralization and most 
ardently desired by the Asse~ly, had been rejected outright as 
unacceptable to Dubai; on the seventh, the ii11portant question of 
the Central Bank, Dubai \vas reserving its position and on the last, 
the ovmership of co:rnnercial agencies, 
amendments24 o 
Dubai was insisting on 
Three weeks later on 28th January, shortly after the flight of the 
Shah, 
presence 
Affairs 
meeting, 
the Assembly held an emergency session in camera in the 
of the Ivlinisters of the Interior, Defence and Foreign 
25 to discuss 11 the deteriorating situation" Opening the 
Tariam warned boldly that "sane states near us imagined 
that their regimes were safe, their thrones mighty, and closed 
their eyes to the lacunae in their internal affairs, with the result 
that the winds 
those regimes11 
of 
26 
change ble\.,r through those lacunae to overthrow 
The outcome of b~is meeting was a third and 
fourth joint session v1ith the cabinet in February 1979 at which two 
Assembly members and two Ministers dre\v up the Joint t·lemorandum. 
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.Grea}~ing entirely neH political ground v the 1-lernorandum' s three-fold 
significance derives firstly fro11 the sophistication of its 
ideological content, secondly fra11 b~e novel frankness of its 
critique and thirdly frclll the alliance of the younger ele;nents on 
roth the e>:ecutive and the consultative arms of govern11ent against 
the supreme rx:>wers 0 
As to its content, the burthen of the i'lemorandum is a demar1d for 
tighter control by the Federation over the Emirates and for 
parliamentary de;nocracyo It begins by addressing itself to the 
unification of the armed forcesv supposedly effected by the 1976 
merger, and says outright that the merger \-TclS a sham: 
11despi te the decision to unify the armed forces and to annul the 
constitutional right of the Emirates to retain their rn·m forces, 
no serious step has been taken ta.·mrds the true unification of 
these forceso Their state has remained fragmented since the 
resolution just as it vms beforeo The resolutions on unification 
1nust therefore be put into effect now and the reorganization of 
the country's armed forces under one unified canrnand canpleted11 o 
Arms purchases too should be the province of the Federal authorities 
alone, t.l'le Jvlernorandtnn continues 1 
"v1i th regard to the procedure for importing arms, the 
reco.'111Tlendation of the Council of Hinisters put before the 
Supreme Council on 16th April 1975 must be implernentedo This 
authorized the Federal body and the Federc..l body alone to import 
arms and to exercise control over their entry into t.l'le country, 
in preference to the present state of affairs in which the 
Emirates purchase and import anns" o 
A:.-; t.'1ey had reneged on their pledge to unify their armies, so the 
Emirates had failed to subject their police and security forces to 
the vauntej unification:-
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11;i'he Supreme CoW1cil issued a decree merging the police forces 
and yassed a Federal law in respect of state security, Hilic.i) 
Has to be entrusted to an ap;;xrratus having sole and co11plete 
authority in all matters of pubhc order in b'le COW1try. 
Despite this, hoi-lever, the ne1·1 syste:a has not been insti tutecl 
and the security forces have r~naine~ in their separate, W1CO-
ordinated state wib'1out being merged". 
The ::.·\ulers' failure to canply ·,.,i th these Federal resolutions, though 
\·lidely known, had not previously been aired in public; indeed, it Has 
a daring departure to irnpute any shortcanings at all to t.'1e I\ulers. 
The most radical change theoretically possible to the U.A.E.'s 
existing political complexion, d1e abolition of d1e separate 
Emirates, vlas d1e l'lemorandurn' s next de.rnand: -
Our people ••••• appeal to the Rulers to lay aside their 
differences, settle the root causes of those differences and, 
guided by the supreme national interest, to abolish inten1al 
borders betv1een the .l2nirates and rid us once and for all of all 
vestiges of thern11 • 
Picking up the thread after a digression on immigration, t.'1e 
manifesto progressed from the abolition of territorial borders to the 
abolition of the Emirates' ownership of and control over natural 
resources and revenue therefran accruing \vi thin their arbitrary 
confines:-
''The state does not possess any resources of its 01-m on v1hich to 
dravl •••• it is no longer acceptable that the state, in managing 
its resources, should have to depend on what one Emirate 
donates or another does not donate. The state as responsibility 
is to'\'/ards all the regions, vlhich means that equality and 
equilibrium must be established bebveen each region. If one has 
a surplus of vlealth vlhilst the others suffer for vrcmt of wealth, 
then d1at state of affairs is inco;npatible vlith the principle of 
equality. Its effects are reflecte::l in the disparate ca!;Eci ty 
for development in each region and t.~e disparate opportunities 
for d1eir inhabitants socially and econo:nically. I··Ierging the 
Elilirates 1-:ithin one framework and tying the11 to that mother 
nation is econo::~ically and EJOlitically incanpatible 1·1ith tl-te 
rete1tion by each Lffiirate of er.clusive control over its natural 
resources, \·lith all the profound internal contradictions an::l 
econanic inequalities that entails, Hhere one Emirate cannot 
absorb its v1eal b~ and the others cannot marshal even a minimum 
of revenue •••• " 
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A further allusion to the Supre-ne Cou.'1cil 1 s shortc~1ings folloHs in 
the iiernorancum's co~.1:)laint t;Ht the curre:1t constitutio:1al frame\·lor:~ 
of the ?ejero:ttion is u.rbitrary and inadequate. At the to;J, 
"tile volu-ue of \·lOr]( pouri:1g into and issuing fro.11 the Su;Jre::~e 
Council requires tha.t it should convene regulo:trly an::i 
frequently. Failure to do so •••••• leaves r.atters in abeyance, 
w1decided, for long perio:ls v;ith the result that public policy 
becanes non-existent." 
After the diagnosis co.11es the prescription~ "v;i th th2se 
considerations in mind, t.:"le Supre:ne Council should meet regularly 
once a month on a fixed l:B.sis". It is hard to convey hoi'l shocking it 
see:11ed at the time that anyone, especially of the younger 
generation, should be addressing the shaikhs in the imperative moo:l. 
The Coui"1Cil of Hinisters, as the executive, should be given real 
pm1ers:-
"The Council and its members the l·tinisters cannot fulfil their 
responsibilities in tb.eir Hinistries unless they are given the 
necessary povler •••• and granted the funds" • 
The judiciary too was in a confusing state that needed to be set to 
rights: 
"Four of the Einirates merged their lawcourts vlith the Federal 
judiciary and three remained outside •••••• Failure to implenent 
la\·ls even after they have been enacted poses a challenge to 
those laws and a threat, undermining respect for the-n in the 
CQ'lliTiuni ty o 11 
Above all, the F~C must beco.11e a legislative, par liarnentary ann of 
government:-
"The FNC must be granted full legislative ;:o•'lers to enable it to 
The 
carry out 
democracy, 
not merely 
debating and 
slogan "man 
its Jnission and practise effectively in a true 
so that it beco:nes a true legislative authority and 
a consultative council \·.'hose role stoos short at 
expressing opinions." -
does not live by breaO. alone" then preceded t.:"le 
sentences that sum up the feelings and aspirations of this ne\'l 
generation:-
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"'l'he v.:mguard of our young iJ20?le, v1ho have ciru.rli~ at the 
fou11tains of J:nm1le:J.ge at hauc or are returni:1g fra:n their 
stuC:ics abroad, is ;?Ouring rock into the couiltry an1ed v1itl1 tl1e 
kJJ.Oi·lle:1ge a."l.d understanding they have gai:1e:1o 'Tl1eir aspirations 
include political ?articipationooooooit is not possible to sto~ 
the:n playing their p::1rt in the de:nocratic process" o 
After this preg:1ant rer:·ark, the . ~e:norandum concludes v.ri th a call for 
an "im:aediate start on drafting a lJeliTI~l~~t constitution 
to ••••• satisfy the nation's longing for a stronger i?ederation." 
In rcco:Jni tion of t."'le dignity-conscious local custo:n of e..~tre.ue 
obliquity in criticism, tl1e authors of the i-'le.-noran:iUJn took care 
throughout to blame the federation's ills on foreign conspiracieso 
Internal security proble.'11S v1ere imported by immigrant labour; the 
contentious internal borders between the Emirates had men fabricated 
by imperialism' the strained state of the public utilities v1as 
caused by pressure on them from expatriates' the banking syste.'Tl must 
be rid of the "evils of foreign exploitation"; tl1e econauic 
reverses of the recent past had been engineered "by foreign hands"; 
foreign capital and skills competing "unequally and 
unlawfully" with local capital and skills; foreign landholdings 
posed a threat to national sovereignty.. No-one was left in any doubt 
however that the real blarne for blocking federal progress Has placed 
squarely on the shoulders of Shaikh Rashid. 
Public debate on the t:iemorandum was to prove in the end short-lived. 
Indeed, the frontiers of allmvable dissent rolled bad~v1ards, not 
fonvards, in its wake, and only bvo or three years later it v1ould 
have been inconceivable for anyone to apostrophize the shaikhs in 
such a tone. 'rhat fact hmvever in no ~t.ray diminishes t.'le manifesto's 
significance in U.A.E. a~d in Gulf politics. In pleading for a 
modem, elected Government, the Hemorandum gave voice to the needs 
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of the ;xo11 g·2T1eration formEd by the great up!1eaval of the 1970s, 
needs \·lhich the regimes have not y.2t nnderstoo:i they Dust faceo 
'i'hat the ideal of de:nocracy and equality should nave b2co:~1e 
identified hostility to the iilller of Dubai Has purtly 
coincidental o 'l'he younger, educated vanguard enviS2ged the 
fulfiL~a~t of their ideals d1rough an int~J,rated state rulej by 
O.e.mocratically-enacted la\·li Shaikh Rashid, sup?Qrte::l ':Jy the 
Provisional Constitution, saH the Federation as a grou;?ing of 
individual shaik.."fldans retaining j:XY1·1er over the conduct of their own 
internal affairso Since by resisting furd1er i~1tegration Dub3.i 1-.ras 
also resisting Abu Dhabi's philosophy of federalism, .?illu Dhabi's 
p.:>li tical 
and Shaikh 
redoubled a 
interests 
Zayid's 
coincided for a time \d th those of the radicals 
natural inclination to c..~-npion them was thereby 
Shaiid1 Rashid also saw clearly the question-mark over tJ1e future for 
hereditary Rulers in the Yonng 'l'urks 1 unitary stateo In a final 
exchange before he recame Federal Prime .Hinister, Zayid and Hashid 
restated their positions on d1e Commander-in-Chief, contributions to 
the Federal Budget, and the Federal media but Shaikh Rashid 'dent 
furd1er o Shaikh Rashid claimed that th.e Federal Hinistry of 
Inform.::ttion had refused to handle his reply to t.~e Joint t·ie:uorandu:n; 
Shaikh Zayid said the i<linistry had never been askej to do soo Shai:d1 
Rashid said that Duba.i had contributed to the Federal i:iudget and had 
in addition built at its O'i·m e.."q)ense projects of general value to 
Shaild1 Zayid conntered d1at to include such indiviaual 
projects under contributions to the Federal Budget made nonsense of 
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th·2 idea of a i?e::leral 3ujget for l"e::1eral purt-Oseso Shai}'Jl f-Gshid 
insiste::i tlut though he had no otljection to Shaik:.'1 Sultan ibn Z21yid 
?2rsonally he \·ias "lil:e onG of his o'>m sons11 - the marmer of his 
ap;x>intl:Jent haj b22n unconstitutional; Sh3.il'±1 Zayid r.uintained that 
hrticle 1 3U of ti1G Constitution gave him the ;:x)'.·!er as President to 
mal~e tl1at ap;:x:>intJnenL 
6ut of the Joint ; ie.11orandun Shaikh l\ashid demanded, 
11a unitary state means no borders, therefore no l~ulers. o. o o it 
means elections, ooooooit means placing finance, revenue and 
decision-ma;dng in the hands of the central govern'Tient. I am 
asl>.ing you [to the intervievler) so you can go and as~8zayid himself: does he want this unity? If he does, I agree11 o 
Shaikh IGshid 1 s question \'las prescient: the fate of one of the 
I(ulers Has indeed questioned directly in April 1979 as a result of 
the l'·1emorandurn movement o The marches and demonstrations \vent on 
longer in Tias al-i~'1aima.h than in the other Rnirates and Shaikh Saqr, 
the Euler, eventually intervened to ask the protesters for a written 
list of their de'Tiands. I·.Jhen co.rnpiled tl1e list called for total 
fusion to replace federation, for ShaiY~'1 Saqr to endorse the 
iiernorandum unreservedly and for the formation of a consultative 
council which the Ruler would consult over legislation and 
administration in the E.."nirate. The l:x:rly that drafted this note had 
30 mer:U:>ers and callej itself the 11People's Committee11 • 
i'lhen tl1e "People 1 s Co:n11ittee" arrived at a pre-arranged meeting 
with the Huler to present their list of demands, they found him 
surrounded by armed tribesmen and took offence. The meeting was 
reported to be so heated that \·lea pons v1ere unsheathed. Shaikh Saqr 
asked fo:i:' eight days 1 grace to consult his family, \vhose iuture v.:as 
gravely affected by the de~nds. During the eight days however, 
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reports i.:A...~an to reach the CQ;nittee that it Hils bein<J slandered. 
'l'he day b3fore their next appointrnent \·:it.~-} the l~uler, t:1e Co::rnitte·e 
tried to holC: a meeting in a r:lOSyue out foun:i it corc.oned off by 
annoured cars. i\ s;JO::cs:nan for the ~uler is said to have Clccused the.'71 
of fa;Je.ntinJ civil viar and b'1ey dis~rsed. 
'l'he :neeting v!ith the Ruler went ahea:.l as planned on 1Oth April a.nj 
was daninated by discussion, provoked by Shaikh ~aqr, of what the 
role of a l\uler \•las to be in the unitary state. Significantly, he 
was assured b'1at his J.X>Sition \·las not under threat as no alternative 
system of rule v/as being sought. 
Shortly aften1ards, hoivever, Shailili Saqr and his son the Crmm 
Prince sunmoned another group of citizens to voice their side of the 
story, which v1as that the Federation had had little to offer Ras 
al-Khaimah. Badly-needed finance for electrification had had to be 
borrowed; prices of essentials like rice and petrol were far higher 
in Has al-Khaimah than in Abu Dhabi; Sharjah, c.Ajman and Fujairah 
had opted to integrate with the Abu Dhabi but had it done them any 
good, the 29 Ruler mused , or they, like Ras al-Khaimah, 
still paying unfair prices? The de~nstrators had tried to tear dovm 
the Ras al-E.haimah flag for \·lhich "blood had been shed" the Crown 
Prince added, successfully enraging his audience. 
J\fter this emotional meeting, no more v1as heard of the People 1 s 
Corrunittee or the consultative council. A Ruler had asked if his 
farnily 1 s rule was to be ended, and the dissidents had ba.ulked at t.~e 
30 prospect • 
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.Crisis Session of 'i'he Suorer:1e Cmmcil 
The .:;upreme Cou.rtcil convened on 10th . :.arch 1979, for the first ti.-ne 
since : >Jove.<lb2r 1 977, to discuss the ;rave condition of tl1~ 
Federatio::1 in general ani the . l~11orandu-:1 in "1 ;urticular-' • 
D2:r.onstratinq schoolcl1i ldren, 'dho:n 3haik .. "l l\ashid clai.rned v7ere 
organize:.l uy the i'..,eueral 1-l.inistry of :education, 1vaved b.:mncrs 
sup;)()rting total integration. Fe;:ale stud.:::mts joined in the 
much-publicized marches on the B:lst Coast. .G. 11pt:.~ple' s charter11 
vas quoted in the 1-\bu Dhabi new·spa:;x=rs demanding an end to the veto 
privilege on the Supreme Council and a ge.11ui.ne mersrer of the anned 
forces, the abolition of internal lx>rders and a ne>·l social 
justice32 • After debating throughout the day, the Supreme Council 
session was left open until 27th L:Jarch33 • 
The 26th l'·larch 1979, the day before the session resumed, \·Jas the 
day the Egypt-Israel peace treaty v.ras signed in \·lashington a11d thus 
the day of the greatest agitation in the Arab world since the Si:-::-Day 
Vlar. i·lhen the Supreme Council resu;ned the follov1i.ng day, Shaikhs 
P.ashid of Dul:E.i and Saqr of 1\cis al-Khaimah vlere absent. Only the 
presence of five ~rates including both P~u Dhabi and Dubai 
1 . t. . s Co . 1 ' . 34 eg1 ~n1zes a upra~e unc1 mee~1ng Press photographs of the 
Supre.11e Council \·lith h-10 empty chairs drove hane the full gravity of 
the situation. 'l'he BBC mentioned that Britain vms mediating to 
prevent the U.A.E. from co~lapse. 
On the day he boycotted the resumed Supreme Councilu Shaikh Rashid 
issued his own refutation of the Joint l•iemorandurn shov1ing that he 
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kne·,., full Hell that the target of the campaign was hiDself. The 
:-~e;norandu:-n'' 35 the Young rfurl~s for se2.l-:ing 
uncvnsti tutio:ml p:::>;~·ers r criticized Pbu Dhabi's ~haviour over b~e 
forces, accused the :'iational Assembly of sullying ti1e 
cow1try' s imu.ge \lith its land e:qxo?riation bill and fimlly mlled 
for outside h.;lp to save tl1e .i?ederation. 
'!'he la~·l cannot be over-ridden by individuals \·lhatever tl1eir status in 
a mcx:iern country, the Dtilla.i ~·lemorandurn began; all must adhere to 
the Constitution. The joint Fi'1C-cabinet manifesto:-
11 shoHs that t.."lose •.-1ho drafted such a Hemorandum totally ignored 
the provisions of the Constitution, thus a:u'1l.lng in an 
unconstitutional manner to shake the fou.T"ldations on \·lhich the 
Federation of the United Ju-ab E..'nirates is built". 
Getting to the crux of the matter from Dubai's point of viewr 
11Federal decree nuffiber three of 1978 regarding the appointment 
of the Ccmna.nder-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Has issued in 
contravention of all constitutional principles11 • 
The land-ovmership bill 
11 tarnishes the reputation 
also represents a clear 
individual"; 
d1e com~erce bills 
of the state at hcxne and abroad and 
violation of the rights of the 
'\vere dravm up vlithout serious study of their consequences and 
repercussions \·!ith regard to our econanic situation and the 
acute recession fran v1hid1 we are presently suffering •••••• and 
are a flagraT"lt violation of the principles of the Constitution11 • 
lJ. though a pennanent constitution is a cherished goal, it 11must not 
prevail over every other consideration and \·Thimsically repeal tl1e 
Provisional Constitution Hhich is in force noil 1 • Finally, :-
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'rhe Eise of The l·;e.11oranjum !:·love:nent 
11 in vie'i·l of the various prolonged phases through Hlu.cn tne 
present crisis has passed and \.'hiD'1 ma.ke it in3up;x:>rtajle, 
r:xrrtictllarly as the appro;,Jriate solution does not ap;Y2ar to b2 
available to us 1 He ;:>ro;ose t.::a.t the Su;:>re:ae Coutlcil requc.:;t 
certain fraternal nations [neanin:r I(uv;ait] in the Gulf region to 
e):ert th:::ir go::D offices to conciliate, so us to sa£es'U3.rd the 
int·2rests of the Federation •••• ". 
Out in the oper1, therefore f \•/ere o.ll Shaikh F;ashid Is srievunces 
frorn the ap?Jint..rnent of Shaik.i-J .Sultan ibn Zayid to the unp:J.latable 
legislation sought by the F1\JC. .i.;'or the first time, the possibility 
of tl1e Federation's ds:~ise had be:::n acknowledged publicly. 
'rhe final salvo in \-Jhat became J:novm as "the :Jattle of the 
i·lemoranda" v1a.s fired on 30th i-larch by a group \·lhich smv fit to 
remain anony.nous. Repudiating Dubai 1s nine points, its au~1ors cast 
the by no'i·l routine accusations of unconstitutional behaviour and 
ridiculed Shaikh l~ashid 1 s charge that it VTa.S the Joint I·lemorandu-n 
that had sought to 6verthrm1 the Constitution36 • The Joint 
~·:ie.11orandurn had simply eX'tJressed "t.'1rough lavlful channels" "the 
hopes and aspirations of the citizen masses for the consolidation of 
the federal movement 11 • 
This last docwnent re-iterated the l1emorandum's call for a unified 
judiciary and defended the decree abolishing the separate military 
co~crnands, though on erroneous grounds. It also defended the draft 
com:nerce, industry and land mmership bills against the Vice-
President's objections, ending \·lit.'1 a list of violations by Dub3.i 
of the very Constitution ti1at Dubai sought so sedulously to uphold. 
·?02 
Cha.Dtcr ?our 
'l'hese i·lere !Julxi.i 1 s alleged failure to to contribute a s;;:>2cific 
?2rcentage of oil revenue to the Fe:1eral :Ju~1sret; to i::-qle:ne:1t the 
la\·.' merging L1e arme:1 forces, to co-O~)erate ·l'lith the Fe:1eral Supre:ne 
Court, 
::ealti1, to enforce tne im:.iigration la•."!.s, to co-orC:.irute oil policy 
an::i to SU?ply the C.'urrency .:::oaro with hard currei1CY o 
~~o l.:lnirate \·ias burciened by the 1971 Constitution with the obligations 
IJubai is here accused of derelicting o Control of oil resources and 
lai·l courts, for exainple, are specifically retained by the E..':lirates 
and not trc:msferred to the central aut.,oritieso This 1··le:r:1oran:lurn v.ras 
inaccurate as uell as anonymous and received little attention after a 
few days. Its value here is as an indication of the depd1 of feeling 
harooured by the integrationists against Shaikh I~shid. 
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::'he ::3e::rinning of The End for The ; ie:nora.11cu-:J i·iove:nent 
the De~Juty ?riD:; ~-Jinster anj Shaikh Surur ibn i·iu.ila:n::ad al-:Iat'1ayan 
called on Shaild'l Rashid in an W1Successful atte:':lpt to mediate bcb-1een 
llbu Dhabi and Dubai 37 0 'l'hen the Crmm Prince and Foreign f.'.iinistcr 
of I·~uv;ait undertook a lengthy raejiation mission and the outcome v;as 
announced on 25th l-l.pril: Shai!d'l Rashid had accepted the post of 
Federal Prime Ilinistero This Has the beginning of the .end for the 
1-iemorandull move.ileilt; as soon as G~e Vice-President took control of 
the executive, the conditions in Hhich the radicals had flourished 
came to an endo Their demise is the subject of t..l-Ie next chapter o 
In J.'.lay the National Asse.:nbly met for the first time since the 
Hemorandum had been presented in l·~ch, only to prorogue itself 
until a neH Government could be - -38 rormea o This tool~ time, but 
vrhen the nei·r Cabinet was finally announced on 1st July, the i-.iinister 
\'lho had helped canpose the Iviemorandum, c1'\l:riullah Uazruc.i of La.l:x:mr 
and Social Affairs, had lost his job and so had the Hinister of 
Education, whan Shaild'l Rashid had accused of canplici ty in G"le 
Spring de11onstrationso This I··tinister, c: Atrlulla'f1 Tariar.1, \·laS G"le 
brother of the Speaker of the National Asse:llbl yo 
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.The !Use of The l·lernorandurn_ I·~ovc=.:nent 
S\.1\l:Tier 1979 sa\'7 an unprecedented level of ;x:>li tical debate in the 
-Gulf shu.il~,do:ns as a result of the revolution in Irano 'l'he qu~stion 
of ;:linerican roses loo-:1ed; tlus v.rus to alier1<1te the intelligentsia 
fra'TI their l~ul·2rs more thu.n any other topico i~overnber sa\·l the attad~ 
by fumtics on the Gran:l ilosque at :·1ecca, then \vith Chrisb;1as cwne 
the I~ussian invasion of Afc_:ihanistano Kuvmi t and 2hrain lx>th 
suffered incidents of terrorism, b1ough the UoAoEo escaped. 
Tariam Tariarn' s address to the opening session of the :·~ational 
Asseinbly in Novemb=>...r 1979 vms the aane of his career and a classic 
t d ~ th hall f " . t' 39 case-s u y OI e c enge o moaern1za 1on o It dmllenged the 
hereditary regimes directly on the subject of de.'1locracy and contained 
fe-vr paragraphs vri thout refere.11ce to freeda'TI. The .implicit warning is 
clear fran the beginning~ 
"no regime or country is safe except with a solid internal front 
and national participationo o ••• o This cannot be unless •• o. a the 
citizen expresses his opinion on internal events, his freeda-n 
of- speech and action guaranteed". 
The Islamic credentials of democracy are adduced to shO\v that "the 
p:;trticipa.ting citizen is not an innovation"; 
"the Prophet listened to the op1mons of the lo:.·1liest of men and 
acknav1ledged the validity of views contrary to his mmo o o. o •• He 
see..~ a country on that pattern, in vlhich the freeda'TI of the 
individual is deeply-rootedooooo.justice is not a favour but a 
matter of irnp:;trtial lavl, impartial to all citizens vriti1out any 
consideration other than Right"o 
Crucially 1 material handouts vrould no longer suffice in lieu of 
representation. 
nrrcday 1 the nation is not 
housing and social security: 
particip:;ttionoooooo 11 
focri and drink and clothes and 
today the nation is freeda1i, 
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"The executive should be unitary to tl1e core", 'I'aria:n prescribed, 
"and subject to the scrutiny of G~e :)20?le11 o The ?i.'lC' s task, for 
its p3.rt, i·,·as to "guide the ~ecutive away fro11 its mistakes 11 - a 
breathta!:in9ly aud3cious thing to say to a shaik .. h in the conte;:t of 
11an enlishtened internal front vnncn may criticize but not 
incite hatred, particip:tte o o o oa.'1d never remain silent throucj'h 
\'lea.kness or surrenaer o Your cabinet H3S foiTiled \·lith one clear, 
specific task," 
Shaikh 1\ashid v1as enlightened as he watched expressionless fra.1 the 
rostrum, 11to canplete the process of integration"o 
Finally, some response to the Joint 1-le.;noran:iwn vvas de:nandedo On 
this point, •\;e are open to dial~""<lle but we shall not be ignored11 o 
This speech of unprecedented daring 1·1as \·lidely admired and daninated 
conversation in the days that follalledo 
'rhe Young Turks v1ere not hov1ever to live up to its pranise once a 
strong .Prime l,·linister tool~ up the reins, and the 1 979 session \·.ras in 
fact tl1e one that marked the beginning of the Assembly's retreat into 
its earlier, generally rubber-stamping roleo 
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The I-~ise of 'I'he ;·ie:norandu;n. i~ove;:tent 
'i'he ~?Ol.-eion ~-:r.:r::rience and ·rhe Ra::Ucalization of '.r£1e IntelliGentsia 
3ut if c:.a:~estic ?Jli tical and econo:nic circunstanc·2S con:luci ve to 
radical thinl:in; ind co-:1e to:]ether in 1 'J7G, in 1 S79 ca..-ne the tu..~ of 
e:-:te1.-nal catalysts to play tl1eir part in the radicalization of the 
intellis·entsia o As the Joint :lemorandurn opened u;_::~ deba.be on ne·l'l 
ioeas a0out governo~~t, so events starting vlith the revolutio:1 
across the vTater unleashed previously tmmentionable criticism of the 
regimes 1 foreign friends a 
In their relations ·.·lith the outside \·lOrld, the Gulf states' recurring 
dile:rrna in mcrlern tirnes has been that their best friends have been 
their vlorst enemiesa aten1al relations have had a strong influence 
on the UaAaE. 's internal develo;xnent, moreover, because most of the 
country's formative experiences have l:x..""efl engendered to a greater or 
a lesser degree by foreign J.:X:Yi·lers o 'l'hese have been the experience of 
living under protective L~~ialism, \·lith its legacy of political 
attitudes and economic idiosyncrasies, and of e1e geographical 
accident of living above a resource vital to larger powers - in short 
the e.'";Y"...rience of smallness canbined with covetabili ty. Since camp 
Da.vid, the Gulf Rulers have had a harder task selling their 
continuing friendship vlith the l·Jestem camp to their publico 
The Truces and Treaties of the British period aimed to deny the ~Jlf 
to all powers other than C;ri tain and to keep the peace between the 
shaikhda.11S t:'1e;-:1sel ves. Controlling inten1al affairs Has not the 
prime gool, arJ.d the problem of the shaikhda.11S • extre:ne econo:nic 
deprivation VIas not addressed until the end of the colonial :periodo 
Some involvement in local affairs v1as ahiays a feature, however, 
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for example the protection of the crr:mtercial interests of British 
subjects40 o 
0ritain's interest in ti1e tenor of internal govcrnu~1t later 0a;an to 
intensify v1hen firstly the air-route agree-aent and then the oil 
concessions I<lade stability desirable on land as ilell as 2t seaa 
Preferences \·7ere for.ned for particular shaik!1s over others an:1 force 
was used on occasion to express such preferences as Hell as to ensure 
the settlement of debts (a ?raninent feature of the pearling 
econany) and sbnilar disputes41 0 'l'hese are G,e themes that lead 
the nationalist element to clabn, as it does in the demorandum and 
elsev1here, that the legacy of colonialisrn is bach.'v;ardness, 
isolation, dependency and internal strifea 
The defence and foreign representation of the Trucial States \~S 
solely Britain's responsibility a As the shaikhdo:ns' larger 
neighbours Sa' udi Arabia and Iran have both tried at times to expa...'1d 
into 'i'lhat is now UaAaEo territory, the shaik.haall.S Here heavily 
dependent on the protecting pov1er to uphold their integrity 42 , a 
state of affairs which rendered the bnperial presence at once 
humiliating and indispensablea After Britain's Hi thdra\·.ral the pre-
dicament lived on when the Shah of Iran became at one and ilie sarne 
tirne ilie aggressor against and guarantor of the Federation. It is 
vivid in the contradictions of to:lay, since the superp::JHer that 
ultimately underpins the shaikhdo:ns' survival is the saue superlJO-,.,er 
t..."la.t ilireatens t..."lem intennittently Hit:• invasion. 
:t~egionally, the environ."llent in which t.l-}e U.A.E. fo'..lnd itself in the 
early years of independence Has da-ninated by the armed hostility 
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betv1een Iraq and Iran and the Har b2tl\'ee.I1 the Sultun of Qnan and t.'1e 
Co:-rrnunist-backed insurgents in Dhufar.o 'Ehe nei·l state 1 s p;::rticular 
foreign ;;>olicy proble.;n \•,'aS that Of its lx:Jrder Cisputes v;ith its b:iO 
largest neighl:ow.-s o Shai::h ZayiCi attaches sreat personal i:n;:xJrtance 
to gCXX::-neiglm:mrliness and his efforts helped to enable Sacu::'ii 
?.ra~ia to reco;nize the three-year-old ::.-;>e:leratio:1 in 1 S74 after an 
unpublished understanding \·lhich is re;;>orted to have gi ve.1 the l(ingdo:n 
access to the coast near ti 1e :..ase of the (!a tar ?e-'1insula. via a 
~--
corridor across Abu Dha~i Bnirate~~o Iran, by contrast, had 
pre-e11pted Britain 1 s \·li thdraHal by landing on the three disputed 
islands of Abu J.lusa and Greater and Lesser Twnbs o A ca.11:Jlaint ~·las 
lo:Jged \dth the United Hations in 1972 but the militarf realities 
}:ept the question in ~ya.nce (see Chapter One) o 
In the early 1970s, it v1as the perception of the Gulf regimes that 
the main Cianger stemmed fran the possible infiltratio:-1 of 
revolutionary ideology from Iraq and/or Dhufaro Clashes broke out 
bet\·Teen Kmmit and Iraq in 4Ll 1973 • and in the sa.t11e year Iraq further 
estranged itself from its southern neighbours by signing its 1reaty 
of Friendship vli th the Soviet Uniono The Shah considered it his 
mission to police the Gulf against both the Iraqis and the Popular 
?ront for The Liberation of 0.na.n and the Arabian Gulf and thus gave 
the states on the Arab side simultaneous relief and discomfitureo 
L:.y 1974, ho'•lever, PFLOAG had been forced to drop its ambitions in 
the Gulf and had shortened its na.tlle to just The Po;,Jula.r .G'ront for The 
45 
one of a nurn,l::>-cr of factors that enabled the Liberation of Oman 
Gulf states to consider a more relaxed approach to regional securityo 
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Dy the middle of the decade the atnt)sphere of detente uas 
established. 
Shaikh Z:r~lid had J:B.id a first state visit to Tehran. ::..;ct>·Jeen this 
and his final visit late in 1977 relations Here said to have srmm 
cordial. ~easons usually advanced for the Daproven~~t suggest L~at 
the Shah had gra.m to accept the ~·ederation as a slightly less 
unequal rurtner a~d to h.:1ve gras;>2d that Federal cohesion \'las more 
conducive to Gulf sectrrity than siding Hith individual l~ulers. In 
1978, U.A.E. Foreign £:iinister At'lrnad SuHaicii 'dent on record as saying 
t.'la.t "the U .A. E. 
In t•Ja.rch 1975, 
4ho \·lould not welcnm the dep3rture of the Shah" 
at an O?:CC nieeting in Algiers, the Shah ai1d the 
Iraqi Vice-?resident Saddam Husain e.11braced publicly, signalling the 
end of the era of polarization. 'I'he gesture v1as greeted \·lith much 
fanfare in the Gulf. . In June fonnal agree.:P...nt i~'a.s reached betvTeen 
the military and ideological ene:-nies on the disputed Shatt al-cArab. 
Iran ceased supplying Uulla dustafa Barzani's Kurds inside Iraq and 
Iraq reduced its support for t.~e guerrillas in Dhufar. sacudi ,\rabia 
recognized the F~ussian-backed People • s De.-nocratic nepublic of Ye.11"'...n. 
Peace had arrived. 
Proposals for Gulf security ):acts, sa-ne mutually competing, Here noi·T 
circulated by the nei., Cro•,m Prince i?a.hd, by the Shah, the Iraqis 
and the Sultan of o.nan and in i'~ove.:i:>2r 1976 the :.i'oreign dinisters of 
all the Gulf states including Iraq and Iran met in l·luscat to discuss 
five different 47 schemes • 'I'i:e meeting was not successful but these 
mid-seventies years are still regarded as sa~ething of a Golden Age 
in the Gulf. 
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In the U. A. E. they Hen: years of a i:x:o.11ing econO:i1Y, the ea.s ing of 
neighbourly tensions. and 171UCh-feted status in intenmtional 
orga:.izations. 'I'hey Here the years l'lhen the Gulf oil-exportc::rs 
enjoyea great cieference after the 1973/4 price rises. Oil and aid 
diplcxnacy thus dn11inated this second phase in the U.:\.1::. 0 s forei;rn 
relations. In 1974 Shaikh Zayid undertook i1is first extensive tour 
as flead of State and VIaS careful to include countries on both 'G1e 
left and the right of the ltrab divide43 • Subsequently he v;as to 
initiate or support mediation efforts in numerous inter-Artlb 
conflicts and remained in de~d as a conciliator until the U.A.E. 
entered a more introspective phase later in the decade. 
'l'he Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab :Lcona11ic D2velopment, vrhich began 
operations in 1973, v.ras the main official channel for aid and in 
1974 its brief Has widened to include Asian, 1\.frican and other 
developing countries outside the Arab 1·1orld. ADF.i\IID ca.11lnitted itself 
to loans totalling $600m in the si..'{ years to t.,e end of 1978. .Z\d-hoc 
aid 1·.ras handed out liberally as vrell during this phase. 
But it v.ras in the e>..J;Xrrience of e.'9Qrting oil that the dilem:na of 
depende.11ce on rx:>Hers sn-netimes hostile 1·ras sharpest. That the oil 
weapon v.ras tv1o-edged v.ras soon perceived; the fact of exploiting the 
\·lest 1 s dependence on cheap a11d plentiful su~Jplies quickly laid bare 
the exporters 1 a.-m reciprocal dependence on the \·Jest' s prosperity and 
gocx:l Hill o This is fertile soil for the "keep it in the ground" 
lobby \·lho argue that as the Gulf states cannot invest their surplus 
revenues profitably outside the industrialized :tations, t.~ey are 
obliged to produce more oil than they need for do.-nestic develotxnent 
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in order to SU;J;?Ort the currencies in Hhich they are forcej to invest 
the proc~e~s of oil ~1ey do not neej to projuce in the first place. 
The ;_:x::>ssible fate of this "nosta9e'' r.1onc=y b2CJ.:-:1e o:1e of t11e r.nin 
\•lorries p::=r:neatin9 the "alternative" literature ( se2 belo-. .r). 
Dr Kissinger's first public threat to consider retaliatory oeasures 
v;as broadcast soon after ~1e Gulf states had asrc-..:>Q on their tot.::tl 
e:nlnrgo against the USA during the Octo~r \·;'ar of 1973 and their 
cumulative five p2r cent cut in supplies to o~1er "tmfriendly" 
\·7estern cow1tries49 • 
The threat H.J.S re-iterated t.l'rroughout 1974 by t.~e then Secretary of 
Defence James Schlesinger and others50 and \'laS still alive in 1975 
\·Then Dr I~issinger, in an intervie1·1 vlith Business \'leek that achieved 
. . t . tl Ar . l ·51 not:or1e y 1n 1e a.o Hor a , weighing the pros a<J.d cons of over-
throv1ing the Gulf regimes, came down against the idea of military 
action aimed solely at reducing the price of crude but left open the 
option of using force to break any future e;nbargo. The threats 
provoked hostile questioning in Bahrain 1 s National Asse:nbly, soon to 
re abolished, aoout the 1971 agreement giving the us naval 
f 'l't' t J rf ' 52 ac1 1 1es a ur_a1r • 
rrhe same threats were revived after the fall of the Sha.~ and ~1e ne1., 
round of oil price rises which it triggered. \7hen the Thatcher and 
Heagan adrainistrations came into office, the Gulf intelligentsia 
viev1ed their proposed f<apid D2ployment l"orce as the epi to:ne of 
\··lestern ill-'vlill53 • Their I\ulers' policies on the level a..l"ld price 
of oil exports thus act as major irritants to tl'!e radicals of the 
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Gulf and therefore a major ;;;otential restraint on L~e regi:nes 1 
5.1 freedo11 to deploy their min asset · o 
One of the princi;Jill st:1te:i aiE1S of oil ana aici G.iplcclacy '..tas to 
rally support for b1e Palestiniw~ causeo 
Uo;~oi:o i·l·2re the mavericks at tlle OP:LC pricing conference in (~tar in 
Dec-=.::llx:r 1976 >·.'here all the other me;:llx:!rs raisej the price of cruae 
DY ten per cent whilst Sac.uai L~"Xabia and the UoAo~o stud:;. to a rise 
of only five per 'i'he gesture \as Hal"'!llly uelco.~1ed in the 
United States56 ana the folloi·ling t\·lelve :ilOnths of t.'le carter 
administru.tion v.rere the hey-day of tl1e ·:·:ashington-idyadh axiso 
It \'las to be a short hey-day o ?resident Sadat initially :ilanaged to 
retain th-2 support of the Gulf states for a time even after half of 
L'le lrrab world had rejected his US-Da.cked approach to p=>....ace after the 
second Sinai disengage;nent in 1975o fra~ a Gulf tour in Januarf 1976 
he returned ho:ne uith pro"7!ises of an extra $700m in aido A r.1onL'1 
later he abrogated the moribi.h"1d 'l'reaty of Friendship \·lith the Soviet 
Uniono January 1977 savl large-scale foo:l riots in C:liro caused oy the 
re.rnoval of governinent su.IJsidies; the Gulf Organization for 
Develo~ent in Egypt responded by raising its commitment to $1,575mo 
\"!hen President Sadat \'lent to Jerusalem in I~ove:":lber 1977 in pursuit of 
a bilateral, peace hoi-lever, it see;·neci. to the 
Gulf states as if all their investr:~ent in a co.11prehensive settle-nent 
had been nationalized vlithout canpc._nsat:iono In Septe.~2r 1977, 
America 1 s sponsorshi;;:> of the Cal-up David accord brought its relations 
Hith the Gulf states to their nadiro It b2came all but irnpossiole 
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for the l:tulers to defen.::S. oil policies clearly favourin~ the •.-:est to 
their educated ~)()~Jula tions o 'i'nrou~;hout t:1at year the dollar 
;::>lmm:::tei in value, lc.r1(:::.in0' adci.ed CO:Jency to b1e kee::ri t-in-tile 
1 979 and 19o0 were the years in 1i1ich all these t..1e::1-:~s bGJan to 
convergeo i;;loa:iy n~volution came to Iran and the Soviets to 
Afghanisbno i"/estern an::iety for the stability of the oil-exporters 
intensified and liestern interest became in turn ever more of a rea. 
rag to L1e radicalsa 1~ve all, the United States 1 continuing 
aru1erence to ~~p David in L~e face of ever-increasing Israeli 
run-;kishness meant that ti1e US could do no right in the eyes of c.l-
I:.haleej 1 s ancl al-.L\z.rnena 1 s constituei1CYo i·iockery and vilification in 
those b-10 foruins of the ;:,rab regi.rnes that enjoyed close links \·lith 
America became an e.r:-1barrass."T\ent to the UaAoEo C-ov·::.=rnme.'1to Nor \·Jere 
the radical outpourin9s te:npered by any acknovlledgement of a Soviet 
design: public opinion in the UoAoEo, in Dlis instance meaning a far 
wider public than b1e intelligentsia, simply does not believe in a 
Soviet threato 
In an a~~osphere in which the US can do no right, the Soviet Union 
need do little to vlin friends o l·tr Lrezhnev 1 s speech in New Delhi in 
D8cember 1980 calling for the neutralization of the Indian Ocean viaS 
Hell received by 57 the Young Turks , as vias the IZm·iai ti .F.~ir 1 s tour 
of :sast L'urope in September 19S1 58 o Having "only nalf a foreign 
p:>licy11 became another accusation against the shaH:hso 
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rrhe Content of "The J\ltemative" 
.=.;:..;;..::.=.;;.::;. -- ---
The Young '.fur)~s' prima ... ry contention is that political reform has 
failed to l~ee:.) !JaCe \·lith material and social chan:J·2o In all the Gulf 
states including the UoAoEo, ti1e carGinal point of d1eir da~estic 
;_)latform is the need for mo::lern, institutionalized, participatory 
J\s \·Tell as the political co:n;?lexion of their regim·2S, 
they deplore the direction that econanic development too1: after the 
1973 upheavals, the · direction of mass i.mr:Ugration, wasteful 
si_Y"'._nding on prestige projects and tJ1e investment of the surpluses in 
the Hest, all of v1hich resulted, ti1ey argue, in a. \ddening of the 
rich-poor gap and a cultural parasitism that has sap;?e:l the citizen 
of any \·lark etJ1ico Their b-10 great foreign policy bugooars are vlha.t 
they see as their shaikhs' servile depo._ndence on America and their 
inertia on or merely verl:al support for ti1e Palestinians, the two 
b2ing mutually interconnectedo 
The regimes 1 refusal to allow vlider p;rrticip3.tion in decision-making 
or to ~~e the~elves accountable to any representative body has been 
presented as so serious a. lacuna as to undermine their 
1 't' 59 egJ. :unacy o Instead of participation and accountability, the 
shaiJrlls are depicted as cynically resorting to hand-outs, favouritism 
and patronage to buy 
t , . t61 o suppress aJ.ssen o 
60 
support and to iron-fist security ineasures 
Such consultative bodies as ti1e shaikhs 
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.The ~Use of The l·io"Tiorandulll .l'-love.112I1t 
-- --- -- -- .._;c_.;..; _ ___;.;._;;.;._ ;;....;..::_....::.;_;,;.=..:;..;;. 
have p:;;rrnitted, c~:cept l~u·dait 1 s, are ;x:>rtrayed as invalid, because 
their . I • me:oers!ll? is ap;x:>intcC:. not elected, <mcJ. toothless, becaus2 
their p::rl'lers are not binc.1in:;62 0 
s·2en by the intelligentsia ilS a light shining, c:lb2it palely, in 
the darkness and its final e:~tinction in 19JG Has seen .J.S pitchin; 
-") 
the internal ::mlitics of the Gulf states into total darb1·2ss'.J..J. 
Later, the literature go2s further and ve.""ltures to S?ell out 
explicitly that in the absenc-2 of any legal cha111"'1els for e:-:;Jression, 
dissidence has no O~)tion but to e::press itself through illegal 
6.1 
ones ·, though this develo;::ment pzrtains to the ne..."{t chapter. 
As Hell as being unaccountable and u.;·rre?rese."ltative, the e:dsting 
executive anns of government .have been condellll'led for the persor1al 
fealty basis of appointments. Despite their \'iestern-sounding names, 
posts are really still a·\'larded according to allegiance, not 
't65 mer1 , v1ith obvious effects on efficiency and justice. 'l'he b:o 
most v7idely read "alternative" i·rriters in the GCC have roth coined 
words for this syste.rn: to iluhamrilad Humaihi it is "bedocracy"66 and 
to Alx1ullah lJafisi it is 11JlJ1glo-be:iouisrn1167 • 
~:cessive spending on defence and security is argued to be the 
corollary to the reg.lr.1es 1 refusal to acl'Tiit the educated but non-royal 
elite to the . 1 - , . . J 68 Cl.~C e or aecl.sl.on-ma~ers • E:}:ternal defence 
policy, the argu;nent runs, is no more than a footnote to the grand 
' 69 American strar.egy , and since t."leir pro-'.!estern orientation is 
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their gravest or:cence in the intelligentsia 1 s eyes, the re;:L1~2s that 
allo'.·l '.:estern l:Bses or 11 facilities" at DiBhran anc1 other lo8:J.tions 
in Sa c.u:::.i I.ra0ia, at ,;asira 2.na 'I'rm:rrait in 0.;-an and at Ju:Efair in 
i3ahrain are ti1e ::10st onensive to the radiC3lso So::1e ;.crriters all.::~~e 
that t.'1e hu:;e \·tllite ele;J1EL."1t port of Jabal ~\li in Dul.Bi sl1ould ::>:2 
adae::i to this list70 o irl1ese re~;irnes have only lulf a foreign 
)X)licy, the ar;ument continues, a p:>licy predicated on subjection to 
- . 71 1-ll11er1ca , v1!1ich is seen as the prote:::::tor of the status-c_:uo 
against legitimate deinarids for refor.-/2 0 
Palestine has of course ahvays played a role in t.~e radicalization of 
public o;:>ini.on 7 3 and the Ymmg Turks • conter:1pt for the inertia or 
''absence•• 7d (al-qhivab) · of their govenn:1ents on the issue, or 
their • I governmen"Cs merely 11holl0\·l'' e~J?ressions of SU??Ort75 are 
not unique to the Gulf but part of the 1·1ider disillusionment G.~t 
adds up to 11The Arab Predica.ment"76 0 
On the econo1lic level, the outcane of the oil l:x:o-n is seen as .h.aving 
turned a depleting real asset into Hestern pa.per insb:ur.lents 
vulnerable to both erosion 77 and to ex;:>loitation as a \veapon 
against the Arabs - to l::P-ing held hostage, as this contingency v1as 
often described after i\merica froze Iran • s assets after the 
revolution and then Libya•s in 198678 0 
The rxxxn is also blamed for driving a dangerous and v1idening ···leage 
beh1een haves and 
buy off . 80 cnange 
79 hol.Ve-nots , augmenting ~he shaikhs 1 
nurturing the despised 
ability to 
11 cor-..su"Tlerist 
1:1entality"81 and the attendant air of depravity, excess and 
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con-u~)tion, 
.. '1' 82 rv.nu 1es 
...., -~ 
'l'he Eise of The l··le:noran:J.urn i'love:-nent 
---------
and p-2rmi tting the fabulous enrich:nent of t.:1e shaiJ:hly 
,. ") 
and of the ClJ,1::;ral 1~1erciunt classes0 J o "oil 
na tiona.lis1:1"u~" 
irres;xmsible s:Jlurl';in~; on absurd 
:xtrochial vanity 0,... J... ., ma.rures .. eo in e;.:cossi vel y lu;:urious ~:::ublic 
buildincrs06 , as ~t12ll as the personal mnity manifested in tl1e 
"co;1surnerist :n.:mtality", by territorial se.11sitivity an:l ]Jetty border 
ciisputes87 and 
ll:::>ove all, 
; 88 by the abandonment of any ;,Jrete.!ce of plarm1ng o 
the oil ~n in the Young Turks' eyes \·las synonymous 
i-?ith the ;;ass immigration thu.t u.t rest encourage:.! ~XJ.rasitism by 
nationals on the irrrnigrants they sponsored and relegated the 
parasitic national to a role of only marginal i..r:J?::>rtance in the 
econQ1lY and at i·lorst laid the Gulf states open to conspiracies to use 
the docile hsian to side-step the dema..."1ds an l~ab presence of CQ11-
~:>arable size might bring or to use Far ?.astern i..rnmigrar1t "militias" 
to seize the oil Hells for America89 o 
Some key phrases recur like a litany in the ''alternative'' 
literature. They include "us interests", "popular participation", 
"foreign "rich-poor ga;>", "depleting assets'', 
11;::>aternalism11 , "cultural inundation", "petty ;.:erochialiSlTI" and 
11Palestine" o The mantra is "Arab unity". No detailed plan of action 
for overcaning the evils and bringing about the desired Cl"B.nges is to 
be foundo Huch of the \lriting has a slightly negative tone as a 
result, though not usually a violent oneo In t:'1e 1970s an:l early 
1980s at least, the radical v-1ri ters, v1i th ti1eir filiddle-class 
. . " ~ t 1 t. . 90 taCJcgrounas, v1ere reronners no revo u 1onar1es • 
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'l'he follal'ling list is a recent abstract of their srievances:-
''Vast e:~Jel1Cil t:ure on arms, the abse..-1ce of the nost LB. sic 
)JOlitic..l.l freedcr.1s, t..'1e holla:i stance sup~.:Drting only veri.::ally 
tl12 victory of the ;.~..rab c::1use, the strong relationship \·:ith 
l~-~erica: 91 all these are obvious sources of hiC.de:1 discontent" • 
folla.dng t\"lO passages frcxn b-;o ::1ost ilidely-read 
"alternative" Hri ters su:rr.urize their analysis of the proble.r"J and 
t..~eir iueal solution:-
'\·lith the grm-rth of b~e population and t:ne availability of 
educational opportunity •••••• the e;-:tent_ of ooli tical and social 
disconte..-"1t has started to increase. 0 0 0 0 .. ~2 and 
11 illthough the api?ffirances of the mcrlern state are present, the 
populations of the GCC states are still governed by a tribal 
mentality. In the GCC the sta. te, as a political institution, 
is merely a skin: the heart is tribal, anG. s;:>ecifically that 
of the ruling tribe. '1'he step fran tribalism to statehoo:i is a 
long one, a very long one, a.Tld the transition fran the tribal 
form to mcriern statehcx:rl has to re acccxnpanied by and 
canpler.1ented by a very co:·:~plex operation. For the state is not 
a flag unfurled and a. national anthem and colour p~otographs and 
col?ur93telev~sior: and loud celebrations and ca.rdl.:o-:;.rd trilL1?hal 
arcn3s ; 1t lS much profounder and mor·e serious. Stat~1oo:l 
is a stage of develo;ment e:.>~rienced by hurnan grou;;>s toHarO.s 
more natur·e relationships and clearer tmderstarlGings and tov;ar~s 
\·rritten systerns and values •••• It is a stage of co:iified 
relations between t:.ne political aub'1ori ties and the peOl)le on 
the rosis that the ccxie favours the ruled, no£ -the. individual 
in poi-ler and that it is the ruled Vlho enjoy the right to 
su;>ervise and evaluate the ruling individual, not vice-versa, 
and that the state progresses fran rule by individuals to rule 
by political institutions acco11:m:iating the new social l:X:Mers 
\·Jhich develop i·lith timeo ~lhereas the trib2, as an archaic 
political system, has values represented in exclusivity, 
cohesiveness, sanctuary, taboo, pride, contempt, po\"ler, 
victory, protection and fealty, etc. , the state, as a 
political systezn new to the Gulf and the P~"1insula, should 
differ radically in its value syste~ from the tribal value 
syste11. 'l'here is the constitution, the la\·ls derived. :ro11 it 
and D1e regulations and ad~inistrative decrees giving er.~ression 
to it. 'rhere [should be] Si'Uarantees for the individual in b~e 
conte:--~t of the group a."1d guarantees for the group :Oy t.'1e 
individual, all l·li thin clear, o1no~ng lav1s and modern 
pre>::,>ressive parameters in which so-an2i-so son of so-and-so has 
no special position and in w§~ch the biolcx.}ical accidents that 
dictate li:1eage have no weight" • 
·:1'he lhs·a of 'l,he : i2.>lorarl:i"tr,1 1-love..-.ent 
::Jut ;:Jrecisely b2cause of this ne·.-~ vocabular_:,-'p ti1e Irani2m Lrr·::Dtp 
t!1e l\ussian a::ivance, the :Lran-I rae; •.-:ar, the softening ·of ti1e ?rice 
of cruc..e an::1 the d·estabili3ing spin-off of inter-.~,_ra.:.J :euc:s, life 
l!as becc..-ne a n:i:1efield for the Gulf slw.i!d1s and the r·2in t."ley feel 
able to give their Yotmg 'l'url~s is shorter in the 1 ~:3'Js than it uas 
cluring the "Golc'\en ;\·}211 of the early anC:: middle 1 :J70s. This is uhy 
the raC.icals in ti1e Ll.A.:...:. lost their lofty sDOnsorship. 
'.:Che regi..-:1es an:deties' w·.=re to find e;-::pression in t.c~e for.aation of 
the Gulf Co-operation Cou<"lcil ui1ich, though careful to project 
itself as anyt.l-}ing but a defence pactp ap)?""....ared to the radicals as an 
attack on the l:x:n.mdaries of ?2DHissible <1isse.;'1t ai'1G. \·?hich, as such, 
crystallize::1 the intelligentsia's op?Qsition. 
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Shaikh Rashid became Federal Prime t-1inister in June 1979 with the 
aims of re-starting and steering the Federal engineu restimulating 
the economy and mastering the Young Turks. His method was to 
re-establish Federal activity in areas he considered appropriate such 
as the budget and the Central 3ank, whilst curbing the growth of the 
Federation's role in others by tight control of spending - and all 
the v1hile ignoring the intelligentsia. What the impact of his drive 
would have been on the Federation in the long term must remain, 
alas, one of history's imponderables, for he was not given enough 
time. The Vice-President fell ill, never to recover, in the winter 
of 1980/81o 
In view of Shaikh Rashid's beliefs, personality and authority prior 
to his illness, it is perhaps hardly surprising that what might 
otherwise have been a public debate during the last year of the 
Constitution's life in fact failed to develop. Despite the 
Hemorandum movement's earlier volubility and the succession of events 
in the Arab and Islamic worlds at that time conducive to agitation, 
the radicals voiced very little public opposition when the 
Constitution was extended without amendment for a further five years 
from 1981 o Thus, in the event, the measure of further Federal 
integration by the end of the U.A.Eo's first decade and of the 
responsiveness of the political structure to the socio-econanic 
changes both proved to be small o 
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Part One~ Shaikh Rashid 1 s Premiership 
The problem p3.ralysing the UoAoEo before Shaikh Rashid agreed to 
become Prime i1inister was the fundamental difference between the 
constitutionalists and the integrationists over the purpose of the 
Federation and its power structure" While the many consequent 
specific disputes remained unreconciledu the executive organs of 
Government had become ineffective" The new Prime t-tinister's 
immediate task then was to restart executive activity, but only in 
areas and within limits acceptable to himself under the 1971 
Constitution, limits that precluded centralization for 
centralization's sake" As the Supreme Council 1 s forcefulness had 
atrophied 8 the National Assernbly 0 s profile had riseno Shaikh Rashid 
was not impressed with its vociferations as a serious problem 8 but 
neither could he condone its continuing press and public lionizationo 
Unequal living conditions and persisting economic stagnation 8 on the 
other hand u were concerns which Shaikh Rashid and the National 
Assembly held in commonu though their approaches to them were 
incompatible a It was to these issues that the new Premier addressed 
himself in his first policy statement" The issue of poor and slow 
performance by the huge federal bureaucracy (whose civil servants 
gave an average of five hours' work a week according to an INF 
report) was the other long-standing irritant that the Ruler of Dubai 
set out to remedy o 
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Kuwaiti Mediation: Shaikh Rashid Becomes Pr~ Hinister 
After the Supreme Council meetings of j\larch 1979 ended in acrimony, 
the Crown Princes of the two smallest Emirates c. Ajman and Umm 
al-Qaiwain, together with the Deputy Prime f>tinister Shaikh Harrrlan 
ibn Huharranad of Abu Dhabi and his brother Shaikh Surur, had been 
charged as a committee with mediating1o Shaikh Surur B,joyed high 
esteem in the Vice-President's eyes but this CQ~ittee was soon 
relegated to oblivion after paying a few calls on the Rulerso At the 
beginning of April 1979 the President and Vice-President berated each 
other in separate press interviews for abusing the Constitution2 
and in the third week the Head of State mused in al-Nustaql:E.l that 
the Federation was voluntary and he was not going to force any 
dissatisfied Emirate to remain a member3o During that first week of 
April 1979 however the Emir of Kuwait sent his Foreign Minister to 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai to hear their points of view and offer Kuwait 0 s 
good officeso The Foreign Hinster returned in the third week and saw 
both sides againo On 25th April it was announced that Shaikh Rashid 
himself was to become Prime Minister of the Federationo Placing a 
Ruler in charge of the executive had been considered before as a 
possible antidote to the Federation's doldrums: Shaikh Rashid's 
agreement to take on the job was a major turning-point, a 
recognition by both disputing parties that their int8rests lay in 
reviving the Federation and relieving the pressures on ito 
Shaikh Rashid's son Muhammad was in the process of marrying his 
cousin at the time and Dubai was afire with pyrotechnic displays, 
shooting competitions, parachuting extravaganzas, horsemanship 
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~~ibitions and open-air theatre, songs and traditional dances to 
which the entire population, local and expatriatev was invited en 
masseo Shaikh Zayid arrived from Abu Dhabi to join in the final 
night of the feasting a .Borne along by the ~'<Uberance, he danced a 
tribal dance on the palace lawna Ecstatic headlines and photographs 
the next day proclaimed a new era of total unityo The Supreme 
Cmmcil convened quickly on 30th April formally to announce Shaikh 
Rashid's appointment but left over until June the approval of a new 
Council of Ministers to be chosen by then, a deadline that was not 
meta 
v~hat had the Kuwaiti mediation achieved? Clearly, Shaikh Rashid had 
agreed to remain a member of and to resume an active role in a 
revived Federationo He soon agreed for example to hand over 50 per 
cent of Duta.i • s incane from oil to the Federal Budget, one of the 
main bones of contention4; this st.nn was to be paid into a Central 
Bank, the statute of which was finally agreed - a great leap forward 
in federalizing t~1ns - after three years of wrangling5o In 
return, Shaikh Rashid had been awarded the direction of nearly all 
aspects of the UoAoEo 's internal life and, crucially, the support 
of the President to enable him to exercise ito 
rhe New Cabinet and Its Prc:x:rrarnme 
Agreeing on the new Cabinet proved an unexpectedly long processo 
Thus c Al:dullah Tariam, the Education Minister whom Shaikh Rashid had 
accused6 of orchestrating the demonstrations against the Government 
was an obvious target for dismissal and found no protection from his 
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erstwhile patronsa His sacking surprised no-onea The Hinister of 
' ' 
Labour and Social Affairs u c. Ab::'lullah ~1azru c i, had been one of the 
authors of the Joint Hemorandum and the Minister of Health Khalfan 
Rumi had been on the fringes of tl1e Hemorandum movement, but in 
their cases their removal was also attributable to Shaikh Rashid's 
dissatisfaction with the performance of their high-spending, 
essential-service Hinistriesa ~brale in the sd1ools and hospitals 
was widely regarded as something of a blot on the national 
escutcheon. The Hinistry of Electricity and vlater u whose incumbent 
was also replaced, had fared little better. 
Three of the four new entrants to the Cabinet were returning 
ambassadors from the UaAaEa 1 S more important missions abroada Hamad 
al-Midfa c. a returned from vlashington to the Ministry of Health, Sac.id 
Salman from Paris to the Ministry of Ed.ucation and Saif al-Jarwan 
fran Cairo to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs a The 
fourth, the new Water and Electricity Minister Humaid al-c.Uwais, 
was a Sharjah businessmana 
No changes were made in the posts of Minister of Finance, Defence, 
Foreign Affairs or the Interior the posts to which the ruling 
families attach the greatest importance - despite the fact that the 
unfortunate ZVIinister of the Interior, Shaikh Mubarak ibn Muhammad of 
Abu Dhabi, was incapacitated by injuries from a car accident in 
England during the period of the new Cabinet's gestation7 a 
'IWo gaa.ls were spelled out in the new Prime Minister 1 s policy 
statement introducing his new Cabinet a On the one hand the country 1 s 
resources were to be utilized for the benefit of "all the Emirates 
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Hithout exceiJtion"; standards in schools and clinics and the 
provision of water and housing were to be overhauled in all including 
the most remote and thitherto neglected comers of the Federation. 
On the other, the economy was to be restimulated to the furthest 
possible extent. The machinery implenenting these policies was to 
be "sim:_Jle and uncomplicated" and was not to be an obstacle to 
speed. 'rhese were practical aims; they were accompanied by a 
promise to "lead the Federation forward" by all possible means and 
an admonition to e1e citizen to participate, but to participate in 
the hard work required. The Joint Memorandum, like all ideological 
issues, was not addressed8 • 
Shaikh Rashid's personality and beliefs were clearly immanent in the 
policy statement. In ruling Dubai, he made it his practice to 
encourage efficiency before doctrine and to seek commercial 
prosperity before political chic. His thrift and tough bargaining 
were legendary u but in so far as social services were concerned, 
Dubai' s at that time were second to none. Its hospitals were among 
the finest in the Middle East and its land development and housing 
programmes were equally successful. For so important an occasion, 
the speech is also remarkable for its brevity - just seven column 
inches. Shaikh Rashid was by nature given neither to abstractions 
nor flights of rhetoric. 
Re-activating The Federation 
Great leaps forward in federalizing terms now followed at speed. 
Dubai undertook to place 50 per cent of her revenue from oil at the 
disposal of the Federal Treasury. This settled a difference 
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outstanding since the constitutional revision of 1976 and caused 
Federal Budget estimates for 1980 to be exceeded ~Y 45 per cent. and 
to reach an actual Dhs23. 2h.'1 against the budgeted Dhs16bn9 • In 
i\Jarch 1980 Shaikhs Zayid and l{ashid reached agree:nent on the Central 
Bank fonnula, which had been blocked since 1977. Agreeing on a 
Governor for the Central Bank took rather longer, but these two 
achievements contained the main promise of Shaikh Rashid's 
administration for the Federalists. 
In Septsriber 1979 the Supreme Council had agreed to revive the 
moribund 1975 National Planning Council and to corrmission this l.xxly 
to draw up a "comprehensive medium-tenn econcnlic and social 
developnent plan", th U A E ' fJ.'rst10 o e • o •• s The enonnous task nCM 
got underway under Sacid Ghobash; its end product was a perceptive 
and detailed document which acknowledged that the funda.'Tle11tal 
detenninant of the U.A.E. economy is the size and make-up of its 
population. Strategically, one of the Plan's two main aims was to 
shift the emphasis on to productive industry, for which a target 
growth rate of 27 per cent a year was set. Precise targets were also 
laid down for all other sectors. The second axiom was the need to 
narrow the gap between the rich and the poor flnirates - the Plan was 
peppered with allusions to the current inequitable distribution of 
wealth 11 • 
Had the Plan taken effect, as it was supposed to do on 1st January 
1981, it would have marked a turning point away from the 
opportunistic approach which had prevailed during .the boa~ years. In 
the event v however v nothing came of it 12 and Ghobash resigned in 
198213 
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In Hay 1980, agre~nent was finally reached on placing the vital 
resource of water under central control, a major transfer of power 
from the Emirates to the Federation14 • A Higher i~ater Authority 
was to be set up and empowered to regulate water consu;nption by 
licensing well-drilling centrally. Previously licensed by the local 
authorities, unco-ordinated drilling had endangered the water table 
to the degree that a grave threat had arisen to the future of the 
country's supplies. f.linistry of Agriculture experts had been 
advocating central control since the rnid-1960s to halt the damage but 
their efforts had always been frustrated by the clause in the 1971 
Constitution which leaves all natural resources under the 
jurisdiction of the individual Emirates. 
In August 1980, the long-argued Federal Industries Law of 1979 took 
effect in theory 15• Thenceforth, licences to set up industrial 
ventures were to be granted solely by a Federal board, a further 
significant hand-over of power from the Emirates to the Federation. 
As well as a Federal licence, all industries were required by the 
law to have a controlling 51 per cent U.A.E. shareholding. Finally, 
an important labour law regulating the importation and use of 
immigrant labour came into effect that same autumn. 
In contrast, laws extending Federal control over trade licences and 
local partnership requirement remained stalled. Two "surrnnit meetings" 
of the tvlinisters concerned were held in Nay 1980 and resulted in a 
report for the Cabinet, but no unanimity was reached. The Agencies 
Law was gazetted in 1981 16 , but ~iately ran into 
17 
opposition g while the local partnership law, so desired by the 
F.N.C., again dropped out of discussion. 
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The Standard of Living 
Initiatives to improve the standard of living of the less well-off 
also went ahead, but not speedily enough to stifle all criticism. 
Defining living standards is a subjective and perilous exercise; 
what a U.A.E. national considers to be satisfactory or unsatisfactory 
variesv obviouslyv according to his background, education and 
personal taste. Indeed, social historians would find the U.A.E. a 
most rewarding arena over which to fight their "quality of life" 
battle. Those criteria capable of measurement are necessarily the 
material onesv but when speaking of the smallestv poorest 
Emirates, it is not wholly unsafe to concentrate on those material 
gauges. The population of the least-developed Emirates was still 
preoccupied for the most part with its housing and income. It is 
safe to assert that the herdsmen and fishermen of e Ajman and Urmn 
al-Qaiwain spent a negligible proportion of their time debating 
constitutional formulaev though the assertion does not imply that 
the same people were without opinions on how matters affecting their 
lives were ordered, especially during this period of anchorless 
material change. 
Farmers and fishermen represented the great majority of hardship 
cases receiving social security payments and to improve their lot a 
central agricultural marketing board was created to guarantee the 
farmer a reasonable return and at the same time reduce prices to the 
consumer by eliminating the middleman. Financial support was 
promised to the co-operative movement to the same end. 
·236 
Shaikh Rashid's Adninistration 
Social security banefits were examined and rises of nearly 100 per 
cent approved fran the beginning of 1981 o 'rhe minimum p3.yable to a 
head of family rose to Dhs800 per month plus an entitlement of Dhs480 
per month for the wife or second member and Dhs240 per month for each 
rerna.ining child or dependent up to a maxirnwn of Dhs4, 640 per month 
for a household of 1 6 persons, co11pared with the maximwn Dhs 1 , 250 
for 10 persons provided under the original 1977 law18 0 
In May 1981 a report by a housing eA'pe.rt claimed that 30,000 local 
families, out of the 48,400 local families making up the total local 
population, were living in sub-standard accommodationo The same 
report estimated that 50 per cent of all local fa.llilies were on low 
incomes, that is 5,400 out of Abu Dhabi's 13,500 local families, 
4,680 out of Dubai's 10,400, 4,750 out of Sharjah's 9,500 and 9,750 
out of the 15,000 local families in the remaining four Emirateso To 
house this section of the population, the report calculated that the 
UoAoEo needed to build 22,400 housing units at an estimated cost of 
DhsSbn by 198520 0 
As an irrunediate measure, Shaikh Rashid's cabinet offered the 
middle-income group Dhs200m in loans of Dhs150,000 - Dhs400,000 per 
family to build homes of a suitable stanctarQ21 o It became apparent 
at once, when more than 12,000 applications poured in, that the 
Dh 200 . t be . t . d t 22 s m was gm.ng o qUJ. e 1na equa e o 
For the public in general, 
23 distribute petrolewn products 
a nationalized company was set up to 
at subsidized prices, rerylacing 
the foreign distributors Shell, Caltex and BPo Next, a review was set 
in motion of civil servants' salaries, not increased since 1977o 
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Table 5-1~ Social Security Reci~ients 1973-1979 
Emirate 1973 1975 1977 1979 
Abu Dhabi 1,741 3,587 5,241 6,018 
Dubai 1,294 4,767 5,841 7,083 
Sharjah 2,619 5,211 6,085 7,133 
Ras al-Khaimah 2,747 5,224 5,853, 6,523 
c:Ajman 840 1,336 1,698 2,022 
Fujairah 1,658 2,883 3o096 3,429 
641 863 1,032 1,202 
Total 11,540 23,871 28,836 33,410 
Source~ see Footnote 1 9 
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Applying The Brakes 
As far as many of these federalizing moves and welfare improvements 
were concerned, however, · Shaikh Rashid's administration was not to 
live up to its promise. Among the reasons for shelving some of them 
were the overall tighter attitude to spending which was beginning to 
develop and which was later to dominate the early 1980s, and the 
great demands made on the Budget by defence procurement, but the 
main brake was the general slowing down of decision-making after the 
Prime Minister became ill in 1981. 
The implementation of the Industries Law was obstructed by political 
opposition from some 
industrialists24 • 
stillborn25 ; the 
Emirates and by non-compliance on the part of 
The Agricultural Marketing Board was 
Higher Water Authority never functioned26 
despite the very grave, indeed life-threatening deterioration in the 
country 1 s water resources which struck in the early 1980s after a 
series of dry winters. The Authority informed the Rulers by letter at 
the beginning of 1982 of the depletion and increasing salinity of 
ground water reserves and asked for land distribution for agriculture 
to be discontinued as an emergency measure and for urgent funds to 
build dams and implement other water-saving measures. In November 
1984 the Cabinet was again pressed to give the Authority the powers 
it needed, but nothing was done27 • 
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Civil servants' salaries were not after all increasedu causing 
school bus-drivers in Ras· al-K.l1airnah to strike and two newspapers to 
be suspended for reporting the fact28 o Social security supplements 
were offered instead to those civil servants who were UaAaEo 
nationalso State subsidies on essential foods were proposed but never 
in fact appliedo Although the trdnistry of Public Works and Housing 
completed its priority list of 700 citizens out of the 12,000 
applicants who were entitled to take advantage of the· housing 
loans29 scheme, no loans were disbursed30 and the organizing 
committee was wound up when the Real Estate Bank was gazetted31 in 
June 1981, though the Real Estate Bank itself was destined never to 
open its doors o 
Although the new Administration°s stated priority was to spend money 
on the remoter regions, development spending from federal sources in 
fact increased only marginally under its first two Budgetso Federal 
development allocations had been put at Dhs1 o 6bn in 1978 and then at 
Dhs1 o 2bn in the 11holding11 Budget of 1979o In the full year 1980, 
developnent still attracted only Dhs1 o 9bn or 12 per cent of the 
original total of Dhs16bno Of that Dhs1 o 9bn, moreover, the great 
bulk was for the oompletion of existing projects and only Dhs551m was 
for new starts - including the Dhs200m for set aside for the housing 
32 loans o 
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Fears for future revenue were not yet in this 1980 3udget the main 
reason for restrainto It was an essential ain1 of Shaikh H.ashid 1 s 
that the Federal bureaucracy should cease to be viewed as the sole 
provider of largesseo InJeed, a degree of COll?eti ti veness entered 
into Abu Dhabi's and Dubai's aid to the smaller Emirates, and the 
role of the Federal i·linistry of Public 'r"'orks shrank noticeably o 
Sh.aikh Zayid was paying through his Presidential Court for a $40m 
hospital on the medically-deprived East Coast and the Abu Dhabi 
Executive Council, in its first project undertaken outside Abu 
Dhabi, was paying Dhs26m towards the setting up of 180 farms in the 
Northern Emirates33 while the Abu Dhabi Fund administered a loan of 
Dhs200m for development in Fujairah34 0 
Shaikh Rashid meanwhile was financing fishing harbours in Ras 
al-IZhaimah, Fujairah and Sharjah's East Coast territories plus 
improvements to the creeks and road systems of c Ajman and Unm 
al-Uaiwain, street lighting in Ras al-Khaimah, two hospitals in 
Diba and Khor Fakkan and mosques and social clubs in addition to 
thousands of low-cost houses costing in tot.al about Dhs800m35 0 
By the end of 1981 the three richest Emirates Abu Dhabi, Duba.i and 
Sharjah had built slightly more low-cost houses for the poorer 
Emirates than had the Federal Ministry - 5, 400 between them compared 
with just over 5,000 built by the Ministry since its creation36 o 
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Economic Reflation Thwarted 
The first Federal monies to be spent specifically on restimulating 
the economy comprised the Dhs1 o6bn repaid to the COI!inercial rnnks in 
mid-1980 to settle UaAaEo nationals' property loanso By this time 
the 1977-79 recession had reached the bottom of that mini-cycleo 
Money supply in all three definitions had shmm real decreases 
throughout 1979 and the first half of 1980 in sharp contrast to the 
huge 82 per cent increase recorded for example in 1976 o Bank· 
lending, similarly, grew by less than three per cent in the first 
half of 1980; in 1976 it had grown by 87 per cent37 0 
Near-empty blocks of flats and near-empty hotels made the position 
conspicuous o Rents had fallen by up to half in the Northern Emirates 
and hotels were struggling to stay open with occupancy rates lower 
than 20 per cent in some cases o 
Reimbursing the banks for property loans was considered the single 
greatest step towards reflationo The original Dhs1 bn set aside for 
the purpJse was quickly increased to Dhs1 o 6bno Inch viduals who had 
taken out loans before 1978 were able to apply to a carmittee headed 
by the Hinister of Planning Sa id Ghobash to have their outstanding 
debts settled subject to a maximum of Dhs10m per applicant38o The 
corrmi ttee then repaid the loan and the interest due on it to the bank 
in question and the debtor in turn repaid the committee on much 
easier tenns o Working quickly, the committee had dealt with all 
applications by the end of the yearo Some 600 citizens benefitedo 
As its task neared completion, the committee was transformed into a 
Real Estate Bank with a capital of Dhs2bn and a mandate to finance 
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future residential and commercial property construction39 0 rbre of 
this type of specialized banks were mooted to ftmd industry and 
agriculture 40 o 
To a small extent the economy also benefited spontaneously in the 
irrmediate aftennath of the Iranian revolutiono Iran's internal chaos 
generated a brief period of golden opportunities for suppliers of all 
manner of foreign goods fran cigarettes to video recorderso Full 
plane-loads and dhow-loads crossed the Gulf from Dubai throughout 
1979, especially after the UoSoAo and Europe imposed trade sanctions 
on Iran after the seizure of the A~rican hostages and Dubai became 
al-thughra - the gapo 
However this was a risky business on which to hang a livelihood and 
it became riskier still when the Iran/Iraq war broke out in September 
1980o 1981 saw a spate of bankruptcies among ~_rchants who had 
speculated on the war o Despite the lifting of the property loan 
burden, private-sector activity in general remained low throughout 
1 980 and Government spending remained too restricted to lead a 
wide-scale revivalo 
deteriorated sharply, 
As the security situation in the Gulf 
the dirhams which might have funded local 
activity flooded out westwards, speeded in their flight by the 
record interest rates then available on the UoSo dollar, creating a 
vicious circleo All of the UoAoEo was becalmed commercially, for a 
major factor in the prosperity of the smaller Emirates is the 
prosperity or otherwise of their larger neighbourso 
In 1981 i 
Dhs1o9bn 
development allocations in the Federal Budget rose from 
(in 1980) to Dhs2o556bn but delays in agreeing the Budget 
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prevented the higher spending target from being met. Only Dhs1.3bn, 
or 49 per cent of the Dhs2.556bnv was actually spent41 • 1981 was 
to be in fact the second most significant watershed in the U.A.E.'s 
econa~ic history after the oil price rises of 1973, for it was to be 
the last of the surplus-revenue years. Though its lasting importance 
was not fully, realized at the time, in the middle of 1981 the oil 
glut began to build up and the U.A.E. like its neighl:x:mrs was to face 
a succession of deficit budgets. 
These lean years were still in the future as 1981 closed, but it was 
widely recognized that the state of the Federal economy had not 
improved greatly since Shaikh Rashid took office 18 months before. 
Abu Dhabi suffered lessv as usual 11 than the other regions. Though 
its Department of Finance pegged 1979 spending under the Development 
Programme at the 1978 level and scaled down projections for 1980 and 
1981, the Development Programme does not include projects in the oil 
sector and the years 1978-1980 in fact saw the largest contracts in 
Abu Dhabi's 
. t 42 proJec s • 
history awarded for the Ruwais petrochemical 
Nonetheless the Ruler saw fit to inject Dhs643m 
($175m) into the Einirate in 1980 by means of land canpensation to 
families in al- 0 Ain and a massive Dhs2.5bn ($681m) in 1981 by means 
of recompensation to citizens of Abu Dhabi whose land had already 
43 been compensated before at less generous rates • Thus the largest 
sums spent on restimulating the economy were spent by a local Ruler 
on his local inhabitants, not by the Federation on the Federation. 
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The Decline and Fall of The !1emorandurn Movement ,;_;::..;::..::;.;;;~ -- -- - --
Shaikh Rashid's performance in starving the Young TurY~ of ti1e 
limelight was in contrast a co~plete successo One of the ess~~tial 
features of his tenure was his indifference to ideologues and in 
particular to Tariam' s National Assembly o The Assembly's first 
ordinary session after its fiery opening in 1979 found itself 
undennined legally u to its tucy44 , when no .member of the 
Government attendedo According to the constitution, Assembly 
sessions ·must be held in the presence of at least one Government 
representative45 0 
Months passed during which the Assembly debated everyday concerns 
without public mention of the Memorandurno Then in February 1 980 
petrol prices were raised in ti1e Northern Emirates and secondary 
school children took to the streets in protesto Some of their Rulers 
went out to meet theme Shaikh Sultan of Sharjah toured his secondary 
schools and listened to his students' complaints about commercial 
exploitation, their grants, the cost of living and the absence of 
any response from the Rulers to the Memorandurno On the same day 
Shaikh Zayid held an open exchange of views with the University 
students at al- c. Aino Here, the undergraduates' concerns were 
quoted as the cost of living, Federal integration, oil policy and 
the Hemorandum 46 o 
~linutely-detailed coverage was devoted to these dialogues and marches 
by al-Ittihad of Abu Dhabi and al-Khaleej of Sharjah, arousing 
suspicions in Dubai that the protests were being orchestrated as a 
means of disparaging Shaikh Rashid's style of Governmento 
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Seizing the opportunity afforded by the petrol price risesr the 
FoNoCo sent mernb=>....rs to call on Shaikh Zayid on 19th February and 
Shaikh Rashid on 23rd February to discuss prices and the .!'>1emorandumo 
By this time a Dhs200m state subsidy for petrol had already been 
announcedr leaving the I1emorandum. Shaikh Zayid, enthused 
al-Khaleej, "expressed o o o •• his readiness to receive members of the 
F .N.C. at any time to discuss national issues. His Highness renewed 
his assurances that he will find quick solutions to the preble~ 
raisedr including the price of petrol and the Joint Memorandum". 
With Shaikh Rashid, by contrast, the meeting was just 
"frank"47 • This was the last that was heard in the media of the 
Memorandum. 
A year had now passed since the Memorandum and the de~nstrations 
which had accompanied it. Frustrated by their own impotence and the 
Government 1 s evident intention to ignore them, F .N.C. manbers 
considered resigning en masse. Much heat was generated but soon 
dispersed. vJhen the delegates to Shaikh Zayid and Shaikh Rashid 
returned to the Council with the few unspecific reassurances they had 
culled, there was little outcry 48 • 
An intentional snub was delivered to the Assembly when the Central 
Bank Law passed the stage of cabinet approval and was sent on to the 
Supreme Council without being first referred to the Assembly for 
discussionr even though the Assembly was in session at the time. On 
hearing indirectly what had happened, the Assembly sent a Note to 
the p . .. rem1er pointing out that his Government had cornmitted a 
constitutional violation49 • The Central Bank Law was pro11ulgated 
nonetheless in the Assembly's sumner recess in 1980 • 
. 246 
Chapter Five 
During that. 1980 sWT"Ener recess a Press Law drawn up by the i'linistry 
. . 
of Infonnation also completed its stages and was enactecL The 
ivlinistry had felt for sane time the need for an up-to-date instrwnent 
to regulate generally the rapidly-gro.·ling number of newspapers and 
magazines and in particular to avert the dangers to the UaAaE which 
might arise if the local Press were to adopt the habit of slandering 
Heads of other Arab States 1 a habit \vhich was flourishing in the 
rest of the Arab world in ~1e atmosphere of vituperation following 
camp Davida The detailed drafting had been left to expatriate Arab 
advisors and the result, though apparently answering the l1inistry's 
need, was atypically repressivea 
Impugning the Head of State or the Rulers was now prohibited along 
with denigrating Islarn 1 incitement against the system of 
government 8 advocating "destructive" ideas or principles, 
"provoking hatred or spreading a spirit of discord among members of 
the society" , censuring the head of any Islamic country or Arab 
state, disclosing facts about the private lives of an individual or 
impugning his commercial reputation and criticizing the conduct of a 
person carrying out an official task50 a 
Power to close down offending publications was vested in the t-1inister 
of Information as an administrative matter without recourse to the 
courts of law and the Ministry itself was made court of appeal 
against its own decisionso Even the state-guided al-Ittihad feared 
that the new law would be open to arbitrary interpretation51 , 
though the journalist who argued so found himself silenced for 
several weeks afterwards52 0 
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Its content apart, the Press and Publication Law's wider 
significance lies in the fact that it, too, was pranulgated when the 
Assembly was not sitting and that it showed the episo:le of the 
Central Bank Law to have been more than a one-off oversighto Both in 
this and by virtue of its content, the Law contributed to the 
general souring of relations beb.,.een Shaikh Rashid 0 s Government and 
the intelligentsia53 0 Two more laws -on the organization of the 
legal profession and the foundation of the Emirates General Petroleum 
Cbrporation54 - were also enacted in the Assembly's absenceo 
Ahmad Khalifa Suwaidi, guiding light of the educated younger 
generation, resigned from his post as Foreign Hinister in April 
1980o As the President's right-hand man, his clout in previous 
cabinets had been disproportionate to his job-title but under Shaikh 
Rashid his status was simply level with that of the other Hinisterso 
Health reasons helped him to came to his decisiono Suwaidi did not 
retire into private life, however, but reverted to his earlier 
position of strength as advisor to and personal representative of 
Shaikh Zayid55 0 
Al-Azmena' s constituency found itself wholly impotent when faced with 
an executive leader of Shaikh Rashid's forcefulness o Tariarn Tariam' s 
speech to the opening session of the FoNoCo in November 1980 was as 
different as it could possibly have been from his fiery oration of 
the year beforeo Then, he thrilled his partisans with his ringing 
demands; a year later his one-minute address offered no analysis, 
no demands and qo prescriptions56 0 
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As its new 1980/1 session wore onu it became clear that the National 
. Assernbly 1 S heyday WaS OVero On 9th Dece.1lber 1980 members debated \olhat 
action to take over the four laws enacted without their participation 
during the su:nmer recess o An extraordinary session on the sa1E 
subject a week later accepted that there was in fact no action open 
to them in the face of the Government's constitutional right to pass 
laws in the Assembly's absence when necessaryo They did not agree 
that the four lav;s in question were truly urgent, however, and sent 
a Note to Shaikh Rashid saying so57 0 
The same session formed a delegation headed by the Speaker to visit 
the Rulers and find out what was being done towards drafting ti1e 
pe:rmanent consti tution58 that was due to take effect in 1981 o This 
delegation failed to gain appointments with the Rulers59 o 
Throughout the new year 1981 meetings continued in the same 
disheartened vein until at the end of the parliamentary session in 
June 1981 Tariam Tariam was quoted as saying, "you all Jmow that the 
Assembly has been on ice for two years now, making resolutions that 
nobody adopts"60 o 
The \vealmess of the Young Turks 1 Challenge 
The Young Turks 1 failure to achieve any of their concrete goals can 
be attributed to four reasonso Firstly, given the novelty of their 
ideological sophistication and tl1e contrasting, time-honoured 
longevity of shaikhly rule, their demands for elections and the 
abolition of shaikhdams were premature to the point of unreulityo 
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Next, the environment in which they flourished was the leadership 
vacuum of 1978 and 1979o Once that vacuum was filled, and filled by 
a leader of Shaikh Rashid's forcefulness and authority, 
Turks \V'ere unable to sustain activityo This is the 
the Young 
sufficient 
reason: it implies in itself an inherent fragility in their 
grass-roots appealo 
Thirdly, whatever Shaikh Zayid 0 s personal views, once faced with 
the true gravity of the Federation's problem in 1979 the President 
was obliged to give a higher priority to reviving the executive and 
thus supporting Shaikh Rashid as head of ito Finally, the content 
of the radicals' views on other regin1es, regional and foreign, was 
a luxury no Gulf ruler could afford to indulge boundlessly given the 
context of war, revolution and polarization that had bedevilled the 
Gulf from the end of the 1970so 
But to say that the Young Turks failed to achieve their goals in 1979 
is not to say that they never will and is not to say that the issues 
which the Young Turks brought out into the open have faded away or 
will fade awayo Indeed, the successive turmoil of religious 
revival, the war, the fate of the PLO and the ordeal of the 
Palestinians in Beirut, and at hane the recession and the cutbacks 
in Government spending were more likely to sharpen these issues than 
to blunt themo The two trends which emerged in the last years of the 
1970s the expression of new vie\'IS unwelcome to the shai:YJ1s and the 
shaikhs 1 instinct to shorten the leash on which they keep their 
people - could be argued to be set on a collision courseo 
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When the Iran-Iraq war broke out in September 1980 v the shaikhs 0 
roan for manoeuvre shrank; meddling in suD~ dangerous affairs was 
one of the things the re~imes feared most fran their radicals v who 
in turn were quick to see that the war could be used as a pretext for 
suppressing dissent61 • Although the war was between an Arab and a 
non-1\rab country, the frightened shaikhdans felt unable to support 
Iraq too openly. Their policy was silence. 
But most supporters of the .f:.1emorandum movement do not appear to have 
suffered for their flirtation with free expression. Some continued 
to hold Federal appointments and others were given vaguely-defined 
but well-paid posts in Shaikh Zayid's and Shaikh Sultan's 
entourages. According to al-Azmena, though, there was a stick as 
well as a carrot, and so;ne did suffer materially62 • 
The Old Constitution Extended 
Heanwhile discussion of the new constitution due to be introduced 
upon the expiry of the old one in December 1981 was being kept alive 
by al-Khaleej and al-Azmena 0 
integration and parliamentary 
both demanding as usual 
democracy. During r1ay 
tighter 
1981 63 
al-Khaleej ventured to point out that since the existing Constitution 
required the Rulers to submit the draft of its pennanent replace;nent 
to the F .N.C. at least six months before it expired, the Rulers 
would be in violation if no draft reached the F.N.C. by 2nd June 
1981 0 Al-Azmena duly marked 2nd June 1981 praninently as the day the 
Rulers violated their own Constitution, and called on professional 
bodies such as the lawyers and students to take matters into their 
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own hands and draw up a constitution the~elves64 o Their efforts 
were hopeless1 five years later on 2nd June 1986 al-Khaleej had to 
make the same point againo 
That was as far as t.'1e campaign went. In October al-Azmena was 
closed dO\m for good by the Ministry of Information and on 28th 
October the Supreme Council met to extend d1e Provisional 
Constitution for a further five years65 o A few days later, 
despite an exhortation by al-J~leej not to do so66 , d1e National 
Assembly approved the extension with only three dissenting 
voices67 • Tariam Tariam, one of those three "no' s 11 , refused a 
seat in the next Asse;nbly. 
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Part Two - The Gulf Co-ooeration Council 
---------
In 1 9 68, Britain 1 s sta ternent· of intent to \vi thdraw fran the Gulf had 
confronted the shaikhs with the most fundamental change in their 
circumstances for over 100 years. Ten years later, the Gulf shaikhs 
were again confronted with a sudden and perhaps still more 
fundamental challenge v the threatened overthrow of the strongest 
hereditary monarch in the region. This time, the shaikhdans were 
manifestly more covetable and the stakes were correspondingly 
higher. Thus the late 1970s and the early 1980s brought with the.11 a 
long series of blows to the regimes' sense of security. They were 
to be years of preoccupation and anxiety. 
As in 1968u the rulers 1 reaction was to group together for mutual 
support - though the Gulf Co-operation Council was careful to present 
itself as anything but a defence pact. Alliances and blocs go 
against the party line of classical Arab nationalism and the GCC put 
the accent on its functionalist and econanic machinery instead. In 
common with the U.A.E. federation, the new organization has one 
member which is much larger than the others and which has the will 
and the capacity to act as the focus. Again like the U.A.E. v the 
GCC is plagued by border disputes and dynastic rivalries. The main 
~nceptual difference between the two entities is that as an assoc-
iation of already-independent states with their own established 
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administrations and econaniesy the GCC is less ambitious than the 
U.A.E. of centralization. The difference is ~~ied in. the fact L~t 
the executive organ oonsists of members 1 Foreign i·linisters. 
The GOC has to acco~~te differing attitudes to internal and 
external security ranging from Kuwait's at one pole, expressed 
(until 1 986) in her elected parliament and pioneering diplanatic 
relations with \·larsaw Pact countries, to Oman's at the other F 
expressed in the Sultan's recorded advocacy of observer status for 
the GCC in NA'ID. Fran the beginning, the existence of Kuwait's 
parliament was perceived as a possible bone of contention between 
member goVeri"lfnC'JltS; with regard to Oman, tl1e Sultan's failure to 
condemn Egypt's separate camp David treaty with Israel was seen as 
tarnishing the Council's ima.ge 68• 
But the most radical circumstantial difference between the Federation 
and the GOC is that the latter has a body politic much more aware and 
educated in a society greatly more complex than that of the 
isolated, undeveloped and homogeneous shaikhdoms of the Lower Gulf 
which had carne together in the late 1960s. Public opinion on the GCC 
is on record - and it is hostile. 
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Background 
The precise circumstances of the GCC's birth were grim indeedo In the 
spring of 1978 Sanalia v1as defeated by Soviet-backed Ethiopia in the 
Ogadeno That surruner President Rubac:i Ali of Aden was deposed and 
-
executed for a crime rumoured to be that of rapprochement with SaCudi 
Arabiao His successorv regarded as much more firmly within the 
Soviet orbit, waged war on SaCudi Arabia's immediate neighbour North 
Yemen in the following year 1 979 and went on to sign a Treaty of 
Friendship with the Soviet Union in December o 
In £-larch 1979 the signing of Camp David inflamed public opinion all 
over the Arab world to its hottest pitch since 1967 o Perhaps none of 
these blows compared in psychological effect hawever with the one 
that fell on 21st November 1979, when the grand Mosque of Mecca - on 
the guardianship of which the legitimacy of the Sacud dynasty partly 
rests was overrun by religious fundamentalistso 
fundamentalist-inspired anti-Western riots were raging from Turkey to 
Bangladesh a 
In January 1979 the Shah of Iran fled after a year of failing, for 
all his arsenals and techniques of repression, to suppress 
revolution a At first the Arab states of the Gulf did not rule out 
the possibility of continuing same sort of normal relationship with 
the new Iranian regime, which was still bourgeois and partly secular 
for the first few months, and in public they felt obliged to support 
it and dismiss any idea of feeling threateneda Shaikh Zayid 
reassured the Press69 that the revolution was "an internal 
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Iranian affair" and that "all indications at present are reassuring 
and augur \•/ell" a By April the U aAoEa Justice Ninister u who had been 
the first official to call on Khomeini, \vas fulsomely praising the 
revolution and calling on all i1uslin~ to support it as the champion 
of the Huslim, Arab and Palestinian causes 70 0 
Such optimism was gradually stainped out by the fighting in Khuzest.an 
or · Arabistan, where Arab sentiment favoured the ethnic self-rule 
demands of the Arab population, and then by Ayatollah Rouhani 's 
revival of Iran 9 s claims on Bahrain in April and the Iranian-inspired 
unrest in Bahrain throughout the SWTII11er and autUITU1o In Novernb=>_r 
Bazargan handed over complete control to the mullahso Fanatics 
seized the US Embassy in Tehran and \vashington froze Iran's assets in 
the us; it would be difficult to say which of these actions dismayed 
the Gulf shaikhs the rnoreo 
Debate began to be heard, inevitably, as to whether the conditions 
that had led to the revolution were applicable to the Arnirates on the 
71 Arab shore o Sane affected to see no canparison and Shaikh Zayid, 
asked by an untypically frank journalist if there were any lessons to 
be learned, replied that "a tree cannot grow unless the ground has 
been prepared for it. to take root"72 o others found this 
complacency to be wishful thinking and argued that the root causes of 
the revolution, the conspicuous wealth of a small elite and the 
appeal of resurgent Islam, did obtain in the Ara'l) Gulf stateso A 
researcher quotes one Gulf Ruler as saying "I would rather deal with 
ten Corrnnunists than one Huslirn fundarnent.alist" 73 0 
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In the last week of Dece:nber v 1979, the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan a '.I'i·lO invariables of post-Har geopolitics had thus been 
swept away in ten months o First the i'-lixon D:xtrine 0 s "tvlin-pillar" 
approach, \vhich relied on regional powers as distinct from a direct 
US presence, lost one of its pillars with the fall of the Shah, and 
secondly Soviet troops moved into a foreign country outside the 
Harsa\v Pact for the first time since World \·Jar 'IWoo 
President carter made no bones about calling the invasion a serious 
threat to the I·Jest 1 s oil supply routeso The strategic reversal to US 
interests was seen as all the more dangerous in that the US had no 
bases in the Gulf area o In January 1 980, the carter Doctrine was 
enunciated: the US would use force if necessary to repel any foreign 
intervention in the Gulf74 o Plans for a Rapid Deployment Force 
sealed the about-face from the Nixon Doctrineo In the summer v 
separate agree~nts were reached with Oman, Kenya and Sanalia 
allowing the US to use facilities in those countries under various 
circumstances a 
Foreign bases and American support are however a grave liability to 
Gulf regimes 
intelligentsia a 
in their self-presentation to their domestic 
Al-Khaleej came dangerously close to the forbidden 
ground of criticizing the UoAoEo 1 S larger neighbour Oman by 
describing the base facilities as "cornpleting American economic 
hegemony over the Arab world and America's plunder of Arab 
resources, especially oil oooooand protecting the security of the 
racist Zionist entity in PaJ.estineo" 
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"The "facilities" which certain states have offered to America 
are an affront to the sovereignty of the people of those states 
over their ovm territory and an insult to their national 
prideo o o o o they cause hatred betv1een the conntries of this region 
and are ~o att~npt to rebuild the oil imperialist alliances by 
new means'' !.1 o 
Vilification of America \·Tas grO\ving more febrile by the dayo "The 
source of aggression against the Arab world is well-kna.m" asserted 
al-Azmenav 
"for if it is not the United States directly then it is one of 
the United States' agents a But v1hen it comes down to attacking 
the Gulf and its people, it seems that the United States has no 
intention of delegatingo 11 
Americans ceased being human when they exterminated the Red Indian, 
this piece went on, but 
01even if many people are ignorant of their brutalities in Latin 
Americav the world cannot ignore the ten million people killed 
at Hiroshima or Nagasaki or the survivors who are still dying 
todayv mutilatedo Whereas the Zionist murders of Palestinian 
women and children and the Savak murders of the Iranians were 
American murders by proxy, in Vietnam at JY'.a.i Lai it was American 
hands that slaughtered the whole population ooooooofor funo 
These are the people· who are threatening to invade the Gulf, our 
Gulf~ these are the people with whom we are so regrettably 
dealing, forgetting what they have done to us and to others; 
pinning our hopes on their frien;;;tp.P when all they see in us is 
just fatheads for their amusement a" 
Shaikh Zayid felt obliged to declare repeatedly that he would not 
countenance foreign military bases or alliances 77 o 
In short, the Gulf was an uncomfortable place for rich Western-backed 
hereditary rulers at the turn of the new year 1980o It might have 
seemed that the new· year could hold nothing worse for them, but in 
September Iran and Iraq went to war o It would ne an understatement 
to say that they had a strong incentive for pulling together" 
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Chronology and Structure 
During 1980 a number of working papers on the security of the Gulf 
and of the Straits of Honnuz in particular were circulated ?S 0 
Qnan' s secret paper was reported to call for a larger and more direct 
US role79 o Kuwait's parliament frorn the opposite end of the 
spectrum had already criticized the concept of association with a 
Sultanate that stepped so far outside the consensuso 
The Foreign Ministers of saGudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, 
the U.A.E. and Qnan met in lliyadh on 4th February 1981 o Two meetings 
of experts then follo\ved before the Ministers met again on 8th 
March, in .1>1uscat this time, to agree on the charter and structure 
of the new organizationo Their state~t to the Press after that 
meeting is faintly tautologous and markedly defensive:-
* 
"In recognition of the special ties which bind each of the United 
Arab ~rates 6 Bahrain, Sa c. udi Arabia, Unan, Qatar and 
Kuwait to one another, arising from their cormnon ideology and 
heritage and the similarity between their social, political and 
demographic structures, and out of a desire to pro.~te their 
people's prosperity, gny,~ and stability through closer 
co-operation, the Foreign I>linisters of these states met in 
Riyadh on February 4th 1981 o 
The talks at this meeting were aimed at drawing up a practical 
framework for the consolidation and development of co-operation 
between the states concernedo As a result it was decided to 
establish a co-operation council between these Arab Gulf states 
which would have a general secretariat and hold regular meetings 
both on the summit and Foreign Minister levels in order to 
achieve the goals of the states and their peoples in all fieldso 
This step 
expressed 
regional 
this way 
seen as 
League, 
causes as 
confonns with the national aims of the Arab Nation as 
in the Charter of the Arab League, which encourages 
co-operation as a means of strengthening the Nationo In 
the formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council can be 
confirming the support of these states for the Arab 
its Charter and objectives, and for Arab and Islamic 
a wholeo" 
The order is alphabetical in Arabic 
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On the organization's structure"-
"In reco::JTiition of the special ties, carmon characteristics an:l 
similar institutions linking each of the United Arab Erniratesp 
Bahrain, Sa~di Arabia, c:man, Qatar and Kuwait and due to the 
importance of establishing close co-operation in all fields, 
particularly econanic and social, tl1e afore-mentioned states see 
a need for the establishment of an organization aime:l at 1 
strengthening ties and co-operation between its me~rs in all 
sphereso This organization, to be kno.m as the Gulf 
Co-operation Council, shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, 
Sac udi Arabia a It shall be a means of achieving a greater degree 
of co-ordination and integration in all fields and of forging 
closer · relations between its memberso To this end it will form 
corresponding organizations in the fields of econo~ics and 
finance, education and culture, social affairs and health, 
oaTh~unications, information media, nationality and passports, 
travel and transportation, commerce, custans and the0movernent of goods, and finally in legal and legislative affairs"!) 
This is a comprehensive brief but conspicuously lacking in any 
mention of defence or securityo Both that anission, and the 
rejection of the charge that the GOC derogates from the pan-Arabism 
of the Arab League, are recurring themes in GOC propagandao 
The Heads of State of the six countries gathered in Abu Dhabi fran 
25th to 27th I13.y 1981 for the first summit and signed the oosic 
documentation a The working paper which this conference studied makes 
it clear in its first sentence that the GOC was conceived in reaction 
to outside events~ 
"The caning into being of the Co-operation Cormcil of the Arab 
Gulf States is a response to the historical, social, 
cultural, economic, political and strategic circumstances 
through which the Gulf region is currently passing and is a more 
pressing necessity at the present time than at any time in the 
past for the good of the peoples of the region11 o 
An uncharacteristically frank admission that unresolved disputes 
\-lithin the Gulf cor1stitute a gap in its security is followed by an 
even more uncharacteristically self-searching question~ 
"we must face up to ans\-Tering tl'le big question of how we are to 
translate oil into stable, comprehensive development for tl'le 
good of our peoples 11 81 
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The constitution v1hich the Heads of State ap;.xoved in Abu Dhabi 
creates a Supreme Councilu a .Hinisterial Council, an ad-hoc 
disputes arbitration body appended to the Supre~ Council and a 
Secretariat, whose staff are enjoined to work in the joint interest 
rather than the interest of individual members. Unlike the U.A.E. 
federation, the GCC is to be financed by equal contributions fran 
all the founders and is not dependent on the largest. 
The first of the organs, the Supreme Council, consists of the six 
Heads of State and is the policy-making organ. As in the case of the 
U.A.E.'s Federal Supreme Council, each member has one equal vote 
regardless of relative size, but substantive decisions must be taken 
unanimously and not by the U.A.E.'s device of a majority including 
the largest rnernbers82• All members of t..l-te GCC have therefore an 
absolute veto and not merely the larger or richer members, a state 
of affairs 
independence. 
v1hich reflects and respects their established 
This body was to meet twice a year in May and November 
and exceptionally at other times as required but since the first year 
has met only once annually. Its procedural motions maybe carried by 
a majority; a quorum consists of two-thirds of the members. The 
Supreme Council appoints the Secretary-.General. 
Next, the Hinisterial Council consists of the six states' Foreign 
Ministers under a chairmanship rotating, like that of the Supreme 
Council, 
names. 
in alphabetical order according to their countries' Arabic 
It is to meet every three months regularly and on extra 
occasions where necessary with the purpose of making recommendations 
to the Rulers and generally encouraging co-operation. 
procedures are the same as those for the Supreme Council. 
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arbitration body was ernpov1ered to reviewu at the 
the Supre~e Councilu both disputes over the 
interpretation_ of the GCX:: rules and substantive disputes between 
member states. i'iernbership was to be designated on an ad-hoc basis 
from countries not party to the dispute. Its majority 
recommendations to the Supreme Council are not binding, however. 
Just as its U.A.E. equivalent the Federal Supreme Court had proved 
irrelevant to the 
the GOC disputes 
l:x:>rder dispute between Dubai and Sharjah ho\vever, 
arbitration body \YaS bypassed completely during 
1nediation over the Council's first serious internal territorial 
dispute, which came to a head between Qatar and Bahrain in 1982 and 
again in 1986. In both rounds, it vms sacudi Arabia's individual 
influence and not the GCC 1 s supranational machinery that persuaded 
the two sides to freeze the case (see Chapter Six). 
The Heads of States' closing statement at the end of this first 
summit affords a significant pointer to the issues to which they 
claimed to have attended and to those over which they did not see fit 
on the other hand to admit concern. First they "re-iterated their 
absolute rejection of any foreign intervention regardless of its 
source", repeating the slogan that the security of the Gulf was the 
responsibility of its peoples, secondly they reaffirmed their 
cornmitment to the Arabs' prime cause, the creation of a Palestinian 
haneland under the leadership of the PLO; third carne a restatement 
of their adherence to the charter of the Arab League and Arab summit 
resolutions and finally a reassertion of the Gulf's nonalignment. No 
mention was made of defence or internal security. 
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This surrnut also set up five COQmittees on social and econa~c 
planning, 
co-operation, 
culture83 • 
financial econa~ic and trade co-operation, industrial 
oil affairs and lastly social services and 
Si:>~ months after this largely procedural first summit, the second 
GCC sumrn.tt convened in Riyadh on 1Oth and 11th November 1981. 1981 
had not been any kinder to the six members than 1978, 1979 or 1980. 
Popular reaction to the US-Israel Strategic Co-operation pact was 
hostile; Iraq suffered severe reverses in the war; in June Iranian 
President Bani Sadr was ousted. Inevitably, the Gulf states were 
driven to ab:mdon in part though to varying degrees their public 
neutrality84 • 
In August 1981 the three hostile state of Libya, South Yellel1 and 
Ethiopia signed an unwelcane friendship and co-operation treaty. 
President Sadat was assassinated in October, the fate of a leader 
who stepped off the fence. 
Against this background the Heads of State convened in Riyadh in 
Noveruber. One of the second summit's purposes v~as to endorse the 
recently-presented Sa«:: udi t-tiddle-East peace initiative, but the 
Heads of State in their closing statement again took care to reaffinn 
their canmi tment to the Palestinian homeland under the PLO and their 
adherence to the Arab League's Charter and resolutions; again they 
rejecte:l the idea of foreign OO.ses in the area but this time they 
also expressed anxiety over the situatio! in Afghanistan and gave 
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their blessing to all attempts to end the Gulf war. They ap~roved 
the Econornic Agreeinent drawn up by Gulf Finance i·linisters earlier in 
the year butu in a departure from previous corn:nuniques 8 they now 
ackna.·Jledged that they had invited their ~fence i·linisters to meet 
"to define priorities for ;_Jreserving the independence and 
sovereignty" of their states85 • 
Reactions at Hane and Abrood 
The architects of the GOC felt obliged to defend th5~elves against 
two accusations, that of do\m-grading the Palestinian cause to a 
lower priority ru,d that of forming a separatist block inside the Arab 
world ranged against other Arab states. Nuch more radical 
criticisms 8 which official statements did not acknowledge even with 
implicit refutation, were circulated in print outside the Gulf. The 
most serious was that the GOC's professed economic and functional 
aims were mere window-dressing 8 a facade for a security organization 
bent on suppressing all dissent or progress and a "rich men's club" 
formed to protect its awn reactionary interests without reference to 
popular consultation. 
Quotes to the effect that as a regional grouping the GCC deviated 
fran the pan-Arab causes were nurnerous86 In refutation, the 
Crown Prince of riahrain for example said that forming a co-operation 
council between the six states did not mean that L~ose states were 
"washing their hands of the Arab causes or distancing themselves from 
th .,87 B11 • Arab public feelings towards Israel deteriorated to their 
worst-ever point during these years. 'rhe Egypt-Israel talks on the 
Palestinian autonomy provided for under camp David expired without 
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result; Israel foDnally annexed the Golan at the enj of 1981 1 in 
the sunmer of 19.:32 Israel invajed Lebanon and inflamed passions to a 
pitch only exceeded by the massacres at the Sabra/C.hatila refugee 
carnp in the autumn. 
·rhroug-hout, new Israeli settle:11ents were being built on the ;-:est 
Bank arrl Israel's treatment of Palestinian residents hardened. 
Incidents of terrorism such as the maiming of the \lest l3ank. mayors 
and attacks on Islamic holy places fed an at:nosphere of angry 
resentment in the streets of IilailY, possibly all, Arab capitals 
against their leaders• impotence and inertia. The charge of 
abandoning- the Palestinian cause is one the shaitd1s can ill afford. 
Official denials that the GOC also constituted a block aimed against 
any ot.t'1er party issued fran King IG-la.lid and CrO\vn Prince Fahd 
downwards. The late King said 
11 the GCCooooooooWill 
hostile ~8 anyone. any power•• • 
Kuwait • s Crmm Prince, 
press conference, said, 
in no way, directly or indirectly, be 
The Council is not a military bloc against 
asked to respond to the same c~ge during a 
11 
[ conca"TTing] the last part of your question relating to sot1le 
people 1 s belief that the establishment of the Gulf Co-operation 
Council means the foDnation of a block against some parties, in 
fact quite the reverse is true. I have noticed in sane foreign 
nevlSpapers a sort of plot to distort the gloHing iJnage of the 
Council so as to give same countries the L~pression that the 
Council 89has been formed at the instigation of foreign parties11 • 
Qnan Is Foreign, .t>tinister and Sac.udi Arabia Is Information Ninister ooth 
gave interviews saying e~phatically that the Council was not directed 
against anyone, as did the then Crown Prince Fahd. 
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Furtheru the formation of regional groupings was argued repeatedly 
to be canpatible vli th me:nbership of the Arab League; the Foreign 
Hinisters' original announcement of the new l.xx:ly took pains to make 
this point (see above) • The Arab League Secretary-General ash-Shadhli 
al-Kulaibi attended the first GCC swrunit and subsequently said that 
the GCC ;.,ras co::tpatible v:ith Article 9 of the Charter of the League. 
Care was also taken to prevent the Council's appearing to be a 
pro-Vvestern block nobvithstanding that its creation Has welcomed by 
I•trs Thatcher90 • Kuwait 1 s Deputy Prelnier and Foreign J.v:inister said 
during a visit to l·loscow in April 1981, 
"we explained to Soviet officials the object of setting up this 
Council and assured them that it is not directed against anyoneu 
in so far as it is to serve ~1e interests of states with similar 
institutions in the region" u adding "no-one has imposed the 
Council on us ••• rather our desire to direct our forces against 
foreign influence has prompted us to fonn it. 0 a .we hope that our 
friends91 in the Soviet Union will view our effort in a positive 
spirit" a 
Pravda had previously charged that the GOC would be a military 
alliance and linked its fonnation with \·lestern efforts to organize a 
security pact in the Gulf. 
The intelligentsia were unconvinced and scorned the GCC's professed 
non-alignment as another sham: the new organization was little more 
than a smokescreen for u.s. facilities92 , an American ruse for 
clamping Sacudi Arabian control over the whole Gulf93 • 
The charge of being a rich men's club was heard more often than it 
was seen in print but the Secretary-General of the Arab Planning 
Institute, Mr ~al:rl al-IYruhsin Taqi I-:luzaffar wrote that the absence of 
Iraq and the two Yemens from the grouping might widen the gap between 
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rich and po:::>r in the Arabia.'1 peninsula and might lower or obstruct 
levels of co-operation in the areau sanctioning differences instead 
of W1ity94 and C.li.Jxlullah Nafisi has made the same point95 • 
The more ominous charge of being a rulers' clique motivated by 
security and thus inimical to freedom of dissent had been laid at the 
door of the U.A.E. ten years before and \vas no\v directed forcefully 
against the GCC96. In the GO:'s case ho\vever this focus of 
criticism vlas magnified by ten years' greater sophistication in the 
body politic, ten years' develop~nt and social dislocation and 
above all by the intensification of anti-Hestern sentiment. c: Isa 
Shahin, an official at Kuwait's Foreign t-iinistry, who was also a 
respected academic and a rne:nber of the National Assembly, wrote that 
one of the major challenges facing the GCC was the lack of popular 
participation in the goverrunent of the six states and in the 
direction of their national \vealth, and Dr cAdil al-'l'abtabac.i, a 
Professor of Lav1 at I\uwait University, expressed the caveat that 
Kuwait's democratic example would have to be followed by the other 
members if the GCC were to win popular legi timacy97 • 
Its perceived design as a tool to crack down on dissent is the GCC' s 
greatest crime for a v1ide sector of public opinion. SaC-udi Arabia is 
routinely blamed for this triumph of reaction, and bilateral 
G 98 
security pacts with Sa udi Arabia are seriously unpopular in the 
smaller Gulf states. The U.A.E.'s pact was the subject of resentful 
taU~ in th t . 1 - emb.l ·-\-..- - . 99 e U .A.E Na 10na l\SS y on a nuuu.=r or occas1ons and 
Kuwait's was abandoned (like the multilateral version) as 
inconsistent with the Constitution. Sa~udi Arabia is also routinely 
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blarned for killing off l~uwait' s l·iational l.sse.11bly1 00 • 
In ~1e orgrulization's earliest years ~e Secretariatv if not ~e 
higher au~1orities, did make an attempt to tackle the dm1estic 
p::::>litical issue. It camlissioned a study p:li_Jer 0:1 the true r.1eanins; 
of develo~:tilent fro:n a symp:Jsi1.ITI of prominent acaderaics, \vho, after 
a year's workv presenteJ a retJQrt wl1ich defined true development as 
the nurturing of resourcefulv econanically-productive and 
socially-responsible citizens. That goal could not be reached, the 
retJQrt warned hm-1ever, \-li ~1out ;::>articipatory governmento It vlent on 
to criticize the "consumerist" life-style to which the meaning of 
''develo011ent" had l.:een reduced in the GO: states. 'l'he J>Iinisters of 
Planning, to Hhom it v1as sul:mitted, rejected the report on the 
gronnds t.l)at it had exceeded its brief by dabbling in politics 101 • 
Like the U .A. E., the GCC as an organization has the centripetal 
advantage that one of its members, sac.udi Arabia, is much larger 
than all ti1e others and is CQ11ll1itted to the association. saGudi 
Arabia and the other five states are not quite so nnequal on the 
other hand as were Abu Dhabi and the tiniest !:mirates in 1971 1 Sac,udi 
Arabia's 
Equally, 
largesse ins~~nt is correspondingly less efficient. 
the tendency to resent domineering behaviour is stronger, 
to the sa~e effect. 
The fundamental motive for closing ranks however has been reinforced 
by many events and shocks since the organization's birti1 - including 
an attempted coup in one of its members immediately after the second 
summit - and the GOC is likely to survive its internal frictions at 
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least as long as the threats to its me;nbers are extanto 
But the unintended side-effect of the fonnation of tl1e GCC has b:=en 
to crystallize shur?lY in tl1e minds of the opposition the features of 
their regimes that they dispute the most vehe:nentlyo A large 
literature no·,., exists (in London, not the Gulf) decrying t_~e 
organization as an l\lnerican-inspired Sac udi ruse to frustrate all 
pro:iresso Sa~e e~nples of G,is literature state bluntly that by 
stifling all legal openings for expression, the advent of the GC..'C 
has hastened tl1e day when dissent vlill erupt through illegal oneso 
. Conclusion: Some Characteristics of the 1 981 State 
For the UoAoEo as a Federation, mernbership of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council reinforces the Federation as persona as a single entityo It 
weighs against any secessionist tendency, though to vlhat extent 
remains to be seen o 
t-'leanwhile, the UoAoEo ten years on still had not reached agreement 
on a permanent constitution but the Rulers 1 inability to do so cannot 
be cited as evidence that their comnitment had stagnated, for it was 
not politics alone that stalled their proceedings this time also but 
the supervention of Shaikh Rashid's illnesso 
In many respects the health of the Federation after two years of 
Shaikh Rashid's premiership was stronger than before a It had been 
resuscitated fran the cana of 1978 and its ability to survive the 
worst-case scenario of a deadlock between Abu Dhabi and Dubai had 
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been proveno It had been fortified by a Central Bank and the 
apparent acquisition of rights over 50 per cent of each Ernirate 0 s oil 
revenueso Important nation-wide legislation had been made possible 
including a law controlling the crucial issue of immigrant labouru 
but other contended laws had nota 
In other respects, new accretions to the Federal machinery and in 
particular the disbursement of federal largesse had been restrained, 
though this too was only partly intentional and was in part due to 
the coincidental strains on the exchequer imposed by the changing 
situation in the world oil marketo Nonetheless, the continuing 
omission of the Government to reflate the stagnant eccinomy 
represented a major contraction in its Federal roleo 
But above all Shaikh Rashid had recaptured for the Rulers -
effortlessly - the initiative which had begun to devolve by default 
on the National Assembly and if he had not resolved the issues that 
had been thrown up by the intellectual debate of the vacuum years 6 
he had for the time being silenced them, at least at haneo t·le can 
only sunnise what he might have achieved \'lith that initiative 
regained a 
During the five years to the Provisional Constitution 1 s ne.'<t e.-<piry 
date in 1986, the Goverrunent 0 s presence was not after all to reviveo 
In 1981 the UoAoEo was on the brink of fresh economic changes which· 
were to be the mirror-image of the leapfrogging revenue years of the 
1970so Oil plummeted in value and the Gulf war escalated and 
spread6 but Shaikh Rashid lingered6 a sick old man, and the UoAoEo 
had to face these trials with its leadership still frozeno 
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For all the Gulf statesu the years following 1981 were dominated by 
the escalation of the Iran-Iraq war and by the steep fall in the 
price of oilu but U.A.E. was faced also with the terminal illness of 
the Vice-President Shaikh Rashid. Each of these baleful developnents 
interacted with ~~e others. The Har itself not only escalated in 
intensity but took on the triangular shapeu wit."l the Go: states as 
one side of the triangleu that brought Dubai and Sharjah Hithin 
Lloyds' definition of the war zone for insurance purposes. Shici 
militancy, encouraged directly or indirectly by Iran, brought vlit."l 
it the destabilization and occasional acts of terrorism the shaikhs 
feared the most anj \·Jas bla.t-:tecl for an attempted coup in one GCC 
member and an attempt on the life of the Amir of another. 'rhe \'la.r 
daninated the GCC' s concerns and ~..ras contri0uted to its greater 
coherence, though members 1 apprehensions of it ':lere not identical. 
President Shaikh Zayid played a part in the various 
unsuccessful mediation atte..rnpts but a growing lack of confidence and 
fear of possible loss of face ruled out their being publicized. 
The Har •·.ras negative h0\·1ever for the level of economic activity, 
which \<las severely blightecl as \vell by the simulta11eous ~lunge in the 
price of oil and later the decline of t."le dollar. The slumt:J 
undermined the Federation 1 s will to decide its economic path. Ever-
gloomier business prognostications led to an e;·:cdus of the 
L-rmigrants; in an econcmy that L:1ported not only its consumer gcxxls 
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but also its consumers u the departures further depressed the level 
of activity vlhich further s..,relled the departuresu and so ona 
Shaildl Rashid's illness continued to slow all decision-making on the 
Federal front aL110st to the point of extinctiona This ·..,ras the 
context in which the blice-extended Provisional Constitution came due 
to expire again in December 1986o Obviously u it was not feasible to 
expect any radical decisions to be reached on a new· Constitution 
under the circurnstancesa Shortly after the provisional one was 
re-extendedu howeveru the Federation was put to its severest test 
by a coup d'etat in Sharjaho This thesis •.vill end with an evaluation 
of the Supreme Council's response to that testa 
The threat of Iranian-inspired instability became a reality 
i.rmnediately after the second GCC summit in November 1981 when Bahrain 
experienced an atte:npted coupa In February 1982 the Foreign 
L--linisters went to i-lanarua to hold their first emergency session and to 
declare their absolute support for Bahraino Their staternent named 
·names by resolving to resist acts of sabotage perpetrated by Irano 
Iraq's readiness to seo.....k a peaceful solution to the Gulf war was 
singled out for praise, in a further departure from earlier atte~pts 
to cultivate a neutral iznage, and Iran was called U!,X)n to recipro-
1 
cate o It is significant thc.1.t the threat 'i'las considered sufficient 
to enable t7le:~1bers, despite their differing relations • ..rith Iran, to 
reach t.~is degree of urunimi ty on a vert eangerous sulJstanti ve issue o 
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The coup attempt also brought ministers responsible for internal 
security to an urgent meeting in ?.iyad.h in February 1982o Li~;:e the 
foreign minsters, they declared that their reaction \·las collective 
and set their technical experts the task of drafting the detailed 
multilateral internal security pact2 o 
The idea of drafting this internal security pact vms given the 
go-ahead at the next council session4 0 It proved unpopular in su-ne 
member states and eventually had to be abandoned5 in favour of a 
more vaguely-defined security "strategy"6 0 
A third emergency foreign ministers' session was again devoted to 
the Iran-Iraq \·mr o Held in two parts separated by two v1eeks, it 
reviewed talks which Sa c.udi Arabia and Km·mit Here holding \'lith 
Iran's b.-10 Arab allies Algeria and Syriao Doth meetings carunended 
Iraq's response to mediation efforts7o 
1he n~~t regular session, in Ta'if in July 1982, took place shortly 
after the Israeli invasion of Lebanono Hembers condemned the Uni teJ 
States for using its Security Council veto against a motion critical 
of Israel, and called on the Council to L-:-~pose econanic sanctions 
. t I 1 . l-L 1 f th . . 8 aga1ns srae 1n w'l.e wa. :e o e 1nvas1on o 
J:efence co-ordination Has clearly an early and high priorityo As \·las 
noted in Chapter F'ive, the second ~leads of State SUiTh-nit was follO\'led. 
by a raeeting of r:1eP."..iJGrs' defence ministers which was subsequently 
held in i'iovember 1981 in Riyadh, preceded by a meeting of the Chiefs 
of Stuffo At this first meeting tl1e ·defence ministers broached tl1e 
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idea of starting an indigenous Gulf arms industry but their 
cornmunique missed out the expected reference to the creation of a 
.. t d 9 JOl.n anny co111man o 
A second defence ministers' meeting took place in Hiyadh in October 
1982p and the follo•11ing year joint exercises got underway wit., 
"Peninsula Shield"p 
Reliable reports say that the 1982 summit in Bahrain pledged $1bn for 
upgrading the island 0 s defences11 0 
Just as t.,e second surmnit in Bahrain had been overshadowed by an 
atte.11pted COUpp the fourth in Doha in 1 983 was to be surrounded by 
rumours of a plato An anns cache \·las said to have been discovered 
belonging to conspirators v1ho were apparently planning either 1 
depending on the source 1 to bloVT up the Sheraton Hotel, •.vhere the 
Heads of State v1ere staying, or to shoot do1m the aircraft bringing 
one or more of them to Qatar o Naturally 1 no confirmation of these 
rumours was ever forthca:ning o Ha.vever the su.-.-uni t \·.ra.s followed by the 
first i·;avc;; of ba:illin:,;s in Km.ra.ito 
Other co: mem;:;ers e;~cept KuHait - now hast::mc:;.J to sign bilateral 
internal security pacts \lith Sac:. udi Arabia, but the draft 
multiluteral version fail2Cl to gain approval ·,.,hen t!1e interior 
ministers met in ICuv1ait in Octoi::x2r 1982 for their second session and 
again Hhen t.,ey met in October 1983 for their thirdo Instead the 
.. t , ed 1 f t t 1 t . . 12 t·lin1.s ers as.~ a ~e o exper s o \'/Orr~ ou sor.1e rev1.s1.ons o A 
month later KuHait e;-:perienced its bomb e..·\:plosions, for ·.1hich 
members of an Islarnic funda1:ent.alist group with Iranian connections 
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v1ere later brought to trial, but Kuwait's r2serva tions over the pact 
were not overturned. The Kuwait News Agency quotes the draft as 
aiming to "preserve security and stability and protect the Islamic 
Shari a and ideals against atheism, subversion and military 
activities"13 but it was criticized openly in the UoAoEo National 
Assembly and was condenmed as an illiberal "conspiracy" by the 
well-knO\m dissident Dr Alxlullah i:~afisi at the opening session of the 
new Km~a.iti Parliament in ~larch 198514 0 
i·luch co-ordination \·las also attempted in the first years on the 
functional and econanic plane and this indeed received more publicity 
t.~ the defence and security arrangernentso In June 1981 finance and 
economy ministers approved the cornerstone Unified EconCA1lic 
Agreement15 , which ainted to pranote free trade and the free 
move11ent of capital and expertise betHeen members and \vas to enter 
into effect in 1933. At tile end of 1932 the s~ne ministers approved 
t.,e setting up of the Gulf Invest~ent Corporation with a capital of 
$2.1bn, to be subscribed equally by each me~r. 
Trade ministers recommended ti1at a strategic stockpile of foodstuffs 
be built up; electricity ministers cCA~aissioneJ studies of a Gulf 
po•.o~er grid an::l oil ministers discussed a gas distribution networ:(. 
Canmunications ministers canmissioned a study of a railHay line to 
link the GCC states •.-lith each other and perhaps with l::.illope via 
Turkey; in 19.34 t.,ey approved a project for a trur.k road frCA-:t Km1ai t. 
to i-luscat, though the neH climate of austerity later caused sorne of 
the schem2s to be retrenched. 
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Intensifying G~eats to navigation in G,e Gulf inspired the GDC oil 
ministers to work out an a•}reement guaranteeing that any member uhose 
oil exports were interrupted by an emergency would be compensated out 
of the production · of other .me.-nters, sold on the afflicted :nember' s 
behalf. They recommended the strategic stod~piling of refined 
products and decided to give priority in siting future joint 
petroch~~cal projects to the relatively poorer me~rs 3ahrain and 
Oman, beginning with a 250,000 bpd export refinery to be built at 
The GCC' s preoccupation \'lith the var intensified throughout 1983, as 
it beca~ clear that Iraq's early gains were not to be repeated or 
sustained and had indeed been reversed17• The organization's line 
of approach still concentrated on mediation and one of the leading 
mediators seems to have been U.A.E. President Shai~d1 Zayid, though 
t.~e people of the U.A.E. uere kept in the dark e.'{cept for the bare 
facts of his itineraries. After previous trips by the Qatari and 
Sa c. udi Arabian Foreign Hinsters, Shaikh Zayid \'lent to Iraq, Syria 
anC1• ', . . Oct ber1 3 ~ger~a ~n o • 
Some sources have it that he t:1en put a plan to end the \·i'ar and 
launch an Islamic "£.Jarshall Plan" 19 for reconstruction to the 
fourb, suarnit in Doha in Nov<21nber, a summit \'lhich Has largely taken 
up wib1 t.~e mediation efforts. If he did so, the plan ~vas not 
ado9ted, for no mention of it W<lS made in the closing ccmmunique •. 
Instead, the co:nmunique returned again to t..~e contrast ootr.;eo._n 
Iraq's and Iran's responses to international mediation efforts and 
urged Iran to follow Iraq in accepting the 31st October .3ecurity 
Council resolution calling for an end to operations against 
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civilian and econanic targets and in international shipping laneso 
This tirr.e u however, the Heads of State added an ap!_)eal to the 
permanent me-nbers of the Security Council to fulfill their statutory 
obligations under the Ui:T Charter to ensure that its resolutions 'tlere 
carried out20 o 
Though GCC pronouncements on the subject had now tilted t~vards 
Iraq, GOC members 0 individual attitudes to Iran had of course al~mys 
been less than unifonno The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Shaikh Khalifa 
ibn Zayid was still insisting in 1984 that the UaAo3o retained 
gcxx1-neighl:ourly relations ~·lith both sides21 and in April 1985 
Duba.i staged an Iranian trade fair billed as the largest ever held 
outside Iran since G~e ~evolution, despite the fact e1at the Iraqi 
D3puty Prime i--linister and Foreign ~linster had already condemned the 
relations of one un-naued but easily-identified GCC menber 1vith Irru! 
as ''a disgrace" 22 a 
In April 1934, d1e Gulf war sa1v a serious escalation whe.11 the ta~-~er 
\·rur broke outa Iraq ai.i::eJ to blockade Iran's oil export tenninal at 
Klurg Island; Iran responded '.:Jy i.x:xnbing oil tankers and co.umercial 
vessels of non-belliger:3Ilt stat::!s heading for Iraq and ther·2by 
confront,~J the Gulf states >·lith the possible cut-off of vital imports 
plus e1e ;?QSsibility of not bein'] able to e;..--;:ort t:!1eir oiL The Har 
nov; took on t.~e t.rian~lar siB.~ that r.vas to characterize its future 
phases: Iraqi attacks on Iran's econo~ic targets were met by Iranian. 
pressure not on Iraq but on the GCC statesa 
In response, e1e GCC foreign minsters met in Riyadh the same month 
::283 
·The End of An Era 
~-------
for t.~eir fifth emergency session and decided to ta};:e the matter to 
ti1e Security Council via the Arab League1 the latter Has called into 
emergency session and de.-nanded that Iran stop the attad:s23 • To 
appeal to the international c~unity represented some~1ing of a~ 
inconsistency; Shaikh Zayid' s sl03an that "the security of the 
Gulf is the responsibility of its citizens" had bGen adopted by 
other Ministries of Infonnation and was tru11peted routinely in ~'l.e 
co~placent official press. The Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaikh 
J.'.'luharrunad ibn ~·lubaral< 'VIaS now quoted as saying 
"nol:xx:.y can help you if you cannot help yourself. 'l'he Gulf 
states collectively are capable of defending themselves but on 
the other hand all the world's interests pass through the Gulf 
and the security of the Gulf is therefore an international issue 
as well. It would be nothing rema2~ble if we asked our fria~ds 
for help if circumstances required" 
a tortuosity destined to grow all the more acrobatic as the war 
escalated. 
The Security Council quickly adopted a resolution asl:ing that freedom 
of navigation in international \iaters be respected but the at~osphere 
of crisis thickened when Sac udi Airforce fi9hters shot do'.-m an 
Iranian F4 on 5th June 1 984. It was later revealed, much to the 
Sac udis' embarrass;:~ent, that the Sac:udi fighters had been refuelled 
. 'd . by u ~ - 25 ~n ILU. -a~r o ::> o torces • 
Also in June 1984 the im;>lications of the tan!·:er 'dar for oil prices 
and sales 'dere discussed by the C-CC oil ministers, Hho were reported. 
to have agreed to build a strategic pipeline to a ne>v terminal on L,e 
Gulf of Qnan coast in either the UoA.E. or Qnan to bypass the 
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Straits of Hormuzo :i(m-Ta.it was reported to be ferrying its oil via a 
shuttle service to tankers viai ting outside the Straits of llo:rmuz v 
and SaCudi Arabia to be keeping reserves of crude in tankers anchored 
outside the Gulf26 0 
t-leanwhile v the Chiefs of Staff worked out plans for a unified Gulf 
defe..'1ce forcev the Rapid Deployraent Forcev which was to be based on 
co-ordinating units from members 0 individual forces rat.~er than on 
creating a separate force under GCC canmando In September 1934 the 
foreign ministers and the defence ministers held a joint meeting at 
Abha in Sac:udi Arabia - a meeting which the press build-up indicated 
was of exceptional importance and approved a policy paper on 
defence prepared by military expertso Their paper and b~e unified 
force was adopted and approved at the fifth summit in Kmvait27 o 
2ut at t.~e saJue ti.!:Je, also in June 1934v the :i:~uwaiti Foreign 
Minister and his UoAoEo counterpart went to roth Baghdad and TeJrran 
on a fresh peace missiono It \vas not blessed with successo At first 
the t•:JO emissaries were encouraged by the response of ooth conbatants 
to the neH initiative, t.ite 1Cu•:1ai ti ;,tinister e:9lained liJ. ter in i1 
staternent on 1 Jt.~ June, but t.'"le position of tl1e "brethren in 
Tehran" had then undergone a "sudden d1ar~ge" v bringin~.r the mission to 
a halL They had ho~::.€d Iran might look on tllc ''oolanced'' 
Security Council ~~esolution 552 in the Saine \vay as Iraq dido :·IO':lv 
althour;h t.'"ley iud not given up hope of Iran's ~ing brought to t..'"le. 
negotiiJ.ting table, the ()__""C ·states Here determined to defend the.rn-
selves and to "respond collectively to any danger to which a member 
might be exposed" o iul asiA--=>cts of that response had been Harked 
out2J 
. ·235 
. The End of An Era 
The C..CX: 0 s fifth sur1mit was celebrated in Kuwait in Nove.'llber 1984 and 
adopted the slogan "the summit of self-reliaYJ.ce" (all subsec;uent 
summits adopted SL~larly fanciful titles)o Iran na.v got harsher 
verbal treaG~a1t ~~1 before in the press build-upo The GCC states 
had refused to lose their composure or to allow themselves to be 
sucked into the v1ar despite continual !?revocations not only in the 
form of propaganda campaigns against them but also of armed attacks 
against installations and commercial shipping29 o 
At this summit the GCC's strategy for Gulf security had crystallized 
into •.-1hat ':las described as a twin-track approo.ch combining neutrality 
on inter-.:trab differences Hith active joint defence planso 
Accordingly, the Heads of State in their closing ca.ununique redoubled 
their praise for Iraq's };X)Sitive stance on international resolutions 
and mediation efforts and called on Iran to match ito But at the 
s.::une tir>.1e, Shaikh :.:i~h said, plans had been asreed for a joint 
defence force under a single ccnunando Its existence ,.,as to b2 for a 
specific period of tL~e, after which the concept 1:JOuld b2 re-
evaluated. i'Jo inb:o!rnal role was envisaged for the force30 • Plans 
for a Gulf armaiilents industry had also been di:.:;cussed but their 
realization n:mained far off o 
·.ihatever the erfect of the dual signal sent out by the KuHait 
SU.11f!1i t I ho'tJever, :·larch 19::35 saw a further r.ujor escalation of the 
• ..rar and the high-casualty '';..1ar of the cities"31 • Fierce lanci. 
battles over the Hor iftr.·;aiza marshlands h.J.d teen raging for a ·deck 
and Iraq had declared all Iranian airs?.J.ce a rnilitart ~~elusion zone 
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when the Foreign i.'·Iinisters met for their ordina.ry session on 17th 
Ilarch. This timep their ca:nnunique declared "total solidarity with 
l(uwaiti Foreign :·.Jinister Shaildl Sabah protested strongly 
against Iran's occupation of Iraqi terri tory. Sin.ce Iraqi terri torj 
\'laS Arab territory, it was the duty of all Arabs to defend it32 • 
The new harder line nob1i thstanding, Shaikh Sabah left the meeting 
for Baghdad and later went to Algiers with his Sacudi counterpart as 
part of the same errand while the GCC Council repeated its readiness 
to send enrissaries to Tehran as -well if ·renran agreed - the U.A.Z. 
Foreisn Minister \vas reported to be the obvious candidate. Like 
earlier mediation efforts, these errands came to nothirtg33 • 
:,!ean\·lhile Iran clairued to have taken several kilornetres of the 
Basra-Daghdad highway; Km·Tait' s defences \vere strengthe.."'led and b.'1e 
Shatt al- c:: .i\rab island of Bubian v1as turned into a military zone; 
intelligence-sharing and joint defer1ce plans Here dra\-m up. 'l'he 
agreement to St:Ere civilian targets which the U.~·l. Secretary-General 
had secured in the summer of 1 984 ;-1as cast aside and brroughout the 
both :Jaghdad and Tehran ...... Cl._leS suffered rer~ated rnissile 
attacks and bowing raids. 
In such an atnosphere of deeper1ing crisis a sudden visit ;Jy the 
Sac udi ?oreign i'Iinster to Telrran in ~·iay, in which the u ... \.E. illc'1~' h.J.ve 
played a ~re':Xlratory 34 role , had an ele.rnent of circun<.1. The Prince's 
visit '.·:as imrnedia tel y overshadowed 
assassination of the ;\inir of Km</Qit on 25t.~ ;.ay by a suicide car 
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The Arnir escaped death by inches; the sound of his shaking voice on 
T.v. broadcasting to the nation \•las a nail in the coffin of any 
lingering Iranian attractiveness to middle-class disaffection. 
\·lhatever the Young 'l'urks wanted, b~e murder of their shaiY~s by 
suicidal Shic. i Has not i L 
In the autumn of 1 985 moreover the Iranian navy startoo intercepting 
neutral shipping bound for Gulf ports and checking cargo for goods 
going to Iraq. The implications for life in the non-belligerent Gulf 
states were so serious that t'1e Gt.'C '.vas obliged to consider reverting 
to a rilor·3 ?lacatory line to~vards Iran. 
At b'1e sixth GCC surrl!nit, (officially "the surrnnit of ta~e-off"), 
which was held arnid unparalleled ostentation in Muscat in November 
19es, the Heads of State for the first time failed to favour Iraq. 
Instead, Sultan ('abus spoke evenly in his 'delcaning s;:>eech of the 
need for "good-neighbourliness"35 • 'l'heir closing ca:'.auniCJUe called 
on Iran to resr.ect the u.~'I. resolutions on the freedo-n of navigation 
in b~e Straits but \vas frGe of strong language. It also expressed 
the CA.."'C' s readiness to revive me;5.iution efforts yet again 1·lib~ both 
col'nba tan ts. 
The iiuscat carununique 1 s a-:Ussion illth of praise for Iraq and of 
condemnation of Iran '.-.ras seized on by canme.11tators as a yualitative 
change in the Go: 1 s . t' J;j pos~ ~on und \vas i:)raised fulso.r:1ely by both. 
the l'ri.-ne Hinister and the Foreign dinister of Iran37 • In Ccceritber 
the latter Hent to .:.{iyad..~ to return his SaCudi counterpart's ~·la.y 
visit to Tehran. 
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The talks were presented officially as a failure38 despite the 
fact that Velayati chose L~is point in tL~e to praise the U.A.~. as 
11
ru"1 exe.rnplary goc:d neighbour to Iran"39 and despite hints from 
other sources that G~e cooL~ess was for public consumption and in 
truth masked a bargain by ·.ffiich Iran got an undertaking fran the Gulf 
states to distance themselves frcr.1 Iraq in return for an Iranian 
promise not to extend the scope of b,e war - in other v1ords an 
institutionalization of the \f.ar 1 S triangularity - and not forcibly to 
li.rnit oil exports b~ough the Gulf to help ste~ the giddy slide in 
prices b~t had followed upon OPEC's decision that r:10nth to ahmdon 
its traditional defance of ?rices. At any rate contacts intensified 
in G~e Ne~·l Year 1906 as the price oi oil fell through :;;15 a birrel 
to\va.rds $1 0 • 
1-lhatever the true tone of the Sa"udi-Iranian talks may have been, 
however, Iran launched its long-heralded land off,2nsive on the night 
of 9th .:.-;-oebr.1ary 1986 and succee:J.ed at onc2, in a night long to be 
remembered by those uho spe.11t it glued to t.~eir radios, in crossing 
the Shatt al-c.'\r:1b. Iran. gleefully c:!escrL:)ed itself as I~uHait' s no• .. : 
neighbour. The Gulf states were horrified; evcm tl1e U.A.l::. felt 
able to issue an . 40 official stateuent co::~demning the attac:c • 
•11 
resp::mded by takins tl1e ':rar t:> econallic br•;ets insid(? Iran· • 
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:The End of the Surolus-Revenue Years. 
-~~~
~llhile the war overshadowed the Gulf as a region, at home the 
development most immediate in its impact on daily life was the plunge 
in oil revenues. Revenue from oil fell from Dhs52.7bn ($14.3bn) in 
1980 to Dhs45.5bn ($12.35bn) in 1981, then to Dhs34.6bn ($9.39bn) in 
1982, and to Dhs27.0bn ($7.33bn) 42 in 1983 after OPEC cut back its 
output and reduced the marker price by 15 per cent to $29 per barrel 
in March of that year. In October 1984 OP.OC was forced to lower its 
production ceiling further from 17. Sm bpd to 16m bpd, and the 
U.A.E 0s oil revenue fell again to Dhs23.9bn ($6.508bn) 43 • 
As a result, 1981 turned out to be the last of the years of surplus 
revenue. The revenue side of the Federal budget decreased from 
Dhs26.233bn ($7.142bn) in that year to a projected Dhs20.276bn 
($5.52bn) in 198244 • Of that projected 1982 sum, however, only 
Dhs16.050bn ($4.37bn) was actually forthcoming, whereas expenditure 
was put at Dhs22.6bn ($6.16bn) 45 • 
The full implications of a continuing slide in revenues did not 
penetrate irmiediately. The perio:l up to the end of 1982 saw current 
expenditure continuing to rise at a steep incline regardless of the 
sharp drop in incane (see table overleaf). Government services 
continued to improve, as expressed for exarnple in the pupil: teacher 
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ratios in the schools and in the patient:doctor ratio, and in the 
individual 1 s share in final consumptiong which grew significantly. 
After the great shortfall in 1982 1 s expected revenuef however, the 
11rationalization11 spirit was implemented with a vengeance. 
Ironically, since the 1981-5 Plan was based on the assumption tl1at · 
oil prices would stabilize at 1980 levels, the Plan would now have 
been overtaken by economic events even if it had not been tacitly 
shelved for political reasons. 
In the following year 1983 the Federation's projected budget revenues 
fell sharply again to Dhs12.945bn ($3.513bn) (they in fact reached 
an actual Dhs 13. 8bn) against expenditure of Dhs18.406bn ($5bn), a 
second projected deficit of DhsS.Sbn ($1.5bn) 46 • Next, 1984's 
projection put revenue at Dhs12.859bn ($3.50bn) against expenditure 
of Dhs17.229bn ($4.69bn), a third deficit of just over Dhs4bn. In 
practice, however, revenues again fell short of expectations and 
reached only Dhs12.4bn ($3.376bn), pushing the actual deficit up to 
47 Dhs5.4bn • 
This time, Abu Dhabi 's individual finances followed the same sorry 
course. Indeed this tune around, in contrast to the 1978 
recession, Abu Dhabi was affected as severely as and in sane 
respects more severely than the other main oil-~xporting Emirate of 
Dubai and than Sharjah, where new oil discoveries in the late 1970s 
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Table6:1 Comoarative Standard of Living Indices, 1980 and 1982 
Item Unit 1980 1982 Growth 
~ 
National incane: 
fixed prices dhsm 98,746 97,611 (Oo6) 
current prices dhsm 98,746 87,844 (5o7) 
Population thousand 1,042 1,186 6o6 
Per capita incane: 
fixed prices 1 ,000 dhs 94,8 82,3 (6o8) 
current prices 1 ,ooo dhs 94,8 74,1 (11.6) 
Individual's share in 
final consumption 
fixed prices 1,000 29,7 42,0 17 o6 
current prices 1 ,000 dhs 29,7 36,7 11.2 
Individual's share in 
government consumption: 
fixed prices 1 ,000 dhs 11 , 5 19,4 27,5 
current prices 1 ,000 dhs 11 , 5 16,6 20.1 
Individual's share in 
private consumption: 
fixed prices 1 ,000 dhs 18,2 22,6 11.2 
current prices 1 ,000 dhs 18,2 20,0 5.1 
Individual's share in 
savings: fixed prices 1,000 dhs 58,6 38,2 (19o3) 
current prices 1 ,000 dhs 58,6 35,5 (22.2) 
Source: al-Tata>oJWUrat al-IgtisadiyYa 1980-82, oo.cit., p 41. 
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Table 6:2 Economic Variables 1980-82 (in dhs mat current prices) 
Variable 1980 1981 1982 Growth 
Population 1 g042g 100 1g122v000 1u186v000 6a7 
Workforce 541.,033 580.,362 596v235 SaO 
Crude oil output 
(million barrels) 625v508 548.,128 450g535 (15a1) 
GDP 109g833 119g266 113g633 1a7 
GNI 98v746 105v541 97v611 (Oa6) 
Disposable income 91v989 101 v525 9511 01 (L 7) 
National savings 61 ,029 58v113 45y323 (13a8) 
Expenditure: final 
consumption 30v960 43v412 49v778 26a8 
of which Government 
final consumption 11,992 19,471 22.,940 38a3 
and private final 
consumption 18,968 23,941 26,838 18a9 
Fixed capital fonnation 30,155 29,018 32,181 
of which Government 12,454 10,226 13,600 
and of which private 
business sector 171701 18,792 19,581 
Total imports 34,116 35,594 34,800 1.0 
'l'otal exports 84,512 83,350 63,300 (10.1) 
Trade surplus 50,396 47,756 33,535 (18.4) 
CUrrent balance of 
p3.yrn;:nts surplus 38,909 36,050 22,333 (24.2) 
Wages 16,011 20,161 22,174 17.7 
Source: Ibid, ·p97. 
293 
.Chapter Six 
had caused a temporary local boan. Abu Dhabi's oil revenues slump.:=d 
drastically from Dhs37.885bn ($10.315bn) in 1981 to Dhs27.495bn 
($7.486bn)in 1982 and to Dhs19.523bn ($5.315bn) in 1983 and then to 
only Dhs17.951bn ($4.887bn) in 1984, less than half of the 1 981 
figure. Total revenue dropped accordingly from Dhs40.312bn 
($10.975bn) in 1981 to Dhs30.099bn ($8.195bn) in 1982, to 
Dhs22.119bn ($6.024bn) in 1983 and Dhs19.625bn ($5.513bn) in 1984. 
Against these incomings, outgoings were put at Dhs37.852bn 
($10.306bn) in 1981, Dhs29.554bn ($8.046bn) in the last surplus year 
of 1982, then Dhs25.787bn ($7.021bn) in 1983 and Dhs22.418bn 
($6.104bn) in 1984. Thus 1982's surplus of Dhs545m ($148m) was 
turned into the large deficits of Dhs3.683bn ($1.003bn) in 1983 and 
Dhs2.793bn ($760m) in 198448 • 
These deficits and the consequent spending cuts can be argued to have 
been more apparent than real, since in practice budget allocations 
were never fully spent. Thus, though Abu Dhabi's 1982 Developnent 
Programme of Dhs6.7bn ($1.824bn) looks smaller than the previous 
year's Dhs7bn ($1.906bn), of that Dhs7bn in 1981 only Dhs5.7bn 
( $1 • 55bn) had been actually spent, so the 1982 budget was in fact 
bigger. 
The 1983 Development Programme of Dhs5.995bn ($1.633bn) looks in turn 
to be smaller than 1982's Dhs6.7bn, but of 1982's Dhs6.7bn only 
Dhs5.4bn ($1 .47bn) had been spent, which means that 1983's allocation 
was again more. Again in 1984 the allocated Dhs5.021bn ($1.367bn) 
was less than the DhsS. 995bn allocated in 1 983 but more than the 
Dhs4.507bn ($1.227bn) actually spent. In that year 1984, actual 
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disbursB~ts under the Development Programme totalled Dhs3.899bn, 
so that 1985°s allocation of DhsSbn was again higher. Total spending 
in 1985 was Dhs4.206bn49 (See Table 3~3). 
The same argument can be applied, though less convincingly 8 to 
Federal expenditure_ as welL 1982°s was estimated at Dhs22.6bn 
($6.16bn) 
($5.25bn), 
for example, but in practice reached only Dhs19.3bn 
according to Central Bank figures. Conpared with this 
latter figure, the following year's budgeted Dhs18.4bn ($5.bn) is 
Real expenditure in 1983 and 1984 was Dhs16.3bn not far below. 
($4.438bn) and Dhs15.195bn ($4.138bn), not the budgeted Dhs18.4bn 
and Dhs17.299bn. From a real Dhs16.3bn to a budgeted Dhs17.299bn the 
following year and then from a real Dhs15.195bn to a projected 
Dhs16.634bn in 1985 is actually an improvement50 • 
But the most significant feature of the new austerity budgets in roth 
cases, in an econany overwhelmingly dependent on Government 
spending, was their extremely small provision for new project 
starts. In 1983 only Dhs4m ( $1. 1m) was earmarked in the Federal 
budget to new schemes and all the remainder of the Dhs1. 7bn ( $463m) 
allowed for projects was for the continuation or completion of 
existing ones. As a consequence of the policy of approving no new 
projects, the total, cwnulative valuation of the Federation's whole 
capital expenditure programme fell by 20 per cent fran Dhs15bn 
($4.1bn) at the end of 1982 to Dh12bn ($3.3bn) at the end of 1983. · 
It then fell steeply in 1984 to Dhs7.46bn ($2.03bn), or half the 
1982 level, and to Dhs6.2bn ($1.688bn) in 198551 (See Table 6~4). 
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Abu Dhabi Emirate 1 s Development Programme (that section of the 
budget devoted to projects) was cut from Dhs7b.n in 1981 to Dhs6. 7bn 
in 1982 to Dhs5.9bn in 1983 and Dhs5.02bn in 1984 as we have 
already seen but againv out of 1983's Dhs5.9bnv only Dhs179m 
( $48. 7m) was for new projects. Before the Developnent Programme for 
1983 was approvedv furthermorev sane 120 projects on which work had 
not yet started were erased altogether and cost-cutting measures 
saving Dhslo9bn ($0.52bn) had to be applied to those already under 
construction52 • 
The third-largest Emirate of Sharjah had entered the 1980s with 
rekindled bullish hopes but, as after the 197 4 boon, soon needed 
help with mounting debts. Amoco's discovery of condensate at the 
Sajac a onshore site in December 1980 gave rise to visions of an 
annual income in excess of $1 bn from oil exports of up to 1 00, 000 bpd 
by the mid-1980s53 • However ~~rts from the new field began in 
July 1982, just as the price of crude began to slide. Imports into 
Sharjah fell from Dhs3.3bn in 1981 to Dhs 2.1bn by 1985 and from 1983 
onwards airport statistics show an outflow of population54 • 
A bank loan of $200m was taken out on the guarantee that Abu Dhabi 
would repay if Sharjah failed to do so; Sharjah did fail to do so 
and the burden of honouring the instalments became unacceptably 
irksome to Abu Dhabi as the latter's own finances degenerated into 
disarray. In i·1ay 19d5 Sharjah reached a lucrative agreement .to sell· 
yas fra.11 Sajac a to Dubai and in September of that year Abu Dhabi 
refused to make any further repayments on Sharj ah' s behalf. Sharj ah 
then obtained an international syndicated loan of $180m. By the 
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time the price of crude hit its lowest point in the autumn of 1986 u 
Sharjah owed $140m to contractors and $600m to domestic and foreign 
bankers a In 1986 and 1987 her projected surplus income was 
insufficient to service these debtso 
One of the reasons for the shortfall was the failure of Emirates 
General Petroleum Corporationv the federal bcrly set up after the 
disturbances of 1979 to monopolize the distribution of petrol 
products in place of the foreign canpanies v to pay its outstanding 
bills to Amoco for its own supplies of SajaCa gaso EGPC was by far 
the largest customer for the gas and its failure to pay Amoco meant 
that Amoco could not pay its royalties and taxes to the Government of 
Sharjaho EGPC' s stance plus Sharjah' s failure to contribute to the 
Federal budget exacerbated already-strained relations with Abu Dhabio 
Relations between Dubai and Sharjah, by contrast, improved further 
with the doubling of Dubai's purchases of Saja~a gas to $70m-worth a 
year from 1 98655 o This second disappointment for Sharj ah thus had 
the effect of reshuffling the three-cornered relationship between the 
three largest Emirates that had stood since the Federation's earliest 
days, and so led to the severest test yet of the Federation in 1987 o 
As developnent spending was cut back throughout the Federation, 
current expenditure was also subj~cted to what was called 
"rationalization"o The building of new low-cost housing was 
suspended by a cabinet decree in 198256 't5 and recruitrnent to new. 
positions in the civil service was virtually frozeno School 
admissions and grants were restricted and the subsidy on petrol 
reducedo Revenue-raising innovations were introduced such as charges 
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for previously-free health services. Delays arose in Government 
payments to contractors and suppliersu who were in turn unable to 
repay bank loans; 
in paying salaries. 
and during part of 1984 the Government was late 
The effects were felt most immediately by the contracting industry, 
the country's largest employer. For suppliers, the value of imports 
through Dubai declined for the first time in recent history in 1982, 
reaching only Dhs18.9bn ($5.146bn) compared with Dhs19.7bn 
($5.364bn) in 1981. 
($5.336bn) in Dubai57 
In 1983 imports climbed back to Dhs19.6bn 
but still registered their first decline in 
the Federation as a whole, to Dhs33bn ($8e9bn) compared with Dhs34bn 
( $9. 2bn) in 198258 • Abu Dhabi 1 s imports were cut by half betv1een 
1982 and 1984, from Dhs12.70bn ($3.458bn) to Dhs6.092bn ($1.659bn), 
and fell as a proportion of the whole Federation's imports from a 
high of 37 per cent in 1982 to 24 per cent in the first half of 
198459 0 
Merchants \vho \vere saddled with large loans from canmercial banks 
taken out to finance this depressed area of activity reacted by 
turning to ·the Government for a solution, not least because the 
Government 1 s failure to pay its debts was one of the causes of their 
cash-flow problems. Debt burdens were especially heavy for those 
local entrepreneurs who had made the move from importing and re-
tailing into industry. During 1 984 Dubai Chamber of Canmerce 1 s · 
journal ran a series of investigations into the plight of local 
factories and found that many of them were producing at only a 
fraction of their rated capacity and incurring large losses. 
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The Chamber's Industrial canmittee sent a memorandum to the Ministry 
of Finance and Industry drawing attention to the gravity of the 
situation but received no reply60 a 
Parallels were being drawn with the 1980 rescue of property loansv 
when the state took over and refinanced cormnercial banks' property 
loans to the private sector (see Chapter Five) o In November 1983, 
the Federation ,of Chambers of Conmerce arranged a meeting with the 
Central Bank and the Local Bankers' Association to try to find a way 
of rescheduling the private sector's debts or easing the burden of 
interest dueo 
A Memorandum by the Hinistry of Economy and Trade was presented to 
the Cabinet in the spring of 1984 setting out the major causes of the 
recession and some proposed . cures o In response v the cabinet set up 
a study canmittee to be chaired by Finance Hinister Shaikh Hamdan ibn 
Rashido The committee met infrequently and without result but 
prompted four more Memoranda prepared by the Federation of Chambers 
of Carmerce, the Local l3ankers' Association, the Emirates 
Industrial· Bank and the Secretariat of the Council of 
L•1unicipali ties o These five papers bear quoting in sane detail for 
the light they shed on the UoAoEo merchants' own diagnosis of the 
economy's ills and on their apportioning of the blame, which has 
both econanic and political significance o 
First, the :·linistry of Economy and Trade's Hemorandum contended that 
G~e current recession differed essentially from ti1e 1977 round in 
that the Governrnent could not lead the way out of it this t:L11e by 
massive new spendingo Out of the imnediate danestic causes, the 
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~tinistry puts at D~e top of the list the 50 per cent drop in oil 
revenues accruing to the Federal Treasury since 1980 as a result of 
the glut of supply and the fifteen per cent cut imposed by OPEX:: in 
the marker price of crude. In turn, the sharp 41 per cent fall in 
public spending from Dhs6.4bn ($1.74bn) in the third quarter of 1982 
to Dhs3.8bn ($1.035bn) in the third quarter of 1983 had gravely 
affected the private sector, for which the public spending was the 
principal engineo Personnel reductions by Government and quasi-
governmental bodies and the large oil companies had seriously 
depressed consumer spending. 
External contributing factors were listed as the world~wide 
depressionv the Iran-Iraq war, and the crash of the Suq al-£.1anakh 
stock market in Kuwait, which had wiped out substantial amounts of 
liquidity in the the U.A.Eo - an amount put at Dhs400m - 600m by 
other sources 61 • 
Finally, the position was aggravated by the fact that many 
corrmercial companies were still owned by foreigners who, the 
Ministry claimed, remitted most of the profits they made in the 
U.A.E. to their headquarters overseas, and by the related fact that 
most foreign employees similarly remitted most of their earnings to 
their home countries. 
Govern~ent action on the problem of accumulating interest repa~nents 
on the rnerchants' borrowings, meaning in effect a rescue, was 
urged as a short-term solution62 • 
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In the second paper subnitted to the canmittee 0 the Federation of 
Chambers of Corrnnerce and Industry endorsed the i•linistry 1 s diagnosis 
that public spending cuts due to the oil glut were one of the prime 
causes of the recession and agreed too that the re~ttance of profits 
and earnings by foreign companies and e~ployees was a drain on the 
economyo The Chambers 6 however, went further and criticized the 
Government explicitly: it had failed to issue the budget on time 0 
or even in the first half of the financial year; it was not paying 
its debts to the private sector and was failing to enforce commercial 
legislation with the result 6 for example, that some supposedly 
nationalized commercial agencies were still effectively in foreign 
handso Since this memorandum was written after the June 1 984 Supreme 
Council meeting (see belO'o'l) , the Chambers were able to tone down 
their criticisms by grateful references to the Supreme Council's 
decision to repay Dhs2bn owed to the private sector and to devote 50 
per cent of each Emirate 1 s own revenue to the Federal budget 
hencefortho 
This second Memorandum laid more of the blame for the econany's dire 
straits on foreigners than the firsto Foreign partners in local 
ventures and foreign businessmen sponsored by local nationals were 
guilty of fleeing the country and leaving behind huge debts, the 
Chambers protestedo Representative offices of foreign cCA-npanies were 
not observing the restrictions on ~,eir activities laid down by law 
and were engaging in substantive activities direct, thereby 
undercutting their local agents and posing unfair oompetitiono 
Under 1 ying the whole problem, however, according to the Chambers, 
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was the fact that there were far more companies in the U.A.E. than 
the size of the market-place could support, and this had generated 
unsustainable cut-throat competition bet·.veen themo This state of 
affairs was blamed on irresponsible licensing, and the Memorandum's 
first recommendation was for licensing to be placed on a more 
rational and realistic basis. 
other measures urged by the Federation of Chambers were restrictions 
on the remittance on profits and earnings overseas and the 
introduction of exit visas to stop foreigners with alleged debts to 
locals from leaving the country without the written per.nission of 
tl1eir local sponsors. Commercial legislation on the ownership of 
companies should be enforced. 
The Ernira tes Industrial Ban.~ prepared for Shaikh Hamdan's ca1'111li ttee 
its ovm list of tl1e problems facing the economy and its suggestions 
for solving them. The first of the Bank's complaints was the 
non-implementation of the 1979 Industries Law, which would have 
centralized the licensing of ne\'1 industrial projects. OE!cause 
licensing had in practice remained in the hands of each Emirate's 
local au~~orities, too many copycat projects had been built, 
causing over-production. Dumping by foreign competitors on the 
U.A.E. market was also alleged. 
The BanJ( therefore called for the 1979 law to be applied in full, · 
for ~rotective customs tariffs to be levied on imported products 
competing with local output, and for Goverrunent incentives to 
0 d t 0 1' t 1 .. 1 0 • • • 63 1n us r1a 1s s, p us ou1er m1nor suggesc1ons 
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The Local Bankers' Association concurred 'dith all the points made in 
the f.linistry of Economy and ·rrade 0 s original i·1ernorandum but raised 
its own particular anxieties in its presentation to the committeea 
Specificallyv litigation between banks and their clients over unpaid 
debts and interest should be heard in future by special courtsv 
whose first duty would be to enforce the agreement originally signed 
between the two parties - in other words to stop clients frQ~ citing 
religion as an excuse for not repayingv as was starting to happen 
(see below) " 
Here, the Local Bankers' Association launched a strong protest 
against a measure which the Central Bank had taken in 1932 to ban 
locally-o\med banks fran lending large proportions of their capital 
to their own directorsa The step had been taken to refonn bad 
ban.!{ing practices on the part of the family-owned banks, but had 
caused t..'1ose banks considerable difficulty (see below) • It should 
be repealed or at least modified, this i-1emorandum deaanded, as 
inappropriate to a family-orientated society. like the U.A.E. 64 • 
Lastly, the submission of the Secretariat-General of the U.A.E. 
Council of Hunici;Jali ties is worth quoting as a slllrunary of the 
others. It bla~ed the recession on the country's failure to 
diversify the econany away from reliance on a single ra·.-~ material, 
oil, and on the GoverTh~ent's long delays in agreeing on the budget 
in the previous two financial years. In the long term, in the view 
of the Hunicipalities, a central planning organization was required 
with effective powers, plus a policy to determine the future size of 
ti1e population65 " 
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Nothing came of the cornmi ttee to which all these papers \·Jere 
presented except the observation that the market for ~Iemoranda \·las in 
the same state as the market for practically everything else -
gluttect66 • They are interesting for the assumption which underlies 
them allv namely that the prosperity of the merchant class is the 
Government's responsibilityv and for the private sector's inability 
to take any of the blame for its shortsightedness upon itself. 
Either foreign scapegoats or the Government were to blame. 
In June 1984 the Supreme Council held a meeting and agreed yet again 
that in future each Emirate would hand over 50 per cent of its 
revenue from oil to the Federation - which had in theory b3en the 
case since the agreer:~ents of 1 980 which followed Shaikh Rashid's 
accepting the Premiership. '!'he arrangement gave rise to a projected 
1984 budget revenue of Dhs12.8bn ($3.485bn) which would have been 
slightly smaller than the previous year's estimated revenue but which 
\vas not achieved in practice. Expenditure was also scaled do•,m to 
Dhs 17.2bn (~4.69bn) but still created a third projected deficit of 
Dhs4.3bn (S1.107bn). The Supreme Colli~cil session also agreed that 
the Federal Govern11ent would eannark Dhs2bn for the urgent repayment 
of its debts to private-sector contractors and suppliers67 • At the 
turn of 1985, however, newspapers were still questioning \vhether 
all, if any, of that s~11 had in fact filtered through. 
As the Ga:' s Unified Econanic Agreement began to enter into effect,· 
its provisions faced local U.A.E business with even greater 
coupetition for a shrinking market. One of the first Articles of the 
Agreement to be implemented was that which abolished customs tariffs 
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in each member state on goods originating in a fellow me~r state or 
acquiring 40 per cent of their value-added within the GCC. Private-
sector industries were already suffering severely fran 
over-supply and competition from imports. Sane GCC member Governments 
subsidize their local industries more than others g moreover g with 
the result that industries in states less generous with incentives 
are less price-competitive68 • 
Complaints about the effects of the Agreement tended to be heard in 
conversation rather than seen in print. The GCC was sacrosanct and 
not one of the areas open to criticism in the local press. Its 
Secretary-General c A.tdulla Bishara visited the U.A.E in I•larch 1985 and 
held talks with the U.A.E. Chambers of Ccxnmerce at which the U.A.E. 's 
problems \vere however given an airing. The Chambers v1anted 
exemptions fran the free-trade rules where the protection of a local 
industry was absolutely necessary, and said L~at subsidies and 
incentives granted by GCC member governm~~ts should be standardized 
to eliminate price distortions and unfair competition69 • 
As the sixth swm1i t drew closer, concern about the Agrea~ent's 
unfairness began to be expressed more openly and it was expected that 
the issue •·:ould be dealt \vith at the summit level. In fact, L~e 
closing cailiTluniquc~ made no mention of any difficulties with the 
Agrear:1ent and said that a carunittee had been set up to \'lork out a 
schedule for bringing ;nore of its articles into effect. Other 
sources r2£X)rtet.i, however, that the carmi ttee' s rea.l purpose was to 
loosen the Agreernent to take account of the objections of many 
members and that one of L~e options which had been considered was 
cancelling it alt03ether70. 
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Consequences for 'l'he Danks 
During the years 1933 and 1984, the amount of money leaving the 
country began to give rise to popular alarm. In pc1rt, the flight of 
. capital was due to the purely financial circwnstance of the record 
interest rates then available on the u.s. dollar and the dollar's 
w1precedented strength, but in part also it was due to a growing 
realization that the econanies of the Gulf states, flooded vlith 
small companies but deficient in leyal controls and in planning, 
were not attractive economies in which to hold assets. 'fhe slwnp had 
led to numerous bankruptcies among the smaller companies and was 
later to lead to some spectacular collapses of big-name merchants, 
all of which meant bad debts for the banks ancJ a further decrease in 
the size of the irrunigrant work force. Political w1certainties 
exacerbated ti1e negative sentlinent, particularly after ti1e first 
serious incidents, the banbings which shook l~uwai t in December 1 983 
and for which a group of fundamentalist Iranian-sympathizinq Shic.i 
were later brought to trial. 
In i'l'ovember 1984 the Central Bank's half-yearly bulletin revealed 
that what was called "the exodus of capital", i.e. the surplus of 
foreign assets over foreign liabilities, had reached Dhs20bn 
($5.445bn) in the first six months of that year, or tvlice the volwne 
71 
of the same period of the previous year 'rhe statistic made 
headline news in the local press and brought into the open argwnents 
vlhich had been heard in private for sane time on the merits of 
introducing some fonn of exchange control, which would have been a 
radical departure from the free-market principles on which the 
econany was currently based. 
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The Central Bank had in fact already seen fit to enact disincentive 
measures as early as 1982 to discourage banks from placing their 
dirhams overseas to the detriment of local liquidity72 and had 
achieved some success both in keeping dirhams at hane, not in 
Bahrain's offshore banks, and in helping the dirham to compete in 
attractiveness with foreign currencies. The Bank now turned its 
attention to the more fundamental problem of the public's lack of 
confidence in the smaller local banks. 
To support and pranote t.~e locally-incorporated banks, the Central 
Bank announced in August 1982 that the nu1lber of branches that the 
foreign banks were to be allowed to operate in the U.A.E. was to be 
reduced to eight each and that branches in excess of that number were 
to be closed down by the end of December 1983. 
'l'he ne'.vS came as a bolt from the blue for the U.A.E. 's 29 foreign 
ronks and in particular to the ten \vho then had more than eight 
branches. The British Bank of the Middle East had 31 branches in the 
U.A.E. at that time; the l3a.nk of Credit and Commerce International 
28, Habib Bank and United Bank 19 each, Habib Bank Zurich 15, &lnl~ 
.3aderat Iran and t.~e Arab Bank 12 each, Chartered .dank and l.3ank. 
i-ielli Iran 11 each and Grindlays 10. Closing all those branches by 
decree brought about a striking change in the physiogno11y of U.A.£. 
ban.'dng. Uy the expi01 of the deadline all the closures had been put 
into effect and the U.A.E. entered 1984 with 29 foreign banks 1vith a 
total of 128 branches against 24 local ban.'<s \vit.h 156 73 • 
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Improving t.'1e image of the smaller local bank.s, on the other hand, 
was more difficult than closing down the foreign oneso For sn~e 
years t.'-le authority had been urging the smallest banks to merge wit.'-! 
each other into a group of 1 0 or so larger banks with larger deposit 
bases and smaller overheads o As the small banks were often owned by 
individual merchant families jealous of their identity and of the 
confidentiality of tl1eir business affairs, the call was not ta~en up 
voluntarily a 
It was because some of these banks were being treated as virtually 
"in-house banks" by such families and were granting loans on the 
basis of dubious information and forecasting that the Central ·Bank 
took, in 1982, its most controversial step to dateo Each bank was 
ordered to reduce its total lending to any one member of its Board of 
Directors to five per cent of its total capital-plus-reserves and to 
reduce its lendings to the whole Board to 25 per cent of capital plus 
reserves a Banks were given until the end of 1 983 to unwind their 
[X)Sitions and bring their lendings into line with the new 
lirnitations74 o 
;\ffected ba~~ ~xperienced considerable difficulty in complying and 
the dictum had to be relaxed twice by the Central Banko In November 
1932 exe:nptions were made for such directors' loans as •.vere covered 
by adequate collateral ill1d ~~arantees and in July 1983 ~~e definition 
of "capital" ·was rela:-cect75 0 
'i'\·10 prime causes of the recession, t.~e Iran-Iraq \·Tar and the \vorld 
oil glut, ra~ained of course outside the Central Ba~~·s control and 
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b,e fortunes of Salle banks continued to go fro.ll bad to WOrSeo 
Results for 1983 showed in many cases a marked drop in profitability 
from 1982o The realization gained ground that same banY~ 1 loan 
portfolios contained large percentages of loans which \'/ere now 
non-performing, doubtful or non-recoverableo 
In November 1983, the Central Bank and the Government of Dubai had 
to intervene to support The Union Bank of the r1iddle East, one of 
the largest locally-owned banks, which was chaired by flamboyant 
Dubai entrepreneur Hr Ca.bd. al-\·lahhab G:lladari e Ahmad al-Ta I ir, the 
t1 inister of State at the t-'linistry of Finance of Industry, was 
installed as Chair:nan in Hr Galadari 1 S place, some Dhs1 o4bn of local 
and Central government funds were pu11ped in, giving the Goverrunent 
of Dubai control of 73 per cent of the bank, and l'1r Galadari 1 s assets 
were placed in the hands of a canmittee of receivers76 0 
A year later at the end of 1984, Emirates National Bank became the 
d 1 1 bank t . . . t• - ~ t f d 77 secon oca o requ1re an 1n)ec 1on or ~vernmen un s o 
'l'his was provided in the form of a buy-out by Union Bank of the 
I-liddle Easto At the beginning of 1985, Dubai Bank, one of the 
oldest and most respected in the locally-incorporated sector, was 
placed under a goverrunent-approved managenent 73 committee and 
In Decem.b=>-r 1 93-4 and January 1935 the Central Bank issued b;o. 
circulars giving precise instructions on the classification of debts 
in banks' published accounts and on the disclosure of secret 
reserves and provision for bad debtso The measures were expected to 
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have the effect of preventing banks fran disguising their real 
position79 o Banks 0 1984 results were thus awaited with redoubled 
anxietyo ~·Jhen published, t..1.ey shov1ed steep drops in profitso 
In May 1985, after it had become "apparent to the UAE Central Bank 
that [their] financial condition ••••••• was such that immediate 
remedial action was necessary", the three Abu Dhabi based 
"Canrnercials", Federal Co"'Clffiercial Bank, Emirates Commercial Bank 
and Khaleej Commercial Bank (which had already been rescued once 
before) were merged into one organization with a capital of Dhs1 .2bn 
($326.8m) of which the Government of Abu Dhabi (not the Central Bank) 
subscribed Dhs690m or 60 per cent. The new merged institution'lost 
Dhs194rn ($52.9m) in 1985 and Dhs67o6m ($18.5m) in 198680• At 
the same time, the tiny Bank of the Arab Coast, based in Ras 
al-Khaimah where many co.llpanies had been founded with Kuwait 
shareholders and had thus been badly hit by the the Suq al-Hanakh 
crash, entered into talks with the First Gulf Ban.l< of c.Ajrnan but 
these faltered. ·rhus the mergers which the Central Bank had reen 
urging on the local banks for some years were brought about by 
necessity, not by persuasion. 
The Central Bank tried to curb the capital outflo•,.,r and bolster 
danestic liquidity in 1984 by floating a Dhs4bn Certificate of 
Deposit to be purchased by those strong banks that had large net 
foreign assets. Repatriating those assets and placing b1.e~ with tl1e 
Central ~~ in this way, it was argued, would provide the Central 
Bank wit..1. sufficient liquidity to enable it to on-lend funds at 
favourable rates to the small ~<s suffering a shortage 
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of liquidity o The bank.s pointed out that removing money from sound 
placements and channelling it to badly~managed banks was a classic 
example of throwing good money after bad, and would reward instead 
of correcting bad banl(ing practices o After the offered interest rate 
was made more attractivev however v the .aank succeeded in selling 
Dhs1o87bn-wor~1 ($509m) of these COs in 198531 0 
By now it was recognized that the central Government was not in a 
position to launch a general "rescue" of loans to commerce as it 
had rescued the property sector four years beforeo Authoritative 
speakers 1vere prophesying that ~1e recession \vould get worse before 
it got better and that the recovery, if and when it materialized, 
would not return the econany to the bciom days of the 1970s82 0 
~he Austerity Heasures and Daily Life 
For the man in street, the slump translated into either joblessness 
or fear of joblessnesso Rumours of the "tafnishat" (an .7\rabization 
of the English verb "to finish'' or make redundant) \vere a dominant 
feature of life in the UoAoEo fran 1983 onwardso They were fuelled 
by repeated reports that the budgets did not allow for the automatic 
filling of existing vacancies and allmved of no ne\·T recruitment to 
ne\v posts; by ru;nours of bankruptcies in the priv.::tte sector, and by 
the visible evidence of an outflow of poi:Julation evidence 
substanti.::ttecl by airi:X)rt statistics ·.o,~hich ?<Jinted to thvusands more 
departures than arrivalso 
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The radical nature of the dernographic change now unden~ay ~vas 
highlighted by Hinistry of Planning statistics ~vhich shov1ed that in 
1982 t..~e growth rate of the inmigrant population, at 5.5 per cent, 
fell belm1 the growt.'1 rate of the indigenous population, which was 
7o6 per cent, 
being83 o 
for the first time since the Federation carne into 
Abu Dhabi's total population declined in absolute tenns in 1984 for 
the first time, dropping by 2.3 per cent from 520,700 the previous 
year to 509,000o Its annual rate of grovlth had previously dropped 
from an average of 16 per cent during 1975 - 1980 to an average of 4 
per cent during 1980 - 1933. As the size of the local population 
had grown by four per cent, t..~e drop in the overall figure \vas due 
entirely to an outflow of expa.triate labour, the Euirate 1 s Planning 
Department reported, adding that as a result the proportion of 
U.A.E. nationals &-:'ong Abu Dhabi's inhabitants had improved from 22 
per cent in 1983 to 8Ll 23.4 per cent in 1984 ·0 The total Abu Dhabi 
•tiorkforce fell fran 309,900 in 1983 to 299, 400; the foreign 
Horkforce fell by 1.1 per cent in 1983 and a further 4o 1 per cent in 
1984, though foreigners still represented 92 o 4 per cent of t..'le total 
as against the 7. 6 per cent of the Horkiorce who •.·Jere local 
t . 1 85 na 1ona s o 
1bge~~er, these facts and these sentiments de?ressed conswner s~les 
dramatically, causing further damage to cor:1pany profits and thus a. 
vicious circle. 
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On top of the burden of job insecurity, large sections of the 
population were no'iV faced with ne•.'l additional living e..xpenseso From 
1982 the admission of most new expatriate children to the first 
stages of free, state education was discontinuedo ~cpatriates 
even expatriate teachers at state schools - were thrown on the mercy 
of the fee-paying sectoro Subsequently, some education area 
authorities opened afternoon classes within state schools to cater 
for the children affected at a reduced feeo University education 
abroad at state expense was restricted mostly to UoAoEo nationals and 
controls on the length of studies were tightenedo 
From 1984, all expatriates had to pay a no11inal fee for health ·care 
at hospitalso During the year, a health insurance card was offered 
to the public; those failing to purchase it were to pay for all 
medical care from 1st February 1985 o The card was free to U .A. E. 
nationals and cost only a nominal Dhs10 for e..xpatriates employed by 
the State, but was to cost foreigners employed in the private sector 
a not inconsiderable Dhs250 ($68). In theory, e.11ployers were 
obliged by the 1 980 Labour Law to pay the Dhs250 for each employee, 
but it was acknowledged to be unrealistic to force them to do so at a 
time of severe recession. 
'l'rea bnen t abroo.d, for cases with vthich the U.2\.E. Has not equipp..;..-.ci 
to deal, ceased to an automatic right e..~cept for U.ri.B. nationals: 
soon, the neivspapers were full of heartrending appeals for money to. 
save sic:{ Palestinian and other children who needed urgent treat~nt 
abroad. S<X:m after they started to appear, a,."1l.lally, the Hinistry of 
Infonnation asked the papers to stop highlighting such sob stories. 
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Though both of these cost-cutting exercises 'tlere greeted with 
dejection by the majority L~grant populationv the single factor 
that contributed most to the general feeling of insecurity dogging 
the population at this time was the so-called 11six-month rule" o 
Enacted wit."l uncharacteristic suddenness in February 1983, this 
amendment to immigration procedures banned any expatriate who left 
his job for any reason from applying to return until he had spent a 
minimum of six months outside the UaAaEa Its practical effect was to 
· discourage any employee from leaving a job even if the employer took 
advantage of the situation to reduce Hages and benefitso It became 
routine for enployers to do so legally by sacking workers and 
re-hiring them under new contracts at lo\ver salarieso ~·lorkers 
accepted such new terms, since the alternative \vas to be 
"tafnished"86 a 
Initially, the "six-month rule" was vlell-received by the large 
anti-immigration lobby and deplored by the merchants, ·only too a\vare 
of its effects on sales, but within a few n~nths its unpopularity 
had spread beyond the merchant stratura as the dichotomy of moden1 
life for the UaAaEa became inesca9<ilile: the econo:nic and social 
standard of living of the influential classes \'las achievable only 
through the presence in large numbers of the iJ1li1ligrants they 
despised a 
The Abu Dhabi National O:msultative Assembly fonnally demanded that. 
the measure be abrogated and rurnours arose on several occasions that 
it \vas to be rescinded a No concessions '(/ere made, however, until t."le 
Supreme Council meeting of June 1984, and even then only a fe'vl 
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narrow groups Here exe.rnptedo After the severe economic reverses to 
come, ha11ever, liberalizing ~~igration became inescapable, and 
during 1986 the job-transfer restrictions \vere relaxec187 o In 1987 
a nev; concession \'laS granted by which transit and visit visa::.: could 
be converted into work pennits88 , so that the trend re~resented by 
the six-month rule was not only neutralized but reversed, and the 
system was n~v more liberal than the pre-1983 oneo 
UoAoEo nationals themselves were not totally insulated from the 
"rationalization rneasures"o 'rhe Hinistry of Social Affairs and 
Labour had to reduce spending on its programmes for the aged and for 
the handicapped and on its social develofment centres for local . 
Social security payments were not cut, but the Hinistrt 
tightened up its checks on applicai'lts during 1984 and at the end of 
that year vias instructed by the I:linistry of Finance to suspend 
p:1yments to l:x=neficiaries Vlho failed to prcx:iuce a UoAoEo passport or 
identity cardo Some 1,500 beneficiaries had their social security 
stopped as a result, most of them elderly90 o i,linistry of Health 
hospitals and clinics were hit by the freeze on new appoint;nents and 
ne\vly-built facilities >·;ere unable to open91 o 
The severance of the social security pu~nents dominated the 
grievances t~<en up by th 92 . t ti 1' t 1 . 1 "eel t' e press ou 1e ~s a so ~nc ua.... ne 
!1ealth service charges, the moratorium on ne'.v jobs in the civil 
service and disru:_Jtion to essential services such as ·,.,.ater and 
.electricity, both of \vhich utilities l:x=carne a sore subject after ~,e 
rainless winters of the early 1980s93 0 
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LeadershiP Fonnd ~'lantinq 
Hhile at hane the recession cut deeper into living standards and 
while the shipping lifeline was threatened by t11e 11 tanker 'llar" in D~e 
Gulf, the Supreme Conncil of the UoAoEo met b1ice in 1982g not at 
all in 1983 and only once in each of 1934, 1985 and 1986o Its 
absence was criticized by al-Khaleej as canponnding the nation's 
proble.11S94 and even the self-censoring al-Ittihad used the word 
"paralysis" again to describe the state of the Govern~ent95 o In 
short, the conditions of 1979, the conditions of paralysis which 
had impelled the Young Turks into the vacuum, had resurfacedo 
This time aronnd, the vacuum arose not from a specific quarrel 
between Abu Dhabi and Dubai but from the insoluble problem of Shaikh 
Rashid's incapacity a February 1 982 \lias the last time the 
Vice-?resident was seen in public on his feet, when he inspected L~e 
inland territory of Hatta after heavy rainso In 1-Jay of that year, 
when he inspected L~e newly-discovered Hargham oilfield, no pictures 
of him Here ShO\ID in the media COVerage of the event despite its 
Brief gli.'Tipses of t11e Ruler seated im:nobile in the ba.ck 
of a car Here offered in Jnne Hhen he opened a traffic nnderpass, 
but thereafter he tCXJk pa.rt in no public cccusions and was never 
photo.;raphed outside his hor..e or special vehicle and only very rarely 
inside them, as for e.'<ill:1ple when very occasionally he received 
official callerso 
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It may be necessary to point o~t that the 09tion of sL~ply replacing 
Shaikh Rashid with a new Pr~~e i·'linister was not available to the 
To any traditional Arab society, the idea of stripping a 
tribal elder of an honorarium for purely practical reasons is 
inconceivable. It is slightly harder to explain, at least to anyone 
\oJho has not lived in the Gulf, why the fiction had to be maintained 
that the Ruler was perfectly fit and still carrying out his duties. 
There was a characteristic fear of ju~ping the gun in operation here 
but also that rather desperate Panglossianisrn that shied a1.vay fro11 
nettle-grasping. 
The substa~ce of politics in Dubai in these years was the demarcation 
of po>rer between the bvo most prominent of Shaikh Rashid' s four 
sons, Shaikh Haktum ion Rashid, the eldest, and Shaikh Huharru"nad 
ibn Eashid. Shaikh 1··Iaktum had 0een designated Crown Prince in the 
1960s and Shaikh ~-1uha.rni:la.d, t..,e third son in order of age, had JJea,_n 
i?ederal l·linister of Defence since Federation '.vas created. 
Shaikh £·iaktu'11 ibn Rashid had the image of a quietly-sf:X)ken, cerebral 
person, nationalistic, co-r1mitted to the the Fejeration, close to 
Shaikh Zayid and with a .!,X)\ver rose among your1g men of simil::tr 
leanings. i\mong his mm tJ80ple he Has knmm for his generosity and 
ivas once descrii:ed as a sort of lender of last resort. Shaikh 
:·Iaktum' s ·..,.ife was a dau9hter of the progressive side 
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of the r.Jaktum far:Uly Y her mother being the celebrated Shaikha Sancag 
herself the daughter of the leader of the Deira refomists in the 
1930s. 
against 
spirited 
i'·lakturn 1 s 
Shaikha San 6 a :.·as famous for having continued the struggle 
Shaik.'1 Rashid after he re-took Deirap and ramined u. 
and active lady into old age. Her son Shaikh •"larFay Shaikh 
brother-in-law Y had a power-base among the same eleme.'1ts of 
the younger population as Shaikh Haktum. 
Shaikh duhammad ibn Rashid had a rather higher profile. In his 
younr;er soldiering days he appeared as often as not in his army 
unifonn and clearly enjoyed his military image. At the beginning of 
ti1e 19d0s his father gave hi.'TI control of the all-important I.:lepartmcnt 
of Ruler's Affairs and Petrolewn which had previously been chaired by 
i·lahdi al-'.i.'aj ir. Shaikh Huhamnad is better known than his elder 
brother to the world outside, though b~is fact is not of relevance 
internally. He is married to a daughter of his father Shaikh 
Rashid's sister. 
Give.n but both of these blO different personalities plus their 
middle brother Shaikh Hamdan ibn .i0shid, Hho directed mw1icipal 
affairs, had to be satisfied before any major decision could be put 
into eff8Ct in Dubai, it is easy to see ho'.v l.Jui:xli' s partici;,x1tion in 
decision-inaking at b'"le F0deral level was a delicat0 matter in these 
years, especially u.s finding the ~oney for t.:'1e ?ejeration v1as itself 
more fX!.inful than ever. 
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Dubai' s relations with neighbouring Sharjah also became tense again 
for a tir.:e after the discovery in 1980 of tl1e new SajaC.a oil field in 
the inland border area bet'lleen tl1e tr.vo Emirateso Force '.Ycls reported 
to have been threatened to remove the American oil canPt--my' s 
personnel from territory claimed by Dubaio Delicate talks over a 
long pericx:i led eventually to a closing of ranks however and by 1986 
Sharjah was supplying gas fuel from the same field to Dubai for $70m 
a yearo Thus Dubai's relations with Sharjah became mutually 
advantageous as Sharjill1's relations with Abu Dhabi deteriorated over 
the loan guarantee and the question of contributions to t~e Federal 
budge to 
'l'wo Supreme Council meetings took place in 1982o The first was 
believed to have been concerned primarily with regional issues and an 
initiative of Shaikh Zayid' s on the Gulf war and the split betr.veen 
Syria and 
d ta 'l 96 e 1 s o 
Iraq, but the uninformative communique gave no 
At the second session, in December, the Rulers turned 
their attention bac."l( to t.l-te danestic econany and decided to eannark 
Dhs1 OOm for ne1·1 graduates, to waive unpaid bills for far.ners and 
fishemen and to return · the stalled Companies La1.,, vlhich made the 
r.Bjority local O\-mers!1i9 of busin•3sses obligatory, to t.'1e Council of 
ivlinisters for further considerationo It remained stalled97 0 
do Supreme Council meetings took place in 1 983 0 Shaikh Zayid did 
however chair t'.-10 consecutive wee..'dy cabinet meetings in August that. 
; 
year, '.'lhen the long-:12layed ?ederal i3udget 'i·las being debated, and 
was rumoured to have e.'q)ressed anger at the burden Hhich Abu Dhabi 
was being expected to shoulder as a result of the revenue shortfallo 
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No more Supreme Council sessions Here held until June 1984, \vhen in 
resp:mse to pleas by G~e merchants slight relaxations to the 
"six-month rule" were approved and the Federal Government pranisecl 
to repay Dhs2bn of its debts to the private sector98 • Only t\vo 
further sessions were held before the Constitution expired again at 
the end of 1986, making a total of five meetings in the five years 
from ~1e end of 1981 to ~~e end of 1986. 
The New Vacuum and The ;~ew Young Turks 
Did the Young 'l'urks step into the vacuum again? In considering ~'"lat 
question, it must be borne in mind that a conspicuous chan:re had 
overtaken t.~Le whole political arena since their earlier heyday in 
1979. Five years later, the largely secular and Western-sounding 
nature of their dernands - a per;nanent constitution, the separation 
of powers, etc., see~ed eiG~er out-of-date or actively 
incompatible \vith the neH spirit of religious fervour gripping the 
Gulf. The lL-nelight no•:~ belonged to those \·lho de:nanded hajab for 
wanen, Shari c a laws and an end to non-religious holidays and to 
frivolous tYI:JeS of entertainment. 
In Xu-.·lai t for exam;?le, Hhen elections '.vere restored in 1901, 
religious fu.r1da;nentalists had secured a hold on the new parliarnent at 
the e:<:_oe.nsc oi the nationalist tendency. Their nu'11i::.3rs '."/ere s:nall 
out th<:dr voice Has not to be i:f!1ored. One of their pri:ne grols was 
to change the designation of the Isla-nic Shari c. a in Kuuait's 
constitution fror.1 "a principal source of legislation" to "t,'te 
source of legislation''. 
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Arab Nationalism and Islillnic Fundamentalism 
The Young Turks had little to offer this new generation of 
ma.lcontentso Indeed, beyond a ccmnon addiction to v1allm·1ing in verbal 
abuse of America99 , the t-~Jo tendencies regarded each other with 
horroro 'fhe fundamentalists tended to see the bourgeois refonnists 
as .t-1ercedes-dri ving capitalists of Hesternized vJays and lax religious 
observance 6 lackeys of shaikhly masters, while e1e Young Turks for 
their part had an image of the fundamentalists as wild men, like the 
gang of fanatics which al-Khaleej said vias terrorizing the Civil 
Service and controllinq promotion boards, a gang so fanatical that 
it had declared even toothpaste unislamic 1 00 o AOOve all, the t'.-10 
tendencies were irreconcilably adversarial on the subject of Arab 
nationalismo 
Throughout the early 1930s, the pan-Arab nationalism of Nasser's 
secular type, which had inspired the graduates of the previous two 
generations, was in retreat 101 though not without many 
devotees still102 o ·rhe ill-feeling between the two movements is 
rehearsed in a series of typical editorials in al-l~leej at the 
beginning of 1935 in Hhich al-Khaleej railed bitterly against a 
number of Imams wno had preached Friday ser..nons branding Arab 
nationalism as inimical to Isla.IL1o '!'hose who waged war on nationalism 
in the name of Islam had t•.visted t.:1e meaning of the v.uran, t..'1e paper 
accusedo 'l'he word "urrma" in the Quran meant any group distinguished. 
from ot.'1ers by com: non characteristics; thus al-Um:1a al-Islt:!.mivva 
"had alv~ays been and \vould continue to be distinguished from others 
by !·1uslims' religious adherence to Islam" whilst 
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al-Umma al- ~arabi~;a was distinguished frc~ other nationalities by 
its Arabness 0 The two were not in conflict with each other o 
"The great majority of Arabs have always been and Hill re.rnain 
part of the Umma Islami ~a to ~'v'hich all 21uslims on earth belong 
regardless o~d1eir nationality, colour or language or 
motherland or state or fatherlaTJ.dp and none of t..'1ern has 
precedence over the other except by virtue of strength of faitho 
11According to the use of 11Umma" in the Quran itself, all Arabs 
belong to one Umrna carabiyva distinguished fro11 other peoples 
and nations by their unity of language, territory P descent, 
customs and traditions and communal life and their perceived 
desire for that communal lifeoooooooooooo 
11Thus, religious allegiance is one d1ing and national 
allegiance is another and it is not necessary that the t·.vo 
should be in conflict; not every1031igion has a territo~J and not ever-] territory has a religiono 11 
These Imams see11ed to be preaching according to a pre-arranged plan, 
al-Khaleej warned, asking whether they constituted an illegal party 
bent on stirring up sectarianism and \vho their masters >vere 1 04 • 
Even the legitimacy of the struggle for Palestine - where a secular 
state Has the traditional goal - was questioned by a young student on 
Islamic grounds, the ult~-nate act of sacrilege not only to 
al-Khaleej's constituency but also to the widest spectru11 of the 
. 1' 105 pun 1c o 
At the end of the day, the distance bet•.veen the shaikhs and the 
refor:ning youngsters of the 1970s was rather less than the distance 
l::oth of former on the one hand and t..'1e net.'v' 
fundamentalists on the other. 
Pressure fran conservative dusl~-n opinion had of course long beBI1 one 
of the main inputs into the political process. In 1977 Shaikh Zayid 
brought in the former Chief Justice of Libya to review the U • .A.Eo 1 S 
existing laws for their compatibility or othen·1ise Hith the Sharica 
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and to draft a penal code 1 06 0 Occasional public floggings took 
place in al- 0 Ain and later in the decade a fc\·1 took place in the 
capital as welL A draft la':l prohibiting alcohol \vas drm-m up but 
not enactedo Other social phenanena perceived by the older u 
conservative elernent to be on the increase in the late 1970s because 
of the influx of foreigners included drug abuse, marriage 't~ith. 
foreign wan en and unsea~ly spectacles in the hotels and on 
televisiono Pressure from these mostly tribal sources, often 
expressed ~1rough the Abu Dhabi Consultative Council, was not 
however in any way subversive of the system of ruleo 
The new, post-Iranian revolution brand of Islamic fundamentalism, 
in the UoAoEo 1 S case, seemed to affect most deeply the first home-
gro\m graduates fran al- CAin University, where, the Your1g Turks 
claimed, it was actively fostered by the nev1 Education i·tinster who 
had replace<.:i c. 1\l.:rlullah Tariarn in Shaikh Rashid • s ne\v cabineto tlany 
controversies arose in the girls' hall of residence in particular: 
was it proper for i11uslim girls to use the telephone·? If not, hm1 
were they to keep in touch \vith their parents in distant Emirates? 
\·las it allowable for girls to go on field trips or even to the local 
sue;;:; to do their shopping? \vas the tradi tiona! kiss on both cheeJ~s 
not an overly demonstrative and ~1us unislumic way to greet returnin9 
friends of the same sex after the >veekend break? 
Since the fu:1darnentalists, Ul'llike the Young Turks, had no patrons. 
a11ong the ruling Shaik.~s, ~1cir d~~nds never became acceptable 
r:aterial for the mediao Docu.Llentary as opposej to anecdotal evidence 
of their activities is ~1erefore ~1ino One incident that did receive 
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attentionv albeit scanty, in t..'l.e Press was the di3missal by the ne'.·l 
Education Ainister in i·iay 1980 of six popular professors at the 
Universityv b-.ro fra-n the Deparbnent of Politics v t\vO fran Sociology 
and two frCA-n History o Four of them had doctorates from American 
universities and the other two from cairo University and the .:\rnerican 
University of cairoo 
All six canplained that no routine disciplinary procedures had been 
followed before their summary di~-nissalo All believed t..~t their 
downfall \'laS due to their refusal to toe the fundamentalist lineo 
Al-Azmena al-Arabiav the only journal to carry the story, quoted 
one as saying that at al-c:.Ain, "to speak the \-lord "Arab" o o o owas to 
blaspheme" o Another accused the University of wanting preachers, not 
teachers, and claimed to have been told that al-<=Ain 'ITas not an Arab 
Islamic university but purely an Islamic oneo 'l'he historians 
complained that archaeology had been struck out of the history 
syllabus as "idolatrous" o Sane students agitated for tile pro£essor3 
to be reinstated and petitioned the Chancellorv but to no 
'1107 ava1 o 
Sa cid .SaL'llal"1, the neH :linister, went on to earn more hostility fro:n 
the traditional Arab nationalist school of refor:n for his alt2rations 
to the curriculum in the state schoolso UnJer his predecessors in 
t..'l.e latter 1970s, a wide review had bL~_n set in train of d1e 
curriculun the Uo.~oi::o had in.."lerited from the Kuwaiti system in force. 
before i::depende.'lce o duch foot1·1ork was done by local and Arab 
~cperts on formulating a new set of policy aims and d1e detailed 
syllabuses rec~ired to meet t..~e11o In 1980 the Rector of the 
University, Dr c atxi al-'"aziz al-Dassam, reported on this work and 
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his study for a new curricul~~ was adopted at a special educational 
conference the same year 1 03 0 
\</hen Sac.id Salman replaced c Abdullah 'l'ariam as ;·.linister howeve1.· P the 
new curriculum was referred to a ne\v canmittee \vhose chainnanp 
al-Khaleej alleged, was a 'trell-kno'i-m religious activist and the 
leader of a religious party in Jordan, one Ishaq Farhan109 0 The 
draft was soon set aside in favour of Salrnan as m-m guidelines o 
Salman's guidelines110 gave priority to the Islamic elernent in 
education and \·rere regarded as "distorted" by the nationalists, 
who criticised the Minster particularly for abolishing national 
history and society as subjects and for banning ~~e daily 
flag-saluting cerernony as "idolatrous"111 0 
Appointing Sacid Salman to replace the reformingcAbdullah Tariam was 
soon recoc;nized by b~e shai~,s as a pr~~e ~~nple of leaping out of 
the frying pan into the fire, and he was disiTiissecl in July 1983 
112 
along vrith the then l·tinister of Islamic .L\ffairs and i\wqaf o 
A second area in which fundamentalist activity can be discerned in 
docurncmtary evidence is in tile law courts. In 1 933 and 193L1, the 
Federal Supre.~e Court 'd<.!S asJ~ed three ti.."Jes to declare the i.;nposition 
of ~· . c: non-:;,nar1 a sentences for drin2dn~ alcohol to be 
unconstitutional, since d1e Constitution obliges judges to use the 
Shari a as their principle guide. In each case a lower court, one 
in Abu Dhabi, one in al-c..:un and one in Sharjah, had sentenced 
HuslinlS found guilty of drinking to short prison sentences only. 'l'he 
three public prosecutors had challenged the sentences and sought a 
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ruling that Abu Dhabi 1 s 1976 law and Sharjah 1 s 1972 law on the use of 
alcohol incompatible wit.'1 the Shari a and therefore 
In all ti1ree cases, the Supre:ne Court found that t.'1e Rulers, in 
t.'1eir tern!?Oral capacity, had t.'1e right to impose te.CJJ:X>ral 
punishments for the temporal aspects of drun'<.eness and that the two 
laws in question \·lere therefore not unconstitutional, but that the 
imposition of such a ternporal perJ.al ty did not preclude a prisoner 1 s 
subjection to the Shari a punishrnent as Hell113 o No further cases 
of this type have appeared in t.~e Official Gazetteo 
The only concrete hint of official concern over religious strife are 
to be gleaned fran a refer2nce to concern in ti1e ;.linistry of i\wqaf in 
Dutui over "e.xcessive extremism" among sane religious organizations 
whose conduct needed to be revie.-,..,ed, and frall tHo decrees by the 
i·linistry. 'l'he first, in 1936, asJ~ed preachers to steer clear of 
contention and the second, in January 1988, required them to 
deposit written, advance copies of ti1eir Friday sermons \·lit.'1 the 
i··iinistry and to avoid all areas of controversy and sectarian 
sensitivity, 
. 11 4 pract~ce • 
limiting their rerrarl~s to ~;uidance on Islamic 
It is of course im;JOssible for any i~uler to stand openly against an 
"Islamic" demand. To do so ·.·Jould be to alienate not only the ne\.,r 
militants but also t.i1e traditional f.iusli.m constituency as · . .;elL ;Jhe.."l. 
anob1.er neu .E'.ducation i·1inister tried to eXJ,)unge Sacid Salman 1 s in-
novations fro.11 the school curriculU!:l in 1987, for 
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exam ole 
" v he lirmediately ~~e up against ~~e tribal representatives 
on Abu Dhabi us l'Tational Consultative CounciL Beforev during and 
after t.~e upsurge of the ne>v'-wave militancy v t..~e l'-ICC has callpaigned 
against allegedly unislamic practices in the schools such as the 
failure of sa-ne wanen teachers to wear full haiab, visits by male 
inspectors to girls' schools, insufficient emphasis (in the ~-JO:::'s 
eyes) on religious education c:mdv its particular bugbear v the 
teaching of music and physical education to girls115 o \·lanen 
teachers in the Abu Dhabi educational zone were subject to ferocious 
restrictions on their rnove'11e.r1t, 
their private conversation116 0 
their social contacts and even on 
·ro express its disapproval of the proposed changes to the curriculu11 
and the dangers of secularism (or to try to "turn G'"le clock bJ.d~11 
as al-Khaleej saw it), the NC.'C held a meeting 'dith the neVT ~-tinister 
in darch 19o7 but did not v;in any . 117 concess1ons A public 
exchange 
11 a ground o 
of letters followed but again the .:-·linister held his 
H.eligious extrernism in the schools had by nm1 become 
so ''negative'' that children's personalities and intelligenc2 were 
being ti·listed, the Minster said in W1USually stron; language in a 
media culture renovmed for its obliquity 119 The fundarnen talists 0 
Here freely calling ~~eir opponents, including the Uinister, 
11 infiC.els11120 o 
A new statement of educational objectives drawn up to supersede .Sa'-id 
~ 1. I • . t . ' ir -t 1 ' t' 121 
...,a.w-nan s an::1. 1ncor;:ora e.J. 1n a new c. ar a'.-1 on er.J.uca 1on co:nes 
doi·m fir:nly on the side of the acquisition by the students of modern 
skills in the mooern environment and seeks to promote a national as 
well as an Islillnic allegiance122
0 
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The :leH ~~ational Asse:nbly 
'l'he first nevl i\lational 1\ssernbly or F oNoCo after t.~e Constitutional 
extension of 1931 began life as a lower-key operation than its 
predecessor had been in Tariarn' s day o Its 1 982/3 session was opened 
a month late, in Dec2rnber instead of r·loverrmr 1 932, and all 
subsequent sessions ·.vere opened late except for t.~e 1986/7 session, 
\•lhich was never opened at a11123 • 
It '.vas not long, though, before t.~e same old issues resurfacedo In 
its rne:nl::ers 1 own eyes tl1e 1 932/3 session was mar:\.ed by the 
Government 1 s indifference to it and failure to attend 124 o 'I'he ·ne.'{t 
session in 1983/4 sa'.v the return of many of the Young 'I'urks 1 
specific favourites: t·1hy did the Govern11ent insist on pa.ssing la1·1s 
when the F .l'l.Co was not in session, even vlhen the laws ivere not 
urc~ent? '.'lere Abu Dhabi and Dubai really payir.g to the Federal 
treasury t.l'1e 50 per cent of t.~eir oil incomes they had can.-ni tted to 
l. t . 11 ?125 verro y. 
i{ather less confidently, the ~'\sser:lbly inched to\·lards a no-go area by 
questioning the UI1touc:1ed alloc:<J.tions to defence and security in 
state . 12G SP2fldlng • .i\bu Dhabi , and lat~r tne U.A.s, had long iJeen 
re:nark3.ble among the Gulf states for sr;x=nding a ver;~ high ?3rcentaq2 
of its revenues on la;-1 and orc1e1.·: oy 1 '970, this heading absorbed 42 
.. -. t 127 per cenl.. oi current ex~nCll ure " In the boo:7l years after the 
oil price rises, defence and security expenditure soared like all 
the other budgetary headingso i3ut in the years of the cut-backs for 
the other categories of spending in the 1980s,. defence and security 
continued to ~~do In 1985 and 1986, defence and the Hinistry of 
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the Interior~ lu.rnj;)ed toget.~er in the budget breakdo\m with the 
dinistrt oi Justice P took 60.4 a11d 60 o 2 per cent respectively of all 
current expenditure and in 1937 the figure for defence and the 
interior~ without Justice, '.-las 52 per cent 128 0 
It is unremarkable in any society that defence spending should be 
unj_X)pular at a time of spending cut-bac)<S in other spheres but the 
debate is significant for e1e fact that defence is one of t.~e areas 
. of decision-making that is strictly the preserve of the ruling 
families is not yet open to j_X)pular comment. 
The original draft of d1e traditional reply to t.~e Presid~1t's 
opening Sl)eech at this 1983/4 session \VciS throvm out by members for 
being ~{Cessively sycophantic and failing to address the internal 
issues of the econanic slurnp, internal security and the 
inter-l:Jnirate border disput2s ·.·lhich had resurfaced with t.~e ne'.-1 round 
of oil e:qloration. ·rhese opening-speech replies had alHays been 
orgies of sycophancy; it was the iinpatience with the sycophancy that 
iVciS nei'l. (<lot agreed until the end of d1e session in June, the 
eventual version was severely critical of the J.X)litical and econanic 
state of the Federation. 
i\ccO!:.pcmying d1e text, moreover, was an unsoli::::i ted re,JOrt to the 
Su;Jreme Council fran t.~e Fa:I.Co 's econor:1ic ccmnittee proposing, on 
its o\'m initiative, a nu::tiJer of p:>ssible for::mlae for financing b'!e 
Fed t . 1?9 era 1.on - • These were:-
1. t.":at seven dollars from the selling price of each barrel of 
oil sold by every R:lirate should b2 handed over to th·2 
Federation. without any deductions for individual ciefen::::e or 
police expenditure; or, 
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2. that if the ~:lnirates chose, alternatively, to hand over to 
the ZeC.eration a full 50 per cent of their revenue fran oil they 
should be allo>·led to deduct a maxiJ!1Uln of 30 per cent of that 
figure for defence costs but no more; 
3. that l\bu Dhabi and Dubai should continue to pay for those 
facilities they Here currently financin;# 
4. that the 55 per cent of the budget currently spent on the 
Anned Forces VIas too high a proportion and should be reduced to 
no more than 30 per cent of the Bnirates 1 contributions to the 
budget. 
Tm·rcrrds the end of the session, a new initiative was taken when 
members formed a delegation to try to se~Jre a meeting on ~1ese 
issues vlith t.~e Head of State. It was noted rather daringly that 
Shai~·d1 Zayid had taken to spending long periods of time a\ia.Y in 
Horocco; the mission failed. 
In his opening sp:ech to ~1e next session in i.'lovernber 1 984, 
however, t.I-Ie President himself ordered that a joint committee be set 
up of cabinet Ivlinisters and National Assembly members including the 
Speaker to investigate t.~e state of the economy. 
Aiter meeting four times, this CO!Timittee drew up a retX)rt Hhich 1vas 
remarkable enough for its strong lansuage but \vas unique for the fact 
that it blc:uned the economy 1 s ills not on the routine scapegoats oi 
the oil glut or foreign conspiracies but on the Hulers. 
The root cause of the economy's ills '.·las diar;nosed as the paralysis 
of the 2aieral authorities due to the infrequency of the Supreme 
Council's meetings. Only the Supre.r:1e Council could reiTI<....-:>C1y the· 
situation by an act of ;>olitical will. 
In the short term, the joint ca;unittee culled for all the Emirates 
to contribute to the .Federal Budget and for the Budget to be 1 0 per 
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cent larger than actual requirements so G~t a state reserve could 0e 
consti tutecL No 2mirate should be allowed to appropriate to its own 
projects a Federal Hinistry's allocation; the Federal r:iinistries 
should be given real executive powers. New sources of state revenue 
should be createdp such as t~""G.tion. 'i'he state should l:JClY its debts 
to b1e private sector and L~plement the spending cuts gradually, not 
all at once. The "burden" of foreign aid should be reduced. 
In the longer tenn, the report called for b1o fundarnental changes in 
d1e U.A.E. 0 s economic philosophy. All commercial, industrial and 
other econo~c activity should be nationalized and a population 
policy should be adopted not only to deter.nine t.:~e future size of the 
country but also to increase G1e relative size of b1e local and 
expatriate Arab elements vlithin it 130• 
Despite having been cn11rnissioned by the Head of State hirnself, this 
report dropped out of sight for over a year ur1til Dece.rnber 1935 and 
U1en for ever. 
In Feb~J 1985 the 1~se~ly resolved to cease issuing resolutions. 
:~esolutions iud become "valueless", in the words of U1e Speaker, 
who \'/as d1ereby echoing his predecessor. ~·linisters ·.·rere fc.iliny to 
attend sessions and the joint F~'lC/cabinet canmittee on the state of 
tJ ha .... '1 - t t . . t . h '"''h 1 131 r"le econa.1y . a ral ec o ge app::)lntmen s vnt we Ru ers • 
?ebrJary 19J4 vr.:ts the fifth anniversary of t.:1.e Joint demorandum. 
Perhaps ratl1er surprisingly in the ne':l clir:nte, al-!illaleej mrke:l 
'-l • . • . • ". ' . 1 t132 w'1e occaslon \'fl·cn edlt:Orla canme.11 • After the bio Suprerne 
331 
G~oter Sb: 
Council r.1eetings of 1979 1 al-Kha.leej said 1 many citizens had been 
under ~~e impression that the Rulers were about to lead the U.A.E. 
into a nev.,r era: ~~ose citizens had been deceived. 
·.rhis and other articles borra,.;ed much fran the language of the old 
the still-disputed borders betv1een the Emirates were a 
legaC'J of colonialism and should be removed; the National Assembly 
should become a true legislature to bring about a proper separation 
of pov1ers; the gap betHeen the wealth of a fe'll Iinirates and the 
poverty of the rest v1as unacceptable and all natural resources should 
belong to the Federation, not to tne Emirates individually133 • 
:··lore of the same f.lemorandum language appeared in long inte...rviev1s with 
young local graduates 134 marking the U.A.:::::. 's 13th National Day in 
Oece;nber 1 984. l·lha.t was the point of providing education if the 
ed.ucated citizen Has still to be denied a say in the running of his 
country? ~~e political structure of the U.A.E. had failed totally to 
keep pace with ~~e social and econa:nic progress of recent tirnes; a 
referenduilt a Hord not often seen in the da:1estic context - was 
demanded on any neH constitution. 
·rite issue of a per::unei1t constitution \lus also revived by al-i:l1aleej 
at be l.)2<;inning or 19ci5 in a series of articles pointing out that 
the ne\'1 charter had in theory to ~ .?resenb2d to the .!.;-.:·r.c. by June 
1986, · six ::1ontils b2fore ~~e e;·:tended Provisional Constitution \·las due. 
• • - .j..; t' . .:] t. 135 co e:(:_Jlre :.:or ~..ne n1.ru 1.me • 
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The !.<.eturn of 'l'he i··Jationalists? ~..:;;...::..:~---
Ku>vait us elections in February 1985, its seccmd since th2 
re3titution of the ~,Iaj lis al-iJm'T'.a, •:Jere i·lidely regar:ied as a. 
surprise return to pov1er for the classical Arab t•Iationalist school 
and a reverse for b'1e religious fundarnentalists, Hho retained five 
seats but in ~1e persons of less vociferous IslaQic propagandistso 
The return of the nationalists Has symbolized by the re-election of 
Dr Ahmad al-I<hatib, the nationalist leader whose defeat in 1981 had 
equally sy;ni.Jolized the triurnph of the fundar:1entalistso 
By ~~e turn of 1985, sect-based violence ·.·ms ma..1dng an adverse 
irnpression in illOSt of the Gulf societies; some observers GJ."Plained 
the reversal of the .:{u' .. lai ti fundament.:1lists 1 fortunes by reference 
to the loss of 'domen' s and children's lives in the bombings of 1983 
and 1984 and the especially violent hijacking of b~e Kmvaiti 
aircraft "KazL:lia" in January 1935. 
Iran's Spring assault of 1985 dealt a fur~~er, decisive blow to any 
lingering adinira. tion Gulf intelligentsia night r~ve been 
harbourin'] for the revolutionarj regime a11d thus severed one of the 
few C.::li:.wn tirr~Js o£ ti1inking !::Jetiie8l1 the .first-generation, You.:1•:J 
'fur:~ discontents and tll2ir youn,:;er siblinc;s t.'1e fum:~-:1entalists. '1'he 
chan·~e o£ heart furtl1er narrm·1ed the distance beb1een tha refor.nists 
and their shaikhs but at tl1e sa;ne ti:ne it burdened the Gulf shai:~hs 
·.vith a natiomlist duty towar::'is Iraq at be v2ry time '.vilen t:1e most 
immediate threats \vere caning fran Irano 
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As al-Khaleej's turning-)_X)int editorial expressed it:-
"OUr sy.npathy with tJ1e Iranian nation, fraa the moment they 
were able to get rid of t..~e Shah us spectre, was based on an 
objectivity Hhich respected our joint convictions, primarily 
our cetermination to stifle international intervention and stCL~d 
up to L~perialism's undisguised ambitionso ·rhey are convictior~ 
to •Nhich 1ve adhere fran our hll'nane Arab nationalist stand-pointe 
"But the dice fell the other \·lay, and the limited l:::order dispute 
turned into an armed conflict and then an all-out 1.var conswi'ling 
fertile ar~ desert lands alike and, more dangerously, 
threatening a war of historic vengeance J::::et·.veen two perr:ar1ent 
presences in the regionooooo 
"Iraq is Arab and will remain Arab, God willinqo The people of 
Iraq are t..,e sole deciders of their internal political systeuo 
And because we believe in the right of all peoples to defen::l 
their national identity, tlleir national territory .:md their 
right to self-determination, and because v1e are .trrabs and shall 
always be Arabs, we reject categorically any attenpt to deny 
Iraq's Arab identity or to occupy its territory or to i~pcse 
outside rule on its peopleaaoooajust as fran our hur:EU~e 
sta..1.dpoint 1tle reject the sar:1e things should they l::efall Iran a.'lC. 
its peopleo 
"Iraq has shO'.'ffi its inclination for peace more than oncea a o •• arc 
that is still Iraq' s 13gositiono ;1hy does Iran not accept that inclination for peace?11 
'i'he intelligentsia's change of heart on the Irar1ian revolution Has 
sealed in a keynote editorial in the Ku'i'laiti nationalists' leading 
magazine al-'l,ali<:a, which e:olained:-
~--~=- -
11Clearly, t.~e ~\rab peoples' support ior t..~e overtiu-o•.v of the 
S~h 's r2gime sprar1g fro:n its e:·::_:P-ctation that the overt.'rrra.-1 
\'lould lend strong su?;:JOrt to b1e ~rrab nationalist r.1ove.r:12nt fra-:1 
b1e '9---'0ple of Iran: it ~·1as not support for a new t:r,?e o:: 
tyran.11y over the Aro.bso 11 
Spearheadinq cho.nge ·.·Tcls one thing, spre.J.din:; sectarian sb:."i.:-= 
anot:1er, t:.'le edicorial added 137 • "~t the ti::1e of Iran's ne2·:t sprl::1J 
orfensive, 11 Da~vn 8" of 1 986, during >vhich the Iranians succeerJeJ. in 
capturin; t.,e Ira~i r.:x:>rt of .:'.J.o, b1e :;:~c issued o. S;,:>2Ci.J.l st.:1ternent 
13J 
conder:ming Ira:1 and :_:)raisin:; Iraq o 
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:rhe i·lors t Years 
1985 '\·Bs altogether a turbulent ar.d depressing year. The attack on 
the Amir of Kuwait in day and the escalating Gulf war, rwnours of 
more plots in Bahrain, tl1e massacre of ?alestinians in G~eir camps 
south of Beirut by Lebanese · Shi c. i, Israel's destruction of the 
P.L.O. headquarters in 'funis and the February ''Amman l'>.ccords •• 
beb1een King Husain and Yasirc:Arafat, which Here seen u.s a betrayal 
and a surrender by many139 , all darkened the regional atrnosphere 
\'lhile ban~ failures, bankruptcies and "tafnishat" spread u.n acute 
air of gloom at ha:1e. Still the Su9rerne Council failed to meet. A 
session \vhich \vould have been t...'1e first for a year >vas fixed for Jur1e 
but cancelled at the last ma.11ento 
.~gr2emc.nt on ti1e 1985 Federal budget ivas not reacl1ed until mid-
Dece.rnber, ;·1hereur::on it Has i.nmediately overtaken by events. .il..t the 
end of t!Et ~onth OP~C a0andoneJ its defence of an ofii.ci.u.l price in 
favour of tr1in9 to keep a share of the Horld market at any price: 
by JanuarJ 193·.5 the price of crude had hurtled do\·r.1 to S1 0 a Ca.rrel 
and in .'\ugust it touched a lo'.v of S8. .Z\bu Oha:Oi' s 1 935 ordinary 
budget \las nevcrr si~meJ at all • 
.Ssti::etGd Federal revenue rose slightly in this acadeni•.: 1 SIJS budget 
to :.J~s12.95Sbn (:,)3.527bn) fra:1 Dhs12.854bn (33.,199bn) in 1904 agu.in.3t 
esti:nated 2:q:::enditure of Dhs16.G34bn (:A.529bn), co:::pared with 
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Dhs17.229bn ($4.691bn) the year before. The projected deficit of 
Dhs3.6bn (:S995m) would therefore have b2e.r1 smaller than 1984's 
projected Dhs4.376bn ($1.191bn) but neither revenue nor ex?enditure 
were on target in either year. In 1984 revenue reached Dhs12.826bn 
($3.492bn) not Dhs12v854bn (S3.499bn) but expenditure fared worser 
amounting to only Dhs15.699bn (:$4.274bn) instead of the projecteC! 
Dhs17.229bn ($4.691bn). 'rhe next year 1 935 revenue sanehow rilanaged 
to exceed the Dhs12.955bn ($3.527bn) expected and reach Dhs15.525bn 
but again e:~Jenditure failed to meet its Dhs16.634bn 
( ~4.529bn) target and totalled only Dhs15. 939bn ($4.3bn). 'rhus the 
actual as opposed to tb.e budgeted deficits in the tv;o years v1er2 
Dhs2.373bn ($774~) not Dhs4.376bn ($1.191bn) in 1934 anj Dhs414m 
(:;;113m) not Dhs3.6bn ($995m) in 1985140 • 
Abu Dhabi managed only a "provisional" budget for 1985 but it 
srlOi·ied oil revenue dovm from Dhs17.951on (:;lt1.837bn) in 1984 to 
Dhs15.823l.Jn (:;4.30Jbn) and total revenue down fran Dhs19.625bn 
($5.343~n) to Dhs17.385bn ($4.733bn). 
,_;ross est.ir:lated ex?enditure '.vas cut from Chs22.413bn (.;;G. 104bn) to 
:J;1s19. 223:Jn ( ~5. 235bn) but still createc: a c:eficit of Dhs1. L143bn 
( :;: ;- ·' ), ' ) 1-11 .,.::Ju_m • 
D:-.ports fell again, G~ougi1 this reflects in i_Xlrt c1e greatly 
i11creasc-::l 9urd1:1s.ing pa.'le~ of t..~e dollar, to 'n'hich the O.irham is 
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tiedv for some of 19U5o Imports fell by eight per cent in the 
Federation as a Hhole from Dhs25o5bn to Dhs23o5bn. Dubai 1 S drop£x.>d 
from Dhs17o2bn to Dhs16o8bn in 1985 but rose in volume to their 
highest level since 19U2 am] 1\bu Dhabi 1 s also declined in value from 
Dhs6o092bn to Dhs5o596bn but increased in volwne142 • 
'l'he cwnulative · total cost of the Federal construction pnY:JraJrrne 
shrank by 16 per cent fran Dhs7,430m in 1984 to Dhs6,192o2rn in 1905 
and U1e year's allocation by 3,1 per cent fran Dhs1 ,209;n to uh:::;UOOm, 
of v1hich only Dhs404m or 51 per cent \'Tas actually spent, il ~~G [Rl" 
cent drop compared \·lith 19£34' s actual st..;endin':J of Dhs743m (sec 'l'alJle 
Hhereas 1984's banl-;: rcsul ts had tended to shm: decrease::;, ullx~i t 
sharp ones, in profitsv 1 Sl85' s temkx.l to shoH actual losses, even 
for the large international banks such as Standard and Chartered, 
Citibank and Lloydso 
to the huge increase 
at the end of 1~85143 
'l'he losses Here attributuble in lar0e meusun'! 
from Dhs5o57bn at the end of 198 1! to lJlls:..:bn 
vThich the l..anks felt obliged to mal~e in 
provision against lud debts, an extra expense which even druconic:ll 1 
cost cutting and staff reductions failc>d to offseto 
i··lany clients v1ere unable to repay; others c!Jo3e this point in tiltlf.:! 
to discover an IslaJnic inllibition against paying tile interest they 
had originally agreed to pay at the time of taldng out the lron. It 
is not possible in the final analysis for a bunk to sue a prmtinent 
client or to call in collateral if the client and the luH courts do 
not cooperate. Some juuges, especially in 1\bu Dhabi v vrould not 
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order the repayment of interest despite the l·linistry of Finance 1 s 
vievl that interest Has leqal under Uol\o.Co la'.-1 and that clients w.~re 
lx>w1d by the tellltS of the loan agreements they hud signc'<..l in the 
first placeo 
'l'he legality of interest dl<lrqes in a cow1try that bases its la· .. , on 
the Sharica was tested and approved in the Supreme Court in 1031 by a 
finding that those sections of Abu Dhabi 1 s pre-F'ederation Civil L-.J;·l 
that had not been superseded by Federal la'J v;ere still in 
force144 o Abu Dhabi's Civil WVT permits interest and rey-uircs 
courts to apply the rate agreed by the contesting parties br2fore 
their disputeo l'/here no rate has been agreed, tile la1., stipulates a 
maxiururn of nine per cent on loans to incli vidllills and 12 per cent on 
corporate loans145o 
Nonetheless, some judges ignored the official line and it bee:11ne 
conunon for the nine and 1 2 per cent nn:d.ma to be applied even wl1err.:~ 
the original lo:..m agreement specified moreo Some uould not allo·.-1 the 
concept of canpound interest, Hith the result U1<:1.t sane litigant 
LB.nks v1ere faced with the prospect o£ having to repily their clients 
instead of vice-versao ily 19fJ7, the non-payment of interest had 
come to be seen as the greatest threat facing the banJ~s in the 
Berchants began to a9itate for an 11 interest amne.sty11 
and the Abu Dhabi National Consultative Cow1cil, in its reply to the 
Amir's opening speech, formally dern;:mderJ a rescue on tlle lines of 
147 the 19UO Government take-over of property loons o 
'l'he long-debated Conunercial Companies Law regulating the mmership of 
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businesses v1as enacted in 1984 but innnediately ran up u.g.::linst 
hostilityu \·/as frozen by a series of moru.toria w1til January 19:J7 
and then resubmitted to a co:rrnittee for still further debate (ten 
years after it had first come before the National 1\ssembly) on the 
relationship between foreign and local partners1413 u adding to the 
general feeling that the U.A.E. Has flow1dering. 'l'he only 9r0'.1tl1 areo 
for the ronks \'laS lending to the govenllnents. 
In the early sunnner of 19£35 the Hational Assembly tried to p~rsuade 
the Cabinet to hold a joint emergency session on tl1e L:Bttenl of the 
historic joint I•HC/Cabinet session of 1979 which had lead to the 
Joint Hemorandum. 'l'he Cabinet stalled by insisting on seeinc.; the 
prot)Qsed detailed agenda first149 • Al-Khaleej tried to keep up 
the pressure by rmming a long series of interviE~ws wiU1 praaincnt 
citizens arguing \vhy the joint session v1as necessu.ry to breu.~: the 
l ' 150 para ys1s , but to no avail. Under the impression that tile 
Cabinet had in fact agreed to the session, the FUC held an emer<Jency 
meeting to draw up the agenda, only to be informed that the cabinet 
had w1expectedly demurred after an151 • In Jwm, it Hi:lS uiUlOW1ccd 
that .the pranised Supreme Cow1cil meeting had been JXJStponed. h nevi 
Hernorandurn appeared, addressed to the Supreme Cow1cil and clrufted b; 
a group of societies including the societies of lav1yers, teachers, 
, 1 ' t • t 1 1 j rJ tl I • t 1:)2 soc1o CY:J1S -s, econom1s s, a c 1ess c u J an· 1e \·:ornen s ::;oc1e y • 
In its language and dGmands this doctlincnt is similor to the 1979 
i:-Iemorandum but stronger on details and v/eal~er on passion and Hi ti 1 a 
distinctly illlllopeful tone, as though its authors despair<:.>d in 
advance of realizing their ideals. It calls specifically for 
controls on foreigners' riqhts to rerai t their earnings and profits 
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overseas and for the mtiona.lization of foreign CO!HJ.)c.l.nies especially 
the bankso Borders bGtlveen Emirates should be abolished and each 
flnirate should hand over 75 per cent of its revenue to the 
Federation. Spending on defence and security shoulu I..JC reduced. 
A1Y:Jve allu the Supreme Council should shoulder its responsibilities 
by meetinq regularly and the Uationlll Assentbly should be 'Jiven real 
legislative poi'ler. 'l'he l·lemorandum was carried only by al-cJlalecj and 
very little neHS[XJ.per camnent folla.ve<L 
In Hove;nbcr it was aimounce<.1 that the postponed Jw1e session of the 
Supreme Com1cil \·/as to take place on 9th l..lccernl..JCr o 1>1-l:hulcc-i 
repeated its exercise of the previous year and ran f.::UCJO-loiYJ 
intervie• .. Ts \vith citizens about their preoccujXltions (dencmds for the 
1 ~- 'J stemming of the outflow of capital b:Jing u ne-;.1 focus this time) :J.J o 
'l'he appointed day passed without the Council session taldng plac(~, 
while the media except for al-1\haleej Iililintaincxl illl catbarrassed 
silence. It was thus amid an atmosphere of considerable sus):xJnse 
that the Hulers finally met on December 16th 1 ~.H35. 
'l'hey Here faced with four memoranda, three of '•lhich had not been 
heard of previously 0 One had men clravm up by the Government of lws 
al-K!J.ainah but its contents, rather mysteriously, Here not divul9e:..>d 
or hinted at; one came fran Shaild1 Zayid himself and concerncx1 "the 
requirements of national actions in the forthcolilinq pl 1asc", 
presumably a reference to the impending expiry for the third time of 
the Provisional Constitution; one uas a consolidated report of the 
Federal Ninistries on their problenlS. The fourth v1as the 12-month 
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old joint report co:rnnissioned by Shai;-;11 Zayid in Llovernber 1984 fran 
the cabinet and the Fi!C on the recession. The outco.ne of the i{ulers 1 
meeting Has a follow-up committee aml a rcassertion yet again tint 
the l.!lnirates would contribute 50 per cent of U1eir individwl oil 
revenues to the Federation154 o 
But in Um \•lake of the December 1985 OPEC about-face, 1 Si8G ~·lus un 
even Horse year than 19!35. In January the. price of oil fell to :;; ·1 0 a 
b::trreL In February U1e Iranians captured U1e Fao peninsula. In 
April U1e United States lx>inl:xxl Libya. Also in 1\pdl (Jutari trCXJps 
seized ~t!Orkers building a Dahraini coastguard station on a dispub::!d 
coral reef and both sides increaserJ their mili tury presence facing 
each other. In i•Jay a u.s. uircraft carrier forced an Iranian naval 
ship which Has about to interdict an iimerican cargo vessel in the 
Gulf to stand off. 
1\greeing U1e 1906 budget again tool~ until October by Hhich tiJ]e, as 
al-I~aleej said, it . 155 had "lost all me<mlng•• • &:pcndi tun~ '.·Tas put 
at JJhs14. 024bn ( $3.0 18bn) , 16 per cent dm-m on 1985, against 
estimated revenues of JJhs12.837bn (:;i3.49Sbn), a deficit of i.Jhs1.19bn 
($323m). In U1e event hoHever revenue exceeded estimates and rec"lched 
Dhs14.8bn ( $4bn) but, reversing U1e trend of the previous deiiclt 
years in the first shock of low oil prices, so did extY~nditure, 
~t1hich totulled 1Jhs15. 7bn ($4.3bn). l\ real deficit Utus arose of 
Dhs899m ( , .. 24 •. )15G .jl :::>10 . 0 It \vould seem U1at the U.A.E. has reachoo tile 
extent of its v1ill or ability to cut back on current f:!Xpenditurc: in 
that 1986 budget, 700 new jobs had teen created in the Civil ~crvicc 
157 for recent graduates • 
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iJy 1986 the cumulative value of the Federation's capital e;qx:m.liture 
progranune had fallen by a further 20 J?2r cent from lJitst). 1 ~2bn 
($1o613Gbn) in 1985 to Dhs4.96Ubn ($1o353bn) with a 1SiiJG annual 
allocation do\m 26 per cent on 1985's DhsUOOin (of 'dhicll only Uhs40 11m 
Has actually spent) to a mere Dhs59Srn (of Hhich only 21Dlll 1/CJ.S 
Abu !Jha.bi 's Develo;:.m:mt Pra:Jramme drop[.:>ed from LJhsSbn 
($L3G1bn) in 1985 to 1Jhs4.5bn (:ji1.225bn) in 1936 und actual 
expenditure achieved w1der it fell fran 1Jhs4.21bn (S1.1 11Gbn) to 
Dhs3. 798lm ( $1. 034bn) 159• 
'l'oronto D:::minion l.:Bcarne the. first foreign connnercial lB.nl~ to pull out 
of the U.A.E. Hiddle East Banl·~, mmed by the al-Futtaim family, 
became the fourth locally-Oimed mnk in Dul::ai anu the seventh in the 
Federation to require state help when, CJ.fter recording tile lu.r9cst 
losses of any oonl~ to date in U1e U.A.E. on its 19135 or.>erations, it 
increased its share capital to give the Dubai Government a 17 J?2r 
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cent staJ~e • 
In June, al-I\haleej rrl<lr}:ed the second of the month, as it had done 
in the run-up to the previous constitutional extension five years 
earlier, as the day on which the Rulers had violated the ter~tporo.ry 
constitution by failing to mai~e any projX)scxl a:nendmcnts or the 
pennanent version available to the :euc sh: months lY...:!fore the 
temporary version's expiry date in !Jecemb::!r 19UG1c1• In the event 
the Provisional Constitution was re-extendcd at the . 1G2 due tJ.mc: 
without the extension ever going before the 1;'i1C at all. Tile :Juprcmc 
Council decrGe was thus in brGach, apparently, of iirticles 144 anrJ 
145 of ~1e Constitution163 0 
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On 1st July the Km1aiti Government resigned becuuse of the ullegcd 
"impossibility of co-operating 
1 - , Hith the i·lilj lis" t.J'•. The l b j lis 'tlus 
then dissolved by the llmir on 3rd July. Unlike it counterpurt of 10 
years earlier~" the 19DG dissolution decree set no tim2 li!,li t for J. 
restoration. It was acco..-n)Janied by the suspension of soi.le u.rticlcs 
of the Constitution and the iwposition of prior censorship on tlt(~ 
press1G5• 
'.i.'he groups '•lhich might be called the opposition, though non-cohesive 
and indeed mutually ant.-:1gonistic on some issues, had held <1 sli~rht 
majority in tiK~ new I~uHaiti Ilaj lis since its restor.::1tion in 1981 
despite changes to the electoral districts. Diplauats had correctly 
expected tl1e new l:xxly to be even more hostile to America, to 02 
w1sy.npathctic to the GC'C 1 s military provisions and the bilatct-al 
security pact \<1itl1 Sa c. udi . 1 GG 1\.rablu , and to try to enforce the 
theoretical accow1tability of the shaH:hly regime. 
In i\ugust the Iraqis demonstrated that they had ucquircd the cJ.pacit:l 
to extend the range of their fighters to Sirri, Iran 1 s ultcrna·ti vc 
oil-loading terminal in t11c southern Gulf, and by the enci of the 
year they had strucl~ as far dovm t11c Gulf us Lllral:. Iran retali.::1tcJ 
against the ruid on Sirri by strufing corn:ncrcial shippin•:J en routE! to 
tl1e Arab states, including the U.l\.E. 
•rile problem of the next, 1906/7 session of the U.l\.E. 1 s o·,m dutional 
Assembly and the attitudes it might strike on the .,,ar, the econa11y 
and the forthcoming expiry of the Constitution was uddresscd by the; 
Government by a technique that hud by now b2come characteristic. 1.:y 
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21st November 19136 v the latest date by \"/hich the F'i·IC should be 
convenedR the necessary Presidential decree hud not b2en issued, 
but this was nothing new in the 1980so All previous sessions since 
1981 had begun months lateo 'l'his time, hov1ever, the decree ... ,ent on 
not being issued until the theoretical end of the session in June 
1987 0 'l'he oversight \'lilS never 111entioned in any neHs;,Japer o Thus the 
ultimate fute of the finul vestiges of the Yow1g 'l'urk challenSJe HilS 
that they uere ignored to death167 o 
Of all these events the one \'lith the most far-reaching implications 
was the Iranian capture of Fao and its pus~ towards Dasrao Iran was 
now in occupation of sacred Arab soil and it \'las Iran ° s apolCY:Jists 
among the Islamic movement in the Gulf who were henceforth on the 
uefensive not her detractors168 • Specific Iranian threats against 
Kmvait further narro•,,ed the circles in which support for the Islamic 
Hepublic was acceptableo '£he ne\'1 moral situation helped to \V"iden ill1 
emerging split bet\'leen Iran and her main Arab backer Syria, 
providing a conconlitant opportunity for a reconciliution betHeen 
Syria and Iraq, though such hopes were not fully realized at the 
l\rab slUTI!llit in Arnman in 1987 o 
Early in 1987 Iran stepped up the pressure on the Arab states of th8 
Gulf by attacking oil tankers leaving I\uwait as well as canmercial 
shipping bound for Kuwait m1d. by mining the approaches to .Kmluit' s 
porto I<m·1ait appealed successfully to the United States, the Soviet 
Union, China and others for protection and for the use ot those 
powers' flags on her ships (trying \·Tithout conviction to present 
the move as "purely 169 ca1m8rcial" ) • Both the GC'C und the i\mnan 
sumnit endorsed ~1e idea170 
0 Iran's Deputy Foreign ilinister 
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retorted that Iran \·Tould have no hesitation in attacking ships v;ith 
either superpower's flag171 o Iranian missiles fell on Ku·,aita 
Ironicallyv though, it \·las the Iraqi attack on tile USS Stark in Ilay 
1987 that brought about the most serious step-uiJ in tension in the 
Gulfo Congress questioned the US D:::fence Secretary on the 
possibility of i1 pre-emptive American strike against Iran's 
deployment of Chinese Silk.·rorm missiles in the Straits of !Iormuz172 
and rwnours that such a strike might be inunincnt 173 brougl1t dmm 
from Iran's leaders ~·Tilrnings of ciltaclysmic consequences for the Gulf 
States and America and "rivers of blood" for the \V'llole \·:orld 
culminating in Iran 1 s June 27th aru1ow1cernent that it deemed America 
to have declared \·Tclr 17 4 o On 3rd July Iriln' s ilabi tual retaliil tion 
against a Gulf tillll\:er for every Irilnian ship hit by Irilq became 
official, declared JX>licy175 0 
Mines in the UoAoEo 's territorial \·laters causec.l loss of life in 
August and in the Silffie month the pilgrimage to i':ecca ended in r;Jass 
bloodshed 1t1hen Iranians clashed \·lith the SaC uc1i policeo J,::f·udi 
Arabia regarded Hecca as a v1atershed and pressed a s~cial session of 
the Arab League for a canplete breach of diplo:natic relations Hith 
176 Iran o 'l'he eighth GCC sum:nit in Riyadh also h2ard stron9 demands 
fran SaC udi Arabia for a tou9her line against Iran but these cleJiliiiK1~:; 
ran into opposition from the more circumspect Uoi\oEo :~huildl 6ayid, 
who had proposed to the i".unnan surnnit that a co:1u:1ission of "tlrrec 
wise men" be delegated to •rehran and Daghdad177 and had visited 
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Syria in l\ugust178 u VTas noH mandated by the GCC to m:plore nc\·1 
contacts v1ith 'l'ehran but Has unsuccessful179 0 1988 was to bring 
direct fighting between the US and Iranian navies and the p::trtial 
destruction of the Uol\oEa us f.lubu.rak oil field off 1\bu ;.iusa as i.l 
result180 a 
'l'he 'l'est 
In the midst of this the tensest phase yet of the Har, the l~uler of 
Sharjah .,.,as ousted in a coup d'etu.t thut pitteJ i\bu Ulnbi ac;o.inst 
Dubai in a crisis which even the controlled press ac!:.~1o'.:lcuged 1 Ll 1 
to be the most serious in the Federation's historyo 
On 17th June 1907 the r·'Jinistry of Infonflc"ltion' s \·lA..'i ne·.:s u.9cncy 
carried a report from Abu Dhabi that Dr Shaild1 Sultan ibn i-lullillTI!nall 
al-Qasimi, Ruler of Sharjah, had abdicu.ted voluntarily in favour of 
his elder lJrother and Catnnander of the limiri Guu.rd Shail-;h Co.J..xJ al-
CAziz ibn Uul1arnnada Dubai closed the Sharjah road that afternoon and 
interrupted evening television prograrrmes to broadcast an atypicu.lly 
heated and uncompromising statement deploring the usurp.J.tion am] 
calling on the forces of the Federation to restore leqitirnacy in 
Sharjah immediatelya !Jhaikh Sultan .,.,as and \•lould remain the rightful 
Ruler in Dubai's eyeso Dul::ai thus left itself no escape-route fran 
re-instating Shaikh Sultana Shilild1 :.::ultan fle•.-1 hane fran London; 
his mm airport \oJas closed to him and he landed u.t Dul.xli, ·,.,rhcre he 
v1as installed under arnted guard in the guest palaceo 
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'l'he Supreme Cow1cil met the next clay. As i1 first step they uere ilble 
to agree 011 decmi119 J:oth the \lAi·l stiltement and Dubai • s ri;x:>ste us 
null and voido Keeping the meeting open as i1 continuous session, 
they then managed to arrive at an aqreemcmt reCtYJI1iziiYJ ::Jl~aii<J1 :Jultan 
as Huler but appointing Shaikh calxl ill-ci\ziz as his Deputy <mel L'rmm 
Prince182• 
IIov1ever Shaikh cabd al- cAziz had leaflets dropped 011 Sharjah claiminc~J 
the full support of (among others) the oppress·2<1, the t,·;iJuois •,.;ithout 
succour ilnd the merchants ruiner] by arbitrary econanic decisions ancl 
accusing Shaikh Sultan of incurring Ohs5bn in debts by SCJUilnclering 
money on 11beautifying the town Hith decorated suqs and gardens11 
vrhile debtors languished in gao1183 • Ile too, therefore, lJacl lett 
himself no Hay out. 
Neither the fact of 1\bu Dhabi's backing134 for Shaild1 calxi al-c.Aziz 
nor the motives behind it were ever discussed on the record, of 
course. Observers see in ll.bu Dhabi 1 s JX>Si tion either e:':ilspera tion 
with Sharjah 1 s failure to repay the syndicated ban.!~ loan guaranteed 
by Abu Dhabi and her failure to contribute to the Federal 1Jud9et or a 
general consensus in the region tlut Shaikh Sultan had r..JCco:oe too 
closely identified v1itl1 tl1e intelligentsia and its goals, or the 
longstanding personal friendship between Shaikh c ilbd al-c.Aziz and 
Shaild1 Zayid, or all tl1rec 1 US. Dulxl.i 1 s forceful and public st.:;,nce 
was attributed in part to Dubai 1 s invesbncnt in rep<J.irin':J relations 
with Sharjah but also, crucially, to a refusal to allot! Abu Dhabi to 
decide unchallenged the legitimacy of disputed clili:ns. 
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13y the folla.·ling Tuesday v after a statement by lUng Fahc1 Hilich I.Jubai 
took as an endorsement of Shaikh .Sultan and ·;.~hich Shaikh Sultan 
himself said had men crucial1 36 , and aft<~r rumours of intervention 
by other regional pm·:crs v the Supreme Council had apparently 
persuaded both brothers to accept the bm appoinbnents, ;;itll Sh.J.ikh 
Sultan as H.uler and Shaikh calx:1 al5hziz as Cro:.-m Princeo 
An embrace of reconciliation b2tv1cen the t'.-10 v.ras fil111ed for 'l'V and 
the press devoted pages of editorials to praising Shc1ikh ~c1yid's 
skill in solvinq the problemo 
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Table b: 3 Abu Dhabi Developnent Programme Exoendi ture 
Actual 
1933 1984 1985 
amount % amount % amount 0. 1> 
Develooment a~~diture 4,373.5 100 3,723.0 100 3,993.0 100 
L Agriculture 214.2 4.9 137.4 3.7 140.2 3.5 
2. Indus~-y & Electricity 1,119.5 25.5 1,006.0 27.0 1v216.1 30.4 
(..) 3. Conmuniactions1 852.4 19.5 723.8 19.5 601.9 15 01 ~ 4. i·funicipali ties 1,513.1 34.5 1,260.9 33.9 1,656.8 41.5 
5. Housing 201.2 4.6 243.0 6.5 49.6 1.2 
6. Information & Toyrism 332.8 7.6 217 .o 5.8 154.5 3.9 
7. Public Buildings- 150.3 3.4 134.9 3.6 174.4 4.4 
i'Jotes: 
1.includes drains project; 
2.includes certain headings not categorized. 
Sources: 
1. Abu Dhabi Dpepartnent of Finance; 
2. Abu Dhabi Depa.'"i:lTient of Planning. 
. , 
~ 
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Table 6: 4 Changes in UAE caoi tal Exoencli ture Programmer EY. Sectpr r 1984-5 
1984 1985 1984 1985 
Sector Total cost as ~6 of ·1'otal cost as % of Armual as % of Annual as % of 
(Dhs m) all sectors (Dhs m) all sectors allocation all sectors allocation all sectors 
(Dhs m) (Dhs rn) 
Services* 3,257o5 43.7 2r749.3 44.4 621.0 51.8 458.2 57a2 
Hater, Gas 1,748.2 23.7 1,582o9 25o6 147 o3 12o3 120o7 15a 1 
& Electricity 
Transport, 1,056.4 14o2 92LO 1·L9 162o 5 13a5 79o2 9a9 
Storage & Cornrr.unications 
Finance, 738o6 1 OoO 396.6 6o4 163o8 13o7 79o7 1Qo0 
Insurw!Ce arD Property 
Agriculture 454o7 6.1 437o4 7o6 88.7 7a4 57a5 7a2 
Processing 99.5 1.3 90o0 1.5 12.2 laO 3a4 OA 
Industrt 
Trade, :Kes 75a7 laO 15o0 0.2 4.5 Oa4 1o2 Oa2 
taurants and rlotels 
Total 7,430.6 100 6y192.2 100o0 1,200 1 OOaO 800o0 1Qt)oQ 
*Includes healG,, education, internal security, foreign relations, youtl1 services, reilgionu 
inforr:ation and tourisr:lo 
Sourc2s: collated fro.11 sev2n.l ne':lspa.per ite.r:J.S ~uoting i:·linistr<J of Plani1ing follo·,.;-up report in early 198Go 
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186o al-Dayan front-page editorial 23rd Jw1e 19tJ"l a.nd intervie·."l \·lith 
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Conclusion 
.. 
The coup in Sharjah was the second crisis in relations betHeen 1\bu 
Dhabi and Dubai to threaten the Federation Hith collapsea Lil~e the 
fmmer one, the appointment of Shaikh Sultan ibn Zayid as Coinnunder-
in-d1ief of the i\nned Forces in 1973 u its root was Dubai 1 s refusal 
to be ignored by Abu Dhabir or to state the sane proposition the 
opposite way 0 Abu Dhabi 0 s failure to attach to Dulxli 1 s vie~·ls a 
weight sufficient to satisfy DubaL 
Neither crisis killed the Federation in the enc.L I\fter the first wus 
overcane successfully, the Federation 1 s character dkl.ngeda It 
absorbed and accommc:da ted the need to allm'l Dulni anu DulYJ.i '::; Sfx~cial 
ethic a status Hhich \!laS not to be disregardedo The learning process 
strengthened the Federation by loosening ito In the 1 SlEWs the volume 
and pace of li'ederal legislation decreased, especially in the 
econanic sphere 0 and the balance of pcr;~er l:r2L1een the Federal 
authorities and the local authorities svrung bacl~ toHarus the local 
1 
centres o 
Sharjah 1 s internal divisions and Shail~.h Sl.Xl al-S>.ziz 1 coup seau to 
have fogged Abu Dhabi 1 s memory temporarily o l\s in 1 979, ... ,hen U1r:; 
prospect of an inunec1iate collapse of the . fecleration uas brought ho:ne 
to Shaikh Zayid, he opted for the Fffieration 0 even at the possiblf.:! 
cost of that ultir;ute sacrifice for a siu"lil:hly leader, loss of 
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face a 'I'he w1precedented (Beans of praisci for his \·Jisuo.n and 
shre':id leadership in the days after the resolution of the crisis Here 
perhaps an attempt to minimize that sacrificea 
No\·1 that this second life-threatening crisis seems to have been 
survived, there seems to be roo.11 for a tentative assertion that 
seceding fran the Federation is becaning a political impossibilitya 
A perceived need to save the Federation has brought the largest and 
wealthiest I2nirate to retreat fran its position tHice; ·and an entire 
generation, born or educated since 1971 and raised to vert hiqh 
expectations, has been taught by a no-expenses spared propagan<.1LJ. 
machine to regard the Federation as the source of all material bow1ty 
and all national respectabilityo 
The opprobriwn of 
disincentives to 
that generation is only one of a nulllx:!r of 
secessiono Others miqht include the acceptance of 
the UoAaEa as a single unit in the Gulf Co-operation Council, v1ilich 
in appearance at least puts its unitary status beyond question; the 
great and grovling regional dangers that might be expected to (but do 
not alHays) militate against disunity; and l_:>erhaps simply the 
passage of time, t-~hich gives reality to the l;'(;.'<Jeral era as the 
memory of pre-Federal tiwes facleso 
But at present the speculation that membership of a regional grouping 
may eventually overcane local jealousies is still academic; tllOUCJh 
bloodshed arising fran inter-dynastic feuds has been minimal since 
tl1e Federation came into being, border disputes and the 
inter-dynastic rivalries from which tl1ey often spring are as canmo:1 
110\'l as they vlere before the Federation, the Gulf uar or tl1e CL"'Ca lnth 
Conclusion 
the U.A.E.'s life-threatening crises to date stemmed fran inter-
dynastic pricl-;.liness; the existence of the Federation may have b:;pt 
in d1eck the v1orst manifestations of v1hat vias uh1ays the lflain threat 
to the stability of these states, but does not seem to have 
eradicated the structure's inherent instability. 'l'here remains the 
possibility that sa11e future action by one of the b-10 lurgest 
flnirates might provoke the other to a degree bcyom.f reconciliation. 
Nonetheless, failing that, the Federation looJ-;.s more likely to 
survive for the duration of e1e current political order e«111 to 
collapse. 
The possibility of 
Federation's great 
interaction \•li elin 
0 
sane such sin of commission is heightened by the 
sin of anission: its failure to grasp that the 
and betv1een e1e shail';.hly families is not 9oin~J to 
be the main arena of politics in the U.A.E. for ever, or even for 
very much longer a failure of Hhich hm1ever most of the other 
shail~ly regimes in the Gulf are as guilty as the U.l\.E. 
In this respect, the area of public opinion, the Federation has 
proved to be sane thing of a genie out of a bottle for the slJail:.hs. 
For e1e shaikhs of 1971, federating Has a necessary evil, a secom1 
best which they had to accept when it became clear that Dritain v1as 
not going to stay. The limits of their ':lillingncss to cede their 
ovm sovereignty to the centre was alHays going to be the dynar:1ic of 
Federal politics. 'rhe great oil bean of 1971 gave e1e Federation a 
breathing space, time for a honeymoon, before those inherent 
tensions had to be face<L 
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For a time after 197 4, those tc:-nsions '"ere barely visible under the 
e.'{citements of the booin yearso There Has no argument about financinc_:; 
thc:- Federation or the allocation of its resourceso '1'he Government H<:l:::> 
exc:-rcised to find projects for the money, not money for th·2 
projectso E.'ven so, differing experiences of foreign contact and o£ 
ccmnerce pulleu the Emirates in different directionsa JJut the 
no-expenses-spared i·linistry of Information devoted its resources to 
selling the Federation to the public, and a v;hole generation jrev; u_p 
~t'lith federalisn1 firmly implanted as the basis of it:::; valuesa In 
1971 , public opinion \·las irrelevant to the shaild1s' decision to 
federate, very soon, the shaikhs Here having to rein in public 
entl1usiasm for the resulto Since ti1e ~perfectly ~~ecuted 
11Wlification11 of their armies in 197G, the shaikhs' entlmsiasm for 
further concession has stagnated v;hile ti1e public's acceptance of thG 
federalising eti1ic h·'1S taken root and flourishr:x.L 
i'Jeither tile great oil J.xx.xn nor ti1e recession inspired any 
federalization of ti1e mmership of natural resourcesa 'l'hesc:- Here 
left to the inuividual mem!..x:Jrs in the 1971 Constitution and tlnt is 
still tl1e case despite frequent assertions that Dui..B.i hand3 ovc:-r 50 
pc:-r cent of its oil rc:-venue to the Federationo Ju3t as the m·mcrship 
of the revenuc:- has i.:.>een tmaffected by thc:- Federation, so has t!K~ 
control of its disbursementa 'i'he spending of money is still a 
function of incli viduul shaikhs 1 perceptions, not of Fs'\Jerul lcr,·l a 
ilost. develo1"A11ent in thc:- llorthern Dnirates v:as financc..>U by ~ilail:ll 
Zayid out of Abu Dhabi 1 s surplus revenue before ti1c l;'c<leration cJ.nll 
has continued to b~ financed by him evc:-r since, purtly throuqh the 
Federal budget but p..:"lrtly tlrrou9h pGrsorial giftsa In thc:- recent lcun 
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years uhen oil revenue has not been in surplus, Shaikh Z.:1yid has 
pLUnped ·Inore money into his O':m 11niru.te throuqh land co:npensu.tion 
schernes3 than into the Federation throuqh nev1 developrncnt spenc.iinq 
in the budgeL '!'he capital expGndi ture proqra:n:;ts of tile l;'ederal 
budget has not had priorityo 
'l1he structw:-e of the Federation has if u.nything itnpedeu the sluiikhs 1 
responsiveness to change in public opiniono 'l'hc provision that rnajor 
decisions in the Supreme Council must ·be W1anitrt6us.,. Hithout uhich 
the shaild1s could not have been prevailed ur::on to f<:..'<..lerate, has liiClue 
all decision-nuking slou o Fe.:1r of fu.ilw:-e rne.:1ns tlli.lt the Council 
lll~~ts w~ry. rarelyo Since 11() }X:)licy~Hld.l:iny Pd'v/~l'S have yet rx~rcolatt.xl 
do\m fran the Supreme Council, and indeed can never do so under the 
existing Constitution, its u.bsence perpetuates U1c characteristically 
reactive, low-profile style of government the shail;.hs prefer at a 
time when the need for decision-muJdng cannot but gro'" o 
Oil ITIOney has changed the body politic of the fonncr 'l1rucial Stu.tes 
beyond recognition through education and the mass infiu;~ of 
foreigners, but none of the changes brought .:1oout i.Jy oil has 
affected the shaik.hs' attachment to their local sovereignty or their 
suspicion of po~ver-sharingo 'l1he existence of a l~ederation to spre.:1rJ 
the benefits has greu.tly accelerated the albeit w1equal spread of 
E.xlucation and of sophistication and !las crc.:1ted a. constituency 
·'· 
1 . I 1 , I 1 I .t : : 1 
a constituency that c<m .uttack its J·:ulers as uulslatnic for LiJi.L.i.n•J to 
provide the people ..,.lith free car telephones - but has not yet hall 
any impact on the shaikhs' attitude to pcy;~ero '!'he Federal Hlilcllincry 
for dealing Hith change has been fow1d to be slmT and easily sto.llcdo 
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Since 1971f three of the signatories to the Provisional Constitution 
have died in ti1eir bedso The Federation has survived all ti1ese 
changes without difficulty but none involved a major Emirate and none 
Has contested internallyo One Huler (of Sharjah) has been rcmovccl by 
assassination and that crisis too was \·1eati1ered successfully o 
No oti1er nuler has yet been removed I.Y2I1nanently by a coup, though 
one has been removed temporarily. In 1991 hoHever, \·lhen the 
Constitution n~~t expires, the Supreme Council will in all 
probability have lost its co-fow1der Shaikh Hashid of lJubaL Sh<1ik.h 
Hashid 0 s lasting conceptual achievement of 197'J \·las to shO'>l that the 
Federation could avmrd l..)ulni its due place and still cohere, an 
achievement at least as great as his material success in crei.!ting 
modern mercantile Dubai and one that has been underpirmed by the 
resolute behaviour of his sons in the 1987 crisis. i\ Pcmnanent 
Constitution enshrining ti1is reality has never seen tile light of 
clay, but its absence may have been p:Jsitive for the Federation 1 s 
cohesion in the long run. 
Lil~e tim Permanent Constitution, ti1ere remain other areas of 
contention which have been and are being addressGd witi1 a neglect 
U1at may or may not turn out to have been benign. I.Jub:ii has ensured 
that the economy remains mixed and not \·/holly nationalized but this 
. \ 
is still the subject of wrresolved soul-searching. Laws enacted in 
the commercial sector have tended to oo simply ignored if 
inconvenient to the pov1erful merchant lobby. 'l'he 1984 Conpanies L:l'tl 
is a prime example of this phenomenon, v1hich undenrlines the 
Federation's prestige and spreads a sense of drift. 
Conclusion 
'£he UoAoEo has not yet decidedu either, the relative importance it 
attaches to secularism versus Islamo This conflict has the potential 
to be a long-tenn source of dissension, even though the attractions 
of the Iranian version of Islamic fund:-unentalism hcl.Ve noi'l worn off 
for all e.'{cept a lm1atic fringev dissension that rnay be magnified by 
the different historical,. economic and deJTta:Jraphic e;:periences of the 
different flnirateso 
lillove all other challenges facing the Uol\oEo, ha.·1ever v rears the 
challenge of satisfying the abstract desire of growing nllr.lbers of 
educated people to share in decision-maJ:in';r as an inalienable right 
and not as a privilegeo 'l'he shaikhs ' policy of meeting this 
challenge by ignoring it proved successful in the first round of the 
battle against change in the late 1970s, but it \·lould m unsafe to 
extrapolate from that victory that the shaikhs i·lill Hin the ne;-:t 
round i'lith the same tactico 'rhe next uave of challengers is li!:cly 
to include a religious element for v1hom the shaikhs personally and 
their lifestyles are themselves unacceptableo 'rhe size of their 
material achievement notv1i thstanding, nei tl1er tl1e FerJeru tion 1 s 
present leaders 
of pov1er-sharing o 
issue, it is 
nor their sons l1ave any track record on tl1e subject 
If an individual shaikh ever did face up to the 
unlikely that the Supreme Council as presently 
constituted would achieve the required unanimity to rock himo 
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:Footnotes 
1o al-1\zmena al-l\.rabia nbro63, 21st I-!ay 19GO, pp4-5 and nbro91, 
3rd Decc..rnber 19UO, pp4-5 o 
2o eog front pages of al-Ittihad 21st and 24th Jw1e 1907 I 
al-l~haleej 21st Jnne 1987 and al-lJr:wan 21 th Jw1e 1987 o 
3o See d1a.pter l"ive aboveo 
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